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THE XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW a publication of The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America

Volume 13

ISSN 1538-5795

2013-2015

—————————————————————————————————— Zubiri Studies in the 21st Century Editorial Ontología y ciencia: de la substancia aristotélica a la sustantividad zubiriana Carlos Sierra Lechuga Quantum Field Theory and Zubiri’s Philosophy of Reality Thomas B. Fowler Naturaleza, Estructura y Sostenibilidad Francisco Jose Ortega Martinez Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology Eric Weislogel ¿Tiene sentido la crítica de Gustavo Bueno al concepto zubiriano de religación? Joathas Soares Bello O Xavier Zubiri e a dereita revolucionaria Alexandre Xavier Casanova Domingo La realidad nunca traicionada Nativitat Senserrich y Morata The Transcendental Panentheism Of Xavier Zubiri In Nature, History, God And Man And God C. Eduardo Sanchez Gauto J. J. Gibson’s Psychology of Perception from Zubiri’s Standpoint Alfonso de la Puerta González-Quevedo Book Reviews

Editorial Review Board for Volume 13

Thomas Fowler

President, Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America, Washington, DC, USA

Antonio González

General Secretary, Fundación Xavier Zubiri, Madrid

Xavier Sotil Baylos

Former Rector, Seminario “Redemptoris Mater”, Brasilia, Brazil

Guillerma Díaz Muñoz

Professor of Philosophy, Instituto de Enseñanza Secundaria de Madrid, Spain

Special thanks once again to Mr. Robert J. Todd, whose generous contributions to the Foundation have made this issue of the Review possible.

Sponsors Sought for The Xavier Zubiri Review The Foundation is seeking sponsors for future volumes of The Xavier Zubiri Review, generous friends of the Foundation who could underwrite the modest cost of publishing and mailing the Review. If you are interested in this important work, please contact the President of the Foundation at your convenience, using the information on page 2. Thank you!

Subscription Information The Xavier Zubiri Review is published as a service to the worldwide community of scholars interested in the philosophy of Xavier Zubiri. It is primarily an electronic journal, and all volumes are available for download in Adobe PDF format from the Foundation’s website, www.zubiri.org/general/xzreview/xzreview.html. A limited number of printed copies is available for the most recent volume and some earlier volumes. These copies are distributed free of charge to qualifying organizations. Others may purchase copies for $US 20, postpaid. For further information, please contact the Editor by e-mail, [email protected]

Information for Contributors The Xavier Zubiri Review is always seeking quality manuscripts on Zubiri’s philosophy for publication. Please see the “Call for Papers” on page 171 of this issue for further information regarding manuscript submission.

THE XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW Volume 13

ISSN 1538-5795

2013-2015

Zubiri Studies in the 21st Century Editorial .............................................................................................. 3 Ontología y ciencia: de la substancia aristotélica a la sustantividad zubiriana Carlos Sierra Lechuga ............................................................................... 5 Quantum Field Theory and Zubiri’s Philosophy of Reality Thomas B. Fowler ................................................................................... 23 Naturaleza, Estructura y Sostenibilidad Francisco Jose Ortega Martinez .......................................................... 43 Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology Eric Weislogel .................................................................................... 57 ¿Tiene sentido la crítica de Gustavo Bueno al concepto zubiriano de religación? Joathas Soares Bello.......................................................................... 77 O Xavier Zubiri e a dereita revolucionaria Alexandre Xavier Casanova Domingo ................................................. 87 La realidad nunca traicionada Nativitat Senserrich y Morata ............................................................. 97 The Transcendental Panentheism Of Xavier Zubiri In Nature, History, God And Man And God C. Eduardo Sanchez Gauto .............................................................. 107 J. J. Gibson’s Psychology of Perception from Zubiri’s Standpoint Alfonso de la Puerta González-Quevedo ............................................ 133

Book Reviews .............................................................................................. 167 Call for papers ............................................................................................ 171

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Entire contents © 2015 by the Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America. Permission to republish in any form is hereby granted, provided that source is acknowledged. Electronic versions of the texts contained herein are available at the Foundation’s web site, www.zubiri.org. The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America is incorporated as a non-profit, charitable educational organization under the laws of the District of Columbia. It is recognized as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt foundation by the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s purpose is to promote the work of Xavier Zubiri and expand awareness of his philosophy, especially in the English-speaking world.

The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America 1571 44th Street, NW Washington, DC 20007 Phone 202-298-0495, Fax 202-338-9084 www.zubiri.org Please direct all e-mail correspondence to the president, Dr. Thomas Fowler, at [email protected]

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Zubiri Studies in the 21st Century Editorial This issue brings together a wide range of topics, and shows the current breadth and depth of Zubiri scholarship. It also illustrates the great variety of areas where researchers have found application for Zubiri’s philosophy. This is extremely important because it allows Zubiri’s thought to enter into wide areas of scholarship and research, far beyond the confines of the philosophy classroom and seminar. Philosophy of course should be a touchstone for knowledge in all areas, and influence as well as be influenced by developments in those areas, as Zubiri well knew. This means that scholars and researchers in many areas such as physics, medicine, economics, and political theory—just to name a few—must take the time to engage with the problems of philosophy and in particular Zubiri’s ideas. Zubiri told me once that he got along better with scientists than with philosophers. The articles by Lechuga and Fowler penetrate deeply into science and how Zubiri’s thought fits well with it, especially contemporary science, at the cutting edge. Lechuga looks at the developments in science and points out that in many ways science is still mired in Aristotelian ways of thinking, especially in terms of substance, when Zubiri’s notion of substantivity is a better fit. Fowler discusses Quantum Field Theory and how Zubiri’s ideas are able to handle the many new ideas there, such as virtual particles, symmetry, negative energy, negative momentum, and the blurring of the distinction between mathematics and physics. Most earlier philosophies are unable to come to grips with these new ideas—ideas that have been forced upon us by careful observation and experimentation with the most advanced equipment in the world, such as the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN in Geneva. The article by Ortega looks at economics and sustainability in today’s world—both very important subjects. He points out the inadequacy of conceptions based on positivism and analytic philosophy, in favor of Zubiri’s ideas. Eric Weislogel looks at new metaphysical ideas such as trope theory, and discusses them in the context of Zubiri’s philosophy. In the area of theology we have two articles. Soares Bello’s article considers criticism of Zubiri’s concept of religation, and shows that the criticism is not justified. Sanchez Gauto examines Zubiri’s theology as manifested in Nature, History, God and concludes that it represents a type of transcendental panentheism, defined as a “vision” of God in the world and the world in God. In the realm of psychology we have a very interesting in-depth study of the parallels between the theories of American psychologist J. J. Gibson and Zubiri’s noology. The article by Casanova Domingo is definitely a different take on political theory with respect to Zubiri, rather different than the take of Senserrich y Morata. We leave it to the reader to reflect on this and the other matters raised in this issue. Thomas B. Fowler June, 2015

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Ontología y ciencia: de la substancia aristotélica a la sustantividad zubiriana1

Carlos Sierra Lechuga

Grupo de investigación Círculo de Filosofía de la Naturaleza Université de Strasbourg, Francia2

Abstract Science, for over a hundred years, has given new ways of approaching physical reality and, thereby, also the necessity of new horizons of understanding. We now face classical problems such as the principle of least action, but new ones such as the physical difference between gravitational mass and inertial mass, the formerly so-called “wave-particle duality”, the thin line between the observer and the observed both experimentally—Compton Effect, for example—and theoretically—Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle—the problem of integrating gravitational force into the standard model, the impassable barrier of limit of the speed of transmission of information, the problem of evolution and its many theories, living organisms, self-organization of matter, the binding quantum, emergence of intelligence, macromolecules, the passage between a macromolecule to a cell, space-time, among many others; in short, the concept of system, clearly disclose an intellectual situation that requires philosophical speculation for clarity in the foundations of our way of approach to material reality. If there are epistemological or ontological problems in science, that is, if there exist meta-scientific problems, I believe it is due to the horizon of understanding from which we are facing them. In this paper I present the thesis that science has continued thinking in an Aristotelian way in terms of the concept of substance, and I will propose another independent variable: substantivity. To do this, I will briefly talk about on the horizons of understanding that Zubiri found in West (mobility and nihility) and, then, I will show why our intellectual situation invites us to think of complex structures from a horizon that could be called that of complexity. Then, I will show how horizons previous to ours still thought in terms of the Aristotelian concept of substance even though there are who may not see it like that. Finally, I will say why to our horizon is required to think not so much in terms of substance as of substantivity, if we as philosophers want to be at the height of our times. Resumen La ciencia, desde hace más de cien años, ha lanzado nuevos modos de acercamiento a la realidad física y, con ello, necesidad de nuevos horizontes de comprensión de la misma. Problemas clásicos como el principio de mínima acción, la diferencia física entre la masa gravitacional y la masa inercial; y modernos como la antes llamada «dualidad ondapartícula», la delgada línea entre el observador y lo observado tanto experimentalmente –el Efecto Compton, por ejemplo– como teóricamente –el principio de indeterminación de Heisenberg–, el problema de integrar la fuerza gravitacional al modelo estándar, la barrera infranqueable de la velocidad límite de transmisión de información, el problema de la evolución y sus múltiples teorías, los organismos vivos, la autoorganización de la materia, el enlazamiento cuántico, la emergencia de la inteligencia, las macromoléculas, el paso entre una macromolécula a una célula, el espacio-tiempo, entre muchos más; en fin, el propio 5

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concepto de sistema, dan cuenta clara de una situación intelectual que requiere de la especulación filosófica para mayor claridad en los basamentos de nuestros modos de acercamiento a la realidad material. Si existen problemas en la ciencia de orden epistemológico u ontológico, es decir, si en ella existen problemas meta-científicos, se debe –creo yo– al horizonte de comprensiones desde el cual se les está enfrentando. En este artículo, presentaré la tesis de que la ciencia ha continuado pensando aristotélicamente en función del concepto de sustancia y propondré otra variable independiente: la sustantividad. Para ello, echaré mano brevemente de los horizontes de comprensión que X. Zubiri ha encontrado en Occidente (movilidad y nihilidad), para luego mostrar por qué nuestra situación intelectual nos invita a pensar en las estructuras complejas desde un horizonte que podría llamarse de la complejidad. Seguidamente, pasaré a mostrar cómo los horizontes previos al nuestro son horizontes que piensan en función del concepto de sustancia aristotélica aun a pesar de que haya quien así no lo viera. Por último, diré por qué para nuestro horizonte se requiere pensar no tanto en términos de substancia cuanto de sustantitividad si como filósofos queremos estar a la altura de nuestros tiempos. Introducción La ciencia, en nuestros tiempos y desde hace más de cien años, ha lanzado nuevos modos de acercamiento a la realidad física y, con ello, nuevos retos que desafían dichos modos; trae con eso la necesidad de nuevos horizontes de comprensión. Problemas clásicos como el principio de mínima acción, la diferencia física entre masa gravitacional e inercial; y contemporáneos como la antes llamada «dualidad onda-partícula», la delgada línea entre el observador y lo observado tanto experimentalmente –el Efecto Compton, por ejemplo– como teóricamente –el principio de indeterminación de Heisenberg–, el problema de integrar la fuerza gravitacional al modelo estándar, la barrera infranqueable de la velocidad límite de transmisión de información, la existencia de un bosón constitutivo en la formación de la materia, la ondas gravitacionales, el problema de la evolución y sus múltiples teorías, los organismos vivos, la autoorganización de la materia, el enlazamiento cuántico, la emergencia de la inteligencia, el paso entre una macromolécula a una célula, el espacio-tiempo, entre muchos más; en fin, el propio concepto de sistema da cuenta clara de una situación intelectual que requiere de la especulación filosófica para clarificación de los basamentos de nuestros modos de acercamiento a la realidad material.

Si existen problemas en la ciencia de orden epistemológico u ontológico, es decir, si en ella existen problemas metacientíficos, se debe en parte –creo yo– al horizonte de precomprensiones desde el cual se les está enfrentando; digamos, a la clave de interpretación. En este artículo presentaré la tesis de que la ciencia ha continuado pensando aristotélicamente en función del concepto de sustancia y que ha sido por ello que ciertos acercamientos a nuevos fenómenos resultan improcedentes o enclenques; en virtud de esto propondré otra variable independiente: la sustantividad, del filósofo Xavier Zubiri, noción que considero más urgente y apropiada en la situación intelectual de nuestros tiempos. Para ello, echaré mano brevemente de los horizontes de comprensión que el mismo Zubiri ha encontrado en la historia del pensamiento occidental, mostrando cómo los horizontes previos al nuestro piensan según la sustancia aristotélica para luego mostrar por qué nuestra situación intelectual nos invita a pensar en las estructuras complejas desde un nuevo horizonte –al menos de cara a las ciencias físicas. Concluiré mostrando que para nuestro horizonte se requiere pensar no tanto en términos de substancia cuanto de sustantitividad si como filósofos queremos estar a la «altura de nuestros tiempos». Para empezar, sin embargo, aclaro que por «ontología» no entiendo una onto-

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logía clásica, es decir, no entiendo por ella «el conocimiento del ser expresado en logos», sino ante todo una disciplina filosófica que estudia lo real en tanto que real (diferenciada de la metafísica, por estudiar ésta la realidad qua realidad); entiendo entonces por τὸ ὂν lo estante, y no «el ente» clásico. Por otro lado, es de saber que en las lecturas de raigambre fenomenológica que Zubiri hizo del pensamiento aristotélico, encontró que Aristóteles se refiere por οὐσία a dos cosas diferentes en virtud del modo como uno accede a ella, a saber, la οὐσία del λóγος y la οὐσία del νοεῖν, lo que he llamado «sustancia lógica» y «sustancia noética»; aclaro, pues, que por sustancia me refiero a la primera, pues a la segunda el Zubiri maduro llamaría sustantividad.3 Vayamos, pues, a pasos contados: ¿Qué es sustancia aristotélica? ¿Qué es sustantividad zubiriana? ¿Cuáles son los horizontes desde los que se piensa occidentalmente y es acaso verdad que en ellos la sustancia tipifica cómo conocer el mundo? ¿Cuál es nuestro horizonte y puede la sustantividad auxiliarnos en nuevos modos de conocer? ¿Qué concluimos de todo esto? I. Sustancia aristotélica Preciso que hablaré de sustancia aristotélica y no de «sustancia en Aristóteles» a pesar de que mi referencia primera a ella sean los propios textos de aquél filósofo. Esta precisión en el fondo dice que la lectura que hago de la sustancia aristotélica sí es la lectura clásica, es decir, la lectura que sus intérpretes en la tradición en general han hecho, y no así la lectura que hoy los grandes estudiosos del pensamiento clásico griego pudieran encontrar novedosa. Me apego a esa lectura clásica porque la historia en general así lo ha hecho, y aquí me interés qué ha pensado la historia. Esta interpretación tradicional ha versado siempre en torno a la «sustancia lógica», y a ésta me referiré. Dicho esto, ¿qué es sustancia? La sustancia está presente en todo el discurso que forjó al pensamiento moderno y, con ello, a su ciencia. Grosso modo, lo que llamamos sustancia es lo que en

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griego se dijo οὐσία , de οὖσα, participio presente femenino del verbo είναι, ser –o como yo preferiría: estar. Lo estante (τὸ ὂν) se dice siempre de un único principio: la sustancia5. Aristóteles ha dicho “τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ᾽ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας […]”6, esto es: lo estante se dice de muchos modos, pero en todos ellos de cara a un único principio: pues de unas cosas se dice que están por ser οὐσίαι, de otras por ser afecciones de la οὐσίας […]. Las cosas están por ser sustanciales, y aquello que no es sustancial depende de aquello que sí. Es claro, pues lo estante está fundamentalmente debido a aquello que lo hace estar, que es independiente de todo lo demás por ser precisamente ello lo más estante. Lo que los griegos –y los escolásticos luego– entendieron por sustancia es lo que está-ahí, el ahí del estar, subsistiendo bajo otras realidades; la sustancia es, en esta medida, una realidad no dependiente sino más bien una de la que otras realidades dependen: “ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἤρτηται, […] οὖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία”7, de aquello de que las demás cosas penden […] esto es la οὐσία. En su virtud, es incluso que lo estante viene a ser lo mismo que la sustancia: “τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία”8, qué es lo estante es lo mismo a qué es la sustancia. Todo lo demás o no está o lo está sólo por estar en lo más estante. Este «en» refiere en todo caso a un con, hay cosas que sólo están por estar con lo más estante, por acompañarlo. Esta es la clásica distinción entre aquello que es οὐσία y aquello que es συμβεβηκός. La primera como la realidad primordial propia de sí misma, la segunda como lo que acompaña a la realidad primaria, como lo que siendo con la οὐσία podría ser, sin embargo, de otra manera, es decir, como su accidente (accidens); lo συμ-βεβηκός es «lo-ido-con» la sustancia. De este modo, traída la οὐσία a terrenos epistemológicos, se dice que la sustancia es la realidad primaria y, como tal, conociendo su realidad tendremos un conocimiento completo de la realidad propia de la cosa misma. Decía Tomás de Aquino que hay un principio (principium) en las

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cosas (aliqua) según el cual—y sólo gracias a él—podrá conocérseles (sit modus eorum quae de re illa cognoscuntur); es decir que conociendo la sustancia de la cosa (rei substantiam) nada de la cosa inteligida excederá la razón humana (nullum intelligibilium illius rei facultatem humanae rationis excedet).9 Esto será preclaro para lo que más adelante diremos. Oὐσία, en este sentido, se entiende como la cosa; no como cualquier cosa. Es la cosa más cosa, es la cosa presente, más presente, según la cual el resto de la cosa queda precisamente delimitada (πέρας) como cosa. Las realidades penden (ἤρτηται) de un principio más real a ellas, de tal forma que conociéndolo a éste conoceremos a aquéllas. No se trata de una extrapolación de dicho principio hacia la totalidad de la cosa, sino de la representación de la totalidad de la cosa en la presentación de dicho principio. Es en este sentido como la sustancia fue un concepto que marcó la historia de Occidente desde que Aristóteles la acuñó explícitamente,10 tratándose en efecto de ella como algo πέρας, algo también καθ' αυτό (suficiente) y algo ὑποκείμενον. La sustancia es también ὑποκείμενον, es precisamente sustrato de accidentes. Si la substancia es lo que está-ahí entonces es lo yaciente (κεῖται), y estando además por debajo (ὑπό) de otras realidades accidentales, entonces es lo sub-yacente. Lo sub-iectum es en esa medida una realidad no dependiente; y así, lo substante deviene sub-yacente (ὑπό-κείμενων). Pero la ciencia moderna es, precisamente, moderna, no griega ni medieval. ¿Qué hay con este principio substancial y subsistente según el cual conociéndolo a él se conoce a la cosa toda? Dijo Aristóteles “τί […] ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα”11, qué es la οὐσία: aquello que no (se dice) de un ὑποκειμένου, pero de ello (se dicen) las demás cosas. Pasa que, siendo la sustancia aquello que no se predica sino de lo cual se predica, en la modernidad ocurrirá un giro en el que las sustancias se distinguen de lo que propiamente –a partir de entonces– llamamos sujeto. El sujeto es el cono-

cedor de, o al menos quien intenta conocer, sustancias. Modernamente, la sustancia puede ser tanto cósica (por ejemplo, en el caso de Newton [substantia]) como «subjetiva» (la res cogitans de Descartes) e, incluso, exclusiva de la divinidad (como en su caso lo pensó Spinoza [substantia]). La οὐσία griega termina desembocando medievalmente en conceptos substanciales como el de ens, del cual uno de sus trascendentales era ser quid (quiditas), lo que compartía cierta sinonimia con la afamada res. A partir de la modernidad, la sustancia subjetiva (p.e. res cogitans) tenderá a buscar sustancias objetivas (p.e. res extensa) precisamente por estar puestas en frente, en su frente (Descartes, Leibniz) o, en su búsqueda, afirmará la imposibilidad de conocerlas (Locke, Hume, Kant) –es lo que se llamó ob-iectum. Quiero destacar este punto clave de la modernidad: la sustancia subjetiva busca en las cosas sus sustancias (las sustancias objetivas), no sus accidentes. Busca de ellas lo que es más real –o lo que así se considera que sea más real–, no aquello que parece (frente al sujeto) no más que algo accidental (distinción típicamente moderna entre el ser y el parecer, esse y percipere). Por ello es que, bien entendido, Galileo –padre de la cinemática moderna– muestra esto diciendo: […] io dico che ben sento tirarmi dalla necessità, subito che concepisco una materia o sostanza corporea, a concepire insieme ch'ella è terminata e figurata di questa o di quella figura, ch'ella in relazione ad altre è grande o piccola, ch'ella è in questo o quel luogo, in questo o quel tempo, ch'ella si muove o sta ferma, ch'ella tocca o non tocca un altro corpo, ch'ella è una, poche o molte, né per veruna imaginazione posso separarla da queste condizioni; ma ch'ella debba essere bianca o rossa, amara o dolce, sonora o muta, di grato o ingrato odore, non sento farmi forza alla mente di doverla apprendere da cotali condizioni necessariamente accompagnata […] 12

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En tal pensamiento galileano se precomprende algo más real y algo que no lo es tanto, su acompañante nada más, esto es: sustancia y accidente. Incluso, inmediatamente después, el mismo Galileo nos habla precisamente de un sujeto (suggetto) en el que residen (riseggano) accidentes (accidenti). Nótese, por otro lado, que aquello de que uno tiene necesidad de concebir (necessità a concepire) junto con la sostanza apunta hacia lo que en filosofía llamamos las categorías, que son quienes acusan (κατηγορεῖν) al sujeto (suggetto) del que se dicen. He aquí que la ciencia moderna es parida por la metafísica clásica –lo que es preciso no olvidar so riesgo de resbalar en ideologías. Cuando el moderno quiere saber la sustancia de la cosa, abstrae todo cuanto la hace esa cosa, a excepción de su realidad primaria (o mejor dicho de lo que cree— precomprende—que es su realidad primaria), creyendo que todo lo demás cuanto la hace esa cosa es mero accidente. II. Sustantividad zubiriana Xavier Zubiri indicó que la filosofía en nuestros tiempos requiere de una metafísica de la sustantividad y no sólo de la sustancialidad. ¿Qué es la sustantividad? “a la estructura radical de toda realidad […] he llamado sustantividad”13. La sustantividad tiene, ante todo, una primaria «cualidad»: ser-esta-cosa-presente. La sustantividad es algo delimitado y formal, diríamos acaso estructural y sistemático. A mi modo de ver, las cosas están formalmente constituidas por propiedades, notas, […] coherentes entre sí: cada una en cuanto propiedad es propiedad de todas las demás, es «propiedadde». Es lo que con un vocablo tomado de la gramática de las lenguas semíticas, llamo «estado constructo». En el estado constructo los vocablos entre sí, y por tanto lo por ellos designado, constituyen formalmente una unidad intrínseca propia. Y esta unidad del estado constructo es lo que yo llamo sistema.14

La sustantividad da cuenta de un modo de constitución de las cosas, más concreto en lo efectivo, más general en lo teórico. La sustantividad se da de manera primera; se da al νοεῖν y no al λóγος. “Ser sujeto en cuanto término de un λóγος no es ser físicamente una realidad subjetual en cuanto realidad. No es lo mismo ser sujeto de atribución que poseer lo atribuido como propiedad física de un sujeto.”15 La constitución de la cosa que la hace ser precisamente esta cosa es primera (prioridad de rango, dice Zubiri), y en ella la totalidad de sus propiedades están puestas unas respecto de otras, sin anterioridad ninguna. Las cosas aparecen primeramente como cosas constituidas en su unidad, sin escisión alguna entre su parecer y su ser, entre la aditividad de sus accidentes y su sustrato sustancial; aparecen constituidas de manera plena. “La sustantividad expresa la plenitud de autonomía entitativa.”16 Esto es: las cosas aparecen como sistemas, y no como elementos aislados inocuos entre sí ni tampoco como errantes accidentes orbitando en torno a un centro sustancial. Cuando se estudia el organismo de un ser vivo, no hay en sentido absoluto un elemento del cual todo lo demás dependa, tan fundamental el cerebro como el estómago, por ejemplo en un animal, pues sin uno el otro no podría hacer lo suyo, en virtud de esto se llama, justamente, organismo. La sustancialidad es resultado de un proceso racional, del λóγος, que dé cuenta de alguna realidad ulterior a lo primeramente dado en esta cosa (y puesta lógicamente luego como si fuera anterior), y es por ello secundaria. La sustancia o sustancialidad podrá ser lo real que se quiera, lo independiente, etc., pero secundaria.17 Por otro lado, el νοεῖν palpa la cosa presente, simple y sistemática, donde no hay diferencia entre el ser y el aparecer. Nótese, sin embargo, que bien entendido no se trata del vetusto esse est percipi.18 La cosa es esta cosa precisamente por ser un sistema complejo constituido por la totalidad de sus notas. El color de esta hoja de papel se presenta como parte constitutiva de la sustantividad de esta hoja de papel; aun cuando, quizá, lo subs-

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tancial sea su celulosa y no las longitudes de las ondas electromagnéticas que rebotan en ella, éstas como consecuentes a aquélla. Pero sea como sea esta sustancialidad, esta hoja ya presente lo es tanto por su celulosa como por su coloridad. Entendiendo la sustantividad como un sistema de notas que precisa la concretitud de las cosas, la hoja (a)parece blanca porque es blanca, y sólo porque esto es verdadero, patentemente verdadero (ἀλήθεια)19, es que luego puede volverse a ello con el λóγος y desplegar la realidad presentada de manera simple y de antemano. Diego Gracia ha dicho que “Si el acto de darme cuenta de que el bastón parcialmente sumergido en el agua está roto no me otorgara algún tipo de saber cierto e indubitable acerca de la cosa, ¿cómo podría yo llegar algún día a deducir las leyes de la refracción?”20 La sustantividad nos muestra la cosa constitutivamente como una unidad integralmente real, y no consecuentemente como habiendo algo en ella más real que lo otro.21 Zubiri toma de la sustancia aristotélica el momento de estar presente (τὸ ὂν), de delimitación de la cosa (πέρας) y de suficiencia (καθ' αυτό), pero no así su sustratividad o subjetualidad (ὑποκείμενον), como si hubiese algo más real que la totalidad de la cosa que la hace ser, precisamente, esta cosa. Este «esta» es un deíctico que nos habla de la unidad o delimitación, de la suficiencia o ser por sí, y de su estar aquí ya presente. Las cosas son tales no tanto por una realidad mayor implícita en ellas, cuanto por el modo como todas sus notas (o «propiedades») quedan estructuradas para constituirlas. La sustantividad nos dice que las cosas son tales por la estructura del todo, en vez de por el enseñoramiento de una de sus partes. Así, por ejemplo, una molécula de agua es tal por estructurarse de dos átomos de hidrógeno y uno de oxígeno (H2O), y sólo es tal por dicha estructura, ningún elemento suyo es más real ni anterior que el resto de la estructura. Antes de ello sólo hay hidrógeno y oxígeno, dos elementos «hidrogenales» y uno «oxigenal» por aparte, pero no agua. El modo de organización es fundamental,

pues baste tener en dicha estructura un elemento de más, por ejemplo de oxígeno (H2O2), para dejar de tener agua y tener entonces peróxido de hidrógeno –la llamada agua oxigenada. Cualquiera que encuentre irrelevante la estructura, tome un sorbo de H2O2 en vez de uno de H2O y sufrirá, literalmente, las consecuencias. Dice Zubiri que: [La sustantividad] funcional no es forzosamente el resultado de una combinación de sustancias que produjera una sustancia nueva. Tampoco es un mero agregado de sustancias, porque en tal caso sólo tendríamos funciones aditivas. Es un acoplamiento de sustancias tal que todas ellas se codeterminan mutuamente. Y esto es lo que hemos llamado estructura. La sustantividad está determinada no siempre ni formalmente por sustancias, sino por estructura, y consiste en una unidad coherencial primaria. Esta estructura es la esencia de la sustantividad en cuestión. La suprema forma de unidad metafísica de lo real, no es la unidad de sustancialidad, sino la unidad de sustantividad, la unidad estructural.22 La sustancia es la que se separa de la cosa misma como siendo lo más real de la cosa, sustrativamente, sin lo cual no habría tal; la sustantividad, por su parte, es la cosa ya presente, con la que tropiezo, delimitada y suficiente, constituida por su estructura, toda ella. Esto es justamente una constelación de notas que hacen de la cosa una cosa constructa. La sustantividad tiene que ver con la estructura23 de algo, con su organización interna que lo hace ser precisamente un algo, ese algo coherente por sí; con una realidad que, de suyo, se articula en relación consigo misma y en relación con lo otro precisamente para ser real y uno. Tal realidad es una y está sistemáticamente organizada. No es una suma de propiedades (o notas) sino la unidad dinámica y estructural que concretiza la especificidad de la cosa. Pongamos un caso: la imposibilidad de medir a una y con la misma precisión el momento y la

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posición de una «partícula» subatómica muestra que al medir hay que romper: la perturbación del sistema, el colapso de la función de onda, formalmente un rompimiento. Físicamente hemos perturbado el sistema físico. Pero filosóficamente, lo que ha ocurrido es que la sustantividad de dicho fenómeno cuántico ha sido desarticulada en sus propiedades, perdiendo, así, su unidad constitucional24. El sistema físico, aun cuando pueda conservar sustancialidad, ha perdido esa sustantividad al haber discernido el momento o la velocidad por aparte siendo así que el sistema físico no sea ya más el mismo: esto es rigurosamente el significado filosófico de la perturbación. En este sentido se ha transsustantivado. Ha ocurrido una transformación de la sustantividad, de su estructura. No se trata ya de sustancialidad alguna como realidad primera. Zubiri dice: El cloro y el hidrógeno son sustancias, y lo es asimismo el ácido clorhídrico resultante de su combinación, y es una sustancia distinta de las componentes por hallarse dotada de propiedades diferentes a las de éstas. Pero en esta idea […] entran indiscernidamente dos cosas distintas: la sustancialidad y la sustantividad. […] [A]mbos conceptos son perfectamente distintos. La sustancialidad sólo es un tipo de sustantividad: la sustantividad que algo posee para que todo lo demás se apoye en él en orden a la existencia. Pero no es la única sustantividad posible. Sustantividad es la suficiencia de un grupo de notas para constituir algo propio; es la suficiencia del orden constitucional. 25 Y también: Así, la glucosa en un frasco es algo que en la metafísica clásica se llamaba sustancial, pero a la vez es algo sustantivo. En cambio, ingerida en un organismo (prescindiendo de las alteraciones metabólicas), a pesar de conservar íntegras su presunta sustancia y sus propiedades, sin embargo ha per-

dido su sustantividad. La sustantividad la tiene solamente el organismo entero: sólo el organismo es el sistema clausurado y total. Por ello la sustancia misma de la glucosa es en el organismo perfectamente insustantiva. Lo radical y primario de las cosas no es, pues, sustancialidad, sino sustantividad. Y la transformación de la sustantividad no es ni remotamente transformación en la sustancialidad: no es transmutación de realidades. La transformación de la sustantividad consiste en que el sistema de propiedades pierde su unidad constitucional.26 Si bien el pensamiento moderno abstrae todo cuanto hace que una cosa sea esa cosa, como creía Galileo, a excepción de su realidad primaria precomprendiendo lo que debería ser esa realidad primaria, y lo cual venía desde el pensamiento medieval, ocurre que en efecto se trata más bien de que no tenemos motivos inamovibles para creer que lo sustancial sea más real que el resto de componentes constitutivos de la cosa. ¿Por qué no podrían ser todos los momentos de la cosa igualmente reales para la cosa misma? A final de cuentas, ni la contigüidad, ni la secuencialidad, ni la extensión, etc., podrían presumirse como más fundamentales que la cosa misma sin una cosa sustantiva que pueda ser contigua, consecuente, extensa, etc. III. Horizontes de precomprensión Fundamentalmente un horizonte de precomprensión es el punto de partida desde el cual uno comprende, enjuicia y conceptualiza aquello que es objeto de sus comprensiones, enjuiciamientos y conceptos.27 Este punto de partida suele ser subrepticio, no es notorio pues está implícito antes de las propias comprensiones, enjuiciamientos, etc. Es el conjunto de presupuestos, precomprensiones, etc., desde el cual uno se lanza a la realidad.28 Así, por ejemplo, si uno toma un martillo, precomprende que debe ser usado para martillar, y dicha precomprensión va implícita antes incluso de siquiera tomar el martillo. Digamos –por usar una analogía musical–

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que un horizonte es la clave desde la cual se interpreta la obra de la comprensión. Pues bien, Xavier Zubiri ha encontrado que en la historia de Occidente ha habido dos grandes horizontes desde los cuales se ha comprendido la realidad; los ha llamado i) el horizonte de la movilidad y ii) el horizonte de la nihilidad. El primero es el horizonte nacido con la filosofía griega y muerto también con ella; el segundo es el horizonte nacido con el cristianismo y que culmina en Hegel, aunque dejando secuelas incluso hasta Husserl y Heidegger.29 i) Para los griegos, la realidad está dada, no se duda de que pueda o no estar. Es lo que se muestra cuando en la Física Aristóteles dice que es ridículo querer demostrar la existencia de la naturaleza,30 lo que se muestra con el mismo concepto de φύσις y la constante búsqueda de su ἀρχή y lo que queda a la vista con el afamado τό ὄν. La realidad está dada, y la pregunta fundamental no va tanto por el lado de si debería o no estar dada sino por cómo es que está ya dada. Es verdad, la realidad ahí está, pero está moviéndose. ¿Cómo puede entonces estar moviéndose sin dejar de estar? Si siempre está, ¿cómo es que está moviéndose? Surgió así toda la disputa entre el ὄν y el μὴ ὄν, naciendo con ello, por ejemplo, toda la física aristotélica liderada por la ενέργεια/ἐντελέχεια y la δύναμις a fuer de explicar el movimiento. No sólo Aristóteles, sino también Platón pensaba lo propio; bien es sabido que el único intento de Platón por hacer una física está en el Timeo, mostrando que una de las condiciones para lo estrictamente físico, como lo es el tiempo, no es más que una copia imperfecta de la eternidad.31 Sus predecesores hicieron lo respectivo al no dudar de la φύσις sino del modo de ser de su principio, su ἀρχή, ese principio ordenador que regula los cambios físicos y que permanece sin cambiar a pesar de generar el cambio. Incluso los eléatas partirán de lo mismo, si bien para ellos el movimiento es aparente, ni duda cabe que hay movimiento –a pesar de que lo más real no se mueva. Quizá esté demás decir que la misma φύσις significa surgir, es decir, brotar, cambiar. Así pues, no se duda en el

horizonte griego de la realidad sino de cómo podía darse en movimiento. La pregunta fundamental en este horizonte es «¿por qué lo que siempre está, cambia?». Desde este horizonte se precomprende la estancia de la realidad y su movilidad, y desde aquí se comprende el resto. Este es el horizonte de la movilidad. ii) Otro es el caso del horizonte de la nihilidad. Este horizonte irrumpe en el anterior con la llegada a Occidente del judeo-cristianismo. Aquí comienza a haber un interés particular por «el ser». El griego no se ocupaba del ser, sino de lo que está; y es que no podría ocuparse del ser porque en su horizonte no está precomprendido en modo alguno su contraparte la nada. Para el griego el mundo ha estado desde siempre y para siempre, y los dioses responden a ello. Pero para el cristiano el mundo no está dado sino que viene dado, viene dado por Dios. Y lo ha dado desde la nada (ex nihilo); cabe hacer mención que esta expresión –originaria de Tertuliano– no es siquiera bíblica, no aparece en el hebreo de la Tanaj sino tan sólo en una versión poco clara, en lengua griega, del deuterocanónico Macabeos (II, 7:28), hablando de una creación «desde las cosas que no son/están» (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων). Quiero decir con ello que este nuevo horizonte occidental es plenamente otro. Desde este otro horizonte, se piensa en la posibilidad de que este mundo pudiera ser otro que el que es, es decir, se posibilita la posibilidad misma de los mundos posibles, así como el que el estado de cosas pudiera ser diferente. Este horizonte deja de preguntar por el cambio y la movilidad de lo dado y ahora lo hace por la propia aparición de lo dado, por su quid. En este, la pregunta deja de ser «¿por qué lo que siempre está, cambia?» y deviene en «¿por qué es el ser y no más bien la nada?»32. Desde este horizonte se precomprende al mundo como creatura, es decir, como contingente, y desde ahí se comprende al resto. Pero nos interesa de esto el advenimiento de la ciencia en el cauce de los horizontes. La ciencia moderna, como hoy la conocemos, nace en el horizonte de la nihilidad. La modernidad toda queda im-

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buida en él; ¿no acaso su padre, Descartes, retoma a San Agustín en la vuelta a uno mismo para conocer las cosas?33 El horizonte de la nihilidad no trata de creencias teológicas, sino de precomprensiones en la resolución efectiva de la realidad, y ahí quedan los padres de la ciencia. Justo es mencionar que el matemático Cauchy, teórico de las funciones continuas y creador de la definición formal de límite, llegó a decir “Yo soy cristiano, es decir, yo creo en la divinidad de Jesucristo, con TychoBrahe, Copérnico, Descartes, Newton, Fermât, Leibniz, Pascal, Grimaldi, Euler, Guldin, Boscowich, Gerdil, con todos los grandes astrónomos, todos los grandes físicos, todos los grandes matemáticos de los siglos pasados.”34 El horizonte da cuenta de que previa a sus disertaciones científicas, está precomprendida la realidad desde la nihilidad, esto es, de que las cosas son contingentes y pueden conocerse a partir de lo que no son, y las leyes que van encontrándose son las razones del porqué (y/o cómo) haya algo en vez de nada. En este horizonte, pues, el conocimiento de las cosas puede ser sustituido por el conocimiento del sujeto que conoce las cosas, o si se quiere: sustituir la realidad por un modelo ideal. El pensamiento moderno presupone una creencia acrítica de una figura dada de la racionalidad, a partir de la cual se cree conocer más la realidad alejándose de ella, tendiendo hacia su idealización. Hay un alejamiento de la realidad en pos de un acercamiento a la razón. Nótese la máxima hegeliana que mienta Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich. Was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig, lo que racional es, eso es real; lo que real es, eso es racional. El sujeto impone las condiciones de posibilidad de cognición de la cosa, débilmente hablando; en sentido fuere: el sujeto impone las condiciones de posibilidad de existencia de la cosa. Lo conocido es subsumido enteramente (o quasi) en el cognoscente. Veremos más adelante como este «estar subsumido» no es sólo un modo de hablar. En términos de la segunda gran metáfora orteguiana: la naturaleza es un pedazo del sujeto, en tanto que contenida

en su pensamiento, en tanto que posible sólo como para él. La ciencia, nacida en el horizonte de la nihilidad, resulta idealista anteponiendo la razón del sujeto a la propia constitución de lo real, el científico es tal en la medida en que modela; como si hubiese un modelo racional (instituido racionalmente) al que la realidad deba seguir o, justamente, amoldarse. Decía entonces que la ciencia nace en el horizonte de la nihilidad, es decir, en el horizonte en que se posibilita lo que las cosas no son, que las cosas no sean y, con ello, en donde es viable conocer lo que es mediante lo que no es. Con el modelo ideal de lo real, se conoce lo que sí es con lo que no es. Conocer la realidad conociendo la idealidad. Hay que decir, por otro lado, que la modernidad (y pre-modernidad) ha visto a la conciencia como un contenedor al cual le llegan contenidos. Es a esto a lo que nos referíamos antes cuando decíamos que lo conocido se subsume en el cognoscente. A veces se le ha visto como un contenedor con forma (Kant) pero a veces también sin forma (Locke), sea como sea, la verdad es que se le ha visto como contenedor. El mundo, por su parte, es los contenidos que por tales o cuales motivos terminan en aquel contenedor; para quienes creen que el contenedor tiene forma, los contenidos de la conciencia adoptan la misma (al modo como, análogamente, lo hace un fluido): el mundo queda idealizado, subjetivado; para quienes no, el contenedor es una tabula rasa que adopta formalidad según la impronta que dejan sus contenidos: el sujeto queda mundanizado, es el empirismo. Empirismo e idealismo son, en bruto, siameses. Sea como fuere, la conciencia es un recipiente que recibe al mundo. El pensamiento occidental moderno, con su ciencia germinal, está cuandocado dentro del horizonte de la nihilidad. Históricamente, pues, acaecen ambos horizontes. Ahora bien, ¿qué hay con el concepto de sustancia? En ambos horizontes la búsqueda de comprensión se ve encaminada a la luz de la sustancia. En el de la movilidad, lo que cambia no es la sustancia; la sustancia es justamente

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aquello más real que, por ser tal, no cambia. En el de la nihilidad, la sustancia suma no ha sido creada sino que es justamente la creadora (Ipsum Esse per se Subsistens). En este segundo horizonte nace la ciencia moderna. Y si bien su interés no está en esa suma sustancia (pues no requiere de tal «hipótesis» divina, como lo dijera Laplace), sí lo está en aquello que dicha sustancia ha creado a su semejanza: las sustancias perenes del mundo finito. Que pueden hallarse a la luz de los conceptos de, por ejemplo, ley y determinismo. Las cosas perenes, no sus contingencias, son sustancias que obedecen siempre a las leyes naturales. Es así como, por ejemplo, es posible en la mecánica clásica conocer toda la trayectoria de cualquier proyectil si de él determinamos la posición y la velocidad. La posición y la velocidad son, para el caso, las cantidades matemáticas que determinan la sustancialidad del proyectil –por decirlo así–, éste tiene (o cobra) realidad física si es viable determinar dichas cantidades: con la posición y la velocidad se conserva la sustancialidad del proyectil, misma que permanece tanto atrás en el tiempo como adelante (determinismo).35 Hemos de recordar en este punto que si la ciencia moderna nació fue en buena medida por la lucha anti-aristotélica que se tuvo entonces de cara a sus explicaciones cualitativas del mundo físico.36 Esto, por otro lado, no significó la renuncia a la sustancia, sino la cuantificación de la misma; la sustancia sigue subrepticiamente. Estando Aristóteles en la cumbre de la época histórica del horizonte de la movilidad, fue fácil que sus conceptos se filtraran, igualmente de manera histórica, al siguiente horizonte. Si recordamos lo que Tomás de Aquino dijo, a saber, que si la inteligencia inteligía la sustancia de la cosa no habría nada de ésta que escapara a aquélla (si intellectus humanus alicuius rei substantiam comprehendit nullum intelligibilium illius rei facultatem humanae rationis excedet), entonces entenderemos el fuerte bagaje de esta precomprensión en las siguientes palabras que Laplace escri-

bió en su Essai philosophique sur les probabilités:37 “Una inteligencia que en un momento determinado conociera todas las fuerzas que animan a la naturaleza […] podría abarcar en una sola fórmula los movimientos de los cuerpos más grandes del universo y los del átomo más ligero; nada le resultaría incierto y tanto el futuro como el pasado estarían presentes ante sus ojos.”38 Se trata aquí de conocer, pues, la sustancia del mundo. Una cosa u otra bien pudo haberla dicho Laplace o el Aquinate. Son parecidos, en efecto, porque ambos discursos parten del mismo horizonte de nihilidad que precomprende como fundamental una realidad primaria; para el caso, la sustancia como materia. Aunque el mismo Aristóteles consideró que la οὐσία estaba en el εἶδος y no en la materia39 –pues la materia no puede (ἀδύνατον) nunca estar separada y, por lo tanto, no es independiente–, para entonces la única sustancia que se tomaba por eje era la material. El químico y nobel Wilhelm Ostwald dijo que “La substancia de la Física y la Química del siglo XIX lleva el peculiar nombre de materia. […] No es del todo fácil determinar unívocamente lo que hoy día se entiende por materia, ya que al intentar dar una definición, resulta que en general se ha presupuesto ya el conocimiento de aquel concepto […]”40. Por su parte, el mismo Werner Heisenberg habló críticamente de la sustancia material desde la electrodinámica: “En la electrodinámica, lo auténticamente existente no es la materia, sino el campo de fuerzas. Un juego de relaciones entre campos de fuerzas, sin ninguna substancia en que se apoyaran dichas fuerzas, constituía una noción bastante menos comprensible que la noción materialista de la realidad […].”41 Es claro que de la sustancia está brotando la ciencia moderna, pero ya desde sí misma (con el electromagnetismo en general, la teoría cinética de gases, la termodinámica de procesos irreversibles, etc.) es notoria la insuficiencia de tal noción y, con ello, la necesidad de nuevas nociones a la altura de estas igualmente nuevas exigencias.

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IV. La altura de nuestros tiempos: nuestro horizonte Hoy en día, sin embargo, estudiamos fenómenos que no respetan lo que podríamos llamar el «Principio de Conservación de la Sustancialidad»; por el modo preciso y fino de su estructuración, éstos no son los mismos antes que después, tanto incluso que no podemos regresar a estados previos desde el estado presente y muchas veces ni predecir los futuros. Hemos comentado anteriormente que la realidad de las cosas está en su estructuración, no en un principio único, por lo que al perturbar su estructuración se perturba, de hecho, su modo de ser real. Coincidiendo en esto con Zubiri. No hay que pensar grandes ejemplos, baste simplemente mencionar –para mostrar esta diferencia entre codeterminación sustantiva y dependencia sustancial– la síntesis llevada a cabo por los aminoácidos para la formación de proteínas; los aminoácidos se estructuran de manera tan precisa y adecuada que la proteína resultante es otra que ellos; no es la adición de aminoácidos, sino algo radicalmente nuevo, una macromolécula propia. No es tan sólo su adición, sino el modo concreto en que se articulan efectivamente, un conjunto de aminoácidos sustanciales no hacen una proteína sustantiva, necesitan de una concreta estructura al modo como un montón de ladrillos no constituyen un muro. Necesitan una cierta disposición, un cierto orden. Creer que las realidades tienen en ellas algo más real que todo el resto o que su organización intrínseca, es creer en la sustancia, y esto no alcanza a concebir ya la totalidad de objetos propios de la ciencia contemporánea. No podemos seguir buscando lo sustancial y dejar de lado todo cuanto creamos accidental. Los problemas ya no son los de antes.42 Cuando clásicamente se habla de un cuerpo, por ejemplo, y de él se obtienen determinadas ecuaciones, se trabaja –en general– no con respecto al cuerpo, sino con respecto al centro de masa, es decir, con respecto a un punto, esto es, con respecto a una

idealización43 –como antes he dicho. Un punto es intrínsecamente inexistente, no es físico sino matemático,44 el cuerpo es físico, pero para estudiarlo prescindimos de él remitiéndonos a la abstracción; los péndulos cuya masa es puntual, cuyos hilos no tienen masa, y para los cuales no hay resistencia del aire (piénsese en los osciladores armónicos) son buenos ejemplos. Claro que la abstracción (ἀφαίρεσις), como toda vía negativa, requiere prescindir de lo particular en pos de lo general; pero no se trata de eso, sino de insistir en que eso «general» sea «lo más real», y esto es ya inadmisible. Esta recurrencia epistemológica de perseguir aquello independiente de lo cual lo demás depende, el sustrato, de perseguir la sustancia, ha sido fructífera en el devenir de la ciencia, ni duda cabe. Pero ha ocurrido y, a mi parecer, cada vez ocurre con más frecuencia en nuestro tiempo, que la ciencia se enfrenta a fenómenos que le resultan inabordables, inoperables, o poco abordables y poco operables, por este ardid epistemológico que ha funcionado sólo dentro de determinados límites. Ostwald había ya caído en la cuenta de la insuficiencia del concepto de sustancia en ciencia y decía que “tenemos dos distintos grupos de razones, de las que unas nos llevan a atenernos a la realidad de las cosas según se nos aparecen, y las otras al abandono de dicha apariencia. [Pero] cada una de las indicadas actitudes encierra insuficiencias, mientras que la combinación de ambas constituye una nueva y suficiente tesitura. Es natural que las insuficiencias aludidas hayan de buscarse mediante una delimitación, en dos opuestos frentes, del concepto de substancia.”45 Pensemos por ejemplo en los fenómenos subatómicos, o en el concepto de sistema, organismo, incluso célula y demás ejemplos mencionados al inicio de este artículo. Fenómenos como éstos exigen ser estudiados no ya desde un horizonte que precomprenda que debería haber en ellos una realidad más real que todo cuando en ellos ocurre, realidad más real que explica y da cuenta de todo cuanto de ella depende. Estos fenómenos exi-

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gen ser estudiados desde otro horizonte porque están siendo planteados desde afuera de los límites que presuponen una realidad suma y perene. Escapan, pues, a los horizontes viejos reclamando uno nuevo. A éste horizonte Diego Gracia lo llamó el horizonte de la complejidad.46 En las estructuras complejas se trata de no buscar una realidad sustancial de la que dependa toda la estructura, como si tuvieran una piedra angular; toda la estructura es real y toda ella tiene manifestaciones propias inexplicables sin la totalidad de la estructura. Ver la totalidad de la estructura como un único fenómeno en vez de como un conglomerado de accidentes dependientes de una sola «parte» es partir desde un nuevo horizonte abierto a las exigencias de los problemas de la ciencia de nuestro tiempo. ¿Por qué es que no puedo medir a la vez la posición y el momento de una partícula subatómica con arbitraria precisión? Esta pregunta se lanza sólo si se precomprende que la sustancia de un fenómeno tal está en su carácter de ser partícula. Las partículas son sustancialmente determinables por su momento y posición. Pero este fenómeno subatómico requiere de otra clave (la clave de interpretación) según la cual esta pregunta resulta ser, a la postre, una pseudo-pregunta o, al menos, una deutero-pregunta. Si se ve al fenómeno como totalidad estructural no nos parecería extraña la ausencia de características de partícula porque de hecho no esperaríamos que fuese una partícula o que se comportase como tal; lo mismo si esperamos que se comportase como onda. Es verdad que hoy decimos que para ciertos experimentos el fenómeno acontece como siendo partícula, para otros no; pero ¿cómo se explica este cambio de dirección en la naturaleza? No se explica, y por eso tienen los científicos que recurrir a antropomorfismos como «el electrón decide si…»; no, no decide nada, carecemos de conceptos porque seguimos circundando uno que nos limita la visión de cara a esta clase de fenómenos: la sustancia. La totalidad de este fenómeno es total, y siendo el caso, uno debe verla como tal. Es labor

filosófica la especulación de nociones útiles en el abordaje de lo real, y es labor filosófica proveer de herramientas teóricas según las cuales el científico tenga de dónde partir para nuevas herramientas matemáticas precisas47, una matemática que mire los sistemas rigurosamente como sistemas constituidos por sus propiedades estructurales, todos mayores a la suma de sus partes, y no como efectos consecuentes de un único principio. V. Conclusión Confío en que el filósofo español Xavier Zubiri, quien hubiera estudiado con Einstein y Schrödinger en Berlín, y con Louis de Broglie en París, ha dado en el clavo para el abordaje de las nuevas realidades a las que nos enfrentamos en nuestro tiempo. Nuestra situación intelectual da para más que un mero análisis lógico del lenguaje, y no se trata aquí de distinguir taxonómicamente lo que es sustancia de lo que es sustantividad, se trata de escuchar a la realidad misma de las cosas y ver qué tienen ellas que decirnos, por encima de lo que nuestros modelos canónicos y canonizantes prefieren. Se trata, a la postre, de atenerse modestamente a la realidad de las cosas, de atender más a las cosas de las que queremos saber antes que a nuestras preconcepciones y prejuicios desde los cuales decimos que queremos saber. Nuestra situación intelectual nos exige ver las cosas en su estructura, como sistemas, como complejos, como realidades respectivas48 y no innocuas. Interpretarlas en una nueva clave puede dificultar nuestro acercamiento al ser éste uno nuevo, radicalmente otro que ese que nos mantenía en un nivel considerable de certezas y en un estado confortable, pero aminora la carga cuando la clave resulta ser una luz a la que esas realidades poco comprensibles desde otro enfoque, son ahora sensibles. No es que la realidad sea translúcida y por lo tanto estemos vedados de verla por principio, pasa que debemos ajustar las longitudes de nuestras radiaciones hasta alcanzar lo mínimo necesario para que reboten contra su real e intrínseca opacidad. Aunque sea más cómodo

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afirmar que sólo es cognoscible aquello donde hasta ahora conocemos, no es esto ni verdadero ni laudable. Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas, donde «Plato» significa cualquier cosa que interpele al lector. Ver desde donde no se ha visto o desde donde apenas se ha empezado a ver, sin duda será arduo, pero al final alguien tiene que poner (de θέσις) la vista (de ὁράω) en ello, es decir, alguien tiene que teorizar (θεωρία). Quizá no sea la sustantividad la

mejor noción para acercarse a las realidades complejas a las que hoy nos enfrentamos, quizá haya otras muchas que ayuden más y mejor, pero es una que atiende honestamente al escudriñamiento de la totalidad de lo real; escudriñamiento frente al cual Platón, hace ya más de 2000 años, confesó haber desfallecido49 pero –como enseñara Zubiri– no por ello haberse desanimado.50

Notes 1

Una versión más corta del presente artículo fue presentada como conferencia en el XVII Congreso Internacional de Filosofía (Morelia, Michoacán, México) de la Asociación Filosófica de México, A.C., en una de las mesas de Filosofía de la Ciencia.

2

Vicepresidente Asociado Fundador de la Academia Internacional Tomás de Aquino (AITA). Miembro de la Sociedad Educativa Latinoamericana para Fe y Ciencia (SELFYC), instalada principalmente en Guatemala. Colaborador Asociado de la revista Razón y Pensamiento Cristiano, Chile. Editor y creador de la Colección Estudios Libres, en Ediciones Castilibros, México. Licenciado en filosofía por la Universidad del Claustro de Sor Juana, México. Ha participado como ponente en los VI y VII Congresos Latino Americanos de Ciencia y Religión, organizados por el Ian Ramsey Centre de la University of Oxford y en el curso Ciencia y Fe: Dos ventanas una Realidad organizado por el Faraday Institute de la University of Cambridge.

3

Cfr. Cfr. ZUBIRI, Xavier, “Filosofía y Metafísica,” in. Cruz y Raya 10 (1935), pp. 7-60. Y ZUBIRI, Xavier, Los problemas fundamentales de la metafísica occidental, Madrid: Alianza, 2008, pp. 67, 68. En esta última referencia Zubiri dice que el mismo Aristóteles dio tratamiento sistemático a dos modos de acceso a la οὐσία, el del λóγος y el de la κίνησις (dejando de lado el acceso por νοεῖν), pero que al final subsume la κίνησις en el λóγος, resbalando.

4

La propia palabra οὐσία es usada en el griego con la significación de heredad o herencia; la herencia es lo que garantiza la independen-

cia de algo (cuando un joven hereda, es independiente de su familia y demás trabajos). De aquí que se usara esta misma palabra pero compuesta para indicar «autoridad»: ἐξουσία. Todavía hoy en griego moderno se habla de los bienes y la fortuna como περιουσία. 5

Quizá haya mejores traducciones para οὐσία, pero la tradicional ha sido sustancia. Aunque estrictamente esté en desacuerdo con llamarle así, prefiero dejarla tal y como se le ha llamado para señalar la tradición de este horizonte.

6

Met. 1003b5. ARISTÓTELES, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, W.D. Ross, 1924. Todas las citas griegas que vienen de la Metafísica se tomarán de esta edición. Las traducciones al castellano de las mismas son traducciones mías, permitiéndome dejar en griego los términos que considero clave.

7

Met. 1003b18.

8

Met. 1028b3.

9

SCG I, 3. “Cum enim principium totius scientiae quam de aliqua re ratio percipit, sit intellectus substantiae ipsius, eo quod, secundum doctrinam Philosophi, demonstrationis principium est quod quid est; oportet quod secundum modum quo substantia rei intelligitur, sit modus eorum quae de re illa cognoscuntur. Unde si intellectus humanus alicuius rei substantiam comprehendit, puta lapidis vel trianguli, nullum intelligibilium illius rei facultatem humanae rationis excedet.” AQUINO, Tomás de, Summa contra gentiles, Romae: Typis Ricardi Garroni, 1928. pp. 7,8.

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“El principio del que parte toda ciencia que pueda la razón percibir acerca de un objeto, es la captación de la sustancia del mismo: porque como dice el Filósofo, el principio de toda demostración es la esencia de una cosa. Y así, según el modo como se conoce la sustancia de un objeto, así es como se puede conocer dicho objeto. Por ello, si la inteligencia humana puede comprender la sustancia de alguna cosa, como de una piedra o de un triángulo, nada excede la inteligibilidad de esa cosa a la facultad de la razón humana.” AQUINO, Tomás de, Suma contra los gentiles, México: Porrúa, Carlos Ignacio González, 2004. p. 3. 10

Platón, por su parte, ya hablaba también del εἶδος como siendo οὐσία. Es interesante notar que él decía lo que más abajo señalaremos decisivo en la interpretación zubiriana de la sustancia aristotélica y que sugeríamos al inicio: que la οὐσία es el objeto de la νόησις. “νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν” Rep. 534a.

11

Met. 1029a8

12

“…anzi, se i sensi non ci fussero scorta, forse il discorso o l'immaginazione per se stessa non v'arriverebbe già mai.” GALILEI, Galileo, Il Saggiatore, progetto Manuzio, 1997, p. 108 (Cursivas mías). En castellano, traducción libre: “ […] digo que siento la necesidad, tan pronto concibo una materia o sustancia corpórea, de concebir junto con ella que está delimitada y figurada de ésta o aquella forma, que en relación a otras es grande o pequeña, que está en este o aquel lugar, en este o aquel tiempo, que se mueve o está quieta, que toca o no toca otro cuerpo, que es una, o pocas o muchas, y ni con gran imaginación puedo separarla de estas condiciones; pero que deba ser blanca o roja, amarga o dulce, sonora o muda, de olor agradable o desagradable, no siento que fuerce a mi mente a tener que aprehenderla acompañada necesariamente de estas condiciones: más bien, sin los sentidos no las hubieran advertido, tal vez el discurso [la razón] o la imaginación por sí mismas no lo hubieran advertido jamás.”

13

ZUBIRI, Xavier, Sobre la esencia, Madrid: Alianza, 2008, p. 87.

14

ZUBIRI, Xavier, “Reflexiones teológicas sobre la Eucaristía”, Estudios escolásticos (Enero-

Junio, 1981), Núms. 216-217, Vol 56, pp. 41-59, p. 44. 15

Op. Cit. ZUBIRI, Xavier, Sobre la esencia, p. 86.

16

Ibid., p. 87.

17

“Radical y formalmente, lo real no es sustancialidad, sino sustantividad.” ZUBIRI, Xavier, “Reflexiones teológicas sobre la Eucaristía”, op. cit. p. 45.

18

Aunque Zubiri no hablaría ni de «apariciones» ni de «existente», a este respecto me parece que en las primeras páginas de L'être et le néant, con la fenomenología de fondo Sartre ha sido preclaro: “Les apparitions qui manifestent l'existant ne sont ni intérieures ni extérieures : eltes se valent toutes, elles renvoient toutes à d'autres apparitions et aucune d'elles n'est privilégiée. La force, par exemple, n'est pas un conatus métaphysique et d'espèce inconnue qui se masquerait derrière ses effets (accélérations, déviations, etc.) : elle est l'ensemble de ces effets. Pareiltement le courant électrique n'a pas d'envers secret : il n'est rien que l'ensemble des actions physicochimiques (électrolyses, incandescence d'un filament de carbone, déplacement de l'aiguille du galvanomètre, etc.) qui le manifestent. Aucune de ces actions ne suffit à le révéler. Mais elle n'indique rien qui soit derrière elle: elle indique elte-même et la série totale. Il s'ensuit, évidemment, que le dualisme de l'être et du paraître ne saurait plus trouver droit de cité en philosophie.” SARTRE, JeanPaul, L'Être et le Néant. Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique, Paris : Éditions Gallimard, 1943, p. 11.

19

Nótese que ἀλήθεια no quiere decir algo como «des-velar», sino más bien «sin-velos». No es lo mismo des- que sin-, pues lo primero implica que en efecto hay velos, y que éstos deben ser descorridos; lo segundo, por su parte, quiere decir que efectivamente no hay velo alguno (y por lo tanto no hay que descorrer nada).

20

GRACIA-GUILLÉN, Diego, “Actualidad de Zubiri: La Filosofía como Profesión de Verdad”, in. Tellechea Idígoras, J. Ignacio (ed.), Zubiri (1898-1983), Vitoria: Departamento de Cultura del Gobierno Vasco, 1984, p. 90.

21

“La sustancialidad sólo es un tipo de sustantividad: la sustantividad que algo posee para

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que todo lo demás se apoye en él en orden a la existencia. Pero no es la única sustantividad posible. Sustantividad es la suficiencia de un grupo de notas para constituir algo propio; es la suficiencia del orden constitucional.” ZUBIRI, Xavier, “El hombre, realidad personal”, In. Revista de Occidente, 1, 1963, p. 21. 22

Idem.

23

Aquí estoy usando «constructo» y «estructura» sin mucho rigor distintivo. Formalmente son diferentes, pero ahora no viene a cuento detenernos en este detalle que, en otros ámbitos, es crucial.

24

“La transformación de la sustantividad consiste en que el sistema de propiedades pierde su unidad constitucional” ZUBIRI, Xavier, “Reflexiones teológicas sobre la Eucaristía”, Op. Cit. p. 45.

25

ZUBIRI, Xavier, “El hombre, realidad personal”, In. Revista de Occidente, 1, 1963, pp. 21-23.

26

ZUBIRI, Xavier, “Reflexiones teológicas sobre la Eucaristía”, Op. Cit. p. 45.

27

A esto Heidegger llamó Verweisung, (vid. Sein und Zeit, § 17) y Bezogenseins (vid, Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), capítulo 4). Gadamer le llamará abiertamente Vorverständnis

28

Posiblemente la aprehensión primordial de realidad esté exenta de estos horizontes. Creo que Zubiri así lo pensaría, así lo pienso yo en lo personal; pero es un tema que amerita filosofarse por aparte.

29

“El mundo griego ha visto esencialmente la idea del ens, la idea del ὄν, desde el horizonte de la movilidad. Si nos trasladamos al mundo medieval, nos encontramos con algo totalmente distinto. Lo primero que piensa el medieval es por qué hay cosas en lugar de que no haya nada. Es curioso que esta pregunta […] está inscrita dentro del horizonte de la nihilidad, que es el horizonte de la Creación. La idea de la nada no cruzó jamás por la mente de un griego. Para la mente griega, Dios, el θεός, no ha hecho el mundo, ni siquiera en Aristóteles; el mundo está naturalmente ahí. En cambio, para un medieval, el mundo empieza por haber llegado a tener realidad. Por consiguiente, todo el problema del ser se inscribe dentro del problema de la nada y de su nihilidad.

Y esto ha seguido de una manera muy pertinaz hasta nuestros días.” ZUBIRI, Xavier, Los problemas fundamentales de la metafísica occidental, Op. Cit. p. 35. 30

“ὡς δ' ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι γελοῖον” Física 193a3. ARISTÓTELES, Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, W.D. Ross, 1936.

31

Vid. Timeo 37d. “ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν: εἰκὼ δ' ἐπενόει κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν.” PLATÓN, Platonis Opera, Londres: Oxford University Press, John Burnet, 1902. “Pero dado que la naturaleza del mundo ideal es sempiterna y esta cualidad no se le puede otorgar completamente a lo generado, procuró realizar una cierta imagen móvil de la eternidad y, al ordenar el cielo, hizo de la eternidad que permanece siempre en un punto una imagen eterna que marchaba según el número, eso que llamamos tiempo.” PLATÓN, Diálogos VI: Timeo, Madrid: Gredos, María Ángeles Durán y Francisco Lisi, 2008, p.182.

32

Recordemos la gran lucha de Leibniz por entender por qué hay algo (quelque chose, lit. cualquier cosa) y no mejor nada (no La Nada, sino nada –Leibniz escribe rien y no Néant): “la première question qu’on a droit de faire sera : pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien ? Carle rien est plus simple et plus facile que quelque chose. De plus, supposé que des choses doivent exister, il faut qu’on puisse rendre raison pourquoi elles doivent exister ainsi, et non autrement.” LEIBNIZ, Gottfried, Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondé en raison, , (consultado el 11 de marzo de 2013.) (Párrafo 7) Además, la interpretación absolutamente entificada (pues ya no habla de «cualquier cosa» sino del «ente» [Seiendes] ni de nada como rien sino como La Nada [no nichts sino Nichts]) de Heidegger al respecto, diciendo que una pregunta tal es fundamental. “Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?” HEIDEGGER, Martin, Was

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ist Metaphysik?, Friedrich Cohen, Bonn, 1931, p. 27. 33

34

35

composent, si d'ailleurs elle était assez vaste pour soumettre ces données à l'analyse, embrasserait dans la même formule les mouvemens des plus grands corps de l'imivers et ceux du plus léger atome: rien ne serait incertain pour elle, et l'avenir comme le passé, serait présent à ses yeux. LAPLACE, Pierre-Simon de, Essai philosophique sur les probabilités, Paris: Bachelier, 1840, p. 4.

Decía San Agustín: “Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas, et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, trascende et te ipsum.“ (De vera religione XXXIX). Si el nacimiento de la modernidad se cuandoca con Descartes, baste decir que éste viene retomando una filosofía y modo de filosofar muy agustino; volver a sí mismo e, incluso, meditar es algo que Agustín inaugura en su afamado si fallor [ergo] sum y en sus confesiones. Para las influencias medievales en el padre de la modernidad, vid. Étienne Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, Paris : Vrin, 1930. La cita continúa diciendo: “Yo soy también católico como la mayor parte de ellos; y, si se me pregunta la razón, yo la daré con mucho gusto. Se vería que mis convicciones son el resultado, no de prejuicios de nacimiento, sino de un examen profundo.” Citado por Baltasar Rodríguez Salinas y José L. de María. “Cauchy”, Historia de la Matemática, 1994, pp. 79-111. Esta noción ha traído vicios en la ciencia contemporánea pues, como «gracias a» posición y momento las cosas «cobran» realidad según la mecánica clásica –ya que de otro modo no podríamos saber de ellas y, sin saberlas, «cómo decir que son reales»–, entonces 1) o el principio de indeterminación de Heisenberg está equivocado (lo que tuvo que rechazarse no de buena gana sino porque la potencia operativa del mismo obligaba a ello) o bien 2) aquello que se mide en Mecánica Cuántica no es (tan) real, dejando en ascuas a quienes preguntan por el sentido físico de las ecuaciones matemáticas.

36

Galileo se refiere a los aristotélicos con su personaje abiertamente burlón llamado Simplicio. Cfr. su Diálogo sobre dos nuevas ciencias.

37

En lo que sigue de este párrafo, compuesto por lo demás de citas, para facilitar al lector su ritmo citaré en castellano, dejando para las notas al pie los originales.

38

La cita completa es: Une intelligence qui, pour un instant donné, connaîtrait toutes les forces dont la nature est animée, et la situation respective des êtres qui la

“Una inteligencia que en un momento determinado conociera todas las fuerzas que animan a la naturaleza, así como la situación respectiva de los seres que la componen, si además fuera lo suficientemente amplia como para someter a análisis tales datos, podría abarcar en una sola fórmula los movimientos de los cuerpos más grandes del universo y los del átomo más ligero; nada le resultaría incierto y tanto el futuro como el pasado estarían presentes ante sus ojos.” LAPLACE, Pierre-Simon de, “Ensayo filosófico sobre las probabilidades”, In. Hawiking, Stephen (ed.) Dios creó los números, Barcelona: Crítica, 2005, p. 362. 39

Met. 1029ª27 “[…] οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην: ἀδύνατον δέ”, […] que οὐσίαν sea la materia, esto es imposible.

40

La cita completa es: „Die Substanz der Physik und Chemie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts führt den besonderen Namen der Materie. Diese ist sozusagen als Verdampfungsrückstand hinterbliebe, nachdem viele von den Substanzen des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, insbesondere der Wärmestoff, die elektrischen und magnetischen Materien, das Licht und noch manche andere, im Laufe der Zeit ihres Substanzcharakters verlustig gingen und als „Kräfte“ ein mehr geistiges Dasein zu füren angewiesen wurden. Was gegenwärtig unter Materie verstanden wird, ist nicht ganz leicht unzweideutig festzustellen; denn versucht man bestimmte Definitionen zu ermitteln, so findet sich, dass meistens die Kenntniss dieses Begriffes bereits vorausgesetzt wird [...]“ OSTWALD, Wilhelm, Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie, Leipzig: Veit und comp. 1902, p. 148. “La substancia de la Física y la Química del siglo XIX lleva el peculiar nombre de materia. La materia es por así decir el residuo de una evaporación, lo que ha

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quedado luego que muchas de las substancias del siglo XVIII, especialmente el fluido calórico, las materias eléctrica y magnética, la luz y muchas otras, hubieron perdido en el curso de los tiempos su carácter de substancias y, consideradas como ‘fuerzas’, hubieron accedido a una forma de existencia más espiritual. No es del todo fácil determinar unívocamente lo que hoy día se entiende por materia, ya que al intentar dar una definición, resulta que en general se ha presupuesto ya el conocimiento de aquel concepto […]” OSTWALD, Wilhelm, “Lecciones sobre filosofía natural”, In. Heisenberg, Werner, La imagen de la naturaleza en la física actual, México: Planeta, 1993, p. 115. 41

cos, Vol. 22, N° 42, año 2013, pp. 170-201. Y en: SIERRA-LECHUGA, Carlos, “Asir gradualmente la realidad: para un principio de correspondencia ontológicoepistemológico”, Atualidade Teológica, ano XVII, fasc. 45, 2013. 45

Werner Heisenberg, La imagen de la naturaleza en la física actual, Op. Cit. p. 10. El original se llama Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik, desafortunadamente no disponemos de un ejemplar para citarlo, por lo que me disculpo con el lector al no ofrecerle la posibilidad de hacer su propia traducción/interpretación del texto.

42

No quiero decir que la física clásica sea obsoleta, sólo estoy diciendo que sus problemas no son los problemas con que hoy nos encontramos. Sus problemas siguen pudiendo ser resueltos (y así seguirán) con física clásica, pero hay otros que exceden su campo epistémico y a ellos me refiero.

43

Hasta que surgiera la genialidad de un gran hombre de ciencia que ideara una matemática menos reduccionista: Henri Poincaré, uno de los padres de la topología.

44

Que diga que un concepto matemático no existe, significa sólo que no está en el mundo físico, pero sí en el conceptual; pasa que a esa «existencia» conceptual no le nombro existencia sino consistencia. He tratado esta diferencia (además de la subsistencia) en: SIERRA-LECHUGA, Carlos, “¿Por qué decimos que la Realidad es una y que, además, tiene ventanas distintas?”, in. Navarro, César y Chamorro, Gonzalo (eds.), Ciencia y Fe: dos ventanas una realidad, Guatemala: Sociedad Educativa Latinoamericana para Fe y Ciencia, 2013, pp. 23-37. También en SIERRALECHUGA, Carlos, “Dios y la Realidad Fásica: Aplicación de las distinciones entre la consistencia lógica, la existencia objetual y la subsistencia metafísica.”, Apuntes Filosófi-

La cita completa es: “Es sind also zwei Gruppen verschiedener Gründe vorhanden, von denen die eine das Festhalten an der Wirklichkeit der Dinge, wie sie uns erscheinen, die andere das Abgehen von dieser Ansicht unterstützt. Wenn der hier vorhandene Widerspruch sich soll lösen lassen, so wird dazu der Nachweis erforderlich seins, dass bei beiden Ansichten Unvollständigkeiten vorhanden sind, deren Ausfüllung die Vereinigung bewirken wird. Diese Unvollständigkeiten werden natürlich in der beiderseitigen Abgrenzung des Substanzbegriffes zu suchen sein” OSTWALD, Wilhelm, Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie, Op. Cit. p. 148. “De modo que tenemos dos distintos grupos de razones, de las que unas nos llevan a atenernos a la realidad de las cosas según se nos aparecen, y las otras al abandono de dicha apariencia. Para resolver esta contradicción, hay que mostrar que cada una de las indicadas actitudes encierra insuficiencias, mientras que la combinación de ambas constituye una nueva y suficiente tesitura. Es natural que las insuficiencias aludidas hayan de buscarse mediante una delimitación, en dos opuestos frentes, del concepto de substancia.” OSTWALD, Wilhelm, “Lecciones sobre filosofía natural”, In. Heisenberg, Werner, La imagen de la naturaleza en la física actual, Op. Cit. pp. 114,115.

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Conferencia llamada “Nuestra situación intelectual: Zubiri en el horizonte de la complejidad.”, dictada por Diego Gracia Guillén (Fundación Xavier Zubiri, España) el martes 31 de agosto de 2010 en el marco del III Congreso Internacional Xavier Zubiri que tuvo lugar en el Salón de Honor de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile.

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Es verdad que ya se intentan (la matemática fractal, sistemas dinámicos [sistemas de ecuaciones diferenciales], matemática del caos, cómputo numérico, teoría de juegos, variable compleja, etc.), pero según nos dice la experiencia, con un éxito grande, sin du-

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da, pero no tan grande como se esperaría.

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ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν. Fedón, 99d.

Zubiri también trató el tema de la respectividad de lo real. Tema de orden metafísico pero que, nuevamente, a mi parecer puede ser retrotraído al del orden físico (propio de las ciencias).

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ZUBIRI, Xavier, Los problemas fundamentales de la metafísica occidental, Op. Cit. p. 121.

Contact information: Correo: [email protected] Website: http://carlossierralechuga.blogspot.mx/

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Quantum Field Theory and Zubiri’s Philosophy of Reality1

Thomas B. Fowler

Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America Washington, DC USA

Abstract The nature of reality as revealed by the most modern science is compatible with Zubiri’s philosophy, but less so with traditional philosophies. This vindicates Zubiri’s view of reality as formality rather than a zone of things, and his view that progression is a search not just for new things but also for new forms and new modes of reality.” Zubiri understood well the quantum theory developed by his friend Werner Heisenberg and others in the first decades of the 20th century. He recognized that this new theory of physics brought with it new modes of reality, such as that of elementary particles, neither waves nor bodies exclusively, which do not fit into classical philosophy and are not visualizable in any ordinary sense. But newer developments, especially Quantum Field Theory, have continued in quite unexpected ways and revealed still more forms and modes of reality that had not been suspected. The nature of these modes suggests that the boundary between the physical and the mathematical is blurring, all of which can be accommodated in Zubiri’s thought, but which is devastating for much of Western philosophy, especially Hume and Kant, and actually favors a more Platonist view. This includes virtual particles that have non-physical properties: negative energy, negative momentum (momentum opposite to velocity), off-shell mass values, speeds greater than light; gauge fields that are more real than ordinary fields, but less measurable; internal symmetry spaces that allow calculations but are otherwise non-real; and symmetry principles in which reality seems to “partake”. Quantum Field Theory also moves away from the problematic action-at-a-distance notion of classical fields, to a more traditional causality requiring contiguity, but with many important differences from the classical view. The nature of the scientific method as understood on the basis of Zubiri’s philosophy changes somewhat with these new developments. However Zubiri’s analysis of science and scientific reality can handle these changes. Resumen La naturaleza de la realidad tal como lo revela la ciencia más moderna es compatible con la filosofía de Zubiri, pero no tanto con las filosofías tradicionales. Esto justifica la opinión de Zubiri de que la realidad es formalidad en vez de una zona de las cosas, y su opinión de que “la marcha es una búsqueda no sólo de nuevas cosas reales sino también de nuevas formas y de nuevos modos de realidad.” 2 Zubiri entiende bien la teoría cuántica desarrollada por su amigo Werner Heisenberg y otros en las primeras décadas del siglo XX. Reconoció que esta nueva teoría de la física trajo consigo nuevos modos de realidad, como el de las partículas elementales, ni olas ni corpúsculos exclusivamente, que no encajan en la filosofía clásica y no son visualizables en el sentido ordinario. Pero los nuevos desarrollos, especialmente la Teoría cuántica de campos, han continuado en formas inesperadas y nos han revelado aún más formas y modos de realidad que no se había sospechado. La naturaleza de estos modos sugiere que la frontera entre la física y la matemática se está 23

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desdibujando, todo lo cual puede ser alojado en el pensamiento de Zubiri, pero resulta devastador para gran parte de la filosofía occidental, especialmente la de Hume y Kant, y de hecho favorece una visión más platónica. Esto incluye las partículas virtuales que tienen propiedades no físicas: la energía negativa, el impulso negativo (impulso opuesto a la velocidad), los valores de masa fuera de la capa, una velocidad superior a la luz; los campos de norma que son más reales que los campos comunes, pero menos medibles; los espacios de simetría interna que permiten cálculos, pero que en otro sentido son no reales; y los principios de simetría de los que la realidad parece “participar”. La teoría cuántica de campos se aparta de la noción problemática de “acción a distancia” de los campos clásicos, acercándose a una causalidad más tradicional que requiere la contigüidad, pero con muchas diferencias importantes respecto del punto de vista clásico. La naturaleza del método científico, tal como se entiende sobre la base de la filosofía de Zubiri, cambia un poco con estos nuevos desarrollos. Sin embargo, el análisis de Zubiri de la ciencia y la realidad científica puede manejar estos cambios. Introduction: Philosophy and Science Philosophy is not an empirical science, like physics or chemistry. But it does have an empirical basis, because philosophy is ultimately knowledge of reality, and science acquaints us with reality, especially aspects of reality that are not part of ordinary experience. All philosophies—all philosophical systems—take as their starting point some aspect of our experience, and build upon it to create a comprehensive view of reality. Plato, for example, started from our perception of qualities such as beauty; and because what we perceive is always less than perfect but nonetheless exists in degrees, inferred that there must be an ideal realm where beauty in its most perfect form subsists. Objects in our world “partake” of this beauty. Aristotle started from common notions such as causality and change, and built what we now term “classical philosophy”. Kant famously started from Hume’s empiricism but perhaps even more importantly, from Newtonian physics, making it an essential part of his philosophy. The problem of course is that if subsequent developments in our knowledge—mainly through science— invalidate or supercede the empirical basis assumed by the philosopher, his entire system can collapse. Aristotle’s theory of substantial change, involving a return to prime matter and a new form, is not compatible with modern atomic theory. Non-

Euclidean geometry and its inclusion as part of General Relativity essentially destroyed Kant’s philosophy, because it showed that reality is not ultimately Euclidean and that we can consistently understand reality in non-Euclidean terms. Thus Euclidean geometry cannot be how we synthesize experience. This implies that any new philosophy must be extremely robust with respect to possible advances in science, as well as incorporating what science has already taught us about reality. Zubiri understood this well, so we shall examine how his philosophy is able to handle ideas in physics that were not envisioned during his lifetime, or were only vaguely understood then. The purpose of this paper is to show that the nature of reality as revealed by modern science is compatible with Zubiri’s philosophy, but less so with traditional philosophies. It also shows that the scientific method, as constructed based on Zubiri’s philosophy, is still valid under the newest physics, though with one change. This vindicates Zubiri’s view of reality as formality rather than a zone of things, because modern science, in particular quantum theory but especially Quantum Field Theory (QFT), has revealed new modes of reality that had not been suspected, and which are not real in the sense of macroscopic bodies or even the particles and waves of quantum mechanics. The nature of these modes suggests

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that the boundary between the physical and the mathematical is blurring, which is devastating for much of Western philosophy, especially Hume and Kant, and actually favors a more Platonist view. Modern physics and Zubiri’s philosophy of reality Zubiri was well acquainted with quantum mechanics, as developed by Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac, Pauli, and others. Heisenberg, in particular, was his friend. So he recognized the significance of the new ideas such as the wave/particle duality: In the most elemental field of reality we have intellectively apprehended that the material things in it are what we term ‘bodies’. In the progression beyond the field it has been thought for many centuries that the things “beyond” are also bodies—of another class, to be sure, but still bodies. It required the commotion generated by quantum physics to introduce in a difficult but undeniably successful way the idea that the real beyond is not always a body. Elementary particles, in fact, are not corpuscles (neither are they waves in the classical sense, be we leave aside this aspect of them) but another class of material things. Borne along by the field intellection of things, we were disposed to intellectively know the things beyond the field as bodies, different perhaps, but when all was said and done, still bodies. The measure of the real was undertaken with a determinate metric: “body”. Now, the progress toward reality has opened up to us other real material things which are not bodies.3 But stranger ideas have come from QFT, such as virtual particles, gauge fields, isospin, and internal symmetries, all of which stretch our notion of what is real in the sense of empirically observable, but which are in some ways more real than what is empirically observable. First let us examine these notions, and then explore how they fit with Zubiri’s understanding of reality, causality, and knowledge.

Gauge fields and gauge symmetry Gauge fields are essential to modern physics, but are very peculiar “entities”, for want of a better term. They began as ways (auxiliary fields) to express constraints, but soon took on a life of their own. The simplest example of a gauge field is the vector potential A, defined with respect to the magnetic field vector B. One of Maxwell’s equations is   B  0 . Whenever the divergence of a vector field is zero, it immediately follows that the field— B in this case—is the curl of another field; that field is always called the “vector potential”, A, with defining equation B    A . Thus the vector potential A expresses the constraint on B that its divergence must be zero. What is especially significant about A is that it is not uniquely determined: one can add the gradient of any scalar function to it and its defining equation is unchanged, because if A  A  f , we have

B    A     ( A  f )

   A    f    A since the curl of a gradient is always zero. Susskind notes: The vector potential is a peculiar field. In a sense it does not have the same reality as magnetic or electric fields. Its only definition is that its curl is the magnetic field [B]. A magnetic or electric field is something that you can detect locally. In other words, if you want to know whether there is an electric/magnetic field in a small region of space, you can do an experiment in that same region to find out…But vector potentials cannot be detected locally.4 Moreover gauge fields such as A go far beyond mere computational devices. Experiments can be devised that show (very indirectly) the presence of the A field using the Aharonov-Bohm effect, where no B field exists.5 Furthermore, we cannot do physics without them: There is no way to derive Lorentz’s force law from a Lagrangian without the vec-

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tor potential [A]. This is a pattern: To write the equations of modern physics in either Lagrangian or Hamiltonian form, auxiliary gauge fields have to be introduced…Gauge fields cannot be “real,” because we can change them without disturbing the gauge invariant physics. On the other hand, we cannot express the laws of physics without them.6 So the gauge fields such as A are in a sense more real than fields we can actually measure, such as B. This is hard to explain on the usual view that reality is a zone of things, but is readily understandable on the basis of Zubiri’s philosophy: “The real is not a ‘thing’ but something ‘in its own right’, thing or not”7. Virtual Particles and Causality Zubiri was well acquainted with quantum mechanics and the ways in which it revised our notions of physics and reality from classical mechanics. As noted above, he noted that in quantum mechanics we learned about forms of reality that are not “bodies” in the classical sense. Zubiri also recognized that with quantum mechanics, we have moved beyond visualizability as a criterion for scientific reality: …elementary particles are realities, since they are given a splendid mathematical description in quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, they are not visualizable as if they were waves or particles. Their real structure is such that they are emitted and absorbed as if they were corpuscles and they propagate as if they were waves. But they are neither. And it is not just that in fact we do not see these particles, but that they are in themselves realities which are “non-visualizable”. And…the identification of the visible and the intelligible is philosophically false: every intellection is sentient and, therefore, every mode of apprehension of the real—even if that reality be neither visual nor visualizable—is true intellection,

and what is apprehended therein has its proper intelligibility.8 QFT and related developments have shown us that there are forms of reality beyond those conceived by quantum mechanics. In addition, QFT gives us better insight into the problem of causality. Traditionally causality was assumed to require a contiguous, efficient cause. This made explanation of inertial movement, such as that of a stone that has been thrown, very difficult: there is no contiguous efficient cause. Even worse was the problem of action at a distance, which came to the fore with Newton’s laws and his theory of gravity. How could the earth cause instantaneous changes in the motion of the moon over a distance of 400,000 km? The answer to the first problem was stated by Galileo and incorporated into Newton’s laws as the First Law of Motion, the Principle of Inertia: “a body in uniform motion tends to stay in motion unless acted upon by an external force.” But this did not really solve the causality problem; it merely affirmed that such causality is not relevant. It was not until Einstein and his application of symmetry that we understood why it is not relevant: there are no privileged reference frames in the universe. What looks like motion to one observer looks like different motion to another, or no motion at all. No causal explanation is needed because we are just looking at a symmetry of nature. The second problem proved more difficult. Faraday first recognized that sources of electric and magnetic force created “fields” in space. In classical physics, and even relativistic physics, a field is an entity which has a value at each point in space and time, and which is capable of exerting a force on particles as a function of its value where the particle is, and the relevant “charge” on the particle (e.g., electrical or gravitational). Thus any suitable object that ventures into the volume of space where the field exists would experience a force proportional to its “charge” with respect to that field. Maxwell showed that these fields are not instantaneous,

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but propagate at the speed of light; and this idea was extended to gravity: the earth sets up a gravitational field, felt by the moon. Einstein later refined the idea of a gravity field, replacing it with the notion of a warped spacetime fabric. But how this fabric interacts with bodies was left somewhat obscure. QFT solved the problem by a return, in a sense—but only in a sense—to the idea of contiguity. In QFT, a field does not have the function of exerting a force on objects; rather, the field merely creates virtual particles which mediate the force, i.e., transfer energy and momentum between the particles. That is, the virtual particles are force carriers. They are called “virtual” because they are not observable even in principle without disrupting the interaction between the particles and in fact can have non-physical proper-

ties, such as travelling faster than light, or negative momentum (momentum in opposite direction to velocity). Moreover the interaction between real particles, mediated by the virtual particles, is the result of the sum of probabilities of all possible ways in which the virtual particles can travel between the real particles. Figure 1, from Feynman, shows some of the possible paths a photon can take in going from point S to point P, reflected off of a mirror. The amplitude at point P is the sum of the amplitudes of all the paths, as determined by their phases, which add as shown at the bottom of the figure. Only those paths near the center have phases which are close in value and hence add; those further away are random and cancel. Thus we say that the light takes the shortest path—the usual law of reflection, even

Figure 1. Possible photon paths in mirror reflection XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015

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though in reality it takes all paths simultaneously but most of them cancel out. Likewise In the case of interactions, all possible exchanges of virtual particles can occur, an infinite number, some of which are shown in Figure 2, for Compton scattering (interaction of a photon and an electron). The first two diagrams show the basic interaction of the photon and the electron. The remaining figures show the alternative ways of interaction. The more loops, the less probable the interaction, but all must be summed to get the total probability of the interaction occurring. Figure 3 shows the interaction of an electron and a positron, which annihilate in a burst of energy as a photon (indicated with k in the diagram), the virtual particle, which subsequently creates another electron and positron (Bhaba scattering). As before there is the basic interaction, and an infinite number of variants, only a few of which are shown. It is never possible to observe the virtual particles without completely disruption the interaction, i.e., creating a new and different interaction that now involves the observer. As described above, the virtual particles, the gauge bosons, have some rather peculiar characteristics: they “take” an infinite number of paths between the particles simultaneously, each with a certain probability; and they can assume nonphysical characteristics such as negative momentum and speeds greater than the velocity of light. So we have not really reestablished contiguity because virtual

particles are not real in ordinary sense— they have some other form of reality. This has culminated in the Path-Integral formulation of much of physics, pioneered by Dirac and especially Feynman, based on earlier work by Fermat. If reality were a zone of things, we could not put virtual particles and symmetry principles in it, and we certainly could not explain the path integral formulation of physics, with the “same” particle taking an infinite number of paths between origin and destination. But virtual particles and symmetry are real, though in a different way than even the waves and particles of quantum mechanics. We have taken leave of “thingness” as a criterion of reality, though we started with: …the intellection that the real things are bodies, but also and above…that to be real is to be a “thing”, in the sense that this word has when one speaks, for example, of “thingness”. That was the measure of reality: progression beyond the field was brought about by thinking that the measuring reality is a “thing”. An intellection much more difficult than that of quantum physics was needed in order to understand that the real can be real and still not be a thing…that progression is a search not just for new things but also for new forms and new modes of reality.”9 The path integral formulation of physics, encompassing Feynman diagrams, definitely represents a new mode of reality.

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Figure 2. Possible interactions and gauge bosons in Compton scattering.10

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Figure 3. Possible interactions of electron and photon in Bhaba scattering11

Isospin Heisenberg first noted that the similarity between protons and neutrons (they are almost identical except for electric charge) could be explained if we postulate a type of abstract internal space in which one of the two, say a proton, can “rotate” into the other, a neutron. In effect, Heisenberg deduced the presence of a hidden symmetry in nature, called “isospin”, and the corresponding abstract space is termed “isospin space”. It is not a rotation like those in our normal day-to-day life. Zee comments: Isospin represents a stunning landmark in the development of symmetry as a primary concept in physics. Previ-

ously, when physicists thought of symmetry, they thought of the symmetry of spacetime. Parity, rotation, even Lorentz invariance and general covariance, are all rooted, to a greater or lesser degree, in our direct perception of actual spacetime. Now, in one sweeping motion, Heisenberg opened up for us an abstract inner space in which symmetry operations can act also.12 Isospin symmetry is known by mathematicians as SU(2); it paved the way for further application of symmetry to fundamental physics. Numerous other isospin multiplets are known, including the sigma particles, the pi mesons, and the kappa parti-

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cles. Essentially we have something nonphysical dictating the physical. In Zubiri’s terminology, isospin space is real because it has the formality of reality, but it is not, obviously, a body or even normal space, or anything material. Symmetry The march away from Newtonian mechanics and determinism, expressed fully by Laplace’s Demon, began in earnest with quantum theory, which Zubiri knew, but has continued in quite unexpected ways. In QFT, as noted, virtual particles have non-physical properties: negative energy, negative. momentum (momentum opposite to velocity), speeds greater than light. But especially it is the notion of symmetry that has become of the greatest importance in modern physical theory. It now goes far beyond a description of reality, but in fact acts in a regulatory manner: Symmetry forbids. Forbidding imposes order, but many different things that possess a certain order may derive from the same symmetry….That is why physicists believe that the underlying symmetry, which forbids whole classes of occurrences at one stroke, is, in a sense, more fundamental than the individual occurrences themselves, and is worth discovering.13 This suggests that we are moving back towards a Platonic view, wherein worldly things “participate” in ideals or forms, specifically, symmetry. One could also take the view—more Aristotelian—that symmetry is a type of formal causality, though how that would work is not clear. The types of symmetry involved include some approximate symmetries, such as the isospin symmetry of neutrons and protons in isospin space, first recognized

by Heisenberg, and exact symmetries. These exact symmetries have become the most important in recent years, with the development of Yang-Mills theories. Historically the Lorentz symmetry was the first to be explicitly formulated, and its importance as a symmetry of nature was recognized by Einstein, who made it the basis of the Special Theory of Relativity. Other symmetries are those in particle physics, which govern what particles of various types there are, and how they are related to each other. Emmy Noether’s theorem relating symmetry, conservation, and invariance has further cemented the importance of symmetry in all of physics: whenever there is a continuous symmetry, there is a conserved quantity. And conversely, if there is a conserved quantity, there is a continuous symmetry. The most important aspect of symmetry is that it is not so much descriptive as prescriptive, which entails a significant change in the orientation of science and in particular, that of the physicist. The 19th and early 20th century paradigm of science, with which Zubiri was acquainted, worked as follows: collect a large body of experimental facts, look for patterns, and find a set of equations that describe those patterns. In Zubiri’s terminology, those equations postulate a reality. Then verify the reality—the equations—by devising and performing experiments. In the case of Special Relativity, Einstein realized that the Lorentz invariance of Maxwell’s equations (their symmetry) demanded a revision of the laws of mechanics and of the rest of physics as then understood, including our understanding of energy, momentum, and time. The schema is shown in Figure 4:

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Facts about Nature obtained by experimenting with frog’s legs and wires, etc.; derivation of individual laws: Faraday’s, Gauss;, Ampere’s

Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory as embodied in his equations

Recognition of Lorentz Invariance and key role of Symmetry

Revision of rest of physics including nature of time, energy, etc.

Figure 4. 19th and Early 20th Century Paradigm of Physics14

But then physicists realized that the arrows in this schema can be reversed, implying a radical change in reasoning and hence in the way of doing physics: After Einstein worked out special relativity, it dawned on him and his contemporary Hermann Minkowski that the arrows in this schema may be reversible. Suppose that it was secretly revealed to us, in the dark of night, that the world is Lorentz invariant. Knowing this, can we deduce Maxwell’s theory and hence the facts of electromagnetism, without ever stepping inside a laboratory? To a large extent, we can! The requirement of Lorentz invariance is a powerful constraint on Nature. Maxwell’s equations are so intricately interrelated by this invariance that, giv-

Facts about gravity, spacetime warp, Big Bang, etc.

en one of the equations, we can deduce the others.15 In fact Einstein used this approach in his development of the General Theory of Relativity, which describes gravity. Rather than infer the theory in a laborious manner from a collection of disparate facts about the motion of bodies, he formulated a symmetry that was capable of actually determining the theory. The symmetry he used is related to the invariance in the speed of objects falling in a gravitational field. He noted that it is impossible to distinguish between the effect of gravity and that of uniform acceleration—this is known as the “Equivalence Principle”—a key symmetry in nature. As a result the schema he followed is that shown in Figure 5.

Einstein’s theory of gravity

Symmetry (abstracted from one fact observed by Galileo at the Tower of Pisa)

Figure 5. New Way of Doing Physics16

This method did not catch on immediately, but by the second half of the 20th century it had become of the utmost importance. As Zee notes:

I regard Einstein’s understanding of how symmetry dictates design as one of the truly profound insights in the history of physics. Fundamental physics is

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now conducted largely according to Einstein’s schema rather than that of nineteenth century physics. Physicists in search of the fundamental design begin with a symmetry, then check to see if its consequences accord with observation.17 Equally important is the fact that symmetry principles assure us that science is a bona fide exercise: …symmetry principles tell us that physical reality, though perceived to be superficially different by different observers, is in fact one and the same physical reality at the structural level…[in the case of isospin] one observer sees a proton, but another observer, whose viewpoint is isospin rotated from the first, may insist that he sees a neutron. They are both right…18 As noted earlier, the relativity of uniform motion—essentially the principle of inertia—is also a symmetry of nature. That is, it reflects the same physical reality, so no further explanation of such motion is needed in terms of contiguous efficient causes.

Measurability

Examples

Ordinary objects Directly measurable

Macroscopic objects

Quantum Measurable subject to limitations (uncertainty principle)

Subatomic particleswave/particle duality

Perhaps more importantly, symmetry principles severely constrain the form the physical laws can take. When Einstein realized that he had to modify Newtonian physics to make it compatible with Lorentz invariance, he did not have a free hand: The revision of Newtonian mechanics was not up to Einstein; it is dictated by Lorentz invariance [symmetry]…That the longevity of stars, the magic of light, the compass needle seeking north, and the frog’s leg twitching are all interrelated and controlled by one symmetry principle—now that is a real surprise!19 Symmetry represents a way of measuring reality, in an important sense. Zubiri rightly emphasized the notion of measurability with respect to knowledge of the real, and at one point referred to the “coercive force of the real”, which was prescient with respect to symmetry and its role (though the original context was the noetic expression of the force of reality with respect to our impressions).20 A summary of the modes of reality and their measurability, based on QFT, is shown in Table 1. Mode of Reality Virtual Phantom

Inferred from effects; characteristic would violate physical laws if directly measurable Virtual particles

Not measurable but physical in some sense

Vector potential, isospin space, weak isospin space, gauge fields

Quasipostulation Not physical but real and connected with physical reality

Postulation Strictly mathematical

Symmetry

Hilbert spaces, imaginary numbers

Table 1. Measurability and Modes of Reality in Modern Physical Theory

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The Scientific Method in Zubiri’s Philosophy and Zubiri’s Philosophy of Scientific Reality Two key notions in Zubiri’s philosophy of reality with respect to science are that of canon and postulation. We shall review these briefly. The Canon of Reality Zubiri pointed out the key role of the canon of reality in his work. Canon comes from the Greek , rule. Though introduced much earlier and used by Kant and others, he believes that the original, etymological meaning is the only one that is valid: That reality which is already known intellectively is not a medium but a measure, both with respect to what concerns what is real and what concerns that which we call “form and mode of reality”. Now, that which is measuring is always reality in the profound sense. But the measurement is always brought about by some particular metric. Reality as the measuring principle is what I term canon of reality.21 Simply put, the canon of scientific reality is the set of entities usable in scientific explanation or acceptable as outcome or prediction of scientific theory. Knowledge through reason in all its forms involves the canon: …reason consists in measuring the reality of things; in it real things give us the measure of their reality. But reason measures reality in accordance with canonic principles which are sensed in the field manner.22 So science as knowledge inevitably works by utilizing a canon that is the set of things deemed to be acceptable as objects of science. This is often taken in general terms as “matter and energy”. The implication is that the canon can be clearly and unambiguously delineated. However, upon closer inspection, the canon of science or the canon of scientific reality is often

hazy. For example, in medicine, there is the problem of the interaction of mind and body. What is the mind, and is it real, does it form part of the canon? Are colors naturalistic? What about other psychological phenomena, such sounds, or even dreams? While it might be relatively easy to disregard dreams, colors are more difficult. If we discount or reject colors, we are in danger of rejecting the whole basis for our perception of nature and natural phenomena. In the 18th century, it was widely accepted that there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and that only the former were really important with respect to nature. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, physicists thought that they had everything pegged with a deterministic billiard-ball model of reality. The idea of things that could be waves under some circumstances and particles under another was not part of their canon. Nor were things that had inherent uncertainties. But even in high-energy physics today, supposedly the hardest of the hardcore science, things are not always so clear. Nobody knows what dark matter is, let alone dark energy, how they may interact with “regular” matter, or what properties they may have. The uncertainty principle made clear that full explanation by means of physical laws, as envisioned by Laplace’s Demon, was an unrealizable fantasy, thus delivering a great blow to reductionism. A review of the history of science readily discloses that science has repeatedly and profoundly changed our view of the world and of reality, and thus affected our canon of reality, as well as affecting the specific canon of scientific reality. The canon of reality allows us to search for new things and new forms of reality. It is thus a guide, but of a particular and essential sort: A canon is not a system of normative judgments but is, as the etymology of the word expresses precisely, a “metric”; it is not a judgment or a system of

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judgments which regulate affirmative measurement. This “metric” is just what was previously known intellectively as real in its form and in its mode of reality. The thinking intellection goes off in search of the real beyond what was previously intellectively known, based upon the canon of reality already known.23 Successful theories remain as beyondreality-postulations and the reality they postulate usually enlarges our canon of reality; unsuccessful theories become essentially literary postulations; indeed, “science fiction” as a literary genre is closely related to failed scientific theories. Thus the Theory of Relativity gave us relative space and time, and the speed of light as a universal constant, as well as the equivalence of mass and energy, made famous by E = mc2 and of course nuclear weapons. Zubiri believes that one of the principal errors of past philosophers was their excessively static view of knowledge—a conquer it “once and for all” approach. Typical of this mentality are the repeated attempts to devise a definitive list of “categories”, such as those of Aristotle and Kant, and Kant’s integration of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry into the fabric of his philosophy. Knowledge as a human enterprise is both dynamic and limited. It is limited because the canon of reality, like reality itself, can never be completely fathomed. It is limited because as human beings we are limited and must constantly search for knowledge. The phrase “exhaustive knowledge” is an oxymoron: The limitation of knowledge is certainly real, but this limitation is something derived from the intrinsic and formal nature of rational intellection, from knowing as such, since it is inquiring intellection. Only because rational intellection is formally inquiring, only because of this must one always seek more and, finding what was sought, have it become the principle of the next

search. Knowledge is limited by being knowledge. An exhaustive knowledge of the real would not be knowledge; it would be intellection of the real without necessity of knowledge. Knowledge is only intellection in search. Not having recognized the intrinsic and formal character of rational intellection as inquiry is what led to…subsuming all truth under the truth of affirmation.24 [Italics added] In Zubiri’s word’s, reason is “measuring intellection of the real in depth”.25 There are two moments of reason to be distinguished (1) intellection in depth, e.g., electromagnetic theory is intellection in depth of color;26 (2) its character as measuring, in the most general sense, akin to the notion of measure in advanced mathematics (functional analysis). For example, prior to the twentieth century, material things were assimilated to the notion of “body”; that was the measure of all material things. But with the development of quantum mechanics, a new conception of material things was forced upon science, one which is different from the traditional notion of “body”. The canon of real things was thus enlarged, so that the measure of something is no longer necessarily that of “body”. Measuring, in this sense, and the corresponding canon of reality, are both dynamic and are a key element in Zubiri’s quest to avoid the problems and failures of past philosophies based on static and unchanging conceptions of reality. Postulation and reality Because reality is a formality, and not a zone of things, its content can be postulated. This is the primary vehicle for disciplines such as mathematics and literature. But it also is important in science since science postulates the content of reality through its theories—loosely speaking, we could say that it postulates reality. As Zubiri explains: In-depth reality is actualized in what has been freely constructed by postulation…It is not truth which is postulated

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but real content. And this is so whether dealing with theoretical or nontheoretical construction. It is not postulation of reality but reality in postulation. One postulates what belongs to something [suyo] but not the de suyo itself. Postulation is the mode by which in-depth reality is endowed with a freely constructed content.27 The great success of science over the past four centuries has been due to its use of such postulation: In physics, at the beginning of the modern age, there were two great free creative efforts to intellectively know rationally the in-depth reality of the universe. One consisted in the idea that the universe is a great organism whose diverse elements comprise systems by sympathy and antipathy. But this never had much success. The one which triumphed was the other conception. It was the free creation which postulates for cosmic reality a mathematical structure. That was Galileo’s idea in his New Science: the great book of the universe, he tells us, is written in geometric language, i.e., mathematics.28 Due to the state of knowledge of mathematics—what we would now term “ordinary differential equations”—this view of physics became identified with a particular type of determinism known as mechanism, and the idea that science could be other than mechanistic in this sense was changed only after prolonged battles, fought mostly in the early decades of the 20th century. But this changed with the development of quantum mechanics, when the recognition of the probabilistic nature of physical laws was forced upon the reluctant practitioners of physics—but was understandable because of advanced in mathematics itself, which made clear that determinism was a special case of probabilistic and statistical descriptions. Thus The mathematical structure of the universe subsists independently of its earlier mechanistic form, which was too limiting. Mathematicism is not mecha-

nism. And all of this is, without any doubt, a free creation for rationally intellectively knowing the foundation of all the cosmos. Its fertility is quite apparent. Nonetheless, the fabulous success of the idea of a mathematical universe cannot hide its character of free creation, of free postulation, which precisely by being free leaves some unsuspected aspects of nature in the dark.29 With the notions of canon and postulation, it is possible to construct Zubiri’s vision of the scientific method. Scientific method Zubiri never explicitly stated his notion of the so-called “scientific method”, but it is possible to deduce it from his writings, and in particular, his idea of the canon of reality and his notion of postulation of reality. Indeed, by formulating the scientific method in terms of these two ideas, matters are notably clarified. In this approach science involves 5 steps: 1. Start with some knowledge of reality (at all three noetic levels-primoridial apprehension, logos, and reason). All science is based on observations which ultimately derive from primordial apprehension, and all rational explanations are intended to tell us about reality beyond apprehension which may account for our observations. Typically the scientist starts from knowledge at least at the logos level, and more often at the level of reason. For example, the Special Theory of Relativity starts with observations about Galilean (non-accelerated) frames, and the speed of light, and as we noted, symmetry in the form of the Lorentz transformation. All of these are already concepts at the rational level, though they clearly use the logos level because things are named. Likewise quantum mechanics starts with the observed distribution of light frequencies from atoms, and Maxwell’s theory starts with observations about electric and magnetic fields. In the theory of evolu-

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tion, as promulgated by Darwin, one starts with observations about similarities in physiological function and also historical sequences of organisms, the existence of random changes in genetic material, and the existence of the process of natural selection. 2. Postulate the content of reality. This may involve postulation of new things such as atoms or quarks, and their characteristics stemming from their essences; or it may involve postulation of new relationships among things already known, such as the Universal Gas Law. There may be a combination of the two. In the case of the Special Theory of Relativity, the reality postulated is that the speed of light is a universal constant, and that all Galilean frames are equivalent, i.e., there is no absolute space or time. Quantum mechanics postulates that energy is quantized and that the position of particles is described by a probability density function—which is equivalent to saying that they do not have absolute position and momentum. Maxwell’s theory postulates a set of relationships among electric and magnetic fields, as expressed in his famous four equations. Darwin’s theory postulates that random mutations operated on by natural selection can account entirely for the history of life on earth.

3. Explore the postulated content (reality). At this stage the scientist explores the new content of reality which has been postulated by the tools at his disposal. Typically this involves deduction or other inference of consequences about the new reality, and possibly visits to new places, construction of new experimental equipment, or reexamination of existing materials. 4. Verify. At this stage the scientist seeks to determine if what has been learned through the exploration of postulated content (reality) is in accord with our experience of reality beyond apprehension. This is done by finding things in the postulated reality which have not yet been observed in reality beyond apprehension, and then searching for them in that reality, usually by experimentation. Verification in this case takes the form of congruence. 5. Check for satisfactory result. If the new theory works for known data, and makes successful predictions, make any necessary additions to the accepted canon of scientific reality, and continue to explore reality seeking new evidence, for or against the theory. In the case of discrepancies, gather more data, rethink postulations, and then continue through the loop until a satisfactory level of agreement exists. See Figure 6.

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Gather data Rethink Postulate reality Gather more data if necessary

Explore postulated reality

Modify Canon of reality if necessary

Verify N

Y Satisfactory?

Figure 6. Scientific Method Based on Zubiri’s Philosophy For Zubiri, of course, reality is formality, and not a zone of things. Hence the realists’ fundamental problem—how to establish a relationship between mathematical formulations of scientific laws and theories and the real world—is not an issue because any scientific theory itself postulates reality. Thus the real issue—for both science and philosophy—is not why we can describe reality with our theories, but how well postulated reality corresponds to reality beyond apprehension. We can describe reality with our theories because they postulate it. For example, phlogiston was postulated to account for observed transformations in combustion. But further research disclosed that there is no such entity—it did not correspond well with reality beyond apprehension. However the postulation of subatomic particles such as electrons, photons, and quarks has proved useful. The integration of postulated reality and apprehension is very tight in Zubiri’s philosophy. This is illustrated by his famous example of photons and color: the photons are postulated reality, but there are not two realities, photons and color; rather, color is the photons as sensed: Now, reason or explanation is above all the intellection of the real in depth.

Only as an explanation of color is there intellection of electromagnetic waves or photons. The color which gives us pause to think is what leads us to the electromagnetic wave or to the photon. If it were not for this giving us pause to think, there would be no intellection of a beyond whatsoever; there would be at most a succession of intellections “on this side”.30 5. Modify the canon of reality. Successful theories remain as beyond-realitypostulations and the reality they postulate usually enlarges our canon of reality; unsuccessful theories become essentially literary postulations; indeed, “science fiction” as a literary genre is closely related to failed scientific theories. Thus the Theory of Relativity gave us relative space and time, and the speed of light as a universal constant, as well as the equivalence of mass and energy, made famous by E = mc2 and of course nuclear weapons. Note that steps (3) and (4) do not require experiments such as those typically done in chemistry and physics; it is only necessary for the theory to tell the scientist to look where he has not looked before, to find something that he has not found before. Otherwise sciences such as cosmology and geology, for example, could not

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exist, since we cannot make stars in a laboratory, or even travel to them. Nor can we recreate mountain-building plate tectonics. Revisions to Zubiri’s Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Reality It is with respect to postulation of reality that the new view of physics has led us to a more profound understanding. Rather than postulate a new descriptive law, such as the Universal Gas Law or Schrodinger’s equation, the physicist starts with some basic observations and a symmetry principle, and infers the descriptive law. For example, consider the hydrogen atom: …the rotational symmetry group imposes the shapes that a hydrogen atom can assume, and…the energies associated with these structures are accurately reflected in the hydrogen spectrum.31 Now there are many symmetries possible, often expressed in terms of symmetry groups, such as SO(2), the group of rotations about a point in two dimensions; or SO(3), the group of rotations about the origin in three dimensions, etc. So utilizing the Myth of the Cave from Plato, the task of the physicist is metaphorically, to ascend from the cave of day-to-day experience in which he sees but the shadows of ultimate reality on the wall, to the light of day of reality, to wit, the symmetries which govern reality, though mathematics. Zee Notes: The discovery of a symmetry is much more than the discovery of a specific phenomenon. A symmetry of spacetime, such as rotational invariance or Lorentz invariance, controls all of physics…Lorentz invariance, born of electromagnetism, proceeds to revolutionize mechanics. And once the laws of motion of particles are revised, our conception of gravity has to be changed as well, since gravity moves particles.32 What is most interesting is that all these

symmetries have already been discovered and analyzed by mathematicians; so what Zee is referring to here is not the discovery per se, but the discovery of applicability. Thus physicists are not in the business of discovering new symmetries, but rather with determining in which symmetries physical reality “participates”, so to speak. With respect to mathematics, Zubiri notes: A free thing is the physical reality with a freely postulated content. Such are the objects of mathematics, for they are real objects constituted in the physical moment of “the” reality in a field, the same reality according to which things like this stone are real. The moment of reality is identical in both cases; what is not the same is their content and their mode of reality. The stone has reality in and by itself, whereas the circle has reality only by postulation. Nonetheless the moment of reality is identical.33 So in this sense we have mathematical realities determining, not describing, reality. In this way, the boundary between mathematics and physics—long thought to be unbridgeable—has now broken down. The postulation step in science, or at least in fundamental physics, is postulation of a symmetry—something already real, from mathematics—from which implications about reality beyond apprehension are drawn, rather than a direct postulation of reality beyond apprehension. This is the sense in which Zubiri’s philosophy of reality must be modified. What is the reality of symmetry? Symmetry, known and studied by mathematicians since the 19th century, is real in the same sense as other mathematical objects—spaces, irrational numbers, etc. But not every symmetry governs reality. So those symmetries that have been found to “dictate” reality—in the form of fixing particle number, types, and characteristics—have a special type of reality which goes beyond that of pure mathematical objects, but is not that of directly observable entities such as bodies or even waves. It does not seem that Zubiri anticipated

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this blurring of the distinction between mathematics and science, though it most likely would have delighted and intrigued him, especially in view of his theory of the reality of mathematical objects and the recognition of reality as formality rather than a zone of things. In a famous essay, Nobelist Eugene Wigner asked why mathematics is so effective in describing reality through science.34 While it is obviously impossible to give a non-theological answer to this question, Zubiri’s philosophy at least gives some insight. The fact that mathematicians postulate reality, and postulate many types of reality, with widely varying structurality, suggests that some of these postulations might have applicability to our experience of reality. Kant’s explanation of this applicability—that the mind synthesizes reality according to rational principles such as Newtonian mechanics—is clearly wrong. Zubiri’s idea, applied to symmetry, seems much closer to the truth. Although symmetry is a notion that comes from ordinary experience, its applicability in fundamental physics stems from extensive work (i.e., postulation) on the part of mathematicians of such things as symmetry groups. The symmetries that appear to govern reality stem from postulation first as reality by mathematicians, then postulation as reality in some sense by physicists describing the world. How far the use of symmetry will take us, that is, the extent to which reality “participates” in symmetry, is unclear. Attempts to unify the four forces of nature based on ever larger symmetry groups appear to have stalled, at least in the sense that “supersymmetry” and string theory are not yielding any verifiable predictions. In QFT, forces are interpreted as interactions with gauge bosons, as noted earlier; but gravity has stubbornly resisted this interpretation. As for the scientific method, the postulation step is where a small correction must be made. As noted, the scientist postulates not a law describing reality beyond apprehension, but a symmetry of

nature. And he only postulates the applicability of an already known symmetry. Then he proceeds to deduce the consequences and see how well the fit observations. Because of its belief in reality as a zone of things, the situation we now have in physics, with virtual particles, symmetry, and gauge fields, matters are very dire for the empirical tradition in philosophy, capped by Hume, for whom knowledge was divided into matters of fact and relations of ideas. The rather stark overlap of “ideas”, i.e. mathematics, and “fact”, i.e., physical reality, makes his philosophy and that of the other empiricists untenable. In a related vein, the general Kantian approach is also untenable. Kant accepted by and large Hume’s criticisms, but sought to overcome them by building causality and physics as then understood into his philosophy. The idea that “categories” can change and expand (essentially Zubiri’s canon of reality) was not really amenable to Kant’s philosophy; and the idea that mathematical notions such as symmetry can exercise a power over reality does not fit either, since Kant envisioned the domination of mind over matter as a type of synthesis of raw experience by the mind, not something that the mind can truly grasp of reality. The situation for the rationalist philosophies is somewhat better, but their lack of basis in empiricism is still ultimately fatal. Zubiri’s comments still hold true by and large: In summary, that which specifies intellection, making of it knowledge, is indepth reality. And this in-depth reality does not consist in either objective ground (Kant), or in intelligible entity (Plato), or in causality, still less in necessary causality (Aristotle), or in the absolute (Hegel). In-depthness is the mere “beyond” as “ground-reality” in all the multiple modes and forms which this beyond can assume. Causality or the principles of a deductive form of knowledge are not thereby excluded,

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nor are the possible steps toward an absolute reality. What is excluded is the idea that something of sort formally constitutes the in-depth reality in which reason is installed by the movement of intellection as thrown from from the field to the beyond.35 Conclusion Zubiri’s philosophy of scientific reality is able to absorb the new developments in QFT, as is the scientific method implied by his philosophy. In particular, the new modes of reality, represented by gauge

fields, virtual particles, and symmetry groups, fit quite well with his thinking that the canon of reality is never fixed, and can be expanded. The new modes of reality do not have to be identified with “bodies” in any classical sense. Nor is it the case that we are compelled to think about reality in these ways, as Kant believed. We have discovered these new forms of reality in the course of normal scientific investigation, and they have replaced earlier notions.

Notes 1

The text of this article will appear in a revised from in a forthcoming book on Zubiri’s theology, co-written by several Zubiri scholars. Xavier Zubiri, Inteligencia y Razón (Madrid: Alianza Editorial/Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1983), 57.

2

3

Ibid., p. 56-57; English edition, p. 261. Leonard Susskind and George Hrabovsky, The Theoretical Minimum, New York: Basic Books, 2013, p. 195.

4

Chris Quigg, Gauge Theories of the Strong, Weak, and Electromagnetic Interactions, Redwood City: California, Addison-Wesley, 1983, p. 43-44.

5

6

Susskind and Hrabovsky, op. cit., p. 211.

7

IRE, p. 207; English edition, p. 75.

8

Xavier Zubiri, Inteligencia y realidad (IRE), p. 104-105; English edition, Sentient Intelligence, tr. by Thomas Fowler, Washington, DC: Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America, 1999, p. 40.

9

IRA, p. 57; English edition, p. 261.

10

Robert Klauber, Student Friendly Quantum Field Theory, p. 340, 352.

11

Ibid., p. 307.

12

Anthony Zee, Fearful Symmetry, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 159160.

13

Vincent Icke, The Force of Symmetry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 103.

14

After Anthony Zee, Fearful Symmetry, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 96.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid., p. 97.

17

Ibid., p. 96.

18

Zee, p. 160.

19

Zee, p. 73.

20

IRA, p. 310; English edition, p. 352.

21

IRA, p. 57; English edition, p. 261.

22

IRA, p. 310-311; English edition, p. 352.

Zubiri, Sentient Intelligence, op. cit., p. 261; Inteligencia y razon, p. 57.

23

Zubiri, Inteligencia y razón, p. 261-262; Sentient Intelligence, p. 336. 25 Zubiri, Inteligencia y razón, p. 45; Sentient Intelligence, p. 257. 26 Zubiri, Inteligencia y razón, p. 43; Sentient Intelligence, p. 256-257. 27 IRA, p. 129-30; English edition, p. 285. 24

28

IRA, p. 132; English edition, p. 286.

29

IRA, p. 132; English edition, p. 286.

30

IRA, p. 43; English edition, p. 256-257.

31

Vincent Icke, The Force of Symmetry, p. 102.

32

Zee, p. 73-74.

33

Zubiri, Inteligencia y logos, p. 134; English edition, p. 153.

34

Eugene Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”, Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 13, No. 1 (February, 1960). Reprinted in The World of Physics, Vol. 3, ed. by Jefferson Hane Weaver, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987, pp. 82-96.

35

IRA, p. 168-169; English edition, p. 302.

XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015

Naturaleza, Estructura y Sostenibilidad

Francisco Ortega Universidad de Sevilla Sevilla, España

Abstract We start from consideration of “economic relationship” as a dialectical relationship between Man and Nature, and as such what is truly real is the Global System that this relationship determines. This system consists of two analytic moments, first what we mean by “Nature,” “World” or “Reality” (or physis) and another what we mean by “man” (or “society”) as constituted in an institutional structure. Every structure is determined by an ideology (superstructure), and to change the former a change in the latter is also required, which requires leaving the modernist conceptualization of the economy based on positivism and analytic philosophy and going to a more contemporary view, in which Reality is a system (graph) consisting of nodes or meaning-things configured dialecticly or respectively. Finally, we present concrete examples of modernist economic structures that do not allow a sustainable system in the human-nature relationship (such as the supposed laws governing natural parks in Andalusia) Resumen Partimos de la consideración de la “relación económica” como una relación dialéctica entre Hombre y Naturaleza, como tal lo verdaderamente real es el Sistema Global que dicha relación determina. Dicho Sistema consta de dos momentos analíticos, por un lado lo que entendemos por Naturaleza, Mundo o Realidad (o Physis) y por otro el Hombre (o sociedad) en cuanto constituido en una estructura institucional. Toda estructura viene determinada por la ideología (superestructura) y para cambiar aquella también se requiere cambiar esta, lo cual requiere salir de la conceptuación meramente modernista de la economía que encierra el Positivismo y la Filosofía Analítica por una más Contemporánea, desde la cual la Realidad son sistemas (grafos) constituidos por nodos o cosas-sentidos dialéctica o respectivamente configurados. Por último presentamos ejemplos concretos de estructuras económicas modernistas que no permiten un sistema sostenible en la relación Hombre-Naturaleza (como son las supuestas leyes rectoras en parque naturales andaluces) Entiéndase que la relación económica de una Sociedad (o de una persona considerada particularmente como sistema biológico) con el Mundo es el modo que esa colectivo tiene de interaccionar con el medio de cara a su viabilidad existencial, es decir a la simple permanencia temporal o existencia (en el sentido escolástico). Entiéndase también que en un grado absoluto de abstraccion los dos términos

relacionales son también subsistemas, por un lado el Mundo es un sistema relacional (la Naturaleza o Physis como ecosistema global que supone el planeta Tierra con sus diferentes especies vivientes) y por otro lado el Hombre (como Grupo Social Global, como el cómputo de personas que constituyen los habitantes del Planeta). Hablar de supervivencia es hablar de la sostenibilidad o sustantividad de la Uni43

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dad del Sistema como un todo relacional Hombre-Mundo, es decir, lo verdaderamente real no es la Naturaleza o la Sociedad en cuanto subsistemas independientes sino la relación misma como Sistema Total. Pero además, entiéndase que esa sustantividad o sostenibilidad consistente en la permanencia de la actividad relacional es dinámica y lo cual nunca es mecánica sino teleológica; lo importante es que el telos o fin al que tiende no implique la extinción de la relación misma sino a un equilibrio entre los subsistemas para lograr su permanencia sine die. Desde el orto de la Cultura Occidental en los Presocráticos (interpretación de Zubiri de Parménides), entendemos que lo que Hay o Ser es una actividad de ser; un “estar sosteniéndose” o “estar siendo”, en gerundio, lo verdaderamente existente es la relación dinámica y no los términos relacionales como momentos aislados o posiciones absolutas contrapuestas, como entiende el Ser la Cultura Oriental. Es decir, desde una consideración Contemporánea y Occidental, la Unidad Sistémica que hay que sostener es en toda regla una relación dialéctica en el sentido hegeliano del mismo: la relación de la Natura o Physis con lo otro que no es ella, el Hombre. En toda relación dialéctica, un término o momento de la relación de define abstractamente por su oposición al otro, pero lo verdaderamente real es la relación misma en cuanto Sistema. Ahora bien, si queremos hacer una análisis de la relación desglosando sus términos, los podemos separar como momentos constitutivos aunque siempre siendo conscientes de que cada uno de ellos son meros momentos abstractos, lo verdaderamente real es su “respectividad” constituyente en cuanto actividad relacional. El Hombre no es algo “aparte” de la Naturaleza ni ésta algo diferente a su relación con el Hombre, aunque sea en una mera relación cognitiva. Por ejemplo, ¿habría electrones o bosones sin el Hombre que constituya su presencia en su mente? Pues bien, si analizamos el Sistema Global como un supuesto y ficticio ecosistema económico y para ello separamos

analíticamente los términos relacionales Naturaleza-Hombre, tenemos que: a) Por su lado la Physis aporta a la relación una “fuerza impositiva” que es la fuente del “estar siendo” de la relación misma, este es un elemento formal imprescindible para la relación puesto que la condición ontológica del Hombre es la de mera “apertura”, es decir algo que tiene condiciones para “recibir”, una fuerza externa que llamamos fuerza física. Es el sentido originario del término Physis en la Antigua Grecia y lo que Aristóteles entenderá por substancia en cuanto fuente que hace que lo que Hay esté ahí o se sustente ahí por sí mismo. Otro problema sería cómo históricamente esa substentabilidad ha llegado a entenderse; recorrido que va desde la noción de aje, a los eidos platónicos, a las cualidades substantivas básicas de Aristóteles (aire, agua, fuego, tierra) hasta la noción moderna de átomo como o mínima extensión (espacio-tiempo) divisible, y la contemporánea de cuerda. Todo lo cual es un problema de hermenútica histórica (entender el contexto histórico que condicionó el inicio de la investigación de la Tabla Periódica hasta el actual Bosson de Higgs), en el cual ahora no entramos. En definitiva, decimos que el Ser es lo que Hay en cuanto un “de suyo” físico o fuerza en cuanto que es algo que se impone “en, por desde” sí mismo (Inteligencia Sentiente). b) Por el otro lado, el Hombre en cuanto el “otro” término de la relación, lo que aporta es no una formalidad sino el contenido de la relación, digamos que el Hombre aporta la parte “psíquica” o “intencional” (Husserl) que constituye la relación con un sentido cognitivo teórico y práctico para el Hombre mismo en cuanto consciencia, sentido que a su vez determina el telos de la relación. Con tal el Hombre es un subsistema que se concreta en una “estructura” institucional, desde la cual se materializa la relación misma. Lo decisivo es que aprehendemos la relación económica Hombre-Naturaleza como una relación con “tal” contenido, aprehendemos las cosas de la Physis como tales cosas con un sentido funcional para de la

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vida humana, así aprehendemos la Realidad o el Mundo como un sistema esencial o campo global de significación constituido por tales entidades u objetividades con un significado determinado, el cual también es un sistema dialéctico o relacional (Zubiri diría de respectividades) Teorizar ahora sobre las condiciones de la objetividad y la significación humana nos va a llevar demasiado lejos (Inteligencia y Logos), lo importante ahora es entender lo que llamamos “estructura” en cuanto instrumento institucional desde la que Hombre constituye la actividad del Sistema relacional Hombre-Physis. “Estructura” es un rancio concepto utilizado por la Antropología Cultural (Estructuralismo) pero su origen está en la Filosofía Marxista. Viene a significar el conjunto de normas, instituciones, ritos, regulaciones,... desde la que se efectúa la relación misma y que determinan un contendido o sentido concreto teórico-práctico de la forma-Physis. Dicha estructura institucional a su vez, determina la instalación del Hombre en la Physis desde una “infraestructura” como manera de materializarse esa estructura. La estructura está causando una determinada infraestructura en cuanto modo ejecutivo o agente material de la estructura en su acción con la Physis, esto es, la infraestructura es: el tipo de construcciones civiles de una habitat físico, de industrias productivas, la infraestructura viaria, energética. Por ejemplo, si una estructura energética prima la obtención de energía a través de centrales nucleares, la infraestructura que concreta esa interacción serán plantas tales. La estructura económica es lo que el bueno de Marx quería cambiar con su “revolución”, es decir, la estructura institucional de producción de momento histórico, que fue la de final del XIX, para así generar otra infraestructura de cara a un reparto más comunitario de la riqueza (hasta alcanzar una utópica riqueza tal que permita a todos los miembros d ela colectividad existir según sus necesidades). Ahora bien, en relación a ella, también se refería a una “superestructura” o ideología como marco de sentido justifica-

tivo de esa estructura. Ese concepto de ideología ha evolucionado y actualmente ya no lo entendemos con la connotación peyorativa que tenía para Marx, para él estaba determinada por la estructura institucional era el instrumento de justificación lógico-hermenéutica de la misma con el fin de perpetuarse; sin embargo actualmente se usa en un sentido más positivo como “marco” cultural de principios teóricos, conjunto de valores, conceptos, aptitudes, teorías... necesarios que dan de sí una estructura. La ideología es un “círculo hermenéutico”, un “horizonte de sentido”, una “visión del mundo”... que causa y determina una estructura. Siempre nos queda la vieja cuestión de si para cambiar la estructura (por lo tanto la infraestructura) como marco normativo de instalación del Hombre en la Physis hace falta primero cambiar la ideología o a la inversa (como consideraba el materialismo dialéctico). En todo caso, en su sentido amplio, una ideología es una cultura en cuanto consciencia social que determina una estructura la cual determina a su vez una infraestructura. Siguiendo con nuestro ejemplo, el que mayoritariamente tengamos plantas nucleares depende de las normas e instituciones que lo hacen posible y a su vez estas depende de la ideología cultural que le da sentido. Esta consideración del Hombre es puramente heideggeriana: el Hombre es “pastor del ser”, entifica el ser, al nombrarlo y darle sentido crea las entidades que constituyen la Physis. Así cada sociedad culturalmente diferenciable e históricamente constituida constituye o crea su propio “mundo entorno”, crea su propio “claro de bosque”, o “cuida del ser” a su propia manera. Es decir, la vida humana se realiza desde un conjunto de entidades esenciales que se definen entre sí (dialécticamente o en respectividad) constituyendo un marco cultural o ideológico (genos o campo de sentido), y si se quiere cambiar la estructura e infraestructura relacional de Hombre con la Physis también hay que cambiar ese marco superestructural. En definitiva, es la ideología como ámbito psíquico de una colectivo (Espíritu Objetivo de Hegel) quien determina en

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realidad que algo es lo que es, algo es tal cosa por “no ser otra”, es un ente porque se define negativamente o dialécticamente en más o menos grado respecto a otro ente dentro del campo de sentido o marco ideológico que la constituye como “tal cosa”. Un campo de sentido es cualquier teoría científica, o simplemente el campo de los colores del arco iris (el rojo es rojo porque no es verde, azul,...), una novela, el sistema monetario internacional (el valor del euro es respecto al cambio con el yuan, el rublo, el dólar,...), etc. Una cultura es un amplio “campo de sentido” o marco ideológico de entidades, una respecto a las otras desde la que se despliega la vida de los humanos que comparten esa cultura, y donde cada cosa-ente es lo que es por relación a las demás. Por eso a veces es tan difícil la comprensión intercultural que en realidad es como un diálogo de sordos. Pues bien, sea como sea verdaderamente la ideología es la que determina la estructura de una sociedad histórica (no entramos en la vieja disputa del materialismo histórico respecto a prioridad de la una sobre la otra). De esta manera las ideologías alternativas son utopías, en el sentido que P. Ricoeur pretende, como motores necesario para el cambio de la realidad en que se vive (Ideología y Utopía, 1997). En principio toda ideología tienden a justificar o dar sentido a una realidad, por lo tanto es conservadora, la utopía tiende a proponer estructuras alternativas dando lugar a otra infraestructura, otro medio de acción del Hombre es en su instalación en la Physis. Pues bien, después de este largo preámbulo hay que decir que toda estructura social como espíritu objetivo desde el que el Hombre se instala en el Mundo, tiene tres ejes: eje horizontal o estructura económica, que regula las relaciones del Hombre con la Physis de cara a la substentabilidad existencial o vital; eje circular o estructura política, que regula las relaciones del Hombre consigo mismo de cara a la substentabilidad del Hombre como grupo social; eje vertical o estructura religiosa, regula la relación del Hombre con lo que no es medio físico ni grupo social, sino

con lo Tras-cendente. Aquí sólo atendemos ahora al eje horizontal o estructura económica, y hay que “darse cuenta” que para cambiar ésta de cómo está actualmente constituida, y se presenta como algo necesario ya que la actual nos está llevando a una situación claramente insostenible de cara a existencia del Sistema Naturaleza-Hombre como Sociedad Global, hacia una relación más ecológica o sostenible hay también que cambiar la ideología o marco cultural predominante y ¿cuál es el marco ideológico que se manifiesta en la estructura que regula la relación Hombre-Naturaleza en la actualidad? La estructura económica actual es todavía claramente “modernista” sin llegar a reflejar la nueva y diferente ideología que ya podríamos entender claramente como “contemporánea”. Para entender esto hace falta un breve recorrido histórico. La salida de la Cultura Occidental de la mentalidad medieval supuso una secularización de lo real y de la vida en su conjunto. Con la Modernidad la Cultura Occidental rompe definitivamente con el sentido que proporciona a su vida la existencia de un mundo tras-cendente y trata de asumir su “mayoría de edad” reconociendo nuestra soledad en la vida “frente” a la Physis. Que el hecho de vivir suponga un enfrentamiento con la Naturaleza es algo que ideológicamente viene de lejos y se corresponde con nuestro arquetipo bíblico representado por la “caída” y consiguiente expulsión del Paraíso, pero el reconocimiento de esa capacidad de intervención de una voluntad trascendente es el hecho determinante de la instalación del Hombre en el Mundo, pero ahora bien, en la “modernidad” ya no hay una “voluntad” providente y más o menos paternal que nos ayude en ello. El Hombre Moderno frente al Medieval se define por el hecho de estar enfrentado” él solo” a la alteridad de la Physis, desde ese consideración pretende una relación de dominio sobre ella, su afirmación como “mayor de edad” radicaría en el ejercicio de ese dominio y para ello cuenta con la “razón” en cuanto función psíquica para establecer un “ámbito

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transcendental” desde el que ejercer dicho dominio. Entender con claridad que trascendente es el mundo allende la conciencia tal como lo entendía la Filosofía Antigua y Medieval y trans-cendental es el mundo como presencia en la conciencia humana tal y como lo entiende la Filosofía Moderna y Contemporánea; transcendental porque podemos trans-itar de una presencia primordial a otra de los mismo pero simbólicamente elaborada. El modelo necesitar un “dominio” está también en el arquetipo bíblico de la “voluntad” divina como potencia dominadora, y es un principio en la fundamentación de la estructura relacional, sólo que ahora desplazada al Hombre: es la voluntad humana quien constituye el Mundo no la de Dios Efectivamente el Renacimiento es un Humanismo. Este principio ideológico es el que determina el sentido fundamental de la estructura económica en la Modernidad, lo cual se concreta a nivel ideológico en la posesión o aprehensión cuantitativa de la Physis y a nivel práctico en la Revolución Industrial. El refuerzo conductista a ese papel de supuesta dominación nos viene a través de éxito que proporciona la Mecánica Newtoniana como teoría explicativa de la Physis, y en la práctica en el “aparente” dominio sobre la Physis que es la Industria Moderna. Esto llevará a la Cultura Occidental al “orgullo ilustrado” y a la noción de “progreso”, nociones ya decadentes en la actualidad. El Dios Bíblico como idea de una entidad substante, infinita y perfecta y tras-cendente queda en la Modernidad relegado a condición necesaria pero meramente teórica, a mera petición de principio lógico-discursivo, algo supuesto pero sin protagonismo ni actuación en la vida humana y ni mucho menos en la relación económica. El Dios moderno es un mero relojero, o un papirotero, o un postulado de la razón práctica, un avalista del orden racional, el primer principio innato,...,todo lo que se quiera pero ya no se concibe que intervenga en la temporalidad e Historia Humana (Deísmo de Voltaire). Este alejamiento de una la providencia trascendente es el proceso de secularización

que supone la Modernidad. El Hombre y su vida tiene sentido como lucha y dominio sobre la Naturaleza, desterrado del Paraíso está enfrentado a la Naturaleza como trabajo (ética luterana y calvinista), y para vencer en esa lucha hay que descubrir, controlar y predecir y para ello hay que aprehender la Physis con el instrumento con que estad dotado nuestra condición natural: nuestra “razón”, la cual a su vez es una función psíquica que tiene como fundamento el “principio de identidad”. La Modernidad insiste y re-insiste en establece un nuevo tipo de saber científico basado exclusivamente en las capacidades humanas y en un presunto método infalible (conjunto de reglas que en realidad ningún investigador aplica), el resultado de ese arduo proceso de delimitación y búsqueda desde Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, y Newton culmina en el Positivismo de finales del XVIII, prolongado a través del Neopositivismo y la Filosofía Analítica de principios del XX (Russell, Escuela de Viena, Hayeck, Popper...). Este saber para “dominar” lo otro consiste en constituir definiciones identitarias universales de índole cuantitativa, lo cual, unido a la idea cristiana del tiempo, dió lugar a la consigna política del “progreso” económico. El Positivismo científico pretende que la realidad aprendida como dato o positum, lo cual se verifica, confirma o falsea desde una definición constituida como algo idéntico a sí mismo en el ámbito transcendental de la conciencia, es la Realidad misma. Todo lo que se adecúe en más o menos medida a la definición es un positum verdadero (verdad lógica), lo contrario es un positum falso o no adecuado a la definición (mide o no mide tal magnitud, desde una simple lógica binaria), de esta manera, igual que el resto de disciplinas académicas, cualquier manual de economía ingenuamente todavía parte de la contundente idea de que la Economía debe ser una “ciencia positiva”. En todo caso esta ideología o “Visión Moderna del Mundo” implica: a) Una Naturaleza fija, constituida por esencias inmutables de acuerdo con su definición identitaria, de ese modo la

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Modernidad sólo concibe el movimiento como mecánico (también el atomismo antiguo fue un mecanicismo), es decir algo puede transformarse en otra cosa que no sea un múltiplo de ello mismo, si algo cambia de esencia deja de ser lo que es. Aquí no hay marco ideológico para entender los procesos dinámicos de transformación teleológica, ya sea escatológica o gradual (evolución). Efectivamente de ahí los problemas a finales del XIX para aceptar la Teoría de la Evolución como fórmula para explicar la aparición de nuevas especies vivientes. La Physis en la Modernidad es un “gigantesco retablo” de cosas o entidades “clara y distintamente” definidas, es decir, identificadas como una representación psíquica solipsista y abstracta, y que mantiene su puesto fijo en la hornacina de su parte del cosmos. Así es el mecanicismo de Galileo, Descartes, Newton,... procedente de la adopción del atomismo cuantitativo como canon interpretativo de lo que aprehendemos. Si transcendentalmente constituyo construyo simbólicamente o defino tal entidad racional: metro, newton, voltio,.... la presencia o impresión positiva (hecho sensible) que se me está actualizando es verdadera si se adecua, sino es falsa (verdad lógica. La Physis se me aparece como un gigantesco retablo ensamblado con estas unidades. La Physis está constituidas por estas entidades identitarias y la interacción entre ellas es sólo mecánica de adhesión o separación. Además si algo es tal cosa no puede dejar de serlo y ser tal otra (Fixismo). b) Sin embargo, para el Hombre Contemporáneo la Physis ya no es así, para éste la identidad o esencia de algo expresada como un concepto genérico y abstracto es una realidad que se constituye como una entidad dentro de un campo de sentido u “horizonte de esencias”, algo no es una definición “constituida” de una forma abstracta y definitiva como algo “en mí”, como algo fuera de un genos o campo de sentido de ser, no es una identificación abstracta flotando en el vacío o frente a la nada. Algo es lo que es por una relación dialéctica dentro de un sistema esencial o campo de sentido y ya no hay nada que se

pueda definir “identirariamente”. Preguntémonos, por ejemplo ¿qué es el átomo para la Física Contemporánea? Un sistema de subpartículas según el “modelo standar” ¿Cuál de las subpartículas –y ya se definen más de doscientas- sería el verdadero átomo? ¿El Bosón de Higgs? En la Fisica Contemporánea, ahora nos damos cuenta que lo que entendemos por átomo es un sistema de partículas subatómicas definidas matemáticamente una respecto a otra, digamos que lo verdaderamente real o lo que aprehendemos es la relación entre ellas y que ese sistema en cuanto tal siempre será una objetividad constituida en un “en mí” como campo de sentido. No es que exista el supuesto átomo o cada una de las partículas subatómicas como una realidad en sí definidas frente a Nada, tampoco como si cada una de ellas fuese un momento del ser identitario y abstracto aislado de una relación constituyente, cada concepto o momento de ser lo puedo definir u objetivizar pero como tal es sólo un término relacional dentro de un conjunto de entidades que lo define en respectividad: un “nodo” relacional definido dentro de un sistema. Un átomo es un “sistema relacional” de más de doscientas entidades matemáticas en respectividad, dicha respectividad es lo que se puede expresar simbólicamente como una función matemática, siendo lo verdaderamente real el sistema relacional mismo no los nodos o entidades que objetualizamos como partes del sistema. En definitiva, resulta que para la economía positiva moderna (Fisiocracia, Liberalismo, e incluso Socialismo), el Hombre es un “sujeto” individual pero con una conciencia genérica y el cual tiene sentido como legítimo agente de ese dominio de la Physis a través de su razón, ya que, rotos los lazos con la E. Media, ha asumido la heredad del Mundo y se considera “mayor de edad” (que propugnan los Ilustrados). Si antes el dominador sobre la Physis era el Dios Bíblico ahora lo es su Hijo: el Hombre Occidental. El modo de ese legítimo dominio es actuando sobre relaciones cuantificables y hete aquí el marco de presupuestos ideológicos laten-

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tes en el libro de A. Smith: Ensayo Sobre la Naturaleza y las Causas de la Riqueza de las Naciones (1776) que da pie a la conceptuación económica positivista que actualmente ha entrado en crisis. Desde un punto de vista Contemporáneo la Physis no es ya un mecano controlable por un orgulloso Hombre que domina en base a las condiciones que impone su excelentísima lógica identitaria: la razón analítica. Este es el presupuesto básico del concepto de empresa como institución estructural básica de la acción económica en la Modernidad. Para empezar, actualmente el concepto de Naturaleza como un ámbito de partes extensas (hasta llegar a una mínima) ha desaparecido. ¿Qué extensión o materia tiene un bosson de higgs? De acuerdo con una lógica dialéctica, que es el modelo de función racional que está presente en Física Contemporánea, en la Physis todo son “campos de sentido” o “redes de nodos”, y estos son entidades o cosas-sentido que interaccionan unos entre otros constituyendo el campo, sistema o grafo. Un ente o cosa-sentido es una realidad transcendental pero cultural e históricamente constituida como tal significación, no es una definición constituida respecto a sí misma sin más (es lo que distingue al Wittgenstein del Tractatus cercano a la concepción analítica de la razón del segundo Wittgenstein de las Investigaciones Filosóficas, en realidad cercano a la razón entendida como razón dialéctica). En todo caso la Realidad como Sistema está constituida por redes de nodos entendidos como entidades o cosassentido que a su vez pueden ser un subsistemas o subredes constituidas por otro subnodos, es decir en cuanto unidad sistémica un nodo o ente puede ser un subsistema o campo de sentido menos genérico o menos abstracto, los sistemas son redes cuyos nodos son a su vez subsistemas, como en un juego de muñecas rusas. Una teoría física (por ejemplo la mecánica newtoniana) es un sistema explicativo constituido de nodos o entidades relacionadas entre sí o en respectividad como

una red o campo de sentido, en un primer grado dichos los nodos son “leyes físicas” que se relacionan como un sistema cerrado de respectividades (las tres leyes de la mecánica), pero a su vez cada una es un sistema que está constituido por conceptos-definiciones, los cuales son nodos o entes con un sentido determinado por su respectividad dentro de una ley (nociones de materia, espacio, velocidad, tiempo,...), conceptos que a su vez están se constituyen por generalizaciones de presencias primordiales con un sentido determinado desde una investigación histórica y cultural. Pero no sólo una teoría científica, también cualquier novela es un sistema o “campo de sentido” donde los personajes, por ejemplo, son psicológicamente identificables o entidades con sentido por su respectividad: D. Quijote es quien es respeto a Sancho, Dulcinea,... o incluso al paisaje manchego; La Regenta es quien es respecto al Magistral y viceversa;... Pero ¿qué es exactamente un nodo? Una cosa-sentido o ente tal y como lo expresa Zubiri en su teoría del conocimiento, así toda ciencia o disciplina académica es necesariamente una ontología históricamente constituida (es lo que viene a demostrar la Estructura de las Revoluciones Científicas de Khun). El modelo de la Physis Contemporánea es el siguiente: el átomo actual es un sistema o grafo de partículas subatómicas interrelacionadas dialécticamente a través de algo que se conceptúa como “fuerzas atómicas débiles”; a su vez estos grafos atómicos constituyen nodos que son las moléculas interaccionando dialécticamente a través de “fuerzas de enlaces químicos” (iónico, mecánico, covalente); grafos que a su vez interaccionan dialécticamente formando nodos o moléculas proteicas más complejas; que a su vez son grafos que interaccionan formando nodos como los corpúsculos intercelulares (ribosomas, mitocondrias,...); que interaccionan formando células; tejidos; órganos;... Lo importante es entender: 1º) Que en el grafo o sistema, cada nodo o elemento relacional es lo que es, una cosa-real, por su relación dialéctica dentro del sistema, la relación de respecti-

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vidad es lo que determina su ser, su esencia o lo que es, es la respectividad lo que determina que algo sea lo que es, que tenga sentido. Esta capacidad de dar sentido es lo que entendemos por razón dialéctica (la cual es necesariamente una lógica polivalente). Sea esa cosa una presencia primordial como un mero color o una presencia ulteriormente constituida como una fórmula matemática o como un producto financiero, o una prima de riesgo, o... es tal cosa por su respectividad dentro de un “campo de sentido”. De tal modo que lo verdaderamente real es la relación como sistema o grafo de los nodos que lo constituyen, estos no son momentos identitarios bivalentes constituidos respecto a una definición analítica, sino presencias constituidas dcon un sentido determinado de manera polivalente. Es decir, en realidad lo que Hay y tal como lo entendemos de manera ulterior son redes sistémicas constituidas como “campos de sentidos”, unos dentro de otros: un sistema ecológico, cada uno de los seres vivos que lo constituyen, una secuencia de ADN (donde un gen es lo qu es por su relación a con demás), el átomo “de Schödingger”, el movimiento de placas tectónicas en el planeta,... La identidad de cada nodo que constituyen los sistemas (el color en un cuadro, tal órgano corporal, tal prima de riesgo en el sistema financiero, el muón como subpartícula atómica,...), lo que algo “es”, su entidad como cosa-sentido es sólo un momento abstracto de la respectividad (en rigor la relación es posterior y posible por esta respectividad, según Zubiri) y meramente teórico y más o menos negativo o polivalente. Efectivamente, podemos decir que como “cosa real en sí” no existe el “quak top”, ni el “bosson de higgs”. Este es sólo una entidad identificada como tal en virtud de su interacción con el neutrino, el muón, el fotón..., es algo “en mí” o “por mi” conciencia o “de la esfera transcendental” del sujeto (expresión de Husserl); la cual es a su vez una esfera cultural e histórica de sentido, es decir, algo es tal cosa respecto o de acuerdo con el sistema relacional que lo constituye como tal “en” la psique humana la cual es una esfera

transcendental como campo de sentido académico-cultural e históricamente constituido. Las ideologías y teorías que constituyen la ciencia y la cultura son “campos de sentido” a diferentes niveles de abstracción simbólica. Actualmente incluso empezamos a concebir la muerte de algo como la desaparición de una red o grafo, sea la muerte de un organismo vivo como de una teoría científica, se trata de un sistema que se vuelve inestable, al desaparecer las relaciones entre sus nodos desaparece el sistema. En el caso de un organismo vivo, por ejemplo, nos situamos a un nivel donde lo nodos son moléculas bioquímicas que deshacen sus relaciones, ahora bien, las partículas a nivel físico-químico elemental no deshacen sus relaciones asíu el átomo de carbono se mantiewne como sun subgrafo de partículas con lo cual se puede recombinar para generar otro organismo, las partículas atomicas se recombina formando otro grafo orgánico, es la propiedad de “bricolage” de todo sistema en red.1 2º) Otras de las características de un sistema en red es la de su singularidad, no hay dos iguales, posiblemente ni siquiera a nivel subatómico. Efectivamente las redes presentan la propiedad del “bricolage”, tras una crisis sus nodos se recombinan de otra manera constituyendo otra red, otro grafo, otro sistema, digamos que otro nodo. Las posibilidades de generar sistemas subsistentes son casi infinitas, pero entiéndase que los que subsisten porque mantienen una relación sustenible como nodos de una red superior son siempre contingentes2. Probablemente el pensador actual que mejor ha expresado esta conceptuación de la Physis es Edgar Morin, desde los átomos a las galaxias, desde las células a las sociedades, todos son sistemas de redes donde el concepto de parte o elemento idéntico a sí mismo, en cuanto unidad objetiva y cuantitativamente distinguible, no es posible3. En definitiva debemos afrontar el problema del análisis de la estructura económica y la necesidad de una supervi-

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vencia ecológica actual como un problema ideológico en cuanto que es esta la que “da de sí” la estructura institucional que a su vez determina la infraestructura productiva actual del Mundo. Si la estructura es una gigantesco campo de sentido constituidos por: normas, leyes, decretos, normas regulativas,.... A su vez, la infraestructura económica también es un sistema en red, y en cuanto global, sería el Sistema Global de relaciones efectivas de la Sociedad Humana con la Naturaleza, la infraestructura económica mundial actual es un enorme grafo o sistema dialéctico en red: un sistema más o menos “modular en red”, donde los nodos son también subsistemas; el sistema financiero, el sistema energético, el sistema agrícola,.... “Más o menos” modular porque siempre hay nodos que por su abanico de interacciones con el resto de los nodos o subsistemas es una “entidad” más decisiva o principal para la pervivencia del Sistema Global, como ha sucedido recientemente con el Sistema Financiero, es tan principal que el Sistema no es modular sino de “escala libre”, todos los subsistema se relacional con él a través del “apalancamiento” y de tal manera que una crisis en el sistema financiero y repercute en una inhibición del flujo monetario y en desestabilización del Sistema Global (parecido sucedió con la Crisis del Petróleo en le 73, la principalidad y dependencia energética de este recurso supuso una crisis en todo el Sistema Económico Occidental). Pero para ello hay que aprehender la Naturaleza dialécticamente, como un Sistema en red y no como “partes aisladas” identitariamente definibles como en realidad todavía se hace por desde una ideología que parte de la consideración de la economía como ciencia positiva (tanto en los planes del Gosplan como en la Escuela Neoclásica y posteriormente la desarrollada por la Sociedad Mont Pelerin). Efectivamente, desde esta ideología la infraestructura del Sistema Económico Global es un grafo donde cada nodo es un subsistema (energético, agrícola,...) pero el principal es el financiero, de tal manera que el sistema no es modular sino de “es-

cala libre” porque una crisis en aquél nodo determina una crisis en todo el Sistema Global destruyéndolo, cuando lo ideal sería un Sistema Global sustentable de tal manera que al no depender de ningún nodo principal la red se mantuviera sine die, lo mismo que los nodos que son subredes. La dependencia, por ejemplo, de una red energética basada en producción nuclear, si hay una crisis en su abastecimiento haría depender todo el suministro y por ende todo el sistema, aunque peor es la dependencia financiera... Atendamos a un ejemplo concreto a nivel de “sistema económico nacional” de como la ideología determina una estructura u a su vez esta una infraestructura inviable: la estructura actual de regulación medioambiental en España está hecha de tal manera está pretendiendo actuar sobre alguno de los nodos concretos de un sistema (una especie silvestre, un cultivo,...) queriendo inhibir actuaciones o promoverlas, pero, por ejemplo una especie en peligro de extinción no se salva sin salvar el ecosistema entero, de ahí que esa estructura mecanicista es claramente un fracaso. Lo mismo sucede con las legislaciones de control de residuos; un conjunto de leyes con propuestas mecánicas totalmente fracasadas no tienen en cuenta ni plantas para reciclaje, ni procedimientos de recogida en función de ellas, no hábitos consumidores,... Para una conservación eficiente del ecosistema de una zona, por ejemplo, hay que partir de un análisis dialéctico de las especies que configuran el sistema, siempre suele haber unos nodos “principales” por su mayor número de interacciones que otros, así en el sistema ecológico que es el bosque mediterráneo, por ejemplo, desde un estudio del grafo que en qué consiste, es más importante el nodo-conejo que el nodo-lince, aquel interacciona como presa con el lince, el águila, el zorro, el meloncillo, la gineta,... y como depredador con un conjunto de plantas, gramíneas, leguminosas,... que si proliferan demasiado pueden hacer desaparece incluso el marco vegetal de sotobosque y se convierte en estepa. Es obvio que el conejo es imprescindible para ese

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“sistema ecológico”, es un nodo principal pero el lince no. Lo que es absurdo es pretender “salvar al lince” sin salvar a todo el ecosistema del cual es parte y para ello es imprescindible una recuperación de las poblaciones de conejos, para “salvar al lince”. Por otro lado, queda claro que la Sociedad Humana Contemporánea después de años de “propaganda e información ecologista” tiene una fuerte conciencia de su dependencia en la interacción con la Naturaleza, es decir, de la Unidad relacional Grupo Humano-Naturaleza en base a un “dependencia amorosa o simpatética” y no en base a una masoquista “dependencia de dominación”. Lo verdaderamente decisivo e importante en esta propaganda ideológica es efectivamente la noción tácita de que un sistema económico es un grafo de interrelaciones donde los nodos principales son, por un lado comunidades humanas y por otro los elementos presentes de su medio bio-físico y que, en cuanto relación dialéctica, la pervivencia de uno depende de la del otro y viceversa en una relación “simplatética”. Esto hay que entenderlo adecuadamente porque, si secularmente hay seres humanos en un medio o ecosistema concreto interactuando en él y ese sistema ha subsistido de esta manera, es imprescindible mantener dicha actuación si no el sistema entrará en crisis buscando un equilibrio de especies que bien podría ser no deseado para el sistema. Por ejemplo, la desaparición de la secular actuación de carboneros en Doñana con su “tala depurativa” sobre el alcornocal hizo que la proliferación de enfermedades en dicha especie vegetal hiciera desaparecer en pocos años casi la totalidad de la arboleda y las subsiguientes especies asociadas (por la urgencia ante los controles de la UNESCO ha habido que replantar con ejemplares ya adultos). Pero en España apenas quedan nichos ecológicos sin intervención humana (Doñana mismo era un coto con una secular actuación cinegética), y además todo los Parque Naturales eran lo que eran en virtud de dicha actuación secular. En líneas generales, actualmente la Naturaleza en España,

como sistema, no puede existir como “Naturaleza Virgen”, lo que hay es un sistema relacional que si ha pervivido durante mucho tiempo es porque es un sistema equilibrado, sustentable por, desde, y con la actuación humana (cinegética, agrícola, ganadera,...). Lo que se ha mantenido viable es la relación misma y sus nodos principales Comunidad Humana-Naturaleza como tales son sólo momentos teóricos resultado de un análisis cognitivo, pero lo verdaderamente real es la relación misma es decir, el sistema relacional que calificamos de “Natural”. Ahora bien, si por moda, por demagogia política (con intereses manipuladores de la población), por ignorancia creyendo en una economía positiva,... se estructuran instituciones que cambian los términos seculares de la relación Comunidad Humana-Naturaleza, podemos encontrarnos con otro Sistema, quizás no deseado o no sostenible. Piénsese en un ecosistema económico con una infraestructura muy simple: en la explotación de una “dehesa de encinas y alcornoques”. Es un sistema natural que subsiste en cuanto intervenido por el Hombre en función de la relación económica que lo hace viable, como tal: las encinas se podan, se mantiene una proporción de ganado, un determinado tipo de ganado y no otro, los alcornoques se descorchan, se hacen cortafuegos,... el sistema tal y como secularmente se ha intervenido es viable económicamente y por ello existe. Ahora bien, por cierto enfoque bisoño o ideológico modernista se genera una estructura normativa (llámese Plan Rector del Parque Natural) que inhibe la actuación tradicional: se prohíbe la tala, se requiere autorizaciones para desbroce, se prohíbe el descaste cinegético,... El resultado es “otro ecosistema” probablemente menos viable para en sus sostenibilidad al estar regulado por normas mecanicistas que no tienen en cuenta el conjunto: más incendios, menos biodiversidad al predominar la especie más concurrente, abandono, enfermedades... Además, probablemente para la comunidad humana el sistema es inviable económicamente para mantener el número de miembros de personas que

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habitan dicho espacio, de ahí la migración de estos hacia otros hábitats más urbanos (los cuales, como todo sabemos, no tiene por qué ser naturales, es decir aquí la Naturaleza no tiene por qué ser Naturaleza, esto es un privilegio solo de los espacios no urbanos). Se impone la necesidad de un cambio ideológico, la estructura legislativa actual bajo el principio mecanicista fundamental de “no intervención” humana”, el cual hasta ahora se ha hecho plausible como “bueno para todos” en la mente de los políticos, personas con capacidad para hacer leyes estructurales, es inoperativo. Es decir, los terrenos rústicos cuanto más virgen mejor, que cuanto menos actuación humana tengan “más naturales”, mejor conservados y “mayor bien” para todos, es absolutamente inadecuado. En nuestro ejemplo, a base a ese principio fundante se ha generado una estructura con un órgano de gestión institucional de ese espacio que se puede llamar “dirección general de parque natural” (una estructura económica), esta dirección promulga leyes (plan rector del parque) que inhiben las actuaciones seculares que mantenían el sistema como ecosistema sostenible ya que en abstracto lo bueno y deseable es la “no intervención”. Es decir, por ese principio y de acuerdo con la lógica basada en el principio de identidad, se regula la intervención secular poniendo trabas administrativas y posibles sanciones al desbroce, tala,... Entonces, siguiendo con nuestro ejemplo, el propietario de la dehesa, decide que lo cómodo es no intervenir. Resultado: los árboles no se talan con lo que no se revigorizan y le acosan las enfermedades (la seca, el taladro,...), no se descasta el ganado y el exceso de una determinadas especies silvestres concurriendo en el mismo hábitat hace desaparecer otras, el exceso de purines desequilibra el estado microrgánico del suelo,... en definitiva, tendríamos otro ecosistema otro equilibrio, probablemente un desierto, paradójicamente la “no intervención” determina una actuación mucho más agresiva para con un sistema natural ya equilibrado.

Todas las regulaciones estructurales adoptadas como “buenas en sí”, por mera identidad definitoria y abstracta en virtud de que están incluidas en un presunto “bien general” de la población, no tiene nada que ver en realidad con la Naturaleza. Esta es un todo sistémico no una agregación de partes o especies animales sin más, toda actuación estructural que no tenga en cuenta un entronque dentro del sistema dialéctico en red concreto que es la estructura económica de la zona que aparentemente quiere “proteger”, es un enfoque modernista que sólo ve la Naturaleza “a trozos”, como si la Naturaleza fuese un mecanismo de partes aisladas. Y sobre todo “no ve” la otra parte principal en la relación de ese todo: el Hombre. En el ejemplo anterior, la legislación de parque natural que quiere proteger a la encina como especie puede que destruya al propio “medio natural” que pretende preservar. Si en las decisiones administrativas, en base a una norma “buena” en abstracto, no se tiene en cuenta la red de relaciones económicas ya existentes pueden hacer inviable para la vida humana ese medio natural tal y como secularmente ha existido y se quiere conservar, en nuestro ejemplo asistimos a que efectivamente los propietarios de finca abandonan las intervenciones que secularmente hacían sobre el ecosistema por presión administrativa, actuaciones que en realidad son las que han hecho que el sistema exista como un entramado de relaciones económicas sostenible, (podas de árboles, cultivos, descastes de animales,...). Al hacerse ahora una estructura de actuación humana en base al principio legislativo, a priori abstractamente “bueno”, de que el ser humano no debe “intervenir” porque la naturaleza debe conservarse cuanto más virgen mejor (ideal para un biólogo bisoño), sólo se realizan las actuaciones que sobre el papel un burócrata-técnico dictamine, y si para que un árbol se regenere por viejo, por ejemplo, hace falta talarlo incluso para que brote de raíz, pero la norma proteccionista lo prohíbe y el burócrata no da permiso, la arboleda en pocos años se muere, con lo cual el mismo parque natural desaparece

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porque no es viable como sistema o entramado en red tal y como existía. El bien social como principio dictaminado desde una lógica modernista donde sólo prima un principio de identidad abstracto no genera vialidad a los sistemas relacionales, a ningún nivel. Este mismo ejemplo pude pasarle no ya a parque naturales sino nacionales

(sólo recientemente se están permitiendo descastes cinegéticos en el P. N. de Doñana). La verdad es que eso es muy probable que pase ante la necesidad de tantos permisos y trámites administrativos para la intervención en esos sistemas naturales de España ¿no será la presunta causa de la seca de las encinas la tinta del papeleo administrativo?

Notes 1

¿Cómo debemos entender el cáncer en cuanto enfermedad orgánica? Situándonos a un nivel del sistema orgánico de tejido, donde las red está constituda por nodos denominadas células , un tejido consiste básicamente en células interconectadas dialécticamente, sucede que hay una que desconecta de ese grafo o red no ejecutando la función-sentido que debira según su posición en la red, de ese modo si se autoduplica y crece por su cuenta produce el tumor en cuanto tejido ajeno al grafo o red de tejidos que constituyen al resto del órgano ¿por qué en un momento dado sucede esa “crisis” en una célula ? Las redes biológicas siguen un modelo “modular” o red de pescadores, aquí cada nodo es un subgrafo de elementos fuertemente conectados entre sí pero poco con el resto del sistema global donde también está incurso. Normalmente una célula que por azar aparece de esta manera (resultado de una meiosis no prevista) es inviable y se desmantela en nodos más primarios, pero si puede nutrirse u creecer genera una tejido dentro del tejido sin la ordenación de funciones adecuada al órgano donde se da.

2

Tratar de explicar la evolución de las redes celulares es una tarea ambiciosa y que aquí tampoco podemos ahora intentar, lo que es evidente es que hay que partir del subgrafo que determina la aparición de un gen nuevo en cuanto secuencia atómica mínima capaz de autorepetirse, es decir, capaz de singularizarse: una mutación. Por lo mismo podríamos entender que el cáncer se produce cuando hay algún gen dentro de la estructura del ADN constituyente de una célula, el cual no se autoreplica, produciendo células diferentes al que constituye el tejido inicial.

El tejido celular está continuamente renovándose, las células se duplican y reduplican. Dada la complejidad de un genoma como sistema de genes ¿porqué dentro de la infinita posibilidad de duplicaciones singulares que ofrece una célula madre empiezan sólo a replicarse unos genes determinados para constituir un tejido determinado? El hecho es que dentro de un mismo organismo cada vez que una secuencia de ADN se replica en una meiosis se producen mutaciones, singularidades genéticas (cada vez que una base nitrogenada no rompa según el modelo prederminado), son los llamados seudogenes. Pero como no tienen relación con el resto de la red proteica el sistema que constituye ese gen es inestable y sus elementos son reutilizados desapareciendo como nodo, ahora bien si un gen de ese tipo si es capaz de interaccionar con otro gen forman una proteína nueva y tenemos otro tipo de células en el mismo tejido que si a su vez se replica dan lugar a un grafo subsistente totalmente independiente dentro del tejido original, de esta manera se desarrolla un nuevo tejido dentro del otro y no tiene nada que ver con el originario e incluso con el resto del sistema orgánico. 3

«La partícula no sólo conoció una crisis de orden y una crisis de unidad (se calculan hoy más de doscientas partículas subatómicas), sino que experimentó una crisis de identidad. Ya no se la puede aislar de modo preciso en el espacio y en el tiempo. Ya no se la puede aislar totalmente de las interacciones de la observación...En fin, es la idea de unidad elemental misma la que se ha vuelto problemática: quizás no exista la última o la primera realidad individualizable o aislable,

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sino un contínuum (teoría del bootstrap), incluso una raíz unitaria fuera del tiempo y del espacio (d´Espagnat 1972)...En tanto que objeto, la partícula ha perdido toda sustancia, toda claridad, toda distinción, a veces incluso toda realidad: se ha convertido en nudo gordiano de interacciones y de intercambios. Para definirla es necesario recurrir a las interacciones de las que participa, y cuando forma parte de un átomo, a las interacciones que tejen la organización de este áto-

mo...Todos los objetos clave de la física, de la biología, de la sociología, de la astronomía, átomos, moléculas, células, organismos ,sociedades, astros, galaxias, constituyen sistemas. Fuera de los sistemas, no hay sino dispersión particular. Nuestro mundo organizado es un archipiélago de sistemas en el océano del desorden.» Ed. Morin, pág. 119121, El Método I, La Naturaleza e la Naturaleza, ed. Cátedra, Madrid 1981

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Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology

Eric Weislogel

Saint Joseph’s University Philadelphia, PA USA

Abstract Ontology is defined as the study of what there is in the most general sense. Depending on the philosopher, ontology may or may not be a synonym for metaphysics. As is universally admitted, the definitions of “ontology” and “metaphysics” are generally contested, and some philosophers, such as Xavier Zubiri as we shall see, have tried to distinguish them. In this essay, I will first outline one particular position that is central to contemporary debates in ontology, a version of trope theory. In particular, the one-category “bundle theory” (the idea that things are bundles of tropes) that I will present will draw heavily (but not exclusively) from Peter Simons’ work. Ultimately, I’ve synthesized ideas from several trope-theoretical positions to formulate what I take to be somewhat strengthened version of trope theory. Let’s call this a Plausible Trope Theory (PTT). By “plausible,” I certainly don’t mean uncontroversial, nor do I mean there could not be a more plausible trope theoretical ontology. I simply mean that if one were committed to developing a trope theoretical ontology, PTT would not be a bad place to start. Second, I will consider some significant criticisms of trope theory in general and bundle theory in particular, and how PTT might address them. Third, I will highlight key elements of Xavier Zubiri’s understanding of the nature of real objects as constitutionally sufficient unified systems of notes, which on the surface bears a resemblance to trope theory. In the process I will discuss Zubiri’s understanding of the distinction and relation between metaphysics and ontology, presenting a condensed version of Zubirian metaphysics (ZM). I will compare and contrast the basic understanding of the terms “trope” and “note,” in part to determine whether Zubiri’s theory is committed to a one-category ontology. Finally, I will show the similarities and differences between PTT and ZM and raise some questions for further ontological reflection. Resumen Ontología se define como el estudio de lo que hay en el sentido más general. Según el filósofo, la ontología puede o no puede ser sinónimo de la metafísica. Como se admite universalmente, las definiciones de “ontología” y “metafísica” generalmente se disputaron, y algunos filósofos, como Xavier Zubiri como veremos, han tratado de distinguirlos. En este ensayo, voy a esbozar una primera posición particular que es central en los debates contemporáneos en la ontología, una versión de la teoría de tropo. En particular, el de una sola categoría de “teoría del paquete” (la idea de que las cosas son paquetes de tropos) que presentaré se base en gran medida (pero no exclusivamente) sobre las obras de Peter Simons. En última instancia, he sintetizado las ideas de varios puestos de tropo teóricos para formular lo que estimo una versión mejor de la teoría de tropo. Vamos a llamar a esto una Teoría Plausible de Trope (PTT). Al decir “plausible” ciertamente no quiero decir “incontrovertible,” ni me refiero a que no podía haber un tropo ontología teórica más plausible. Simplemente quiero decir que si uno se compromete a desarrollar una ontología teórico tropo, PTT no 57

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sería un mal lugar para comenzar. En segundo lugar, voy a considerar algunas críticas significativas de la teoría del tropo, en general, y el paquete teoría en particular, y cómo PTT podría abordarlos. En tercer lugar, voy a destacar los elementos claves de la comprensión de Xavier Zubiri de la naturaleza de los objetos reales como sistemas unificados constitucionalmente suficiente de notas, que superficialmente parece relacionada a teoría de Trope. En el proceso voy a hablar de la comprensión de Zubiri de la distinción y la relación entre la metafísica y ontología, la presentación de una versión condensada de la metafísica zubiriano (ZM). Voy a comparar y contrastar la comprensión básica de los términos “tropo” y “nota”, en parte para determinar si la teoría de Zubiri se ha comprometido a una categoría única ontologíca. Por último, voy a mostrar las similitudes y diferencias entre PTT y ZM y plantear algunas preguntas para la reflexión ontológica. I. Ontology and Trope Theory: Towards a Plausible Trope Theory (PTT) Thomas Hofweber, in his article “Logic and Ontology” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,1 generalizes the issues of concern to contemporary ontologists as follows: The larger discipline of ontology can thus be seen as having four parts: (O1) the study of ontological commitment, i.e. what we or others are committed to, (O2) the study of what there is, (O3) the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways, (O4) the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any; how the questions it aims to answer should be understood; and with what methodology they can be answered. In the process of addressing these broad concerns, ontologists involve themselves with a variety of specific questions about objects, universals, properties, tropes, time, events, change, identity, sets, numbers, persons, free will, God, and so on. We cannot, of course, deal with all these matters in the confines of this paper in the manner each deserves. Instead, we will explore one particular ontological position, trope theory. Indeed, we will only

have the opportunity to examine one subset of trope theories, that of “bundle theory”—in short, the idea that things are bundles of tropes. This is what ontologists call a one-category ontology, meaning that the category of trope is, according to these philosophers, adequate for articulating a sufficient understanding of the basic nature of real things. In the main, we will be engaged with (O3) in this discussion, but the other issues will no doubt arise. Allow me to address briefly a set of related questions that might arise for the reader at the outset: Is not science – in particular, physics – sufficient for answering the concerns of (02) and (03)? Does not science tell us what there is and explain the most general features of reality? Is it not the case that, today, metaphysics simply reduces to physics?2 Does the trope-theoretical ontology to be discussed in these pages consider itself in competition with the ontology of science? To fully address these concerns would take us far afield of our theme here, but it must suffice to say that although these seem like reasonable questions, in fact, these questions rest on significant confusions about both science and ontology. Trope theorists (as is the case with most mainstream ontologists and, for that matter, Zubiri) are not concerned to develop a competing ontology. “Science,” if there is such a unitary thing, must necessarily have ontological commitments. Both working scientists and ontologists are, in a sense, triangulating towards a plausible ontological view of reality, one that squares with the practice of science but

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that is logically and metaphysically coherent. So it is not a matter of an ontology competing with science so much as it is a matter of (possibly) competing ontologies. And it is not even necessarily a matter of competing ontologies, as I hope to show in this paper, but rather of complementary ontological insights. Both trope theorists and Zubiri mean for their philosophical considerations of what there is in its basic structures to be a complement to and elucidation of the findings of the natural sciences.3 Tropes are “ontologically unstructured (simple) abstract particulars.”4 Although Santayana first used the term “trope” in a philosophical sense, it is generally considered that the locus classicus of trope theory is an essay by Donald Williams.5 He proposed that tropes (he adopts the term “abstract particular”) …are the primary constituents of this or any possible world, the very alphabet of being. They not only are actual but are the only actualities, in just this sense, that whereas entities of all other categories are literally composed of them, they are not in general composed of any other sort of entity.”6 Thus, on this view, things are composed of tropes and the relations of location and similarity.7 Now, this understanding of tropes as primitive — i.e., considered as a one-category ontology8 — leads directly to the “bundle theory” of objects: objects are nothing but bundles of tropes. A question arises for bundle theory: what makes this object (this bundle of tropes) this object?9 Specifically, must there be some substrate in which the tropes inhere or which in some other fashion binds the tropes in such a way as to constitute this object? Let’s take for an example a white billiard ball. Among the key tropes that constitute this object are “white,” “spherical,” “smooth-surfaced,” and “weighs six ounces.” How shall we think about this? Some philosophers argue that there would have to be some whoknows-what (Locke called it a “bare particular”) that “underlies” these tropes and

in which the tropes “inhere.” This, of course, should seem unsatisfying to onecategory trope theorists, as it would introduce the distinct ontological category of substance and treat tropes as properties inhering in substances. But, on the other hand, to say that a cue ball just is the conglomeration of certain tropes leaves the theory vulnerable to saying that if a trope white is over here and a trope spherical is over there and a trope weighs six ounces is at some third place and smooth-surfaced is in yet another place, we’d still have a cue ball. That stretches credulity. Thus it is said that the “compresence”10 of these tropes constitutes the object. But, again, how should we understand “compresence”? And what all is compresent? The four tropes, white, spherical, smooth-surfaced, and weighs 6 ounces, are compresent, but is that compresence, itself, a trope? And white and spherical are compresent - is that particular compresence a trope as well? In other words, are there relational tropes such as compresence? And if so, are there further relations between the compresence trope, itself, and the “atomic” tropes (white, spherical, et. al.) of the kind we named? If so, does it lead to an infinite regress? And even if that regress is infinite, is it vicious or benign?11 Call these sorts of relations “internal relations.” Of course, we have not mentioned the further tropes, which Williams for one would countenance, of “external relations”: the compresence of the white-sphericalsmooth-weighs-6-ounces and the greenfelt-flat-surface of the pool table. Must we consider such tropes, if tropes they be, in understanding the constitution of the cue ball? And what are we to say of two identical cue balls? Is it even possible to have two identical objects at all? And what about the trope “white,” which constitutes both cue ball A and cue ball B? In classical ontology, the white in cue ball A and the white in cue ball B are instantiations of “whiteness,” a universal (e.g., a Platonic form). The concern with universals for trope theorists (but not only them) is that

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they seem to commit us to ethereal, independently existing abstract objects, which conflicts with the commitment of modern science to a physicalist metaphysics. As mentioned, PTT is meant to be a complement to the modern scientific worldview, not an alternative to it. But if tropes are particulars rather than universals, they cannot be in two places at once, as universals allegedly can be. So how does trope theory explain two white cue balls?12 Trope theory holds that tropes are particulars, and so either does not countenance universals or reduces them to classes of exactly similar objects (with very little analysis of in what “exact similarity” or “exact resemblance” consists)13. One hopes that in addressing these sorts of issues we can come to a better understanding of the constitution of real objects. Setting aside the question of universals for the time being, let’s at this point keep in mind that tropes ought not to be considered as parts of a thing such that a thing is “made up of” tropes. Despite the way Donald Williams puts it (see above), that is not the best way to understand bundle theory’s tenets. According to Peter Simons, “Trope bundles are not meant to be mere collections, and certainly not collections of self-subsistent individuals which could first exist and then be assembled into a whole like an army is built by putting men together, or a ship is built out of divers bits of steel, etc.”14 Some philosophers would say that tropes are not parts but ways things are. On the other hand, Simons reminds us, We should not however take seriously the view that tropes, whether they are ways or not, are not entities at all. Clearly a bundle theorist cannot, because then he would be building entities out of non-entities. Ways and tropes are not nothing, hence they are something, hence they are entities. But they are not THING-like, if by that we mean substance-like. They are not res, they are rei or rerum.15

Tropes are not independent things, but are ontologically dependent. However, in their bundling tropes can also yield something emergent, something more then just an agglomeration, something with an independence of its own. The notion of dependence, here, is still problematic. As we saw, one-category ontologists do not want anything in their theory that would commit them to a second (let alone a third or fourth) ontological category. So upon what are the tropes of a given thing dependent? It certainly cannot be a “bare substance,” on this view. Simons proposes what he calls a nuclear theory to attempt to address this question. It is a “pure” bundle theory, if I may put it that way, a one-category ontology. There is no thought of substance or an “extra” substratum or otherwise propertyless something-or-other that bundles tropes together. Simons’s theory, though, will hold that there is “something” upon which tropes are dependent. But can he have his cake and eat it, too? Can he hold to a one-category ontology that (1) answers the question of how this object is this object; (2) accounts for the distinction between essential and accidental features of things, and thus accounts for the intuition that things can indeed undergo accidental change; (3) does not sneak in through the back door some notion of substance or substratum under another guise, thus vitiating the claims of the sufficiency of one-category ontology? To see what he intends by this “something” that is not another ontological category, we have to see how Simons thinks objects are constituted. Objects can be thought to be constituted generally in two (non-temporal) stages. To understand what follows, we must make a brief detour to discuss the meaning and the weakness of foundation relations as Edmund Husserl sees them. According to him, a right understanding of foundation relations will stave off the threat of an infinite regress that arises if two objects can only be unified via some third entity. Husserl recognizes two forms of foundation relations that are immune to this threat:

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An individual A is weakly founded on an individual B iff A is necessarily such that it cannot exist unless B exists. For instance, if B is an essential proper part of A, then A cannot exist without B (or any other of A’s essential proper parts). There is, however, a second type of foundation relation recognized by Husserl: A is strongly founded on B iff A is weakly founded on B and B is not a part of A. Strong foundation works like this: A cannot exist unless B exists, but B is not a part of A. For instance, a color trope could not exist without an extension trope, but extension is not part of color. One can wonder, however, whether these conceptions are really helpful or whether they are not, in fact, merely vague and confusing. Simon proposes this puzzler: Suppose that A and B are strongly mutually founding, that is, neither is part of the other, and neither can exist without the other. We may now ask, what is it about A and B that makes this so? Consider that it may be an essential proper part of a Dry Erase Marker that it be some color (there can be no Dry Erase Marker that is no color at all), and yet that fact alone does not account for the fact that some Dry Erase Markers are red. Simons chalks up the problem to Husserl’s carelessness about what holds at the species level and what holds at the instance level. Color is such (viz., as species) that it requires (is strongly founded upon) extension. But a given instance of an extended object, while requiring color, does not require an instance of red. So Husserl’s solution to our problem of the constitution of particular entities is insufficient. In an effort to have this thing be this thing, what about if we say that A and B are compresent if they are at the same place, P? Simons objects that, first, it presupposes an absolute concept of place or space that is physically and metaphysical-

ly dubious—again, PTT intends to complement science. Second, it treats place as a substratum—just what one-category trope theory hopes to avoid. Finally, it makes the whole idea of movement (and identity throughout movement) to be mysterious. On this (mistaken) view, a trope is what it is based on the place it occupies, so if it were to move (along with the thing it comprises) it would cease to be what it is (and the thing it comprises would no longer be the same thing). None of these solutions captures what our intuitions tell us: that things have properties that can change while the thing remains the “same” thing. Traditional substratum theory would be a strong contender for a satisfactory explanation were it not for the fact that, as we have seen, the notion of “substratum,” itself, is highly problematic. 16 Simons’ own proposal for understanding the constitution of objects applies a somewhat different concept of foundation relation, although it owes much to Husserl. Firstly, two particulars are said to be directly foundationally related if either is founded, whether weakly or strongly, on the other. Two particulars are then foundationally related iff they bear the ancestral of the relation of direct foundational relatedness to one another. A collection forms a foundational system iff every member in it is foundationally related in it to every other, and none is foundationally related to anything which is not a member of the collection. If A is either weakly or strongly founded on B or if B is weakly or strongly founded on A, then A is directly foundationally related to B. The condition, “bears the ancestral of the relation” (in this case of direct foundational relatedness) is derived from Frege. Edward N. Zalta explains it by an example: The intuitive idea is easily grasped if we consider the relation x is the father of y. Suppose that a is the father of b, that b is the father of c, and that c is the fa-

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ther of d. Then Frege's definition of ‘x is an ancestor of y in the fatherhoodseries’ ensured that a is an ancestor of b, c, and d, that b is an ancestor of c and d, and that c is an ancestor of d.17 In the present case, foundational relations can be traced back to the direct foundational relations in the given object. That object, here considered as a foundational system, is such if and only if every member (here: trope) in it is foundationally related to every other member (trope) in it, and none is foundationally related to anything that is not a member of that collection of tropes. This gives the object its “independence” and its organic unity. So consider a collection of cooccurring mutually founding tropes. This collection forms a foundational system (every member of the collection is foundationally related to every other member and not to any non-member). This foundational system forms the nucleus of the object. It is the individual essence or individual nature of the thing.18 It is not a mere collection of tropes, but a “connected unity”.19 But this will most likely not be a complete thing, as it will also have a variety of other properties. Considered as tropes, nonessential properties can be borne in a strong foundational relation with the nucleus. These leave us with a view of objects that is consistent with our intuition that things (thought of in terms of the nucleus) can change (by addition or subtractions of non-nuclear tropes) and remain the same thing (again, in terms of the nuclear foundational trope system). Simons asserts that his theory combines the best of bundle and substratum theories.20 That which plays the role of substratum avoids the who-knows-what character of the traditional view of substratum — it is, itself, nothing but a nucleus of mutually founded essential tropes. The preceding was a brief introduction to the idea of tropes, of one-category ontology, and some of the issues with which trope theory must contend. In particular, I have singled out Peter Simon’s “nuclear” version of “bundle theory” as the basis for

a plausible trope theory (call it “PTT”). In the next section, we will explore several objections to trope theory and its attendant bundle theory ontology. II. Criticisms of Trope- and BundleTheories A. Problems with tropes Jerrold Levinson, in his “Why There Are No Tropes,”21 supplies many of the reasons some philosophers have rejected trope theory. First of all, says Levinson, a trope is defined as a particularized attribute. Now, there are two kinds of attributes, properties and qualities. Levinson defines “property” as follows: Properties are exemplified by being red, being heavy, being wise, being vivacious, being a bachelor, and are standardly designated by gerundive expressions, most notably, ‘being _____’. They are conceptualized as conditions objects can be in, and are not quantizable, that is, not things an object can have more or less of. In other words, they are indivisible, non-partitionable things. Properties can also be conceived, although awkwardly, as beinga-certain-ways, that is, as entities that have ways of being, or ways things can be, at their core. On the other hand, “qualities” …are exemplified by redness, heaviness, wisdom, vivacity, and are standardly designated by abstract nouns. They are conceptualized as stuffs of an abstract sort, and thus as a rule as quantizable, that is, as things an object can have more or less of. In other words, they are inherently divisible or partitionable things. Given this understanding of the terms, Levinson notes that tropes would have to be particularized qualities. Tropes cannot be “particularized properties,” as that phrase, says Levinson, is oxymoronic. Properties cannot be quantized or partitioned. So if there are tropes, they would

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have to be particularized qualities (i.e., abstract stuff). But can there be particularized abstract stuff? Only if there can be abstract stuff (i.e., qualities) in the first place. On reflection, Levinson came to think that such abstract stuff is incredible. There cannot be qualities, bits of stuff that are somehow like material bits of stuff but abstract, and so there cannot be particularized qualities. So there cannot be tropes. Levinson takes Williams to task on his idea that there are “subtle parts” of objects in addition to “gross” parts. Williams’ somewhat famous example is of three variously similar lollipops.22 Each lollipop has an exactly similar “gross” part: their respective sticks. But they also share exactly similar “subtle” parts, such as their shape. Levinson finds the latter “parts” to be incredible. How can there be parts that are non-decomposable and intangible? What is it to say that an object is “made up of” (in part) its shape?23 Simons, as we have seen, does not go as far as Williams in claiming that tropes are “parts,” but Levinson still objects to Simon’s talk of tropes as “particularized ways” things are. Tropes, by definition, are particulars (and not universals and thus shareable). But even though it is clear that for two objects, A and B, which seem to share a particular way of being, W, that A’s being W and B’s being W are different (by the simple fact that A is not B), nevertheless there is no reason for not saying that W, itself, is exactly similar (or identical) in each case. For instance, if W = “weighs 10 pounds”, there is no reason to think that W is not a shared attribute. Ten pounds is ten pounds. Levinson criticizes Cynthia MacDonald’s proposals for tropes24 by saying, in effect, that trope theory is less explanatorily efficient than traditional (universal attribute) theory. Levinson writes, Standard attribute thought doesn’t need tropes, whereas trope thought, assuming there were any good reasons to think there were tropes, would ulti-

mately presuppose attribute thought. Thus tropes are not only either incoherent or unbelievable posits, but metaphysically otiose ones as well.25 In this thoroughgoing attack on the very idea of tropes (abstract particular attributes), Levinson raises many other objections that I shall leave to one side. The upshot is that Levinson finds conceiving of tropes as particularized attributes is highly problematic, if not completely implausible or incredible. He notes, however, that if tropes are conceived some other way, then this particular set of criticisms may very well not hold. Levinson writes, Thus, if tropes are proposed as nonattribute-like abstract particulars of some sort, their claim to recognition is not touched by what I have said here. Similarly, if tropes are proposed as property instantiations or property exemplifications, then since these are simply varieties of states of affairs, they too are unaffected by the brief I have presented. But in the sense of tropes as originally introduced into modern philosophical discussion, that is, as particularized, necessarily unshareable, attributes, able to serve as the primitive building blocks of a coherent alternative ontology, there are, I maintain, no tropes.26 B. Problems with bundles Even if Levinson’s objections to tropes as the building blocks of all reality, as Williams would put it, can be answered, what are we to make of the attendant “Bundle Theory” of objects? The notion that objects are nothing but bundles of tropes is problematic. Even in a fairly sophisticated bundle theory as that proposed earlier by Peter Simons, wherein there is both a nucleus of essential tropes to which other, adventitious tropes adhere in some way, is open to significant questioning. To meet the criterion of self-identity of objects, tropes must be compresent. This notion is under-analyzed in the literature,

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however. We’ve already seen some issues that arise with this notion of compresence, including the fact that it may imply an unwarranted conception of absolute space and time. In addition, as Maurin points out, either compresence is an “internal” relation, in which case the tropes that are compresent must always be compresent27 - an unacceptable consequence -- or compresence is an “external” relation, which would then lead to different metaphysically unpalatable consequences (viz., Bradley's Regress28). Again, the question is always: What makes this object this object? C. A brief rejoinder from PTT The Plausible Theory of Tropes I've been sketching in this paper may be able to address some of the key objections leveled by Levinson, generally by taking a cue from Levinson's own parting remarks. The strategy would be, first, not to conceive of tropes in the traditional language of attributes (whether properties, qualities, or ways). Second, discussion of tropes should take place in terms of states of affairs. However, this latter piece of advice raises other sorts of problems. If a particular state of affairs consists in part of a “property instantiation” or “property exemplification,” we are still left with the problem of the means of that instantiation or exemplification. Or we could put it this way: what are we talking about when we talk about properties in this case? We return, thus, to the problem universals, and however we solve it, we are sure to be committing ourselves to at least a twocategory ontology. In other words, there might be tropes, but there has to be more than tropes. PTT, which is committed to a onecategory ontology, might propose the following workaround for this objection: states of affairs are adequately describable in terms of abstract particulars that are the constituents (not parts) of a given state of affairs.29 III. Zubirian Metaphysics At the time of his death, Zubiri was at work on a book that was, in effect, the

culmination of his lifetime of philosophical endeavors. That book, entitled Man and God (El Hombre y Dios), was left uncompleted.30 Although Man and God is an ambitious and wide-ranging work, it does provide a convenient summary of Zubiri’s metaphysical vision of reality as it was laid out in his earlier works, especially On Essence31 (Sobre la esencia)32 and The Dynamic Structure of Reality33 (La estructura dinimica de la realidad).34 Zubiri would make a distinction between the terms metaphysics and ontology, viewing the latter as founded upon the former. For Zubiri, reality is not merely a field of things. Thus to understand what contemporary ontology might learn from a Zubirian point of view, it is important to establish what Zubiri means by the word “reality.” He begins his discussion by saying that “everything real is constituted by certain notes.”35 Each note exhibits two moments of a thing. First, each note “belongs” to the thing, and, second, each note serves to determine what the thing is to which it “belongs.” I put the term “belongs” in scare-quotes to indicated that there is not a relationship between, on the one hand, a thing and, on the other, a note. Certainly, for Zubiri, there is no “thing” that has a metaphysical (let alone temporal) priority over its notes. His example: heat is a note of a thing, and heat determines that the thing is a hot thing (and not some other kind of thing). Zubiri spurns the traditional term “property” in his exposition because of his objection to the traditional coupling of property with substance. On this traditional view, substance is conceived as a subject in which properties inhere. I like to call a simplistic version of this traditional substancemetaphysics the “Mr. Potatohead Metaphysics.” Mr. Potatohead is a children’s toy that consists in a brown ovoid plastic potato with a variety of small holes in it, as well as a separate set of attributes (eyes, mustache, ears, lips, etc) that can be interchangeably plugged into the holes, thus giving Mr. Potatohead a variety of possible looks. On the simplistic view of substance-

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metaphysics that Zubiri rejects, the “potato” represents the substance and the ears, lips, eyes, etc., represent the properties. Zubiri objects to the Lockean idea that there must be something underlying the features or properties that is in itself, somehow, featureless.36 But what is reality? For Zubiri, reality is the fact that notes belong to a thing in their own right.37 The “in their own right” is the key. This is the formality of reality. To be formally real, a thing must have its notes in its own right. Notes cannot simply be imputed to a thing, nor can they be simply signs of a stimulus-response relation if the thing to which the notes belong is to be a real thing. What does this mean? Suppose I imagine I am experiencing a dragon. The dragon is large, green, scaly, and fire-breathing. But none of these notes of the dragon belong to the dragon in their own right, but are merely imputed by me. Thus the “dragon” is not real (because “its” notes do not belong to “it” in their own right). Take another example: I am at work on a table. Its notes include that it is a fine workspace and it is aesthetically pleasing. According to Zubiri, a table is not a real thing - or as he puts it more informatively - a table is a “meaningthing” but not a “reality-thing.” Yes, there is a real thing here in my office, a thing whose notes belong to it in its own right. That thing has a certain mass, shape, physical makeup, etc. It is a physical object. The fact that it is a “table” is a function of my having a need for this physical object according to some project I am pursuing. Tables do not have their notes as tables in their own right, but only as imputed by some person or other. Meaningthings are not independent from realitythings, of course, and certain realitythings and not others have the capacity to be certain meaning-things. As Zubiri says, the reality-thing water has no capacity to be a table.38 How do we know that certain things are real? We apprehend reality directly, says Zubiri. Reality is not a concept or abstraction nor is it the conclusion of a line of reasoning. It is - as he likes to put it

- something “physical” (by which term he does not mean simply material; he is distinguishing “physical” from “theoretical” or “conceptive,” which are mere for Zubiri). Only certain kinds of things can apprehend reality. To illustrate this point, Zubiri compares humans and dogs as they encounter heat. For a dog, heat is the signal for a certain response (move away, come closer). That just is heat for a dog, and, if I may put it this way, it’s all about the dog. But for a human, heat is a warming, and not simply a stimulus invoking a response. It might invoke a response in a human, for instance if the heat causes discomfort in the human. But the human apprehends the heat in its own right, immediately (i.e., does not have to reason towards that as a conclusion). This, by the way, is the answer to “Cartesian anxiety” concerning the “exterior world.” How do I know there is a world “out there” that’s not just in my head? Zubiri answers: Before you even come to know the world at all you apprehend the otherness, the in-its-own-rightness, of things. That is a precondition of knowing (and hence questioning) anything at all. This capacity of human beings forms the basis of what Zubiri calls “sentient intelligence.” We can see – as we always do in metaphysical exploration – that the epistemological quickly enters into the discussion. However, what Zubiri is describing here is not, at bottom, epistemological but metaphysical. He is not addressing the question of how we know but of what reality is. Reality is not a function of human knowing; rather, he says that reality is “activated” in sentient intelligence.39 Reality is neither a concept nor an idea. Reality is fundamental and, for Zubiri, an obvious fact. Where we philosophers go wrong is in the “entification of reality”40—adopting the idea that reality = things, and the “logification of intellection”41—the idea that reality is a function of predication. To continue, things (generally) have a variety of notes, and real things have those notes in their own right. Those notes form a unity, but that unity—the unity of a real

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thing—is not simply an additive unity but a systematic unity. A real thing is a unified system of notes. What does this mean? Zubiri explains that every note of a thing should be understood as a “note-of” the thing. In other words, there are no freefloating notes, and a thing is not a mere conglomeration of pre-existing notes. To say that a note is always a note-of is to say that a note is what it is as a function of all the rest of the notes of the thing. And it is to imply that the thing is what it is solely as a function of the notes that it possesses in its own right.42 There is no Mr. Potatohead apart from his notes, and the systematic unity of his notes just is Mr. Potatohead. The unity makes the notes to be what they are, and the notes make the unity what it is. The key here is the preposition “of.” Zubiri says that the “of” is a moment of a thing’s reality. Things are, in effect, particular forms of “of-y-ness” (if you will forgive me this atrocious locution). So is Zubiri saying something like, “A thing is nothing more than its notes”? No, he is not. Every note, insofar as it is a note-of, always points to something “more.”43 Your notes, for instance, are “your notes”—not mine or anyone else’s. Your notes are notes at all only because they are yours. It is not as if there is a big bucket of notes somewhere and someone (say, God) grabs up a bunch of these preexisting notes and glues them together and comes up with you. If that were the case, you would be nothing more than these glued-together notes. Hume perhaps thought something like this. There is no “substance” at all (that’s just a manner of speaking); all there is are properties. But that is not what Zubiri is saying. He does not think that Hume’s position is defensible. What would it mean to say that there is “big” or “green” or even “hairy” all by themselves? If that is incoherent, things won’t get any better if you string them together into a “big-green-hairy”—all by itself it won’t result in a big, green, hairy monster. You need something more. But the “more” is the question. Is it a substance, something in some way “independent” of the accidents?

Zubiri does not think the “more” is some extra thing, even though every real thing is not just the sum of notes, not just a string of notes. Each note is constitutional in character, and the system of notes has constitutional sufficiency— meaning that this systematic unity is sufficient for constituting this thing. The formal notes (as opposed to the “adventitious” notes, notes that are a function of the thing’s relationship with other things in the world) in their systematic unity just are the real thing; they constitute the real thing. So where is the “more”? Here, Zubiri makes another important distinction. He coins another term, substantivity, and then opposes it to “substantiality.” The latter term refers to Aristotle’s (and St. Thomas’) notion of substance. In Zubirian terms, a substantivity is not a substance. The way Zubiri would put it, each organism is one substantivity comprising a multitude of “substances.” He gives the example of the substance, glucose. It is a substance, not an “accident.” But it is taken up by an organism (say, a human being) in such a way that it loses its (on Aristotelian terms) substantiality as it becomes note-of the human being. Zubiri reserves the term “substance” in the contemporary sense of “stuff” or “material.” Things are substantivities.44 Again, this is the reason Zubiri wants to speak of “notes” rather than “properties.” On Aristotelian terms, properties inhere in a subject (the word “sub-ject” literally means “thrown underneath”). For Zubiri, notes cohere among themselves, comprising a systematic unity. The systematic unity is substantivity. Further, Zubiri makes the distinction between notes that are constitutive and notes that are not constitutive. All notes, says Zubiri, are constitutional; some are constitutive. He gives the example of “all white cats with blue eyes are deaf.”45 He says these notes are constitutional (of blue-eyed, deaf, white cats), but not constitutive. Why not? Because these notes are “grounded in others.” What others? The notes of the cat’s genes. These genetic notes are constitutive of the cat (i.e., ac-

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count for its bare existence, so to speak), unless of course science comes to show that genetic notes are further grounded in more “fundamental” notes. But this, he says, is a matter for biology, not philosophy.46 Compare this to Aristotle’s understanding of the structure of the human soul. According to him, that structure is based on functions. For instance, there are the rational functions of the soul. What mechanism allows for these functions (e.g., brain, neurons, central nervous system, etc.) is a biological question. The metaphysical question is: What are the constitutive functions of any human being (no matter how they happen)? Or in other words, what functions are essential if a thing is to be a human being? This is something like what Zubiri is after here. He finds the essence of things in their constitutive notes, the systematic unity of notes that are not grounded upon other notes and that are necessary and constitutionally sufficient for the thing. He writes, The constitutive notes comprise the radical subsystem of substantivity: they are its essence. Essence is the structural principle of substantivity. It is not the correlate of a definition. It is the system of notes necessary and sufficient so that a substantive reality may have its remaining constitutional notes, including adventitious notes.”47 Here again, Zubiri is distinguishing himself from Aristotle. He is trying to define what the essence of something is. Traditionally, essence is presented in terms of an idea or a definition. For instance classically, the essence of a human being was to be an appropriate body with a rational soul. A human being is an “embodied soul.” For Zubiri, this seems “definitional,” merely a way of speaking. For him, the essence of anything is the substantive system of constitutive notes. That’s the technical definition of (the word) “essence,” but essence is not a technical definition. It is a reality.

The unity of the system of notes determine a thing’s “interiority,” what Zubiri calls its in. These notes form a constitutional systemic unity. But at the same time, notes project outward. This is the system’s ex. Zubiri, then, defines dimension as “the projection of the whole ‘in’ into the ‘ex.’”48 Each constitutional sufficiency (laypersons call that a “thing”) has multiple dimensions, multiple ways it projects “itself” outwards. And each dimension projects the entire unity of the system of notes. Even though notes are always “notesof,” each note, itself, is a form of reality. They are real. “The color green is the greenish form of reality.”49 An entire system of notes as a constituted reality is a form of reality. There are various forms of reality. Zubiri says that the notes of a living being are “reduced to physico-chemical elements.”50 The living being qua living being, however, has its own form of reality (different from a star or a stone, he says). The corollary to this is that a living being is not reducible to its physico-chemical elements. Those are different forms of reality.51 You might say that they are different realities, but for Zubiri reality is always numerically one. There is just one reality, but it is comprised of multiple forms of reality. And each form of reality determines how that reality is “implanted” in the one reality. Personhood, for instance, is a “way of being implanted in reality.”52 Zubiri summarizes: [E]verything real, be it an elemental note or substantive system, has two moments. There is the moment of having these notes: this is suchness. And there is the moment of having form and mode of reality; which technically I shall call ‘transcendental,’ designating with this term, not a concept, but a physical moment….53 We said that a substantive reality is “more” than the sum of its notes. What is the “more,” we wanted to know. It is not a subject, a subjectum, that is standing under an array of properties. Zubiri writes,

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Each real thing, through its moment of reality, is “more” than what it is through the mere content of its notes. The moment of reality, in fact, is numerically identical when I apprehend several things as a unit. This means that the moment of reality is, in each real thing, an open moment. It is “more” than the notes, because it is open to everything else. This is the openness of the real. The openness is not of conceptual character. Nor is it the case that the concept of reality can be applied to several real things; rather, reality is a moment physically open in itself. That is the reason why transcendentality is not a mere concept, common to everything real; transcendentality is not community. It is actually about a physical moment of communication.54 “The moment of reality is numerically identical,” just means there is one reality. Each “thing” has its form of reality and each collection of things (say, a landscape) has its form of reality. But there is just one reality. The “more” of each substantive reality lies in its openness to everything else. A tree is a tree and as such it is open in its implantation in reality to be an element of the landscape (which in turn has its own form of reality, different from the mode of reality of the tree). Zubiri calls this the openness of the real. When Zubiri writes, “transcendentality is not community; it is actually about a physical moment of communication,” he means that openness does not merely mean that things can be set next to each other and considered as a collection of things, a “community” of things. He means that openness of the real entails that all things are communicating (in a manner of speaking) with each other; they are being together essentially because anything real is always open to everything else. Respectivity is always necessary; relations are possibly accidental, but always and necessarily founded on (prior) respectivity.

Notice at this point that Zubiri is not saying “in relation,” because a relation implies that there are at least two separate things that then come together in that relation. But openness is a constitutive element of anything real to be real at all. To be the note that it is, the note has to already be open to other notes and be constituted by its openness to other notes. Relations can only come after this constitutional openness, are only possible because of this openness of the real. If there were no openness of the real, there could never be any relationships at all. There are thus systems of systems of notes, based in the end on the most fundamental or constitutive notes (in biology, this might be the notes of genes; in physics, perhaps it is superstrings). This insight leads Zubiri to a further point about reality, the difference between relationality and respectivity. He says, “Everything real, both in its suchness and in its reality, is intrinsically respective.”55 He writes, “Respectivity remits [“sends forward”] each real thing to another.” Real things are like this because of their constitutive openness. The ground of the in-itsown-rightness is respectivity. Each real thing is what it is in its respectivity towards what else is, in its constitutive (which means “that which makes something to be what it is”) openness. Each real thing is implanted in reality in a determinate way, based on its capacities for respectivity, based on its role (so to speak) in the system. The thing determines the system and the system determines the thing – and all this is before anything like “relationships” develop. This is a constitutive fact – not a choice or an option, not just a way of looking at things – according to Zubiri. Nothing is real if it is not “its own” reality, and nothing is “its own” reality unless it has to be, by virtue of being constitutively open. […] The result is that every real thing is open “towards” other real things, and each form and mode of reality is open to other modes and forms of reality.”56

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Radical respectivity is not thing-tothing but mode/form of reality-tomode/form of reality. So, for Zubiri, the world – and there can be only one – is “the respective unity of all realities insofar as they are realities.” There might be more than one cosmos, by which Zubiri means an already constituted system of things (maybe there are other possible kosmoi, i.e., a multiverse), but there can only be one world, one reality. What Zubiri is saying here does not contradict what we said above about there being one reality, that reality is “numerically always one.” Ultimate reality is this total respective unity of all modes and forms of reality that, to one implanted in reality in that way, certainly feels like the “only” reality, and that makes the forms/modes of reality of others seem like different “realities”. One world, one ultimate reality. And that reality is respective. Even if there were only one real thing, it would be “formally respective in and of itself.” It would be its own world. Zubiri makes a further distinction between actuality and actualness. He explains that actualness is just like St. Thomas’ understanding of act. It is the opposite of potency. Actuality—and he thinks this word is the one most philosophers equate with Thomas’s idea of “act”— for Zubiri means, in effect, the way in which any real thing is here, now. Viruses—his example—were always real, always had actualness (there were not mere potencies). But humans didn’t always know about viruses, didn’t always have to deal with viruses. Viruses were not a part of our reality, so to speak. But now they are. Now, they are actual, they have actualized, they have actuality. Actuality is founded upon (or grounded by) “prior” actualness (the founding/grounding is not temporal, of course). Why is Zubiri making this point? He wants us to see the relationship between what is real, on the one hand, and what we know to be real, what we experience as real, on the other. There are those philosophers—Bishop Berkeley, to give one example—who like to think that only if hu-

mans (or something with consciousness) experience something does that something exist. This is called “idealism,” and it has its roots in Platonic thinking. Idealism holds that what is real is the idea. Plato thought the ideas—the forms—were the most real things and that they somehow possessed eternal being. Other idealists think ideas are only found in people’s minds. In either case, there is a distinction between idealism and materialism (which holds that what is real is matter). Zubiri is neither an idealist nor a materialist in the classical senses of these terms. He is a philosopher of reality, and for him both ideas and matter are real. That means reality is not based on ideas or on matter; rather, these are based on (or founded in) reality. So Zubiri is, in a sense, equating “actuality” with being manifest to us, having a role in our reality. “Actualness” is just the idea that real things are (and, as real, are open and respective). Things attain actuality as a function of sentient intelligence. There would be actualness without sentient intelligence, but not actuality Zubiri writes that “Whatever is real because of its respectivity is real as a function of the other real things. This is the functionality of the real.”57 Now, everything is real because of its respectivity, so everything that is real is real as a function of other things. “Function” is a familiar Aristotelian term, but the functional analysis that Zubiri presents differs markedly from Aristotle’s functional analysis of the human soul, for example. Functionality points to something deeper in the actualness of real things. Before anything can have a function (ergon) or a set of functions in the Aristotelian sense, it must be recognized that all real things are what they are as a function of everything else. Zubiri means the word “function” in something like the sense of “My buying Elton John tickets was a function of wanting to see him in concert.” Buying tickets is nothing at all except with reference to the show and my wanting to go to it. However, Zubiri does not necessarily mean function in the sense

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of something I do, some act or set of acts I perform. He means function as in “function-of” (as he means note as in “note-of”). This is more or less a restatement of the lesson that any “thing” is a constitutionally sufficient system of real notes, and both the notes and the system they comprise are constitutively open to the rest of reality. The notes determine the thing; the thing determines the notes; and everything determines (in one way or another) everything else. This is not because we think it’s this way; it’s because it is this way. Everything is the way it is as a function of the way everything else is.58 Finally, Zubiri makes a distinction between being, the province of ontology, and reality, the province of metaphysics. He bases that distinction on the difference between actuality and actualness. Being is to reality as actuality is to actualness. The latter term in each pair is the ground or foundation for the former term in each pair. A key implication of this distinction is that whatever we say in ontology ought to be grounded in reality, properly grasped. In On Essence, Zubiri makes a conceptual cut in this manner: The view from without inward is a way of viewing as inhesion and leads to a theory of the categories of being. The view from within outward is a view of actualization or projection and leads to a theory of the dimensions of reality. These two manners of viewing are not incompatible; rather, both are necessary for an adequate theory of reality.59 Real things are unified systems of notes in their own right that can be understood from the point of view of either the “in” (the “of-y-ness” of the respective notes) or the “ex” (the outward projection, the dimensions, the actualness of the thing as a function of all other things). Zubiri would say that an Aristotelianinspired category ontology can (and must) be developed based on the former perspective, just as a metaphysics of reality in all its dimensions would need to be developed on the latter. The latter project would have to take into account sentient intelligence,

i.e, would have to make reference to our human way of apprehending reality, in order even to get started. Having brought to light some of the key ideas of Zubiri’s quite elaborate metaphysical vision—and before attempting to map his work onto contemporary discussion in ontology—we should pause to highlight some key questions and problems raised by this work. 1. Have we hit bottom? In philosophy, starting points matter. Despite the last century’s philosophical preoccupation with anti-foundationalism, anyone hoping to develop a systematic theory—especially of reality, itself—has to make a start somewhere, beyond which the theory cannot go. All sensible philosophers agree that at some point one has to put one’s foot down, so to speak, and accept that other philosophers can always question this starting point. There is no getting around this, and we must remain humble about our choices of principles. Zubiri—in some ways like Descartes— begins his metaphysical quest from an experiential or epistemological standpoint. Reality, for Zubiri, is the foundation for all that follows. There is no getting outside, underneath, or beyond reality. But we “get at it” immediately. We apprehend the “inits-own-right-ness” of things (and do not have to argue towards it or deduce it). It is our starting point. Now, there is a long-standing drive in thought for “objectivity,” a point of view that is not any particular point of view, a position that is absolute, and this for fear that a subjective and relative position could only yield a parochial theory, perhaps no better than a idiosyncratic taste or predilection. This purported Holy Grail of theory has been described as view of things as if we never existed.60 But is such a goal attainable? I think not. I know of no one who has fundamentally doubted the veridicality of one’s own general experience (even accounting for error as a modulation of the veridicality of experience). It seems, to me anyway, acceptable to start with this reality that we apprehend directly in its

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“in-its-own-right-ness” and see where this methodological starting point leads us. One possible objection that could be levied against this option can be drawn from deconstructions of what is called the “metaphysics of presence,” the idea that being is not fully, transparently present to apprehension but subject to position in differential systems and temporal deferring (what Derrida called différance). Zubiri’s thought, I might argue, tends to be immune from such criticism. A defense stems from the distinction Zubiri makes between reality and being and with the notions of “openness,” “functionality,” and “respectivity.” However, this argument cannot be made here. Suffice it to say that any philosophical position – including deconstruction—has a certain “aboutness.” To the extent that a philosophical position is not just meaningless chatter, it has an object. Deconstruction is, to my mind, still too wedded to a philosophy of language. Zubiri’s philosophy—while not reverting to pre-Kantian naïveté—is about reality. 2. What is the ontological status of “notes”? But what, exactly, in addition to the formality of reality (i.e., the “in-its-ownright-ness”), do we apprehend? What is, besides the formality, the content of that basic apprehension? It is the notes of individual things. Zubiri holds that “there is nothing real that is not individual.”61 Those individual things are unified systems of notes. Now, we know that Zubiri does not think that notes themselves are things, and so he does not hold to some idea that things are mere conglomerations of notes. But what exactly is the ontological status of notes? How shall we think about what he is calling notes? Notes are not the imputation of human beings. They are realities or forms of reality (if not things). But what does this mean, ultimately? In many ways, “notes” is an unanalyzed concept in Zubiri’s thought. What accounts for the fact there are different notes? Different things are different because they are each a systematic unity of different notes. It is the notes that ac-

count for the difference between things. But what differentiates one note from another? Is it that notes, themselves, have notes? Does this lead to some sort of regress? Would such a regress be vicious or benign? 3. What accounts for the systematic unity? I.e., why are there certain things rather than others? Again, to say that different things differ due to the different notes that form their systematic unity raises the question of why are there different systematic unities? What even accounts for these unities? 4. Is there a phenomenological basis of metaphysics, and if so is this legitimate? This may be a complementary question to the first one raised here. I think we would agree that there is a difference between asking about what there is and asking about what we apprehend that there is. We would all wager, I’m sure, that there are things we do not apprehend (to say nothing of comprehend). Does Zubiri’s principle, that reality is apprehended immediately by sentient intelligence, leave us with a merely subjective or correlationist view of reality? Has he, in spite of himself, missed the point that reality exceeds our apprehension? This is the gist of the knock on Kant made by Quentin Meillassoux.62 Kant rightly recognized that human modes of apprehension deny access to things-in-themselves – his “Copernican revolution.” But then Kant, says Meillassoux, limits reality to what is structured by the structure of reason— “correlationism.” Meillassoux suggests that Kant should have quit while he was ahead, having undone anthropocentric notions of reality. The problem, it seems to me, however, is that there is no way to not have some degree of “correlation” between our thought and our world. Otherwise, our thoughts are about nothing and the world infinitely withdraws. Certainly, we cannot plumb the depths of reality with anything like comprehensiveness, let alone completeness. There is an irreducible mystery

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to being. But this does not mean we can make no headway in trying to understand reality to some extent. It is a story for another time, but Zubiri’s analysis of sentient intelligence may provide substantial tools for the project of understanding reality that does not simply determine things to be correlates of thought or consciousness. As we will now see, Zubiri’s philosophy is hardly the only one open to these kinds of questions and objections. IV. Conclusions: Similarities, differences, and some further questions Clearly, similarities and differences exist between a plausible trope theory (“PTT”) and Zubirian metaphysics (ZM). Let us explore some of them. 1. Both Zubiri and PTT reject what I’ve called the “Mr. Potatohead” substanceattributes ontology. Both ZM and PTT reject the idea of an underlying who-knowswhat to which adhere various properties. Both find the trouble with this notion of underlying subject (or bare substance) to be that it is an empty notion. A thatwhich-lacks-any-features-in-its-own-right is literally unthinkable. 2. Both ZM and PTT (as opposed to, say, Williams’ understanding of trope theory), reject the Humean version of bundle theory. ZM rejects it as strictly insufficient to account for the constitution and identity of things, and PTT rejects it for its insoluble logical difficulties, as outlined above. 3. Nevertheless, both ZM and PTT recognize the importance for reasons of object identity (especially through change and over time) to posit something that counts as the essence of the thing that remains (essentially) the same over time and through change. (a) ZM maintains that an object, O, is a unified system of notes whose essence is its irreducible core of fundamental, constitutionally sufficient constitutive notes. The unification of the system is a function of the respectivity or openness of reality – the notes of O are what they are as a function of (or with respect to) all of the other notes

(that are likewise respective). The core or essence is a matter for science to determine (for instance, that it is the genetic material of organic beings that constitutes the essence of those beings). That there is such a core is a “physical” (i.e., not merely theoretical or conceptive) fact. Is there a “more” to O? Yes, but only in the (important) sense of “transcendence in”, as Zubiri puts it—in other words, in the openness of the real, i.e., vis-à-vis respectivity. (b) PTT, while not countenancing a featureless substratum, nevertheless holds that there is a core or nucleus of mutually founding tropes, each of which is founded upon the others members and none of which is founded upon any non-member. This nucleus might then serve as a oneway foundation for other tropes that might themselves be founded on other nonmembers of this essential nucleus. (c) We can see, therefore, that ZM and PTT have similar intuitions as to the sufficient constitution of any object, O. But in neither case is there some thing in addition to the notes or tropes that constitute O. 4. Neither ZM nor PTT accepts the existence of free-floating notes/tropes. However, there is a difference. (a) PTT seems to agree with all trope theories (whether they be exclusive or an element of a multi-category ontology) in seeing tropes as abstract particulars that have an “identity” of their own. Tropes come ready made, so to speak (despite their not being free floating). Levinson, as we saw, criticized this position on a number of fronts, but a key complaint is that this conception of trope would automatically entail at least one additional ontological category: a universal. It would do so because to even understand the trope is to see a trope as a token of a type (and there seems no getting around this with the suspect notion of “exact similarity”). (b) ZM, on the other hand, finds the “identity” of any note to be a function of all the other notes to which it is both respective and open. In other words, a note is what it is because of all the other notes of

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the object as well as of the object itself (considered as a unified system of those notes) it characterizes. In addition, that note is what it is as a function of how the object as a whole is open and respective the rest of reality. Not only are there not free-floating notes, there are also no substantially independently identifiable notes at all. (c) The question is whether PTT or ZM is more satisfying of our explanatory objectives. Short of a (paradoxical) Platonic view of a particularist ontology (i.e., trope theory), there is no adequate way of understanding tropes themselves, as Levinson has argued quite vigorously. On the other hand, ZM leaves us in the same bind as some of his illustrious predecessors, including both Parmenides and Heraclitus, as well as any contemporary processrelational metaphysicians (for instance, Whitehead): How can we tell what O “really” is if its notes are subject to a constant flux of respectivity (or, the flip side of the same coin, if it is melted into a single Reality)? (d) But what if Zubiri is a nominalist after all? What if “reality-things” are, themselves, (merely) “meaning-things,” things that derive their identity and meaning as a function of their place in a human experiential scheme of one particular sort or another (physics, say, or metaphysics)? Thomas Fowler63 identifies nominalism, the metaphysical view that only particulars exist, that so-called “universals” and “abstract entities” are simply manners of speaking, 64 as one of the three pillars of the “unholy trinity” in much contemporary philosophy of science (the other two pillars being naturalism and reductionism).65 Zubiri's view of what he calls “meaning things” is clearly nominalist in the sense that a table qua table has no de suyo (i.e., in-its-own-right) features. But what of the “reality thing” that can manifest as a table? For Zubiri, the table qua thing has its reality de suyo, and not simply as a function of human perception or practical interest. But here it pays to recall Zubiri's insight into the levels of intellection. At the

fundamental level, that of sentient intelligence, the intellect actualizes the reality that the table qua thing is in its own right. But the truth of this intellection is prior to logos, prior to the articulation even of the thing’s de suyo features. Does the intellect’s ability to articulate such features imply a realist commitment to universals or abstract entities? If the formality of reality is the in-its-own-right, then are articulations themselves real? Or, if they are indeed real, would they have any necessary connection to that of which they are articulations? It is hard to see how they would, and if they do not then articulation appears nominalistic. “Reality things” in logos turn out to be “meaning things” relative to particular theoretical programs of one kind or another. The possibility I am raising here is certainly arguable and depends on possible interpretations of Zubiri’s metaphysical position. I raise the issue in consideration of the question raised earlier: How can we tell what object O “really” is if its notes— the ones it has de suyo—are subject to a constant flux of respectivity? It would seem the answer is that we cannot. The lesson to be drawn from this (possible) conclusion is that the ontological project, whether in the guise of a quest for an plausible trope theory (a desideratum of those adhering to the “unholy trinity” of nominalism, reductionism, and naturalism) or rather in the terms of Zubiri’s metaphysical program, is always a practical project, a praxis, and as such is a function of human projects generally. Neither PPT nor ZM—nor any other metaphysical program—could possibly bring the quest to get at the basic structures of reality to a close. Recognizing this, the terms of the debate have changed. It is no longer a matter of seeking “adequacy” but rather a question of the nature of the praxis itself. What are we really after? In any case, both PTT and ZM make a substantial contribution to our metaphysical and ontological project. Both, though, have their weakness. PTT tries to account for things in isolation in a way that Zubiri

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would find, in fact, implausible. Respectivity and the openness of reality demand at least the addition of other strategies. ZM, on the other hand, may be holistic to a

fault, unable to account adequately for the identity and perdurance of objects without the supplement of categorical ontology.

Notes 1

2

3

Hofweber, Thomas, “Logic and Ontology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . For instance, here is a view that can be found repeated throughout the contemporary critique of metaphysics: “Metaphysics nowadays pretty much amounts to microphysics and macrophysics, particle physics and astrophysics, made possible first by microscopes and telescopes, and now by computer-driven microscopic and macroscopic instruments that probe the unimaginably small and the unimaginably large…”. John D. Caputo, The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (Indiana University Press, 2014), pp. 113-114. This desideratum is not universally shared among all metaphysicians and ontologists, of course. This is a key issue in metaphysics generally: What is the relation between our ontological commitments and our engagement in the world – including our scientific engagement? Which drives which? The two views under consideration here, however, are strongly committed to consistency with modern science.

4

See Anna-Sophia Maurin, “Tropes,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/, accessed 6/24/14 1:19 pm.

5

Donald C. Williams, “On the Elements of Being: I,” The Review of Metaphysics 7(1953).

6

Williams, p. 7. Readers unfamiliar with trope theory may detect a similarity with Leibniz’s monads. The resemblance, however, is quite superficial. Mention of Leibniz in tropetheoretical literature is almost non-existent. Leibniz saw the “building blocks” of reality to be immaterial, non-extended, soul-like spiritual substances. One will search in vain for such language among contemporary ontologists. Aristotle and Locke are the real progenitors of trope theory.

7

“Any possible world, and hence, of course, this one, is completely constituted by its

tropes and their connections of location and similarity.” Williams, p. 8. 8

I.e., a single category is sufficient for adequately explaining the basic structure of reality.

9

This is the most commonly raised question in terms of getting at the heart of trope theory. See, for instance, Márta Ujvári, The Trope Bundle Theory of Substance: Change, Individuation and Individual Essence (Walter de Gruyter, 2012). P. 164

10

Williams lists as alternatives terms to compresence, “collocation,” “belonging to,” “concresence,” “coinherence,” “togetherness,” and “concurence.” Williams, p. 8.

11

Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Bradley’s Regress,” Philosophy Compass, 7.11 (2012) pp. 794807; Maurin, “Trope Theory and the Bradley Regress,” Synthese, Vol. 175, No. 3 (August 2010), pp. 311-326; Ross P. Cameron, “Turtles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 230, pp. 1-14.

12

One solution is to say that exact resemblance is simply the ontologically innocuous supervenience of the tropes being the tropes they are. It is an internal relation. It is, as David Armstrong would say, an “ontological free lunch.” See Peter Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Sept. 1994), p. 556.

13

Generally, “similarity” is taken to be primitive, i.e. admitting of no further analysis.

14

Peter Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(1994)., p. 562.

15

Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance.”, p. 565.

16

Note that in the case of the third objection, traditional (i.e., non-place) substratum theory holds the advantage: the whole bundle (“attached” to its substratum - whatever that is) moves.

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17

Edward N. Zalta, “Frege,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ Accessed 10/14/2014 18:11.

18

Simons uses the term “substance” in this discussion, but there is an ambiguity at work. Substance can mean one of two (along with property) metaphysical co-principles of things. This is the propertyless something-orother of what I will refer to later as the “Mr. Potatohead version of substance theory. But substance can also mean that which is apt to exist in itself, a whole existing in its own right and not as an intrinsic part of anything else. Here, Simons means the latter. To keep matters - to my mind, anyway - more clear, I will just use “object” or “thing” instead of “substance.”

19

“A foundational system collection or plurality of nected system.” Simons, ticular Clothing: Three Substance.”, p. 563.

20

Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance.”, pp. 567-568.

21

Jerrold Levinson, “Why There Are Tropes,” Philosophy 81, no. 04 (2006).

22

See Williams, “On the Elements of Being: I.” pp. 4 ff.

23

Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p. 570.

24

See Cynthia Macdonald, “Tropes and Other Things,” in Readings in the Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics, ed. S. and C. Macdonald Laurence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

25

Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p. 527. E. J. Lowe is criticized in a similar fashion. See pp. 575-6.

26

Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p. 579.

27

As an example of an internal relation, if John is shorter than Mary, that is simply by virtue of the fact that John is the height he is and Mary is the height she is. There is nothing “additional” at work here. If John is the height he is and Mary is the height she is, then they will always be in the height relation they happen to be in - necessarily. Note that an internal relation would not, therefore, be a trope, as it has no “independent” reality. I.e.,

it could not serve as a building block of reality, as trope theorists want tropes to do. 28

See Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Trope Theory and the Bradley Regress,” Synthese 175, no. 3 (2010). and Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Bradley’s Regress,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 11 (2012). “Bradley’s Regress” is the same sort of objection that Aristotle’s “Third Man” argument held against a Platonic theory of forms.

29

What I have in mind here as a strategy is akin to Donald Davidson’s “anomalous monism” theory of mental events. His view on that issue is that all mental events are physical events, but that they are anomalous. That means we have not two different ontological categories (mental and physical), but rather two irreducibly different explanations of mental events. See “Mental Events” in Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Philosophical Essays of Donald Davidson) (Oxford University Press, 2001)., pp. 229244.

30

El Hombre y Dios was originally organized and completed by Ignacio Ellacuría and published in 1984. That version of the book went through five editions. The English translation, Man and God, by Joaquín Redondo (with critical revisions by Thomas Fowler and Nelson Oringer) was made from (apparently) the 2nd or 3rd edition of El Hombre y Dios, both from 1985. That translation appeared in 2009 (University Press of America). In 2012, a greatly expanded New Edition of El Hombre y Dios appeared. This has yet to be translated to English. In this paper, I will be citing from the English translation [hereinafter MG] and the 5th edition of the Spanish original [hereinafter HD].

31

Xavier Zubiri, On Essence. Translation and Introduction by Robert Caponigri (Catholic Univ. of America, 1963).

32

Xavier Zubiri, Sobre La Esencia / About the Essence (Obras De Xavier Zubiri) (Spanish Edition) (Alianza Editorial Sa, 1962). Originally published in 1962.

33

Xavier Zubiri and Nelson R. Orringer, Dynamic Structure of Reality (Hispanisms) (University of Illinois Press, 2003).

34

Xavier Zubiri, Estructura Dinamica De La Realidad / Dynamic Structure of Reality (Obras De Xavier Zubiri) (Spanish Edition) (Alianza Editorial SA, 1994).

is not just a mere things, but a con“Particulars in ParTrope Theories of

No

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35

Xavier Zubiri, Man and God (University Press of America, 2009)., 24.

36

“The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that support substantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding; book 2, chapter 23; “Of our Complex Ideas of Substances” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_the ory

51

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, this insight might be fruitfully applied to issues in the philosophy of mind by those theorists hoping for a viable non-reductive physicalism.

52

Technically, a form of reality has a particular mode of implantation. See Zubiri, Man and God, 27.

Zubiri, Man and God., 27. Zubiri, Man and God., 27. 55 Zubiri, Man and God., 27. 56 Zubiri, Man and God., 28. 57 Zubiri, Man and God., 29. 58 Note that this idea consonant with concept of evolution and natural selection. 53 54

37

Zubiri, Man and God., 24.

59

38

Unless, I suppose, the water is in the frozen state and is shaped in a particular way. See Zubiri, Man and God., 25.

Zubiri, On Essence ; Translation and Introduction By a. Robert Caponigri., 148.

60

One contemporary school of philosophy that goes by the name of “speculative realism” (and sometimes “object oriented ontology”) finds the central flaw of both Anglo-American analytic philosophy and continental philosophy to be their adherence to “correlationism,” the idea that things are merely correlates of human thought. The speculative realists want to get at what things are in themselves beyond any correlation that might exist with consciousness. What this project could amount definitely remains to be seen. It should be noted, though, that one important proponent of this school, Graham Harman, specifically names Zubiri as a key influence on his thinking “from the point of view of objects.” It is not the purpose of the present paper to unpack and assess this relationship between Zubiri’s ideas and those of speculative realism.

61

Zubiri, On Essence; Translation and Introduction by Robert Caponigri., p. 156.

39

Zubiri, Man and God., 38.

40

Zubiri, Man and God., 48.

41

Xavier Zubiri, Sentient Intelligence (Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America, 1999)., 35.

42

Again the phrase, “it possesses,” here can be misleading. There is no separate, metaphysically independent “it” that then “possesses” notes. To say, “it possesses,” is just a manner of speaking.

43

Zubiri, Man and God., 27.

44

To be clear: Zubiri contrasts his idea of “substantivity” with that of the traditional notion of “substance” in the sense of the Mr. Potato Metaphysics. But there is an ambiguity. For Zubiri, a substantivity is a unified system of notes, and some of those notes are “substances.” This latter usage, however, does not refer to classical metaphysics. Rather, “substance” in this latter usage means something like “material” or “stuff” of a certain kind. I do not believe Zubiri is implying that this latter usage was Aristotle’s or St. Thomas’s, and the difference between their metaphysical theories still holds (despite this ambiguity).

45

Zubiri, Man and God., 26.

46

Zubiri, Man and God., 26.

47

Zubiri, Man and God., 26.

48

Zubiri, Man and God., 26.

49

Zubiri, Man and God., 27. Zubiri, Man and God., 27.

50

Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude (New York: Continuum, 2009). 63 Thomas Fowler, “Reductionism, Naturalism, and Nominalism: The “Unholy Trinity” and Its Explanation in Zubiri’s Philosophy,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 9(2007). 72 62

Stathis Psillos, Philosophy of Science a-Z (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 163 65 Fowler, “Reductionism, Naturalism, and Nominalism: The “Unholy Trinity” and Its Explanation in Zubiri’s Philosophy.” 71 64

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¿Tiene sentido la crítica de Gustavo Bueno al concepto zubiriano de religación?

Joathas Soares Bello

São Bento do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Abstract The present article aims to provide an answer to the criticism formulated by the philosopher Gustavo Bueno to Zubiri’s Theologal Philosophy. On one side, Bueno considers the concept of “religation” not to be a consistent one because it relies on the “absurd” notion of creation; on the other side, he states this concept is not a good enough foundation for a Philosophy of Religion, since religation would not account—for instance—for the existence of irreligious people. To refute these theses it will be necessary to verify the relationship between religation and creation as well as clarify the distinction between religation and religion Resumen El presente artículo pretende responder a las críticas del filósofo Gustavo Bueno a la filosofía teologal de Zubiri. Bueno, por un lado, considera que el concepto de “religación” no es consistente, pues se apoya en la noción “absurda” de creación; por otro, piensa que tal concepto no sirve como base de una filosofía de la religión, una vez que la religación, por ejemplo, no daría margen a la existencia de personas irreligiosas. Para contestar a estas tesis será necesario averiguar la relación entre religación y creación y aclarar la distinción entre religación y religión.

Introducción En este artículo se responde a dos críticas al concepto de religación en Zubiri: Gustavo Bueno ha sostenido que el concepto mismo es inconsistente, al estar fundado en la noción “absurda” de causalidad creadora; y que es incapaz de fundamentar una filosofía de la religión, pues, además de que no sería posible probar la existencia de un fundamento personal religador y creador, la religación implicaría una pansebeia o religión universal, lo que, por un lado, quitaría el carácter antropológico de la filosofía de la religión (todo ser sería religado) y, por otro, sería desmentido por el hecho de que hay muchas perso-

nas no religiosas. Tales críticas, que pretenden ser demoledoras, están en las cuestiones 2ª y 5ª de su libro Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión, que recoge un conjunto de conferencias “reconstruidas”, en palabras del autor. Las respuestas a estas dos críticas constituyen las dos pequeñas partes de este trabajo. En primer lugar, consideraré en qué sentido es posible asimilar la religación a la creación, y si ésta constituye una noción “absurda”; después, buscaré mostrar si, efectivamente, el hecho de que todo esté religado implica una pansebeia y no permite el hecho de la irreligiosidad, es decir, aclararé el nexo entre religación y 77

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religión. 1. ¿Tiene consistencia el concepto de religación? En su cuestión 2ª (“El conflicto entre la religión y la ciencia”), Bueno afirma que la filosofía teologal de Zubiri es una “Teología preambular”, porque considera que tiene un origen teológico –para el autor, el pensamiento de Zubiri es una “filosofía escolástica”, en el sentido de la ancilla theologiae–, pero, con honestidad intelectual, reconoce que la crítica tiene que apuntar a sus eventuales insuficiencias, sinsentidos o contradicciones internas1. Bueno considera que la doctrina de la religación de Zubiri es un ejemplo de lo que él denomina “contra-modelo”: “Entendemos aquí por ‘contra-modelo’ a un sistema inconsistente de términos y relaciones, dado que algunos de sus elementos son incompatibles”2. La religación zubiriana sería un contra-modelo ontológico, porque estaría edificada sobre la idea de la causalidad de la persona, que supone la idea “errónea” de la causalidad como relación binaria (causa-efecto), y la idea “absurda” de causalidad creadora3. Veamos con más detalle su interpretación, para luego analizarla. De acuerdo con Bueno, el concepto de religación habría sido construido sobre el concepto tradicional de “relación transcendental” (de las criaturas a su causa primera) y sobre el teorema kantiano de la “apercepción transcendental”, según el cual, como afirma Bueno, la conciencia se da originariamente en el mundo exterior. Esta conciencia habría sido convertida en “existencia”, en la filosofía existencial; después, la existencia habría sido convertida en “vida”, en Ortega y Gasset, y finalmente la vida habría sido convertida en “persona”, en Zubiri4. El concepto de “apoderamiento” estaría sobrepuesto al de causa eficiente, en particular a la causalidad eficiente que se atribuye al acto de creación: Si no entendemos mal (y entender aquí es encontrar el modelo tradicional sobre el que se está construyendo), apoderamiento es un concepto que se superpo-

ne, aunque desbordándole, en parte, al de causa eficiente, sobre todo creadora. Porque la causa (sobre todo creadora) tiene un poder (decir “potencia” induciría a confusión, dada la correlación aristotélica potencia/acto). Además, poder, por sus connotaciones políticas, personales, prepara muy bien la silueta de algo que está preparado para ser rellenado por un ser personal, Dios, como Causa creadora y conservadora, el Gran Poder5. En la interpretación de Bueno, el apoderamiento es el acto creador de Dios que pone y conserva en la existencia al hombre, que es “absoluto” en cuanto “ente-ensí” y “para-sí”, pero que es “relativo” porque es efecto del “Poder de la Causa” (el “Gran Poder”), manteniendo con éste una relación transcendental, que es la religación. Dice Bueno: …aunque en su núcleo, esta idea es la tradicional relación trascendental de la criatura, y en particular, de la persona libre a su Creador, que la pone en el ser como libre (Bañez, Molina, Zumel) está justificado acudir a un término nuevo (religación), puesto que lo que se quiere subrayar es que, por ejemplo, hay que atender, no sólo a la subordinación o dependencia (lo que conduciría a una teoría de la religión afín a la de Schleiermacher), sino al momento positivo, absoluto, de la persona. Tampoco interesa subrayar la premoción física, divina, del acto libre de la voluntad, pues se trata de abarcar al ser total del hombre y no sólo a su voluntad, ni, menos aún, a su entendimiento. Por ello, re-ligación no es ob-ligación. Porque la obligación presupone al sujeto previo al que se obliga, mientras que la religación surge en la constitución misma del sujeto, como es propio de una relación trascendental. Por otra parte, la elección del término religación (que en principio se justifica por el ligare, en composición opuesta al obligare, como hemos dicho) tiene la gran ventaja de que recorta, “en línea punteada”, lo que casi

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inmediatamente después se llamará religión6. Una vía más fácil para contestar a Bueno quizás sería decir que la religación o el apoderamiento por el poder de lo real se trata de “dominación” –del momento de realidad– y no de “causalidad” (“funcionalidad de lo real”)—entre cosas reales—, y también que la “fundamentalidad” o “fontanalidad” de Dios—esencia del hecho de la religación—no es necesariamente creación, pero aquí he elegido otra vía. Para Zubiri, la religación es el hecho por el cual el hombre está vinculado a las cosas reales en tanto que reales, fundándose en la realidad de las cosas como algo último, posibilitante e impelente, es decir, en el “poder de lo real”. El hombre se ve impelido a investigar el fundamento del poder de lo real vehiculado por las cosas reales, y para Zubiri este fundamento es Dios, Realidad Absolutamente Absoluta, siendo la esencia de la religación la fontanalidad de Dios. Zubiri no identifica, en el plan filosófico, esta fontanalidad con la creación, que para él es un tema teológico. En otro lugar he sustentado que no hay razón para no llegar filosóficamente al tema de la creación a partir de un análisis de la religación7. Aquí haré una síntesis de lo que ahí he desarrollado. Zubiri, supuestamente, se mantendría en la línea de Duns Escoto, el cual negaría la creación como verdad racional. Pero, en realidad, Escoto, así como Santo Tomás, simplemente niega que la verdad de la creación en el tiempo sea objeto cierto de la razón8. En cualquier caso, aún tengamos un universo eterno (como postulaba Aristóteles), este no sería increado, sino que estaría fundado en un Principio metafísico, que es precisamente la Realidad-Fundamento zubiriana, que desde siempre estaría creando, de la nada, el mundo—eternidad y creaturalidad no se oponen necesariamente. Con lo cual la “tensión teologal” del hombre hacia Dios puede ser entendida como la clásica “relación creatural”. Pero ésta no es una “relación trascendental”—como piensa el mismo Zubiri en el artículo “Respectividad de

lo real”—, sino “categorial”9: la religación está en la línea de lo que Zubiri llama “respectividad remitente” –toda cosa real está de suyo abierta a las demás cosas reales–, la cual, aunque sea inseparable de la realidad, se funda en la “respectividad constituyente”10—la apertura de la realidad a su propio contenido—, del mismo modo que la relación categorial se funda en la sustancia, aunque la relación creatural sea un tipo de relación categorial especial, inseparable de la misma creatura o cosa real11. La relación trascendental, en realidad, nunca se da entre realidades, sino entre co-principios reales (como materia y forma, acto y potencia, etc.). Dicho eso, consideremos el concepto bueniano de causalidad. Para Bueno, la causalidad no es una relación binaria de causa (X) y efecto (Y), expresada en la función Y=f(X), porque causar es producir una alteración (un efecto) en un esquema material procesual de identidad (H, de hylé), lo cual se expresa en la función compleja Y=f(X,H): …para que algo se configure como efecto será preciso contar con un esquema material procesual de identidad cuya configuración depende de diversos supuestos de índole filosófica, científica o cultural. El esquema material de identidad podría hacerse corresponder con la causa material aristotélica, siempre que ella quedase determinada según criterios positivos E, que expresaremos en la fórmula E(H). El efecto se define entonces como una interrupción, ruptura, alteración o desviación del esquema material procesual de identidad (ruptura que no afecta, en principio, al sistema que, por decirlo así, engloba al efecto). Se comprenderá, dada la relatividad del concepto de efecto, no ya inmediatamente a su causa, sino a un esquema material de identidad (dado en un sistema complejo de referencia) que, si no es posible determinar en cada caso este esquema procesual de referencia, la noción de efecto [consecuentemente la de causa] se desvanece12.

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Si se traduce este pasaje a términos aristotélicos, la causalidad eficiente sólo podría ejercerse en un substrato material; donde no haya “materia”, no puede haber causalidad. Así, la idea de “creación” sería absurda, pues su esquema material procesual de identidad sería “la nada” (creatio ex nihilo subjecti), y no la causa eficiente divina inmutable. Consecuentemente, admitiéndose la existencia de Dios como ente infinito, todo “efecto” divino no podría “salir” de él mismo, por así decirlo; por eso la crítica a la posibilidad de causar un ser libre: éste, de ser causado por Dios, no podría ser algo distinto de él (tema que Bueno retoma en la cuestión 5ª). A partir de estas premisas, desde una posición materialista, se concluye que, como hay lo finito, “lo que no es Dios”, no puede haber Dios. Esta conclusión es la consecuencia lógica de la asunción del principio de extranihilidad (“de la nada, nada se hace, y nada puede volver a la nada”); tal principio, como enseña el profesor Juan Cruz Cruz, Es una negación de la tesis creacionista o de la producción de lo finito por el infinito mediante un acto libre […]. Con la admisión del principio de extranihilidad se expresa que hay coincidencia o identificación entre lo infinito y la serie ilimitada de cosas finitas13. Santo Tomás ya había respondido, en la Suma Teológica, a la objeción de Bueno, entonces formulada así: Según el Filósofo en I Physic., los antiguos filósofos admitieron como una verdad de sentido común que de la nada, nada se hace. Pero el poder de Dios no llega hasta lo que es contrario a los primeros principios; por ejemplo a hacer que el todo no sea mayor que la parte o que la afirmación y la negación sean las dos verdaderas a la vez. Por lo tanto, Dios no puede hacer algo a partir de la nada, esto es, no puede crear14. A lo cual Tomás respondió: Como hemos dicho anteriormente [q.44 a.2], los antiguos filósofos sólo se fija-

ron en la producción de efectos particulares por causas particulares, las cuales necesariamente presuponen algo anterior a su acción. En este sentido, era opinión común entre ellos que nada se hace a partir de la nada. Sin embargo, esto no se da en el origen de las cosas procedentes del principio universal15. En la creación no se produce “tal” o “cual” realidad particular, desde otra(s) realidad(es) particular(es), sino “la” realidad en cuanto tal, desde la “realidad absolutamente absoluta”—de ahí que Zubiri se refiera alguna vez al acto creador como “producción de lo real en tanto que real”16. La aplicación de la noción de causalidad de Bueno al acto creador divino es una incongruencia, un “disparate”17. Al lado de la razón de “producción”, de procedencia artesanal, Santo Tomás atribuyó a la creación el carácter de “emanación”, despojada del paradigma “necesitarista” del gnosticismo (inmanencia, falta de libertad y degradación del principio originario). Como lo expone Juan Cruz Cruz: “en el interior divino la emanación es un orden de origen entre coincidentes o concurrentes; en el exterior divino, la emanación es un orden de origen entre incoincidentes, especialmente en el plano entitativo…”18. En sentido semejante, Zubiri, para quien la creación es “proyección ad extra de la vida divina”, la compara con las procesiones trinitarias: “Así como en las procesiones trinitarias se constituye la esencia infinita de Dios, así también en la procesión creadora se constituye la esencia finita de las cosas”19. 2. ¿Puede la doctrina del a religación fundamentar una filosofía de la religión? En su cuestión 5ª (“Religación y religión”), Bueno plantea dos críticas: por un lado, repite la idea, ya presente en la cuestión 2ª, de que la doctrina de la religación es una réplica de la doctrina kantiana de la apercepción transcendental; por otro, pretende mostrar que esta doctrina de la religación no es apta para fundamentar una verdadera filosofía de la religión, ya

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por sus premisas, ya por sus consecuencias. Según Bueno, Zubiri habría sustituido la conexión transcendental entre la “conciencia de mi existencia” y el “espacio de los objetos” por la conexión entre “persona” y “Dios” o, con más cautela, entre persona y “ente fundamentante” o “Poder último de lo real”. De la misma manera que los objetos del espacio-tiempo no son algo sobreañadido (tras su rerepresentación) a la conciencia, sino algo constitutivo de ella, tampoco el Fundamento sería algo sobreañadido a la persona, sino constitutivo de la misma; así como el mundo exterior no puede considerarse contenido de una tesis demostrable, una vez que su presencia está presupuesta en toda demostración, el poder de lo real no sería algo demostrable. Pero la doctrina de la religación sería “heterodoxa” respecto de la filosofía crítica, según la cual el orden moral práctico es el fundamento de las ideas transcendentales (Alma, Mundo, Dios), como si este orden fuera el ens fundamentale; la doctrina de la religación pasaría por alto la crítica de la razón, recorriendo en sentido contrario el camino crítico, y recayendo en las posiciones escolásticas prekantianas20. ¿Cómo responder a este planteamiento? Para Zubiri, hay una respectividad, en la intelección, entre inteligencia y realidad en cuanto “verdad real”, es decir, realidad actualizada –y no realidad “allende” la aprehensión–; y hay otra en la acción humana –considerada metafísicamente, en cuanto constituyente de la “realidad humana siendo”–, entre la persona y el poder de lo real (que es la misma realidad como ultimidad, posibilitación e impelencia), presente en cada cosa real; esta segunda respectividad, que es la religación, también es algo dado en la intelección primordial. Este poder de lo real es fundamento de la persona humana, y no es nada sobreañadido a ella, como afirma Bueno. Pero no se trata de algo “presupuesto”, sino de algo “mostrable”, porque está presente en la aprehensión primordial de toda acción del hombre. A partir de esta presencia del poder de lo real es que se

puede “demostrar” racionalmente su fundamento allende la aprehensión –el fundamento del poder de lo real o de la realidad simpliciter allende la aprehensión también es, forzosamente, el fundamento de la persona humana. El poder de lo real en cuanto fundamento de la realización humana dado en intelección primordial no es formalmente lo mismo que su fundamento demostrable en intelección racional. Pero demostrar algo no es hacer este algo presente en intelección primordial, sino “dar razón”, a través de él, de aquello presente en esta intelección; es decir, en el caso que nos ocupa, se trata de pensar aquello que posibilita que el poder de lo real sea fundamento mostrable y mostrado de la realización humana. Una posibilidad sería decir que el poder de lo real es un puro factum, que es justamente la posición atea. Zubiri y Kant recurren a vías distintas para llegar a Dios, pero en ambos casos, se trata de partir de lo dado en aprehensión—el poder de lo real o el orden moral como lo entiende Kant—para justificar a Dios como fundamento metafísico ya del hecho de la religación, ya de los hechos morales. Bueno confunde aquí el orden de la fundamentación epistemológica—o “noológica”, en términos zubirianos– con el orden de la fundamentación real o metafísica. En el caso de Kant, el orden moral es fundamento del conocimiento de Dios como “Sumo Bien”, pero Dios mismo es el fundamento (postulado) de la realidad moral: “la razón práctica […] apoyada sobre el hecho moral tan inconcuso en su género como el hecho científico, se ve forzada a aceptar como condición de posibilidad del mismo la existencia de Dios”21. En el caso de Zubiri, el poder de lo real es el fundamento del conocimiento de Dios como “realidad absolutamente absoluta”, pero Dios es el fundamento de la realidad como poder. La perspectiva “crítica” kantiana está asumida en la noología de Zubiri, y no representa ningún escollo para su filosofía teologal. Dicho eso, pasemos a la crítica que Bueno hace de la religación en cuanto fundamento de la filosofía de la religión.

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Según Bueno, las dos premisas más importantes de la doctrina de la religación son la premisa de la existencia de un ens fundamentale de naturaleza divina y la premisa de que este ens fundamentale es el correlato de la “relación transcendental” implicada en la religión—ya hemos visto que no se trata de relación trasncendental. En verdad, la existencia de la realidad divina no es una premisa, sino una conclusión a partir del hecho de la religación, y la segunda “premisa”, en verdad, se reduce a la primera. Pero, prescindiendo de esto, la crítica que Bueno hace es, en primer lugar, una crítica general a cualquier prueba de la existencia de Dios en cuanto realidad personal, crítica que además tiene la pretensión de ser una prueba de la inexistencia de Dios en el sentido indicado; y, en segundo lugar, es una crítica al carácter fundamentante de un supuesto Dios personal. Para Bueno, el Ser o Fundamento del ser al cual apuntan los argumentos ontológicos o cosmológicos22 no tendría por qué ser un ente de naturaleza personal, dotado de inteligencia y voluntad; o mejor, no podría ser una entidad personal, una vez que conciencia o personalidad son “figuras” del ente finito, cuyos límites se perderían o desaparecerían, “como desaparece, o se desfigura, la figura de la circunferencia en el momento en que su radio se hace infinito”23. La comparación que Bueno establece entre circunferencia y personalidad (o inteligencia) como “figuras” no tiene sentido: una “figura” geométrica es, por definición, algo delimitado, de modo que si el radio de una circunferencia se volviera infinito, no sería ya radio, ni habría circunferencia, mientras que la “figura” personal o la “figura” inteligente—si de “figuras” se quiere hablar—, aunque esté delimitada en y por realidades finitas –hablo de hombres–, no se define por esta limitación. La “inteligencia” es mera actualización de la realidad y la “persona” es la realidad formalmente suya. La “figura” humana es lo que dejaría de existir en el momento que su inteligencia se volviera infinita; seguiríamos teniendo inteligencia,

pero no inteligencia humana o inteligencia sentiente. Un radio infinito es un contraser, pero una inteligencia infinita es meramente una inteligencia sin las limitaciones de las condiciones humanas, algo que no destruye la esencia misma de la inteligencia, aunque no la podamos conocer en sí misma. Bueno sigue diciendo que, aunque existiera el Dios personal, la “segunda premisa” no sería verdadera, porque un ser personal infinito no podría ser “religador” de la persona humana, pues la absorbería en su infinitud. El “apoderamiento” sería un absurdo, “como es absurda la posición extra causas del efecto de una causa que se supone infinita y personal, y que habría de contener, por tanto, en su conciencia infinita, a todas las conciencias finitas que estuviesen religadas a ella”24. Esta crítica depende de la noción de causalidad que supone Bueno –por la cual algo infinito sólo podría producir un efecto infinito–, y, por tanto, queda respondida con lo que se dijo acerca de la creación en el análisis de la 2ª cuestión25. Para Bueno, las principales consecuencias de la doctrina de la religación serían que todo ente finito está religado (la idea de la religión universal o pansebeia) y que ningún ente finito puede dejar de estarlo (en contradicción con el hecho del ateísmo y de la irreligiosidad). Bueno sostiene que, una vez que todo ente finito está religado, todas las cosas reales serían “religiosas”, lo que desdibujaría la disciplina de la filosofía de la religión, que ya no sería antropológica, sino también geológica, astronómica, botánica, zoológica, etc. La doctrina de la religación necesitaría dar dos “saltos mortales”: pasar de esta pansebeia a la religación personal (estricta), y de esta religación personal hasta las figuras de las religiones positivas: El “primer salto mortal” equivale a yuxtaponer al concepto genérico de religación universal, el concepto específico de una religión propia de la raza humana, o de la persona, estableciendo, por ejemplo, que la religación del ente inte-

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ligente-sentiente, tendría caracteres específicos (lo que equivaldría a afirmar que la religión tiene varias especies: geológica, botánica, humana) y, a lo sumo, que la religión humana (la religión natural o personal) es la religión en sentido estricto (lo que sólo podría establecerse en virtud de una simple estipulación arbitraria). El segundo “salto mortal” tendría lugar al pasar de la religión natural a las religiones positivas. Pero ¿acaso es posible pasar del concepto de una religión “personal” a los conceptos de las religiones positivas?26 El poder religante domina también sobre las demás cosas reales, y no sólo sobre el hombre, pero sólo en la persona humana esta respectividad cobra el carácter específico de “religación”, que es la fundamentalidad en cuanto dirigida a la realización de un ser personal, es decir, la fundamentalidad formalmente experimentada: Religados al poder de lo real es como estamos apoyados en él para ser relativamente absolutos. En otros términos, el sujeto formal de la religación no es la naturaleza sino la persona, o mejor dicho la naturaleza personizada. De suyo la religación afecta al hombre no separadamente de las cosas, sino que en alguna forma afecta a todo. Pero sólo en el hombre es formalmente religación, sólo en él es el acontecer formal de la fundamentalidad. La persona no está simplemente vinculada a las cosas o dependiente de ellas, sino que está constitutiva y formalmente religada al poder de lo real27. No se trata de una “arbitrariedad” decir que sólo hay religación en sentido estricto en la persona humana, pues esta afirmación integra la conceptuación de la religación, en la medida que distingue por una parte la fundamentalidad del poder de lo real sobre el hombre como un apoyo para ser relativamente absoluto, y, por otra, la fundamentalidad material del poder de lo real sobre el cosmos. Dentro de una misma respectividad fundante, entre el poder de lo real y todas y cada una de

las realidades concretas, cabe distinguir la respectividad que acontece entre este poder y las personas humanas, y el término religación sirve a este propósito: manifiesta lo peculiar de esta ligadura en lo que respecta a al hombre. De modo que la religación no implica ninguna pansebeia. La religación no es ni “religión natural” ni “religión personal”, sino un momento constitutivo de la persona humana (es “religación personal”). La religión es su plasmación28, no necesariamente en forma de “religión positiva” (verificable históricamente), pero siempre como “religión personal”, porque es un acto (de la entrega al fundamento del poder de lo real) de la persona. No hay “salto mortal”, porque la religación no es religión, sino que puede concretarse en religión (que podrá ser institucional o no). Más adelante, Bueno cuestiona cómo es posible explicar, desde la religación, la impiedad y el ateísmo, una vez que todos están religados: “¿por qué si todos los hombres están religados, según su específica forma humana, no todos los hombres son religiosos…?”29. Y dice que la única respuesta es postular una hipótesis ad hoc: el ateo es el hombre “desfundamentado”. En realidad, las actitudes noreligiosas (indiferencia, ateísmo, agnosticismo) se explican exactamente por el hecho de que la religación no es religión, ni se despliega necesariamente en religión, porque no todos descubren el fundamento del poder de lo real en la realidad divina, aunque siempre haya un proceso intelectivo y una opción respecto de la fundamentalidad de la vida. Bueno cita el término “desfundamentado”, referido al hombre ateo, y utilizado por Zubiri en su artículo “En torno al problema de Dios”30, cuando debería fijarse en el análisis de El hombre y Dios, que en cierto modo supera la perspectiva anterior31. Además Bueno no explicita el contexto de la expresión. Zubiri dice que el hombre puede “sentirse” desligado en virtud del éxito de su vida, “endiosando” a ésta, pero que esto es una interpretación del poder de lo real (“deidad”, la llamaba entonces), sólo posible en virtud

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del hecho de la religación (que el ateo puede “olvidar”), y en la cual el ateo identifica este poder con la facticidad de su vida. Pero como el fundamento real del ateo no es su propia vida32, solamente el “fracaso” de ésta lo hará percibir esta realidad: En su hora, la vida fundamentada sobre sí misma aparece internamente desfundamentada, y, por tanto, referida a un fundamento de que se ve privada.[.…] Por esto el ateísmo verdadero sólo puede dejar de serlo dejándole que sea verdadero, pero obligándole a serlo hasta sus últimas consecuencias. Sin más, el ateísmo se descubrirá a sí propio siendo ateo en y con Dios. El fracaso que constitutivamente nos acecha asegura siempre la posibilidad de un redescubrimiento de Dios33. Es decir, el ateo no es una suerte de hombre “no-religado” –una especie de “no-predestinado” que vive “suelto” en el mundo y que no podría llegar a ser religioso–, sino que vive la religación apoyado en un fundamento aparente –su propio ser–, y su posible hallazgo de este hecho descubre que su vida, en cuanto se apoyaba en sí misma, no estaba en su verdadero fundamento y, en esta medida, estaba desfundamentada. Éste me parece el único modo posible de entender lo que dice Zubiri, a la luz del contexto y de su conclusión: este descubrimiento descubre, a la vez, que el ateo siempre estuvo “en” Dios y “con” Dios, pudiendo ahora estarlo formalmente. Consideraciones finales Con lo dicho, queda demostrado que el motivo que Bueno apunta para considerar la religación como un “contramodelo” no se sostiene: el concepto de causalidad creadora es perfectamente ra-

zonable y, si es posible referirlo a la religación—como pienso que es e intenté apuntarlo—, no implica ninguna dificultad. Sobre la crítica de Bueno acerca de la religación como posible fundamento de la religiosidad, se puede decir que sólo la realidad humana se encuentra estrictamente religada, pero esta religación no es aún religión sino la raíz de todas las actitudes posibles frente al poder de lo real, sean religiosas o no-religiosas (atea, agnóstica o indiferente). La religación no es una teoría, sino que Zubiri nos brinda la descripción del hecho, por todos constatable, de la dependencia que la persona humana tiene en relación a la realidad, la cual nos remite al problema del Fundamento de esta realidad. El ateísmo asumido por Bueno es una posibilidad de interpretar el poder de lo real: éste sería mero factum, y la vida humana sería autosuficiente. Pero tal ateísmo no es el punto de partida en la experiencia humana, y el teísmo zubiriano tiene derecho a la ciudadanía filosófica: éste no es fruto de una especulación “absurda”, basada en sofismas, sino de una posibilidad anclada en el hecho mismo de la religación, pues el poder de lo real no es un poder de una realidad específica, y así es razonable pensar que se funda en la Realidad Divina. En nuestros días, el problema de Dios, antes de ser el problema de su existencia, es la cuestión de si la vida humana tiene fundamento. La religación apunta a que “alguien viene”, y justifica los esfuerzos intelectuales para la demostración de la faz concreta de este Fundamento. La fecundidad filosófica de esta idea de la religación, a mi parecer, no queda comprometida por la crítica de Gustavo Bueno, sino que ésta ha sido ocasión para establecerla aún más firmemente.

Notas 1

Cf. BUENO, Gustavo. Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión. Madrid: Ed. Mondadori, 1989 (Col. Enfoques 9), p. 105.

2 3

Ibid., p. 109. Cf. BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión , p. 111.

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4

Cf. Ibid., p. 109.

5

Ibid., p. 110 (énfasis añadido).

6

BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión, p. 111.

7

Cf. BELLO, Joathas. “A religação do homem a Deus em Xavier Zubiri e Tomás de Aquino”. Coletânea: Revista de Filosofia e Teologia da Faculdade de São Bento do Rio de Janeiro, Ano XII – Fascículo 24, Junho/Dezembro 2013, pp. 234-252.

8

Acerca del problema de la creación en Escoto: GILSON, Étienne. Juan Duns Escoto: Introducción a sus posiciones fundamentales, Pamplona: EUNSA, 2007, pp. 328-341.

9

“Sólo del término de la creación surge una relación; ese término es la misma cosa hecha y producida por el creador; y la relación es un accidente categorial. No es formalmente una relación trascendental…” (CRUZ CRUZ, Juan. Creación, signo y verdad: Metafísica de la relación em Tomás de Aquino. Pamplona: EUNSA, 2006, p. 154). “Algunos autores afimaban, por ejemplo, que la relación de las criaturas a Dios debería incluirse dentro de este género [relación trascendental] y no entre los accidentes. Santo Tomás sostiene, sin embargo, que se trata de un accidente que las criaturas tienen por haber recibido el ser de Dios” (ALVIRA, Tomas; CLAVELL, Luis; MELENDO, Tomas. Metafísica. Pamplona: EUNSA, 2001, p. 75).

10

ZUBIRI, Xavier. “Respectividad de lo real”. Realitas III-IV, 1976-79, 1979, p. 31..

11

Para Zubiri, la “respectividad” es una dimensión más honda que la “relación”, ya categorial, ya transcendental, como afirma en su artículo “Respectividad de lo real” (cf. ZUBIRI, “Respectividad de lo real”, pp. 13-43). Considero que Zubiri lo dice movido por la polémica con la metafísica clásica, de la cual quiere mantener cierta distancia, para afirmar la novedad de su pensamiento. Pienso, sin embargo, que la originalidad de la inteligencia sentiente no consiste en una negación de la gnoseología clásica, tal como la tomasiana, por ejemplo, sino en una radicalización de aquel planteamiento, posibilitada por la interposición de la crítica kantiana. En el estudio citado más arriba (“A religação do homem a Deus em Xavier Zubiri e Tomás de Aquino”) trato de mostrar más ampliamente cómo es posible alinear el concepto zubiriano

de respectividad y la noción clásica de relación; para los efectos del presente artículo, basta lo dicho en el cuerpo del texto. 12

BUENO, “En torno a la doctrina filosófica de la causalidad”. Disponible en: http://www.fgbueno.es/med/dig/meta89i.p df (consulta: 02/03/2014). Además de las “causas”, Bueno admite “razones”, que responden a la pregunta “¿por qué?” cuando se trata, no ya de la identidad de procesos individuales, sino de clases, como ocurre por ejemplo en las ciencias históricas, cuyas relaciones causales “se dan en múltiples líneas de secuencias, cuya reunión, aún sin ser aleatoria, tampoco es necesariamente causal: la llamaremos transcausal. En ellas, aunque no haya causas, habrá razones” (Ibid., loc. cit.).

13

CRUZ CRUZ, Creación, signo y verdad, p. 20.

14S.

Th. I, q45, a2, ad 1.

15S.

Th.I, q45, a2, ad 1. El hecho de que la creación suponga la omnipotencia divina no es el problema de la polémica anticreacionista, porque la única objeción que se puede hacer desde una perspectiva formalista es la de que el poder de Dios no podría hacer algo contradictorio (que es el supuesto de la crítica de Bueno y de los “antiguos filósofos”). Así, es suficiente apuntar que, en virtud del objeto a ser conocido (la creación de “la” realidad desde la “realidad absolutamente absoluta”), la “causalidad eficiente”, en cuanto sistema de referencia, debe ser utilizada de modo análogo.

16

PTHC 154.

17

Cf. IL 284-285.

18

CRUZ CRUZ, Creación, signo y verdad, p. 137.

19

PTHC 177.

20

Cf. BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión, pp. 201-204.

21

ELLACURÍA, Ignacio. “Voluntad de fundamentalidad y voluntad de verdad: conocimiento-fe y su configuración histórica”, en Revista Latinoamericana de Teología, año 3, mayo-agosto de 1986, p. 114.

22

El autor ignora la especificidad de la vía de la religación.

23

BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión, p. 206.

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24BUENO,

25

Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión, p. 208.

29

BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión, p. 212.

Bueno también se refiere a los problemas de la “ciencia” y de la “moción” divinas, pero la posibilidad de conciliarlas con la libertad de nuestras acciones, sin absorberlas, queda ya fundada en la razonabilidad misma de la creación. Aquí no me referiré a las posibles soluciones (tomista o molinista, por ejemplo), sino que remito a un texto de Zubiri en el cual trata de estas cuestiones y propone su respuesta particular: cf. SSV 155-193.

30

Cf. NHD 393.

31

Como afirma Antonio Pintor-Ramos, “la explicación que en 1935 se daba del fenómeno del ateísmo por la ‘soberbia de la vida’ puede sin duda explicar muchas formas concretas de ateísmo, pero filosóficamente no puede considerarse ni satisfactoria ni suficiente” (PINTOR-RAMOS, “Dios y el problema de la realidad en Zubiri”, en Cuadernos de Pensamiento, n. 1, 1997, p. 109).

32

Desde la comprensión de que el fundamento del poder de lo real es la realidad divina.

33

NHD 393-394.

26

BUENO, Cuestiones cuodlibetales sobre Dios y la religión, pp. 210-211.

27

HD 92-93.

28

Cf. PFHR 87.

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O Xavier Zubiri e a dereita revolucionaria

Alexandre Xavier Casanova Domingo Galicia, Spain

Abstract Xavier Zubiri can be seen from a new viewpoint called “Arch-individualism” or, more politically, “Revolutionary Right.” This school of philosophy, Archindividualism, acts much like Xavier Zubiri himself, as Zubiri always has the philosophical and Christian tradition as his starting point; nothing can be done without the tradition or away from the tradition. But it is not vulgar Conservatism, either politically or theologically. Zubiri shows that a revolutionary analysis of reality, the human being and his relationship with God can be made from the very realm of tradition, purifying it without throwing it away, and thus opening the way for true human liberation. Now a parallel with the Theology of Liberation (from its leading head and Zubiri's disciple, Ignacio Ellacuría) facilitates the comparison between the leftwing perspectives starting from Zubiri and the right-wing perspective, also starting from Zubiri, of Arch-individualism, which in turn is very close to Theology of Liberation, although Theology of Liberation would be left-wing. Resumen O Xavier Zubiri pódese ver desde un novo punto de vista chamado Arqueoindividualismo ou, máis politicamente, Dereita Revolucionaria. Esta escola de filosofía, o arqueoindividualismo, traballa moi no estilo do Xavier Zubiri, porque o Zubiri sempre ten a tradición filosófica e cristiá coma o seu punto de partida; non se pode facer nada sen a tradición ou fora da tradición. Mais isto non é conservadorismo vulgar, nin politicamente nin filosoficamente. O Zubiri mostra que unha análise revolucionaria da realidade, do home e da relación do home co Deus, é posible dende o mesmo campo da tradición, purificándoa sen desbotala, e así abrindo o camiño para a verdadeira liberación humana. Agora un paralelo coa Teoloxía da Liberación (partindo da súa cabeza representativa e discípulo do Zubiri, o Ignacio Ellacuría) facilita a comparación entre as perspectivas esquerdistas que parten do Zubiri e a perspectiva dereitista, tamén inspirada no Zubiri, do arqueoindividualismo, o cal pola súa parte está moi próximo á teoloxía da liberación, aínda que a teoloxía da liberación sería esquerdista. Nota lingüística preliminar. É sabido que o galego ten un complicado proceso sociolingüístico de normativización e regulación dende a súa recuperación no uso culto i escrito a partir do século XIX. Esta aportación ó pensamento do Xavier Zubiri non ten pretensións estilísticas, filolóxicas ou lingüísticas, senón que é, simplemente, unha reflexión filosófica e

teolóxica en galego. Por tanto, aquí utilizarei (en xeral) a típica normativa maioritariamente usada hoxe na filosofía ou teoloxía en galego: a normativa da Real Academia Galega, sen por iso pronunciarme no coñecido conflito que esta institución mantén, por exemplo, coa Academia Galega da Língua Portuguesa, pois estoutra academia normativa fai practicamente idénticos ó galego e ó portugués europeo 87

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continental. Iso si, dado o rexeitamento da pedantería académica que manteño en forma e fondo para esta reflexión, vou manter un risco enxebre da lingua galega que hoxe, por calco morfosintáctico do castelán ou por falso senso da elegancia, é típicamente omitido no galego escrito: o artigo ante nome de persoa ou de nación. En galego dise tradicionalmente: o Xavier Zubiri Apalategui, a Galicia, o Brasil, a Rosalía de Castro. a Nélida Piñón. ¡E non é un vulgarismo! ¡Trátase de galego, non de castelán, onde as cousas son moi distintas! Tamén oralmente en portugués europeo, ou en brasileiro, é un trazo lingüístico xenuinamente lusófono, ó que non cómpre renunciar por imitación doutras linguas neolatinas, sexan o castelán ou o francés. Introdución Tradicionalmente, na filosofía, hai dúas preguntas esgrevias. ¿Ten algunha utilidade real a teoloxía? ¿É a dereita algo máis cá monótona apoloxía que os ricos e privilexiados fan de si mesmos? Pois ben: ó meu ver, a resposta é positiva en ambos casos. A teoloxía é útil para responder ás grandes preguntas que fai a filosofía. E a dereita xenuína non fai unha noxenta apoloxía das riquezas mal gañadas, senón que distingue entre riquezas mal gañadas e ben gañadas; e mostra que mesmo as riquezas ben gañadas son

un medio, nunca un fin, no progreso real dos pobos e dos individuos. É certo que a teoloxía usouse e úsase para dicir moitas parvadas sen proveito. É certo que as ideoloxías de dereita usáronse e úsanse para intentar abusos e crimes por parte dos que ostentan postos xerárquicos de inmenso poder político, económico e intelectual. Mais existe unha teoloxía verdadeira, de boa fe i eficaz. O mesmo para a dereita coma concepción ideolóxica, política e filosófica: hai unha dereita verdadeira, de boa fe i eficaz. Todo isto hai que dicilo de entrada, xa que vou analizar ó Xavier Zubiri dende unha concepción filosófica, unha escola de filosofía, creada no ano 2014, que entre os seus moitos sinónimos, “movemento das raias vermellas”, “revolución do arquetipo” e, sobre todo, “arqueoindividualismo”, ten o sinónimo de "dereita revolucionaria". Con efecto, é abertamente unha escola filosófica de dereita, e recoñece a importancia do Deus e da teoloxía. O difícil de entender nesta nova escola de filosofía é o seu encadramento "antitradicional". Porque hai, en xeral, unhas ligazóns tradicionais entre tendencias de cada escola filosófica, ligazóns que son cambiadas ou mesmo invertidas polo arqueoindividualismo. Presento a continuación as ligazóns tradicionais nun cadro sistemático.

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Individualismo Realidade Derradeira Permanente Absolutismo ético Espiritualismo Amor Hedonismo Tradicionalismo Cientifismo Inmortalidade da ánima Liberdade contra a autoridade externa Realidade do Deus Ateísmo como inexistencia do Deus Ascetismo Revolución política comunista Reencarnación Liberalismo radical Fin da opresión do home polo home Antiabortismo Soterioloxía Aristocratismo Nirvana Dereita Outros (engadir)

Relativismo ético Autoritarismo sociopolítico Colectivismo ideolóxico Antimaterialismo Altruísmo Inmanentismo Dogmatismo Escepticismo gnoseolóxico O Deus creador Agnosticismo Monoteísmo Laicismo Antihedonismo Antropocentrismo Indiferencia ante a pobreza das masas Democracia Igualitarismo Familias numerosas Salvación por un Deus externo ó home Endogamia e cooptación culturais Aniquilación do ego Contrarrevolución ¿?

Tabla 1. Ligazóns tradicionais dentro de cada escola filosófica Porén, o arqueoindividualismo mantén tódalas reivindicacións da primeira columna... cambiando radicalmente as liga-

Individualismo Realidade Derradeira Permanente Absolutismo ético Espiritualismo Amor Hedonismo Tradicionalismo Cientifismo Inmortalidade da ánima Liberdade contra a autoridade externa Realidade do Deus Ateísmo como inexistencia do Deus Ascetismo Revolución política comunista Reencarnación Liberalismo radical

zóns da segunda columna, como veremos no segundo cadro esquemático

Absolutismo ético Libertarismo sociopolítico Antigregarismo aristocrático Materialismo Egoísmo Transcendentalismo Chegada experimental ó coñecemento Construtivismo gnoseolóxico O Deus emanador dende si mesmo Gnosticismo Politeísmo Relixiosidade Hedonismo Teocentrismo Eliminación da pobreza das masas Rexeitamento da democracia

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Fin da opresión do home polo home Antiabortismo Aristocratismo Soterioloxía Nirvana Dereita Outros (engadir)

Diferenza entre homes peores e mellores Forte e sostida redución da natalidade Autosalvación individual Promoción de todos á casta suprema Afirmación eterna e infinita do ego Revolución ¿?

Tabla 2. Ligazóns dentro do arqueoindividualismo Aínda que moi esquemáticos, estes dous cadros mostran a forte orixinalidade do arqueoindividualismo, e a dificultade para comprendelo como nova escola filosófica. O decisivo é comprender que o arqueoindividualismo non é unha reforma menor dalgunha escola filosófica xa existente; e que, por outro lado, se apoia explicitamente na longa tradición filósofica das escolas anteriores, non sendo un adanismo xurdido dunha folla en branco. ¿Como enlaza todo isto co esforzo metafísico e teolóxico liberador que fai o Xavier Zubiri? Verémolo deseguido. O existencialismo revolucionario do Zubiri. É frecuente incluír ó Xavier Zubiri no existencialismo; ou, quizais mellor, nos existencialismos, nas diversas correntes filosóficas que parten da existencia como dado fundamental da realidade. Os existencialismos adoitan dividirse en existencialismos teístas e non teístas, e dentro dos existencialismos teístas falaríamos de existencialistas cristiáns, coma o Emmanuel Mounier, o Gabriel Marcel, o Kierkegaard e o propio Xavier Zubiri. É coñecida a crítica segundo a cal o existencialismo é un caixón de alfaiate filosófico, onde cabe de todo e, por tanto... non se define nada. Se todo filósofo pode ser un existencialista, entón dicir dun filósofo que é un existencialista non engade ren a dicir que un filósofo é un filósofo. I entón dicir que o Zubiri é un existencialista cristián nada engadiría a dicir que o Zubiri é un filósofo cristián, de inspiración cristiá.

Respondo a isto que o existencialismo, en filosofía, si que é definible e delimitable como actitude primaria ante a investigación filosófica. Se partimos do ser en abstracto, deslocado da situación concreta, non hai existencialismo. Se, pola contra, partimos da vida ou existencia concreta de quen busca a verdade, hai xa un existencialismo intencional, aínda que os resultados da investigación poidan ser tan dispares coma os que opoñen ó Sartre, á Ayn Rand e ó Karl Jaspers, por exemplo. Mailos tres parten da experiencia concreta da persoa, da súa existencia non abstracta senón vivida concretamente; por iso os tres son existencialistas. Cousa que nunca poderemos dicir do san Tomé de Aquino, do Maimónides nin do Jacques Monod, por poñer tres exemplos moi diferentes entre si. Por tanto, hai delimitación entre existencialismo e ausencia de existencialismo na actitude filosófica inicial. E, así, tamén o Xavier Zubiri Apalategui é un existencialista. Un existencialista radicalmente cristián. A principal xustificación disto está na propia obra do Xavier Zubiri. En efecto, o seu transparente e antirretórico castelán, a lingua na que fai toda a súa obra, dá acceso fácil e directo ó seu pensamento. Unicamente son necesarias traducións e reexposicións das súas ideas ós que non falen castelán ou teñan tanta présa que non poidan le-las pasaxes significativas das obras principais deste filósofo vasco. Maticemos lingüisticamente que, ó se-lo éuscaro (non o castelán) a lingua materna do Xavier Zubiri Apalategui (tradución literal deste nome do éuscaro ó galego: Casanova Xunto á Ponte Biblioteca) a obra en castelán do filósofo vasco contén

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numerosos xiros morfosintácticos inspirados na lingua vasca. E concretamente os abondosos neoloxismos en castelán introducidos polo Zubiri, transparentan o rico e moi produtivo sistema de matización por sufixos e partículas, arredor da raíz semántica orixinal, que hai no éuscaro, mais non tanto no castelán. Se o facemos directamente no aspecto lingüístico, se lemos directamente en castelán os libros do Xavier Zubiri, encontramos un claro e persistente existencialismo cristián. Cousa que sempre fixen, ler en castelán directamente ó Xavier Zubiri sen necesidade de comentaristas ou tradutores. Con todo, en galego, é recomendable a introdución ó cerne do pensamento zubiriano feita polo brasileiro Everaldo Cescon e publicada na revista norteamericá "The Xavier Zubiri Review" no ano 2007. Titúlase "A “trilogia teologal” de Xavier Zubiri: contribuições e problemas". Xa que o galego, o portugués europeo e o brasileiro (portugués americán) son tres formas da mesma lingua lusa. A exposición devandita do Everaldo Cescon é fiel ó proxecto do Xavier Zubiri i explica a concepción fundamental do filósofo vasco. Daí podemos tirar citas e frases rumo a esta reivindicación do Xavier Zubiri para a dereita revolucionaria (arqueoindividualismo). Dou por suposto un bo coñecemento xeral da filosofía do Xavier Zubiri nas reflexións que poñerei a continuación; e remito ós falantes de galego se non teñen tal coñecemento, unha vez máis, ó salientable traballo do Everaldo Cescon. Entón, a obxeción fundamental que se lle pode facer a este existencialismo teísta cristián, ó pensamento nuclear do Xavier Zubiri, é a mesma obxeción que se lles pode facer tamén ó arqueoindividualismo e a toda filosofía teísta: se admitides ó Deus como principio explicativo supremo e como ente verdadeiro, ¿que cousa real non é o Deus? Se todo é o Deus, e o teísmo así o afirma, en derradeiro termo hai panteísmo. I en derradeiro termo o panteísmo equivale a un vulgar ateísmo. Dicir que

todo é o Deus non é diferenciable de dicir que o mundo é o Deus... ou que o mundo é eterno, sen o Deus; daí a clásica acusación de ateísmo contra o panteísmo do Espinosa (Spinoza). Orabén, o Zubiri, e toda hipótese metafísica seria a prol do teísmo (quer politeísta ou monoteísta) distinguen graos de realidade. Tódalas cousas son o Deus ou os deuses por participación, mais non todas do mesmo xeito nin con igual identificación á divindade. O teísmo serio é un panteísmo cualificado, un panenteísmo. No panenteísmo hai ó tempo identidade e diferencia entre a realidade finita creada (ou, segundo o arqueoindividualismo, emanada) e o Deus, realidade derradeira, que lle dá orixe. Coma di o devandito Everaldo Cescon, falando do Zubiri: “Deus doa o poder do real, de uma ou de outra forma, com a realidade fundante”. Faino, si, mais conservando a diferenza entre o Deus mesmo e a súa máxima criatura, o home. Engade o Everaldo Cescon: “o homem é experiência de Deus porque está fundamentado na realidade de Deus.” E aquí xorde explicitamente o carácter revolucionario da metafísica e a teoloxía do Xavier Zubiri. Cito outra vez ó Everaldo Cescon: “O homem está constitutivamente religado ao poder do real e é levado a entregarse inteiramente à realidade absolutamente absoluta, que está no fundo de toda a realidade e da pessoa humana.” Hai pois a posibilidade do cambio radical de plano. A deiformidade, que non deformidade; a posibilidade de obter, por parte da criatura, por parte do home orixinado, a forma do Deus. Cousa, por outra parte, xa anunciada polo mesmo Xesucristo: “En verdade dígovos: deuses sodes.” Non vou negar, nin moito menos, as fortes diferenzas metafísicas e teolóxicas entre o Xavier Zubiri e o meu pensamento sobre os mesmos temas, inspirado libremente no arqueoindividualismo. Segundo esta escola, afirmo que a realidade divina é politeísta, hai moitos deuses, no canto de monoteísta, porque non hai un Deus único que anule ou debilite ós demais deuses. Tamén recoñezo o ateísmo: o

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Deus e os deuses non existen, porque a existencia é unha limitación, e o Deus non é limitado. As cousas distintas do Deus existen no Deus, que lles dá existencia sen ser, en si mesmo, existencia. Non hai nada maior que o Deus no cal o Deus poida existir. Porén, negala existencia do Deus non é inmanentismo, senón polo contrario o recoñecemento da trascendencia non dual, non sometida á continxencia da existencia, que ten o Deus real; o plano supremo da realidade. En cambio o Zubiri, dende o seu cristianismo católico, resulta radicalmente monoteísta; di que só o monoteísmo é exclusivamente verdadeiro. É certo que a linguaxe, mesmo unha linguaxe acertada, só é aproximativa en materia teolóxica, pois o Deus é unha realidade non verbal en derradeira instancia. Con todo, reitero a verdade relativa do politeísmo porque, no plano fenoménico, todo o que é aprehendido é aprehendido como ser senlleiro, diferenciado dos outros seres. Daquí é transparente que os moitos deuses saben abofé que proceden dunha orixe sen manifestación sen nome. Mais non por iso necesitan nomear un só Deus como presidente ou rei de todos eles, no que os demais deuses deleguen os seus atributos divinos. A pregunta latente, claro está, é se todo isto pasa dalgún xeito de ser un mero xogo verbal, completamente inútil, entre conceptos que de nada liberan ó home real dos seus numerosos e graves problemas. Pois non estamos na típica i estéril discusión sobre o sexo dos anxos. O Xavier Zubiri, igual que pretendemos face-los arqueoindividualistas, busca a religación total, completa, de cada home co Deus. O fin disto non é establecer unha distinción verbal predominante entre politeísmo e monoteísmo, por exemplo, senón achegarmos efectivamente ó Reino do Deus. I este reino non pode chegar se facemos asercións falsas ou moi improbables. Daí a magnífica frase do Xavier Zubiri, de novo atopada no Everaldo Cescon: “As religiões nunca partem do zero.” Unha

frase que os arqueoindividualistas facemos extensiva a toda comprensión global que pretenda mellora-la realidade. Por iso aparece a nosa estraña, en aparencia, conxunción entre revolución e dereita, xa que tradicionalmente pénsase que a revolución é cousa da esquerda. Pois unha verdadeira revolución nunca parte de cero. Por iso, neste senso, toda verdadeira revolución é "de dereita", se pretende triunfar, se pretende liberar ó home dos seus atrancos. Debemos partir, na revolución, do que xa coñecemos e avanzar sobre tal coñecemento. O arqueoindividualismo, que é sen dúbida un movemento revolucionario no metafísico e tamén no político, parte de feitos comprobados e de teorías sometidas cientificamente a comprobación, falsación e reelaboración experimental. E no mellor da aventura intelectual do Xavier Zubiri albíscase isto tamén. A parte estritamente eclesiástica e apoloxética do catolicismo no Xavier Zubiri, sinceramente, éme pouco interesante; tan pouco como adoitan selo pra min as apoloxías da respectiva superioridade do xudaísmo, o budismo, o luteranismo, o islamismo, etcétera. Abonda aquí con indicar, no plano metafísico e neste senso suprarrelixioso, co René Guénon, que ningunha tradición espiritual é insubstituíble e culminación metafísica en si mesma... xustamente porque se dá no plano fenoménico aínda relativo (concepto sánscrito de ilusión radical, "maia"). O intento de substituír unha relixión, o catolicismo por exemplo, por outra relixión, o sunismo islámico por exemplo, que sería máis verdadeira, é pueril, por moi humano e comprensible que resulte na socioloxía relixiosa. Aquí entra unha frase hoxe admitida con maior ou menor matización por tódalas relixións: “O Deus é amor.” Pois será. Mais, mesmo si é verdade, tal amor é moi diferente para o rico e para o pobre. Certa teoloxía cristiá afirma que os pobres son os preferidos polo Deus. Tendo en conta feitos ben comprobados, non meras opinións, que indican que os pobres viven menos tempo e con máis en-

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fermidades que os ricos, mesmo sendo moi indulxente con esta frase e co contexto no que tradicionalmente se di, cómpre recoñecer que a pobreza non achega a Deus, non produce nada positivo en si mesma; que da pobreza se debe fuxir coma do demo. Dito con outras verbas, e bastante duras: teoloxía si, parvadas non. En xeral: a apoloxía da dor e das dificultades no mundo fenoménico, tan característica de tódalas relixións e cosmovisións de alicerce bíblico (incluidas as tendencias islámicas) choca de sócato co feito de que hai moitas manifestacións da dor que son completa ou case completamente mecánicas, estériles, que nada teñen de divino directa ou indirectamente e que, simplemente, débense á autonomía relativa de funcionamento e desenvolvemento que ten o mundo material fenoménico transitorio. En xeral, a dor non acerca ó Reino de Deus, senón todo o contrario. Agora, pode parecer que me afasto radicalmente do Xavier Zubiri e que vou a un prometeísmo laicista e inmanentista. Pois non hai tal. O que busco, o que busca a dereita revolucionaria, é unha revolución metafísica e política real, que ten moi en conta a tradición (de feito, en típica frase da dereita: o que non é tradición é plaxio) mais que, lonxe de insistir no pecado, a culpa, a caída e conceptos ligados, insiste no contrario: na acción santa, na autoxustificación inocente, no andar ergueito. Di o Zubiri, citado polo Everaldo Cescon, que o amor en Deus "é real, formal e constitutivamente um êxtase de pura volição e de pura inteligência". Isto implica plenitude física no posible, plenitude síquica e apertura á excelencia espiritual. É deiformidade, deiformación... ¡deificación! O que se necesita é un equilibrio superior. Sen conciencia do carácter transitorio, insatisfactorio e humillante do mundo fenoménico, creríamos que é posible a felicidade nun plano existencial tan baixo; é o erro do prometeísmo. Por outra parte, sen conciencia da natureza intrinsecamente divina do ser humano creado

(mellor: emanado, segundo o meu punto de vista) pensaríamos que hai unhas barreiras físicas i espirituais á súa comprensión que non existen, pois se o home quere chegar á santidade, chegará a ser santo, e as portas do inferno non prevaleceran contra el; crer que a salvación non é posible dende a racionalidade humana é o erro do calvinismo. O que se necesita é amor sen narcisismo. O que se necesita é egoísmo ben entendido, que é o amor a si mesmo, e non desprezo do próximo. Quen se ama a si mesmo, amará con verdade e con poder ó seu próximo. Por isto queda o aporte sólido do Xavier Zubiri á liberación real do home, un aporte tan sólido que non precisa gabanzas indixestas. O Deus revélase precisamente na acción do home que busca entender, que busca a realización da súa máis alta posibilidade. É un Deus intrínseco á conciencia do individuo, sen por iso limitarse á escuridade e á continxencia do individuo transitorio. É un Deus que libera por estar dentro mais empurrando para fora. Fora do mundo material de tebras: ata o Cristo Cósmico. A intelección sentinte, segundo o Xavier Zubiri, permite un acceso completo á realidade percibida. Hai nisto unha superación da dualidade, da imperfección no coñecemento. A miña interpretación do Zubiri é, abofé, meta-kantiana. Sosteño que as análises da aprehensión da realidade polo home, pola súa intelixencia, pola súa afectividade, pola súa corporalidade e polo encontro transcendentalmente reforzante coa Realidade Derradeira, o Deus, permiten progresivamente chegar a un coñecemento exacto do real, por moi longo que resulte o proceso. Esta posibilidade non é unha variña máxica, mais si a guía antirrelativista que orienta en todo o proceso. Os planos de realidade, especialmente na Historia (aquí salienta o Zubiri máis teólogo, máis cristián) son progresivamente transparentes segundo a actuación do home religado ó Deus.

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Vou rematando. Realmente, a dificultade está na integración do pensamento zubiriano nos paradigmas do arqueoindividualismo. A teoloxía da liberación, o arqueoindividualismo e o Zubiri. Unha comparación coa recepción do Xavier Zubiri na teoloxía da liberación, a través do amigo i expositor de Zubiri, o xesuíta Ignacio Ellacuría, aclarará a novidade da miña formulación. A teoloxía da liberación é aberta e intensamente política. Orabén, o feito de recibir inspiración do pensamento zubiriano, non directamente político en por si, indica que o pensamento zubiriano permite mediatamente obter consecuencias políticas importantes. Isto, tanto na teoloxía da liberación como na dereita revolucionaria. En xeral, a Teoloxía da Liberación xorde pra dar unha solución ó problema da ausencia de liberación hispanoamericá. A fundamentación teolóxica da liberación non pode ser só sociolóxica ou económica, malia o importante peso do marxismo na teoloxía da liberación. Por iso o Ignacio Ellacuría parte do seu excelente coñecemento do Xavier Zubiri (que foi mestre seu) para postular unha espiritualización do home, como realidade radicalmente aberta segundo o Zubiri, que na praxe histórica induza unha espiritualización que teña sempre en contra a materialidade da realidade. O esquema, ata aquí, é moi similante ó esquema da dereita revolucionaria, do arqueoindividualismo. ¿Onde está a diferencia? Ó noso xuízo, ó xuízo dos arqueoindividualistas, no feito de que o Ignacio Ellacuría (e a teoloxía da liberación en xeral) propoñan ó pobre como un "lugar teolóxico" ou concepto paradigmático da acción salvadora e liberadora do Deus na Historia. Orabén, dende o materialismo histórico, cultural e dialéctico, non só do Marx e o Engels senón tamén de moitos outros autores coma o Marvin Harris, o Freud, o Darwin, o Jacques Monod, etcéte-

ra, cómpre concluír que, empiricamente, a pobreza nin é liberadora nin dá, en xeral, oportunidade ningunha de liberación ou mellora. Agás escasas excepcións, a pobreza produce corrupción, desesperación, maldade, pecado, crime, morte, dor... e máis pobreza, en círculo vicioso. Non cabe outra actitude racional ante a pobreza ca elimina-la pobreza, sobre todo a pobreza extrema, a miseria. Ontoloxicamente, a pobreza fai do home, realidade aberta en principio coma ben di o Zubiri.... unha realidade pechada. O pobre real, non o pobre imaxinado por certos teólogos da liberación, é un ser cáseque sempre involucionado ó animal prehumano. O pobre real é un home carente de horizontes e de capacidades para saír da súa condición. A miseria non produce revolución; só produce miseria. Así, este irrealismo fantástico, totalmente inaceptable, é o punto nodal que desloca á dereita revolucionaria, ó arqueoindividualismo, da teoloxía da liberación. Sendo totalmente imposible, na realidade, mellora-la condición humana baixo a pobreza severa, é necesario tamén rexeitala simbolicamente e recoñecer que a pobreza nada ten de divino e que un concepto racional do Deus non ve pobreza no Deus, senón riqueza (xusta) no económico e no espiritual. A “civilización da pobreza” proposta polo Ignacio Ellacuría é un contrasentido, por moito que o propio Ignacio Ellacuría pretenda logo matizar este grave erro, presentándoo como “satisfacción universal das necesidades básicas”. ¿O que é iso, senón precisamente riqueza? O que necesitamos é unha “civilización da riqueza... da riqueza xusta e universal”. Así, a consecución dunha gran abundancia material é ós ollos da dereita revolucionaria unha condición necesaria e ineludible para a liberación do home na Historia; o cal, segundo o coñecemento científico comprobado, implica un axuste demográfico radical (limitación i estabilización da poboación) e o cambio da irracionalidade consumista á produción de materiais e servizos de gran calidade, longa duración e harmonía ecolóxica sostible no medio ambiente sen o cal ho home real

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non pode vivir. Pódese entende-la dereita revolucionaria, aínda, como unha forma de teoloxía ou filosofía da liberación... mais, iso si, unha teoloxía da liberación realista e nunca utópica. Trátase no noso sentir, no sentir do arqueoindividualismo, dunha lectura realista e progresista das teses do Xavier Zubiri. O home, sendo en principio unha realidade limitada e falible, ten, nembargantes, a capacidade de acolle-la captación do poder divino e humanizar toda a realidade, cara á divinización tamén, pois a “deiformidade” e a “deiformación” do home implican que o home só pode ser plenamente humano aspirando a ser tamén

divino. O cal implica recoñecer, sen romanticismo ilusorio, o peso determinante (e abafante se non o recoñecemos) das leis do mundo material, para crea-los puntos de salto a dimensións cada vez máis libres, cada vez menos atadas á materialidade animal transitoria, do home no que ten de propiamente anxélico, de crístico e divino. E, como non tratamo-los arqueoindividualistas de fachendear de novidade académica, coma o noso interese é sinxelamente a liberación real, física, metafísica e relixiosa, do ser verdadeiro empírico, do home, quedamos á espera de todo tipo de críticas e suxestións.

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Departamento de Filosofía Teorética y Práctica Facultad de Filosofía de la Universidad de Barcelona Barcelona, España Abstract The purpose of this paper is to reflect about a portion of the correspondence between Ellacuría and Zubiri in order to establish a foundation for articulation of thought of the Jesuit based on his reception of Zubiri’s thought, and their relationship. For Ellacuría philosophy was always something very serious, something that required a disciplined exercise in search of impeccable intellectual rigor. Following these criteria he laid the foundations of what was supposed to represent a new Christian philosophy that was in full harmony and consistency with Latin American reality. We could summarize the center of his intellectual concerns, his intellectual project. But it is something else. This article seeks to show, on one hand, something of the meaning of philosophy and life, and on the other hand, to assert the importance of the philosophy of religion as a discipline or field of philosophy, one that can access the keys to many of the conflicts pressing upon our century. This is important because without thinking how can action be developed? Philosophy and life show that life is religated, and it is though religación that theology is done in the passionate desire to give consistent voice to religated reason. This is the common ground of Xavier Zubiri and Ignacio Ellacuría; teacher and student. Both epitomize consistency and accuracy; and for both intellectual passion becomes life and how you always pay a price for that consistency when there is no possibility to buy what is not for sale. Resumen El objeto de este trabajo es reflexionar alrededor de una parte de la correspondencia entre Zubiri y Ellacuría a fin de poder establecer las bases de la articulación del pensamiento del jesuita a partir de la recepción, por su parte, del pensamiento y de su relación con Zubiri. Para Ellacuría la filosofía fue siempre algo muy serio, algo que requería de un ejercicio disciplinado a la búsqueda de una impecable rigurosidad intelectual. Siguiendo estos criterios acabó construyendo las bases de lo que habría de representar una nueva filosofía cristiana que estuviera en plena sintonía y coherencia con la realidad latinoamericana. Así podríamos resumir el centro de sus preocupaciones intelectuales, su proyecto intelectual. Sin embargo es algo más. Este artículo quisiera mostrar, también, por un lado algo del significado del binomio filosofía y vida y por otro lado, reivindicar la importancia de la Filosofía de la Religión como disciplina, o ámbito de la Filosofía, privilegiado para poder acceder a las claves de muchos de los conflictos que urgen, que están apremiando a nuestro siglo a pensar, por que sin pensamiento ¿cómo va a elaborarse la acción? Pensar de forma significativa, desde dentro y para adentro. Del binomio filosofía y vida, la vida se religa, es religación y religación que se hace teología en el deseo apasionado de dar voz coherente a la razón religada. Es este el lugar común de Xavier Zubiri e Ignacio Ellacuría; maestro y alumno; a mi entender epítomes ambos de coherencia y rigor; de pasión intelectual que se hace vida y de cómo siempre hay que pagar un precio por esa coherencia cuando no hay posibilidad de comprar aquello que no está en venta. 97

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Escribir sobre Xavier Zubiri e Ignacio Ellacuría representa para mí, siempre, un reto íntimo porque aprendí a comprenderle durante mi investigación doctoral y significó un auténtico hito vivencial. En mi vida y en mis intuiciones hay un antes y un después de conocer, comprender y reflexionar a ambos. Quisiera en este artículo recordarlos a ambos en el hoy de mis pensamientos. El objeto de este trabajo es reflexionar alrededor de una parte de la correspondencia entre Zubiri y Ellacuría a fin de poder establecer las bases de la articulación del pensamiento del jesuita a partir de la recepción, por su parte, del pensamiento y la relación con Zubiri. Los citas1 de Zubiri y Ellacuría pertenecen a una serie de textos y correspondencia inédita de él que aparecieron en la Revista ECA de la Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, concretamente en el número 577-578 correspondiente a los meses de noviembre y diciembre de 1996. Por ello, ya queda dicho aquí y por ello no aparecerá ninguna nota al pie en referencia a los textos citados ya que todas ellas serían idénticas. Para Ellacuría la filosofía fue siempre algo muy serio, algo que requería de un ejercicio disciplinado a la búsqueda de una impecable rigurosidad intelectual. Siguiendo estos criterios acabó construyendo las bases de lo que habría de representar una nueva filosofía cristiana que estuviera en plena sintonía y coherencia con la realidad latinoamericana. Así podríamos resumir el centro de sus preocupaciones intelectuales, su proyecto intelectual. Desde el principio fue consciente de los muchos problemas que contenía la expresión filosofía cristiana hecho que puso de manifiesto en un escrito de los años 60 titulado La problemática de una filosofía cristiana. Sin embargo, es importante poder ver como se expresaba él en referencia a esta problemática: Con ocasión del centenario de la muerte de San Agustín (1.500) surge la pregunta de si Agustín es filósofo, y, más

en general, si es posible una filosofía cristiana o tan solo una weltanscahuung o una sapientia cristiana. Brehier concluye… que nunca ha habido filosofía cristiana, y que el cristianismo en cuanto tal no ha influido en la filosofía. Le responde Gilson que la filosofía occidental es lo que es gracias al cristianismo.2 Respecto a la recepción de esta polémica en el mundo intelectual católico Ellacuría dice lo siguiente: … se centra más en el segundo término: lo que es la fe cristiana y su influjo sobre lo que ya sabe de la filosofía y de sus exigencias. Según Heidegger, la pregunta sobre el ser no irrumpe mientras se está en la seguridad y en la comodidad. El que cuenta con la fe de la Biblia no puede preguntar auténticamente, porque tiene la respuesta antes que la pregunta sin dejar de ser creyente. Por tanto, no es posible un filosofar cristiano…3 Podríamos definir a la filosofía cristiana como aquel pensamiento filosófico desarrollado íntegramente por cristianos convencidos. De modo que el auténtico problema reside en determinar que es un filósofo cristiano. Éste sería aquel pensador que pudiera distinguir entre el orden del saber y el orden de la fe, así como aquel que reconociera las causas naturales aunque encuentre en la revelación cristiana una luz para iluminar a la razón. Aunque esto sea claro y simple la definición de las características de un filósofo cristiano resultan problemáticas a la vez que discutibles. En un texto que se cree escrito en los años 50, con toda probabilidad, Ellacuría escribió: … ¿Qué mueve el cristianismo a acercarse y aprovecharse de lo natural, de lo profano, de lo que, al parecer, no es formalmente cristiano? Y si se quisiera complicar más el asunto, todavía pudiera presentarse esta otra pseudopregunta que tanto los filisteos de un

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lado como los del otro insinúan arteramente como hipócrita inocencia: ¿es que el cristiano no tiene suficiente con su cristianismo como respuesta intelectual y como actitud vital?4 La respuesta intelectual y la actitud vital no son suficientes para Ellacuría, creencia que para él se subsume a Santo Tomás a quien admiraba profundamente por su audacia intelectual. En los años que transcurrieron a partir de 1955, Ellacuría tomó partido en el llamado movimiento neo-tomista que propugnaba la vuelta a un pensamiento católico tomista a partir de la síntesis entre la filosofía de Santo Tomás y los descubrimientos de las ciencias y de las filosofías de Kant y Heidegger. Las figuras más prominentes en esos años del neo-tomismo eran el Cardenal Mercier, que fundó la escuela de Lovaina y Marechal. En España destacó el que fuera maestro de Zubiri, Juan Zaragüeta. En este contexto, él buscaba y creía posible encontrar elementos comunes entre la filosofía tomista y las filosofías contemporáneas. Ellacuría pretendía la síntesis entre tomismo y modernismo. De hecho, su admirado Santo Tomás había hecho lo mismo cuando intento armonizar su pensamiento con las filosofías de Aristóteles y Averroes. Ellacuría se expresa como sigue en otro texto inédito en junio de 1958: Urgentemente se precisa captar y decir lo que de positivo tienen los modernos, no de corrida y con la prisa de añadir inmediatamente un pero adversativo y destructor, sino con ánimo abierto de buscar lo valioso aún entre actitudes y expresiones que admiten un doble sentido…5 En esta etapa se consideraba un partidario de la filosofía perenne, un escolástico. Sin embargo, ya aquí su postura es de una gran apertura lo cual le coloca, en ese medio, como un heterodoxo. A propósito de un texto redactado por Peccorini El ser y los seres en 1961 que se presentaba fiel a las posturas tomistas, Ellacuría escribe: El haberse entretenido demasiado en la

discusión minuciosa contra el suarecismo le ha hecho presentar un tomismo exacerbado y poco actual. De todos modos, se ha metido en un terreno en el que es imposible co-filosofar en Centroamérica, donde sería una pena que la filosofía comenzara siendo discusión escolástica. Tal vez, el autor haya proyectado demasiado su propia y personal formación y preocupación filosóficas en un ambiente cuyo tono existencial es ciertamente distinto. Esto no obsta a que el autor le sea permitido y aun obligado tener su específica interpretación del ser ni a que se le niegue contacto con el tomismo contemporáneo. Con todo, creo sinceramente que una predisposición personal le empuja a interpretar conforme a sus esquemas aun a los tomistas contemporáneos, desposeyéndolos así de lo más original en ellos.6 Centrándose en el tema de Centroamérica y la filosofía escribe: ¿Puede ser entonces el tomismo con su forma y sus específicos contenidos filosóficos una auténtica filosofía efectiva en Centroamérica7? La pregunta es desaforada y a su respuesta no se van a aportar aquí sino unas posibles directrices, las más de ellas negativas. Desde luego no, si se trata de un tomismo intemporal y repetitivo, es decir, un tomismo que ni siquiera reproduce el valor filosófico de su origen, sino tan solo la inteligencia de sus fórmulas. Hay que añadir inmediatamente que, si el tomismo ha sido solo eso en muchas partes y tiempos, no tiene por qué serlo y de hecho no lo es hoy en varios pensadores, auténticamente tomistas, auténticamente pensadores y auténticamente contemporáneos.8 El movimiento tomista y neo-escolástico era, en ese momento, en que lo vivió Ellacuría una postura muy de avanzada, dada la situación de una Iglesia Católica muy conservadora que en ese momento estaba preocupada atacando al modernismo, lo moderno y lo que en relación se mantuviera en ambos. Su pensa-

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miento hasta aquí ya nos muestra un Ellacuría radical, a la vanguardia de los movimientos intelectuales de la Iglesia. Parece ser que para él no era incompatible servir a la Iglesia, ser radical de varias maneras y vivir y estar de acuerdo con los tiempos. Ignacio Ellacuría creyó encontrar en el pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset una filosofía susceptible de poder formar parte de su síntesis. Algunos especialistas creen que intentó cristianizar a Ortega intentando dar con lo más esencial de su pensamiento. Más concretamente y como indica el título de un trabajo redactado en esos mismos años Posibilidad y modo de aproximación de la filosofía escolástica y la filosofía vitalista moderna, hacer compatible el pensamiento de Ortega con la filosofía escolástica. Sin embargo, tal proyecto se irá desvaneciendo en la medida en que Ellacuría conozca el pensamiento de Zubiri, en el que encontrará mucho más vitalismo del que creyó hallar en Ortega. En esa obra encontró el plus de realidad que le faltaba para que su proyecto intelectual fuera viable en Centroamérica. Únicamente la vida, anclada en la realidad, podría renovar el pensamiento filosófico cristiano. La crítica que Ellacuría hace al escolasticismo es la falta de radicación vital en la vida misma, el sentido vital. Todo ello estaba en plena sintonía con su espiritualidad de aquel momento. Paralelamente Ellacuría se planteaba la posibilidad de poner límites a los existencialismos y en esos términos pensó en Zubiri. Lo que había leído de él en NHD le había gustado y creyó que su tesis doctoral le daría un espacio apto para discernir en qué medida el pensamiento de Zubiri podía acotar los vitalismos y existencialismos9. En una carta de Ellacuría a su vice-provincial se expresa como sigue con relación a la primera vez que vio y habló con Zubiri, el 8 de septiembre de 1961: Le dije sucintamente que veía en él un modelo de juntura entre lo clásico y lo moderno, entre lo esencial y lo existencial. Zubiri sonrió y dijo que efectivamente ese había sido el intento de su obra.10

Se aprecia con claridad que la síntesis que Ellacuría pretendía pronto se desvanecerá a partir de ese primer contacto. Volvió a tener la segunda entrevista con Zubiri el 2 de agosto de 1962. En diciembre de aquel mismo año aparecía publicada SE y el 27 de enero de 1963 Ellacuría le envía una carta entusiasmada a Zubiri de la que reproduciré algunos fragmentos. En ella se ve como esta obra le hace pensar en la auténtica posibilidad de una nueva filosofía cristiana, trans-escolástica y trans-tomista: …le quería agradecer su libro por lo que tiene de servicio no sólo a la filosofía y no sólo a la verdad, sino, sobre todo, por lo que tiene de servicio al cristianismo y por lo que tiene de servicio a la Verdad. Yo lo siento así y así se lo digo sin limitación alguna … Lo que me pasó fue que el libro fue un deslumbramiento en un terreno en el que me parecía que ni yo cabría en el deslumbramiento … Yo creo que los formados en la escolástica tendían a pensar que lo que usted les podría dar de avance y profundización estaría en un terreno no todavía cubierto por ella, el terreno de los existencialismos, historicismos y vitalismos …; en el mejor de los casos pensaban que usted iniciaría una síntesis y no un mero conglomerado, entre la filosofía clásica y la filosofía última … El asombro ha sido, entonces, que usted ha dado todo esto de una forma superior, como quien da una solución no al problema mal propuesto, sino a un problema que luego habría que replantear… Desde luego no se dirá que su filosofía, ni aún siquiera su filosofar, sea aristotélico, ni escolástico. Yo diría que es más bien un mea-aristotelismo y tras-escolástico… ni en la técnica, ni en los resultados de su pensamiento. Y esto para nuestros tiempos balbucientes, nebulosos e inacabados es ya un valor de primera línea. Pero la escolástica en los escolásticos de hoy no tiene de ordinario las cualidades que le son propias sino de una manera que yo llamaría prestada y no originalmente creado-

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ra. Esas cualidades en usted dan permanentemente la impresión de absoluta originalidad creadora. La prueba mejor está en los resultados: allí donde la escolástica se ha detenido en sus soluciones…, usted va delante en presentar más realidad -no solo realidades- y en presentarla en su ser positivo.11 El mes de marzo de 1963 volvió a visitar a Zubiri y en una carta dirigida a su vice-provincial dice lo siguiente: … él conoce en concreto el movimiento neo-tomista alemán, pero sabe que está influido por el trascendentalismo de Marechal y la tendencia a lo ontológico de Heidegger. Yo le dije que en muchas cosas de fondo, más como orientación que como resultado, iban a reconocerle sus aportes, que a mí me parecen más originales, más profundos y metafísicos que los de ellos, personalmente juzgo que no hay comparación entre lo que supone el pensamiento de Zubiri, que seguramente merecerá consideración aparte y renovación en filosofía y lo que puede suponer un Lotz, Brunner, Siewerth, Coreth y compañía.12 Ellacuría al contrario que muchos vio en SE una superación radical del escolasticismo y del neo-tomismo. Le propuso el primer esquema de su tesis doctoral13 en marzo de 1963, en la misma carta que antes cité, explica: El tema que le propuse a Zubiri como tesis era el de la principalidad de la esencia frente a la presunta principalidad de la existencia, lo cual me permitía familiarizarme con algún existencialista serio, y frente a la principalidad del ser lo cual me obligaría a meterme con el tomismo alemán hoy. A él le encantó el tema, porque considera que es la continuación de su libro. Que no ha desarrollado suficientemente y me dijo que volvería a repensarlo mientras fuera escribiendo mi tesis.14 De 1967 al 1972 el proyecto de Ignacio Ellacuría en cuanto a renovar la filosofía cristiana sufrirá una evolución ya que

se trasladará de un pensamiento estrictamente filosófico y cristiano a un pensamiento teológico que tendrá como núcleo la liberación y la revolución, así como un trayecto hacia la llamada Teología Política. Conviene, por tanto, prestar una atención especial a ese periodo vital para él, en cuanto se produjo una transformación intelectual. Todo ello no debe ser concebido en términos de ruptura total a pesar de que la transformación le lleva del ámbito filosófico al ámbito teológico. Sin embargo, creo que podemos mostrar como a un nivel profundo no hay tanta transformación ni ruptura, ya que en el fondo lo que siempre pretendió fue servir intelectualmente a la Iglesia. Durante este periodo trabajó mucho con y sobre Zubiri. A partir de su tesis doctoral, ente los años 1964 y 1967 redactó siete artículos en la línea de su tesis. A pesar de tanta dedicación a la obra zubiriana, Ellacuría nunca fue asistente de Zubiri. La dedicación vino dada por el temor a que el filósofo falleciera antes de haber podido dar a conocer su pensamiento más maduro, ciertamente también porque consideraba esta filosofía como de una importancia capital en el pensamiento contemporáneo. Siguiendo esta línea en el año 1968, un mes antes de que diera comienzo la famosa conferencia de obispos latinoamericanos en Medellín, Ellacuría dictó un curso en esta misma ciudad, sobre la Teología de la Revolución. De hecho, Zubiri le escribe una carta significativa y de mucha importancia de la que citaré un fragmento que me parece profundamente esclarecedor: Tiene usted en sus manos la redacción de mi curso sobre El problema del hombre. Desearía que a su publicación (firmada por ambos) siguiera la de algunos otros. A mis años es la única manera de dar cima a mi labor, usted lo sabe tan bien como yo. Con este fin, la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones (que le cuenta ya como perteneciente a ella) le incorporaría definitivamente a su seno para trabajar conmigo, financiando su viaje, etc. Si sus superiores le autorizaran a continuar su ministerio

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en El Salvador con la estancia de unos meses en España (por ejemplo desde agosto hasta febrero, o cosa similar).15 A partir de 1967 Ellacuría no volverá a dedicarse a la filosofía hasta que en 1985, escriba el artículo Función liberadora de la filosofía, donde decía cuales deberían ser las características de una auténtica filosofía cristiana: … aquella que instalase su filosofar autónomo en el lugar privilegiado de la verdad de la historia, que es la cruz como esperanza y liberación.16 Es esencial colocarse en términos de autonomía suficiente para poder realizar una crítica de las instituciones o verdades inmutables de la Iglesia. En este mismo sentido, Ellacuría nos dice: El buscar lo cristiano de la filosofía por el camino de la coincidencia dogmática o de la sumisión a la jerarquía eclesiástica va en contra de la naturaleza misma de la filosofía y ha resultado estéril para ella, la filosofía cristiana así entendida, como la filosofía marxista de homóloga estructura, son las mejores pruebas no sólo de la esterilidad intelectual de ese modo de concebir la cualificación de una filosofía, sino muchas veces del cambio de signo de la función esencialmente liberadora, en función esencialmente controladora y dominadora al servicio de lo que se considera como verdad inmutable o como estructura institucional intocable.17 Se halla ya la idea de una filosofía concebida como filosofía liberadora o concebida desde una óptica liberadora. Por tanto, se puede afirmar de una forma más que consistente que el proyecto de establecer las bases para una nueva o renovada filosofía cristiana era mucho más para Ellacuría que un proyecto juvenil. La Iglesia y el mundo estaban cambiando rápidamente y sus intereses intelectuales siempre se adaptaron a la realidad a la que nunca traicionó. El Concilio Vaticano II (1965), la elección del Padre Arrupe y la carta que en diciembre de 1966 éste envió

a los provinciales de América Latina pidiendo a los jesuitas una opción más clara por los pobres constituyeron probablemente los tres elementos coyunturales que influyeron en el proyecto filosóficoteológico de Ellacuría. Seguidamente presento un fragmento que puede clarificar su postura más madura: … (hay que buscar) la auténtica humanización de los hombres impedidos especialmente por la miseria y por determinadas estructuras… Ahora bien, donde quiera haya ese trabajo por el desvalido, por el injustamente tratado… hay un trabajo típicamente cristiano.18 El 15 de agosto escribe una carta a Zubiri en la que le comenta que ha dado un curso sobre Teología de la Revolución y uno sobre Antropología zubiriana. Los esquemas de ambos cursos se conservan y en ellos destacan la amplitud, la profundidad y la radicalidad. Los ejes del esquema son los siguientes: análisis filosófico del concepto de revolución; el carácter moral de las revoluciones; el análisis de la revolución soviética, cubana y negra de los años 60 en EEUU y el análisis de la situación de injusticia y miseria de América Latina. La Teología de la Revolución ha sido considerada por especialistas como José Comblin como la primera contribución de las iglesias latinoamericanas al pensamiento cristiano. Podemos considerarla, en este sentido, como el antecedente más directo de la Teología de la Liberación. Ellacuría la llegó a definir en uno de sus cursos como el sometimiento de la revolución al logos teológico a fin de poder analizar el tema desde la perspectiva del Dios cristiano. Podría considerarse como un estudio de las revoluciones latinoamericanas desde el punto de vista del Evangelio. A partir de 1968 Ellacuría disponía ya de un proyecto intelectual maduro que, por si mismo, constituía una de las posturas más avanzadas de la Iglesia en aquellos momentos. No creo que se pueda hablar de ruptura en Ellacuría entre filosofía y teología sino más bien de integración de una compleja triada realidad-filosofía-teología; es decir,

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una Filosofía de la Religión que le permitirá una postura crítica, así como le mantendrá perpetuamente en una plataforma de observación de las injusticias, de las desigualdades19. En ella, es posible analizar los hechos en términos de transformación y continuidad. Insisto en el hecho de que Ellacuría siempre pretendió servir a la Iglesia en la búsqueda intelectual y rigurosa de una nueva filosofía cristiana. Una Iglesia que para él no se identificaba necesariamente con la jerarquía, sino genuinamente con la Iglesia de Cristo. En su vida constatamos que él creía, no tanto que desde la filosofía no fuera posible servir a la Iglesia, entendiendo a ésta desde el término Pueblo de Dios, sino que debía hacerse insertando, religando, fuertemente la filosofía y la reflexión teológica a las más crudas realidades latinoamericanas. Creo que toda su reflexión, su vida y su obra intelectual están marcadas por un objetivo centralmente filosófico fundamentado en el pensamiento zubiriano, lo cual no le impidió que este objetivo tomara cuerpo en investigaciones políticas, económicas y sociales que implicaban necesariamente reflexionar teológicamente sobre el hecho de las revoluciones sociales en América Latina. A principios de 1972 en Madrid dictó una ponencia acerca del tema general de Filosofía y Política, en el marco de un ciclo de conferencias, en ella expresaba la necesidad de pasar de una filosofía de lo político a una filosofía política en la cual pudieran tener cabida tratamientos específicos sobre, la ley, la autoridad, la guerra, el derecho a la rebelión, un pensar efectivo desde la más concreta situación real y sobre la realidad más total y concreta. Esto significaba para él una implicación que se piensa efectivamente desde una situación real y no es real sino es absolutamente concreta. Siempre creyó que el pensar sobre situaciones concretas no era más que el primer paso del proceso filosófico ya que, en última instancia la condición de posibilidad de este pensar era acceder a lo más real de la realidad, tal como había aprendido perfectamente de Zubiri.

La totalidad de lo real no está dada, hay que hacerla y únicamente en y desde este hacer se puede descubrir más perfectamente el carácter más real de la realidad misma. Ellacuría se exigió siempre a sí mismo una profunda dedicación y una técnica de captación de la realidad, a fin de que la contribución a esa efección de la realidad y a esa iluminación fueran estrictamente filosóficas. Lo más real de la realidad es, según sus propias palabras, redactadas en un texto de 1980 titulado El objeto de la filosofía, la realidad histórica. El objeto de la filosofía según Ellacuría ha de pretender ocuparse de lo que es últimamente la realidad, de lo que es la realidad total en cuanto total. Esta totalidad de lo real exige una total concreción y esta total con concreción está determinada por su última realización y cobra su última realización por la historia y en la historia. Son en última instancia los análisis filosóficos de realidades concretas el instrumento que permitía al filósofo acceder al objeto último de la filosofía, la realidad histórica que era tal como él creía estricta metafísica. La historia es forzosamente política. No significa esto que sólo lo político sea histórico puesto que esa historicidad compete al grado más intenso de realidad, sólo significa que en su última concreción la historia es política… Efectivamente, allí donde entran a una la actualización, no puede menos que ocurrir que la politización también metafísica de la realidad –en sentido metafísico- de esa actualización, y consiguientemente de una reflexión última, total y concreta sobre esa realidad.20 La filosofía madura de Ellacuría tiene como concreción fundamental la realidad histórica. Para terminar esta reflexión afirmar que se hacen urgentes a la vez que necesarios para el pensamiento contemporáneo investigaciones más concretas acerca de la evolución de la filosofía de Zubiri y Ellacuría así como la recepción que su vida y su obra han tenido en Europa. También creo fundamental continuar con los estudios sobre Filosofía de la Religión

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tal y como Zubiri expresó que constituyen hoy un marco privilegiado para poder en-

tender muchos de los conflictos más cruciales de este nuestro siglo.

Notas 1

Valdés Valle, R: “La evolución del pensamiento filosófico de Ignacio Ellacuría” en ECA (1996) Vól. 51 Núm, 577-578 Nov-Dic. pp 1029-1047. La revista ECA es una publicación de la Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas

2

Ibid., p. 1029.

3

Ibid., p. 1030.

4

Ibid.

5

Respecto a esta expresión “… una auténtica filosofía efectiva en Centroamérica?” Ellacuría se está refiriendo a un pensamiento filosófico que pueda conectar con la realidad en la praxis. En este pensamiento que lograra finalmente articular y sistematizar la realidad tal y como Zubiri la entiende se convertirá en eje vertebrador de su filosofía que es a la vez teología y Teología de la Liberación. Recomiendo para profundizar en todo ello la lectura de los textos de Ellacuría que forman parte de Misterium Liberationis. Concretamente " Historicidad de la salvación cristiana", y "Utopía y profetismo", en Mysterium Liberationis. Conceptos fundamentales de la Teología de la liberación, tomo I ( I. Ellacuría y J. Sobrino coeditores) Madrid: UCA y Trotta, 1990, pp. 323-372, y 393-442 respectivamente.

6 7

Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1031. Respecto a esta expresión “… una auténtica filosofía efectiva en Centroamérica?” Ellacuría se está refiriendo a un pensamiento filosófico que pueda conectar con la realidad en la praxis. En este pensamiento que lograra finalmente articular y sistematizar la realidad tal y como Zubiri la entiende se onvertirá en eje vertebrador de su filosofía que es a la vez teología y Teología de la Liberación. Recomiendo para profundizar en todo ello la lectura de los textos de Ellacuría que forman parte de Misterium Liberationis . Concretamente " Historicidad de la salvación cristiana", y "Utopía y profetismo", en Mysterium Liberationis. Conceptos fundamentales de la Teología de la liberación, tomo I ( I. Ellacuría y J.Sobrino coeditores). Madrid, UCA y Trot-

ta, 1990, pp. 323-372, y 393-442 respectivamenter. 8

Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1040

9

Respecto a poner límites a vitalismos y existencialismos recomiendo la lectura de Las fuentes espirituales de la angustia y de la esperanza de Zubiri en donde se ve con claridad, a mi parecer, cómo el filósofo concreta los límites a los existencialismos. Este texto constituye un apéndice de la obra de Zubiri Sobre el Sentimiento y la Volición que publicó Alianza EditoriaL Zubiri lo escribió a principios de 1961 a partir de una petición por parte de Monseñor Boyer-Mas que organizaba unos encuentros de intelectuales cristianos conocidos con el nombre de “Entreriens de Bayonnex”. Fue el propio Monseñor Boyer-Mas quien lo tradujo al francés y lo leyó en el encuentro de mayo de 1961, al que Zubiri no asistió en persona. Se publicó, por primera vez, en Revista de Filosofía. 3. época, vol. IV(199l), núm. 6. págs. 239-245. Editorial Complutense, Madrid. Actualmente en Sobre el Sentimiento y la Volición, Madrid, Alianza Editorial y Fundación Xavier Zubiri 1994 .

10

Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1041.

11

Ibid., p. 1042.

12

Ibid.

13

La tesis doctoral de Ignacio Ellacuría se tituló La principalidad de la esencia de Xavier Zubiri y la defendió en Madrid en la Universidad Complutense en 1965.

14

Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1044.

15

Ibid., p. 1045.

16

Ibid., p. 1046.

17

Ibid., p. 1047.

18

Ibid., p. 1048.

19

En efecto, Ellacuría sigue las ideas que sobre Filosofía de la Religión expuso Zubiri en su texto “Note sur la Philosophie de la Religion”, publicado por el Bulletin de l’Institut Catholique de Paris. Texto que publicó como parte de sus reflexiones acerca de la Filosofía de la Religión en relación al curso “La Philosophie

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de la Religion dans le Penseé Contemporaine”, que dictó entre enero y febrero (4, 11, 18, 25, 1-II, 8) de 1937. Para profundizar nada más interesante que ir a leer al propio

20

Zubiri. Notes sur la Philosophie de la Religión en Bulletin de L’Institut Catholique (1937) Paris, nº 10. Valdés Valle, R., op. cit., p. 1047.

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The Transcendental Panentheism Of Xavier Zubiri In Nature, History, God And Man And God

C. Eduardo Sanchez Gauto, Th.M. Asunción, Paraguay

Abstract Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) was perhaps the most original and systematically rigorous thinker in contemporary Spanish philosophy; but he may also be the least known, due to circumstances of his life that prevented him from occupying the center stage in Spain’s intellectual life. This paper intends to show that Xavier Zubiri’s theology is in fact a form of panentheism, a view of God where the world is in God via an ontological link, and yet God and the world are not identical. After a summary review of literature relevant for understanding the question and some basic notions on panentheism, we analyze Zubirian theology as shown in two of Zubiri’s most important works: Nature, History, God and Man and God. The conclusion of this study is that Zubiri’s theology may be in fact a form of transcendental panentheism. Resumen Xavier Zubiri (1898–1983) fue quizás el pensador más original y más sistemáticamente riguroso de la filosofía española contemporánea; pero también es el menos conocido, debido a circunstancias de su vida que le impidieron ocupar un lugar central en la vida intelectual de España. Este trabajo busca mostrar que la teología de Xavier Zubiri es de hecho una forma de panenteísmo, una visión de Dios en donde el mundo está en Dios mediante un vínculo ontológico, y aun así Dios y el mundo no son idénticos. Después de una breve reseña de la literatura pertinente para comprender la cuestión y algunas nociones básicas de panenteísmo, se hace un análisis de la teología zubiriana tal como se muestra en dos de las obras más importantes de Zubiri: Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, y El Hombre y Dios. La conclusión de este estudio es que la teología de Zubiri puede ser en realidad una forma de panenteísmo transcendental. There is unanimous consensus that for Zubiri the problem of God was one of three problems that challenged him during his entire life, and he devoted considerable thought to it.1 Surveys of Zubiri’s views on God are offered by Garagorri,2 Cescon,3 Juan José García,4 Zárraga Olavarría,5 and Melero Martínez,6 among others. However, most studies treat Zubiri’s theology from existential lines, or simply assume that Zubiri’s theology is just an-

1. Introduction Panentheism (or Lack Thereof) in Zubiri Scholarship Since this is a study examining the panentheism in the philosophy of Xavier Zubiri, it is convenient to give a cursory examination to how this problem was presented by the students of Zubiri’s philosophy. 107

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other version of classical theism. However, there are some hints that Zubiri’s theology might be considered as a form of panentheism. Rivera Cruchaga, in an obituary for Zubiri, unconsciously alludes to the possibility of panentheism in Zubiri’s philosophy. He remembers an anecdote where Zubiri said to him: “When we are in the truth, we are in the Word of God, we live in God”.7 Cescon hints that Zubiri could have understood the God-world relationship in panentheistic fashion, without using the specific term. Since Zubiri understood each thing as a manifestation of God, because it is not God and yet it is formally constituted in God,8 Cescon concludes that for Zubiri a separation between God and the world was inconceivable.9 A thorough study of the concept of religation and his correlation with human experience of God is done by Correa Schnake.10 Without realizing it, Correa describes religation in strongly immanentist terms that might hint at panentheism: “religation is a presence of God in things precisely in order to constitute them as real, and specifically in the human person as that which is constituting its mission to the ground of its own personal reality in the configuration of himself.”11 Marquínez Argote sees a remarkable similarity between the theologies of Zubiri and another panentheist thinker, Paul Tillich, despite evidence that Tillich was not aware of the thought of the other. Marquínez attributes this similarity to the fact that both were disciples of Heidegger.12 For Marquínez, the similarity lies specifically in the analogy between the devices of the “depth of the ultimate” in Tillich and religation in Zubiri. Corominas also point out the deep influence of Heidegger in the formulation of Zubiri’s theology, making it instrumental in the abandonment of Zubiri’s previously held modernistic convictions.13 Zárraga Olavarría, after offering an elaborate explanation of Zubiri’s view of God, states that the problem of God was for Zubiri the “north” to which all his phil-

osophical system is directed, and without it would not be understandable.14 He implicitly recognizes a panentheism in Zubiri when he states: “God is effectively in everything, but not “exactly” as the pantheist would have it”.15 Despite all these hints, at the present time the author is not aware of any identification of Zubiri as a panentheist, save perhaps a brief, ambiguous and inconclusive mention by Franciscan theologian Félix Alluntis.16 Panentheism Panentheism can be described as “a ‘vision’ of God in the world and the world in God”. This quote, which for now shall remain unattributed, shows how according to this particular view of the God-world relationship, God and the world are joined together in some sort of ontological link. Panentheism can be generically defined as the view of God where “God and the world are ontologically distinct and God transcends the world, but the world is in God ontologically.”17 According to Palmquist, “panentheism typically refers to a synthesis between traditional theism and pantheism, whereby the whole world (and everything in it) is believed to be in God, though God transcends the boundaries of the natural world and is more than nature.”18 That is, the world and everything in it is in the being of God or ontologically in God. The notion that the world is in the being of God, that is, ontologically in God, is key for panentheism and it serves to distinguish it from modern statements of classical theism which strongly emphasizes the notion of divine immanence. Cooper explains that for the classical theist, God is not only immanent; he could be absolutely immanent because God’s transcendence is absolute.19 David H. Nikkel offers a thorough characterization of the concept: “Panentheism” literally means “all in God.” (The word was coined by the early nineteenth-century German phi-

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losopher, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause.) It holds that the non-divine individuals are included in God, are fully within the divine life. God knows all that exists without externality, mediation, or loss (though God’s knowledge and valuation are more than the creaturely experiences that are wholly included in the divine experience). God empowers all that exists without externality, mediation, or loss (though there is genuine indeterminacy and freedom of choice and action which God empowers in the creaturely realm). This is in contrast to traditional theism, which has tended to regard God as utterly distinct from the creation and the creatures. Deism is an extreme of this tendency. On the other hand, panentheism also distinguishes itself from pantheism (literally “all [is] God”). It holds that God is not reducible to the nondivine individuals, to the universe as a whole, or to the structure of the universe; but rather God transcends them, having a reality—an awareness and a power—that includes but is not exhausted by thereality of the creation and the experiences and actions of the creatures.20 The ontological link between God and world is well described in the explicitly panentheistic theology of Jürgen Moltmann, who states: “God’s essence has in itself the idea of the world from all eternity”.21 Since God’s essence is also His existence, creation is necessary and an extension of the divine Being, instead of the utterly contingent characterization of creation prevalent in classical theism.22 Systematic analyses of panentheism are available from Culp23 and Cooper.24 In his work, Cooper offers a matrix for analyzing and classifying the various strands of historical and contemporary panentheism according to the following distinctions: 1. Explicit or implicit panentheism. Explicit panentheism is distinctly assumed by its proponents, while

other thinkers have a panentheistic theology while avoiding use of the term or simply not using it. 2. Personal or nonpersonal panentheism. Some panentheistic thinkers see God as nonpersonal while others see God as personal. 3. Part-whole or relational panentheism. Some panentheists regard the world as part of God, without fully being God. Others see God distinct from the world, but ontologically linked in a symbiotic fashion. 4. Voluntary or natural panentheism. Some panentheist thinkers regard creation of the world as necessary for God. Others see the world as the product of a free creative act from God. 5. Classical or modern panentheism. Classical panentheism affirms most theistic attributes of God including omnipotence, while the modern panentheism states that God is affected by creaturely freedom. This paper will use Cooper’s distinctions as useful tools for the analysis of Zubiri’s doctrine of God. Note on Versions Employed In order to write this study, both Nature, History, God and Man and God were examined in their original Spanish, in the latest editions available to this writer.25 Now, expressing the plenitude of Zubiri’s thought in English can be a very difficult undertaking. Melero Martínez ably puts it: Xavier Zubiri’s style is unique. He invents neologisms, changes the meaning of some terms. He is precise and almost pedantic in his terminology even when that makes for a not very elegant Spanish. He gives a precise philosophical meaning to expressions from the ordinary language and from other sciences, such as: personality,

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personeity, reity, reality, religation, theological, theologal, sentient, truthing. These are just some examples.26 In order to quote the text in this work, the author used the English versions available. For Nature, History, God the Fowler version was used.27 For Man and God, the version employed was that of Joaquín A. Redondo.28 These translators deserve a lot of credit and admiration for ably expressing the nuances of Zubirian thought in good English. Throughout the work, quotes from Zubiri will be taken from these sources with some corrections or emendations from the author when, in his criterion, a better or more precise rendering of a particular phrase could be used. Therefore, any responsibility for any errors or mistakes in translation should lie with the author of this paper and not with the translators of the two previously mentioned works by Zubiri. Zubiri’s Panentheism in Nature, History, God Nature, History, God was Zubiri’s second book (the first one was his dissertation), and it contains a showcase of his early thought. Published initially in 1944, it contained a series of articles and essays of diverse provenance, published between 1932 and 1944.29 The fifth edition saw the inclusion of an additional essay, “Introduction to the Problem of God”. Thus configured, the book deals with the problem of God in three essays: “Introduction to the Problem of God”, “In Regard to the Problem of God,” and “Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology”. While these essays were diverse in origin and correspond to different stages in Zubiri’s early thought, they all show a remarkable unity on the matter of Zubiri’s theology. This study shall approach each study on its own, and then a concluding synthesis will be attempted. It must be noted the texts under study are three isolated essays, which show a theology in development. Many statements are fragmentary,

vague or incomplete. However, even so, they provide a good view of the initial stages of Zubiri’s theology. Introduction to the Problem of God Although “Introduction to the Problem of God” is the first of the essays on Nature, History, God dealing specifically with Zubiri’s theology, it was a later addition. It appeared only in the fifth Spanish edition (1963). The date would appear to situate this essay on Zubiri’s mature period; however, in the Preface to the sixth edition Zubiri states: It is basically a lecture given some 15 years ago, which will enable the problems treated in the chapters In Regard to the problem of God and Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology to be situated in proper perspective.30 Zubiri begins stating that the current time is perhaps one of the times which “most substantially lives the problem of God.” It is necessary to examine this problem from the intellectual way; and more specifically, from philosophy. This is despite the fact that this way is the most vexing of them, because it is destined to leave almost no one satisfied.31 In the essay, Zubiri describes God in a paradoxical way. “In a certain rigorous and authentic sense”, the reality of God is “the most unreachable of all realities.” However, “the reality of God, though on one hand the most distant and unreachable of all realities, is also on the other the closest of them all.” The problem of God affects to the very core of human existence. Man seeks an answer to this question because he feels shaken by it at its very root. However, a review of the status of the problem of God in the history of philosophy shows that the philosophical way is not as simple as it would appear at first. Intellection of God, which here means an intellectual justification of God’s reality, is only achieved at the end of the path. What path is this? A cursory examination would

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form the impression that is just another existential analysis.32 However, right behind the existentialist language lies the procedure of phenomenological analysis: a series of methodological reductions in order to examine the structures of consciousness with the purpose of apprehending universal truths.33 This has not gone unnoticed. Several studies have pointed out the key place of phenomenology in Zubiri’s thought and specifically in his reflections on the problem of God.34 Melero Martínez, for example, states that phenomenology is the general humus (substrate) of Zubiri’s philosophy.35 The first step is an analysis of human existence. Here we begin to see the initial steps of Zubiri’s phenomenological and transcendental view of God: man is always positioning himself in respect of something which Zubiri calls “ultimateness”. This is because man is not a mere thing; but as a strictly personal reality, it stands against the whole world in an absolute way and his acts are the actualization of his absolute reality. What is this ultimateness? Zubiri responds: This ultimateness is not merely something in which man “is,” but rather something in which man has to be in order to be able to be what he is in each of his acts. Thus the ultimateness has a grounding character.36 This grounding effected by the ultimateness determines the absolute character of human reality, although Zubiri still does not disclose at this point what or who this ultimateness is. This ultimateness makes the man religated to it. Thus, Zubiri introduces a key concept in his explanation, something that would be place at the center of his view of the God-world relationship. Religation is “the absolute personal character of human reality actualized in the acts which it carries out”.37 As one commentator put it, religation is the ontological link to the ground of existence,38 or, more clearly, is the ontological link by which man has access to God.39 By

religation man is shown everything that is real. It is no mere experience of man, nor a psychological or social phenomenon, or moral conscience, but the very principle and ground of any possible experience, including these four aspects. This religation exposes man to that ultimateness which Zubiri calls deity.40 This is another key concept to which Zubiri will return later in Man and God. Here, it is described as not necessarily being God as a reality in and of Himself. “Deity” is here just a trait, and an enigmatic one to boot, by which man is being shown all that is real. The discovery of this deity is thus the principle, the beginning of any possible experience. Now, deity as described is just an enigma and because of this enigmatic condition, deity forces human intelligence to learn about it. The second step is thus the solution of the enigma of the deity, and this step is for Zubiri strictly demonstrative. Deity is inexorably grounded on “reality-deity” or “divine reality”. It is this reality-deity as a character of the ultimate reality or as first cause. Since it is the first cause of all things, including human realities equipped with intelligence and will, it is a first reality which is also intelligent and free-willing. This reality is beyond the world in order to ground the world as a reality. Now, this poses a question: is this ultimate reality, is this first cause, God? This leads us to the third step. The third step points out that the first cause which was shown in the second step to be also free and personal, is essentally a personal, transcendent reality, and this an “absolutely absolute” reality. To this reality we can call him God. Now, how can we say that God is the grounding, the foundation of the world? For Zubiri, the answer lies in an act of pure donation. Since it is a selfdonation of a pure and perfect will, it is also pure ecstasy, of pure love. This pure love is the highest form of causality. Thus, God is the grounding of the world out of pure self-donation in love.

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In summary, the three steps are the following: 1. Analysis of the human existence: discover the ultimate reality, or “deity”. 2. Deity as first cause or “divine reality”. 3. First cause as an absolutely absolute, free and personal reality; that is, God. Zubiri ends this reflection saying that even though finding God from the philosophical way is possible by tracing these three steps, it is impossible to grasp adequate concepts about God. Man think by abstracting concepts from things. Some of these concepts are “representative”, which are inadequate for thinking about God. But others are “directionals”, which could be Zubirian-speak for the phenomenological intentionality; they point out to other things. They could help in our way towards God; but we must discern ways to God that are possible from others which are not. In other words, and inasmuch as Aquinas’ arguments for God are ‘ways’, we have the outline of a via phenomenologica to God.41 This paper by Zubiri purports to be a mere introduction. However, in a few pages Zubiri manages to present several key concepts of his thinking, such as deity and religation, or the hierarchy of absolute realities. There is no explicitly panentheistic statement here, although it should be noted that God is shown as the ground and foundation of any reality by “ultimateness”, and man is intimately linked to Him by “religation”. God is thus shown as a transcendental reality which is the ultimate ground of existence for any being, enabling their existence by their link to him in deity or religation. In Regard to the Problem of God In Regard to the Problem of God is a much larger text which was initially published as a journal article in 1935.42 There, Zubiri formulates a more detailed intro-

duction to the problem of God, and here the key issue of God’s relation to the world is explored with more detail than in the previous chapter. According to Corominas, this essay was heavily influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy.43 Zubiri again uses a phenomenological method to access God as a reality, with religation as his key concept. In order to know if there is a God, we must begin from human existence. This is the starting point of Zubiri’s phenomenological access to God. Now, this is possible because for Zubiri phenomenology is not only ontological (as in Husserl), but also a way to analyze reality and not only consciousness. Man’s personhood is his being. Personhood is implanted into being in order to realize itself while living with other things. Now, the “with” is one of human personhood’s formal ontological traits in itself. Man has to realize himself as a person during his own life. This life is a mission; life is something sent to man, and existence is imposed upon him. What makes this imposition is also what “impels” (move, prompt, make do) man to live. Now, what is what impels man into living? It’s something previous or “anterior”. This is something into which man holds onto in order to exist and realize himself. This is unavoidable since man cannot “be” by himself. “[Man] needs to be prompted to make himself. His ontological nihility is radical”.44 There is something, then, that makes us to be. At this stage, Zubiri introduces his key concept in his access to God. This is a point that was identified as essential for both his theology and anthropology.45 We are prompted into being, we are obligated to exist, because we are ontologically linked to what makes us to be: We are religated. Religation, thus, is that ontological link to something that previously makes us to be.46 It’s a link to something from which we come and “makes there to be”. Religation evidences the fundamentality of human existence, something that causes that we are being being. Man is not only religated; he is constitutively religated.

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Now, since man exists “with” things, and man is religated, the something that religates man, religates with him the whole world. In religation, “the whole material universe appears”.47 This means that religation is our way to access all reality. This begs the question: What is that something that religates man? For Zubiri, this is “what we call God”: a reality which Zubiri names as deity.48 But this isn’t God per se yet; it’s a reality that opens up for us the ultimate reality of God and shows that we are grounded in that reality. God is ens fundamentale, the being which grounds us. Groundness is God’s chief attribute. Religation shows us that God is not a thing. Man is not with God (as it is the case with things); man is in God. Zubiri here quotes Acts 17:28, “In him we live and move and have our being”. Man does not need to arrive to God; he is coming from Him. The problem of God is thus the problem of religation.49 While many have seen the concept of religation as an original feature of Zubiri, Yáñez points out its roots in the thought of José Ortega y Gasset, Zubiri’s mentor and professor of philosophy in Madrid.50 God is thus a transcendental reality accessed through religation. By religation, humanity and the whole world is “in God” ontologically. Zubiri describes his panentheistic vision in this terms: God is not something which is in man as a part of him, nor is He something which is added to him, from outside; nor is He a state of conscience; nor is He an object. What of God there may be in man is only the religation through which we are open to Him, and in this religation God becomes patent to us. Hence one cannot, strictly speaking, talk of a relationship with God.51 But who is God? Even the verb “is” is troublesome because God is beyond Being; He is the One who makes being possible as ens fundamentale.

There is no identification of the being of metaphysics with God. In God the “there is” surpasses infinitely with respect to the “is.” God is beyond being. Prima rerum creatorum est esse, being is before created things, the medieval Platonists said. Esse formaliter non est in Deo ... nihil quod est in Deo habet rationem entis, being is not formally in God ... nothing which is in God has the form of being, repeated Master Eckhardt, and with him, all of the Christian mystics.52 The concept of being becomes problematic, and here is where panentheism comes full circle for Zubiri: Since God is beyond being, we need a different concept of what a being is. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, paired with the Aristotelian idea of substance, could lead to the undesirable outcome of pantheism. Anything that “is” is anything that comes from God. Since God’s status is now a metaphysical problem, the world also becomes problematic at once. What is the answer? Panentheism: Religated existence is a “vision” of God in the world and the world in God.53 The quote may be familiar to the reader, because it was used to characterize panentheism at the begining of this paper. This is the core of Zubiri’s panentheism. “God remains linked to the world ‘by reason of being’.”54 And the existential link is what Zubiri calls religation. What is atheism, then? Atheism denies deity; it is a negative position regarding deity.55 Atheism comes when the man feels that he is unbound; ignores his religation, and identifies his being with his life. This happens when the person feels self-sufficient. “Success is the great creator of atheism”.56 Human life is the ultimate absolute and, quoting St. John, Zubiri states that man falls into “pride of life”.57 That’s why pride is the capital sin among all capital sins. This prompts Zubiri to make an interesting insight:

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The present time is a time of atheism; it is an time that is proud of its own success. Atheism today affects, primo et per se, our time and our world. Those of us who are not atheists, are what we are despite our time, as the atheists of times past were so despite theirs... As an historical period, our time is one of “unbinding” and disfundamentation. For this reason, the religious problem of today is not a problem of differing faiths, but the problem of religion-irreligion.58 Since this position is not sustainable, man has tried to clutch himself in all kinds of supports. Today, Zubiri says, is the time of philosophy. But philosophy cannot be a way of life. Yet, “at the bottom of a great part of contemporary philosophy lies a surreptitious deification of existence”.59 Again, panentheism could be atheism’s demise: Surely the hour will come when man, in his intimate and radical failure, will awake as if from a dream finding himself in God and failing into the realization that in his atheism he has done nothing but be in God. Then he will encounter himself religated to Him, not so as to flee from the world, and others, and himself; but the other way around, in order to sustain and maintain himself in being. God does not manifest Himself primarily as negation, but as fundamentation, as what makes it possible to exist. Religation is the possibilitation of existence as such.60 In this article Zubiri begins a phenomenological analysis of human existence and ends with a panentheistic vision of God as a transcendental agent beyond being but the ground where all beings have their existence. Man apprehends the world by being linked to this transcendental agent by religation. Without even begin to define anything related to God’s character, Zubiri’s panentheism is already an essential part of his theology.

Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology This is the last chapter on Nature, History, God, and it is made from the notes of two courses Zubiri gave; one on Hellenism and Christianity in Madrid (1934-1935) and the other in Paris (19371939). Zubiri says almost defensively “They are simply an exposition of some New Testament texts, as seen by the Greek tradition. They are, therefore, simple historical pages, nothing more. I must emphasize this.”61 Despite this disclaimer, however, this chapter has very little of actual New Testament theology and a lot of Christian Neoplatonism, incorporated almost wholesale into Zubiri’s theology. Zubiri actually admits his partiality some lines below, where he uses “Greek theology” as a synonym with Christian Neoplatonism: “Personally I shall not hide my affection for Greek theology. Without any exclusivism whatsoever, I have yielded in the following pages to this propensity.” All in all, this is no minor footnote in Zubiri’s thought. It is a key development of his thinking62 and the basis for many concepts of his theology, such as religation.63 Melero Martínez explains the importance of this essay for Zubiri: The inclusion of a text of theology, Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology, which closes the book, invites to reflection: Why should a theological discourse appears in a text of philosophy? Why the last word in Zubiri is theological? The seriousness of these questions is heightened because it was an unpublished text that could have been silenced. Only those who attended the course at Madrid, 1934-1935, or those of the Foyer international des étudiants catholiques of París in 1937 could have known of its existence. At this time, Zubiri is a secularized priest writing about theology. This text was the last one to pass the ecclesiastical censors in October 27, 1944, which held back the printing of the book.

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Only the internal need of this discourse would justify its inclusion.64 Zubiri begins by investigating the being of God and to the effect he draws heavily from ideas from Plato, Aristotle, and the “Greek fathers”, which for Zubiri usually denotes the Christian Neoplatonist philosophers, among whom Pseudo-Dionysius is heavily mentioned.65 “God is love” is no mere statement; it is a metaphysical definition mediated by the dialectic between agape and eros66 God’s being is nothing static but energéia, power, operating activity.67 God is power; both as power that unfolds Himself to the world (agape) and as a power that seeks its own and natural perfection (eros).68 God’s love is both ecstatic and effusive manifesting itself in an internal emanation or “effusion”, the Trinitarian life; and an external effusion/emanation, a creation and a “deifying” self-donation or deification.69 This insight by Zubiri was noted by some as the basis for the later Zubirian concept of “the power of the real”.70 The Trinity is the mysterious mode of being an infinite God which is yet one by nature. In order to develop his view of Trinity, Zubiri turns to Richard of St. Victor. Richard’s doctrine on the Trinity were used for Zubiri as building blocks to develop a trinitarian theology of eternal, personal emanations.71 God is an infinite being whose infinity is pregnant with love, understood as the very ecstasy of being. God is a personal reality full of love and manifests itself as a personal reality (the Father) which due to his own perfection eternally generates as an emanation another person (the Son), which is the personification of the power, the dynamis of the Father. This perfection, when it is an actuality that reverts upon its essence is the person of the Holy Spirit. Zubiri describes in this way the procession— perichoresis, circumincession—of the Godhead. Each person is distinguished from the others by the way of having the divine

nature. In the Father, it is a principle; in the Son, as constituting agency; in the Holy Spirit, as self-donation in act.72 Being simultaneous and eternal emanations, both the Son and the Holy Spirit are images, eikón (icons) of God with a distinctively Neoplatonic flavor: The Son is eikon because He proceeds immediately from the Father; the Holy Spirit is so because He proceeds from the Father through the Son, and consists in manifesting the identity of the Father and Son: pneúma ek Patrós di’hyioû ekporeuómenon. Such is the Greek scheme.73 This Neoplatonistic chain-of-being depiction of the internal structure of the Trinity is essential to Zubiri’s view of God and determines a panentheistic view of God’s relationship to the world. The Trinity is not only a model of divine life; “Let us not forget that this expresses not only the nature of the Divine life, but also the structure of creation and of deification”.74 God’s personal life is extended by ontological emanation (effusion) into creation and deification. The trinitarian structure of divine life, then, causes the ontological and dialectical unity of God and the world that is the distinctive mark of panentheism. By creation, God produces what is “the other” but as an emanation of God Him”self”. If there is any doubt that his could be panentheism, let’s take a look at the very own words of Zubiri: And hence the creation, at the same time it produces things distinct from God, maintains them in ontological unity with Him through effusion.75 In keeping with this idea, Zubiri explicitly rejects pantheism.76 By via negativa, Zubiri states that the transcendence production of creation is opposed to the immanent procession of the Divine persons. This is why Zubiri prefers the term “effusion” to emanation. For him, “emanation” has a pantheistic connotation.

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Creation produces the otherness in God and in creatures is an ascending attraction to God and is patterned, as it was previously stated, in the life of the Trinity. The emanations inside the Trinity set the pattern for a chain of being in creation: “in the transcendental act of creation, the three persons fulfill the same function in the order of causality as in the life of the Trinity”77 Only God truly “is”, and His creation is an absolute action in nothingness. How this happens is interesting: Creation, then, as an absolute act of God, is a voice of God in nothingness. The logos has a subject: nothingness; and a predicate: the Divine ideas. The outcome is clear: nothingness is transformed (if I may be permitted the expression) into “someone” (subject), and the ideas are projected onto this someone making of him a “something” (predicate). In this way the ontological structure of creation is determined; the finite entity is above all a duality between that it is and what it is.78 This leads to another statement that is rather obliquely panentheistic and a quotation of Acts 17:28, a locus classicus of many panentheists: Thus it is clear how, without blurring the distinction between God and creatures, everything there is in them of positive being is owing to the presence of God in them. If, dealing with finite causality, the action of the agent is received in the patient, then in regards to the creator-actor the patient and its passivity only exist due to their presence in the agent. We are, we move, and we live in Him, St. Paul will say, probably repeating a formula already current in his day.79 Zubiri now works the consequences of his panentheism. First, there is an elaborate, Neoplatonic chain of beings, “the ontological hierarchy of beings according to their greater or lesser formal perfection.”80 This hierarchy has three orders in the material realm: bodies (soma), whose being is its light (phos); then the living

beings, whose being is their life (zoé); and finally, personal beings, whose being is their spirit (pneûma).81 Second, there is the cosmic unity of creation: “Being, as active unity, unifies things in themselves and is unified with God. But we added that it also unifies each thing with all others of its species.”82 But there is more. A second effusion from the Trinity where God personally gives Himself to the world: deification. By deification, creatures get re-united with God’s personal life and the cycle of divine love gets completed. Deification has two specific moments: First, God makes the nature of a creature —man— the nature of His own personal being. This is the reality of Christ in the Incarnation. Second, through Christ humankind participate their personal life into God’s personal life. To this, Zubiri calls Sanctification. Even through deification’s chief object is man, the whole material creation cannot be completely excluded from this process and somewhat is affected by it. In this way, Zubiri’s panentheism grounds his philosophical interpretation of Christian and Roman Catholic doctrine. Thus, in “God and Deification” we have a Neoplatonic theology which is strongly immanentistic and, in the opinion of this writer, even panentheistic. God is viewed as effusive love and the Trinity is His life as emanations or “effusions” of his love. Outside Trinity, God’s love emanates or effuses in two ways. Naturally, in creation by effusing or emanating a hierarchy of beings which remain ontologically linked to God’s transcendental reality. Supernaturally, by “deifying” His whole creation by a personal Incarnation in Christ and sanctification by grace for humanity. Deification is a way for creation to return to God’s intimate life. Summary In Nature, History, God Zubiri offers a fairly complete account of his theology. God is the ground of all beings and the ultimate transcendental reality. All things

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are ontologically linked to Him by religation. Religation is the vehicle for a panentheistic view of God. Probing deeper, this panentheism comes from an understanding of God highly influenced by Christian Neoplatonism. In the next section the study shall examine Zubiri’s view of God at the other end of his work, via the posthumous work Man and God. 1.

Zubiri’s Panentheism in Man and God

Man and God was published posthumously in 1984. As such, it reflects the last, mature stage of Zubirian thought. When Zubiri died in 1983 the book was almost ready for publication.83 With The Philosophical Problem of the History of Religions84 and The Theological Problem of Man: Christianity,85 it was part of his “theological” trilogy.86 For Zubiri, the problem of God has two facets or aspects. First, it is necessary to determine whether there is something which we call God. Second, if there is a God, it is necessary to determine if man can have any kind of access to Him. Thus, in Man and God he approaches the issue in three parts: 1. Human reality. 2. The problem of divine reality. 3. Man as experience of God. The first part is devoted to questions of philosophical anthropology; the second, to problems of philosophical theology; and the third, to issues of theological anthropology. For reasons of efficiency, this study will focus mainly on the second part of the work, where the whole of Zubiri’s theology lies. In tackling the question of God’s existence (or more properly, God’s reality) Zubiri examines three points: the problem of God’s reality per se, the “justification” of God’s reality (really, an argument for God’s reality), and the characteristics of such reality.

The problem Zubiri begins by stating that all classical arguments or ways for proving God’s existence are insufficient. For Zubiri, arguments for God’s existence have started from two points of departure: reality, considered as nature—via cosmologica—, or the study of a particular aspect of human nature—via anthropologica—, and all of them are found insufficient.87 Concerning the cosmological sets of arguments, Zubiri examines Thomas Aquinas’ five ways88 and finds them inconclusive because they depend on a certain set of metaphysical presuppositions, a specific metaphysical interpretation of sensible reality: these ways take the validity of Aristotle’s metaphysics for granted and fail to take account of man’s true place in the universe.89 In addition, they may point out to something, but it is not clear at all whether the end to which they point out is the same thing. [T]he first way leads to a first unmoved mover; the second, to a first efficient cause; the third, to the first necessary being; the fourth, to a being in the plenitude of being; the fifth, to a supreme intelligence. But do these five “primarities” refer to one and the same being? That must be proved.90 But there’s more: even if we take for granted that Thomas’ ways point out to the same supreme being, it is not clear if that being is God. Duns Scotus saw it and formulated a two-way argument where he started by proving the existence of a first being, and then he argued that this first being is infinite and is thus God.91 But this is by no means clear, because it is not evident that infinitude should be an exclusive or necessary attribute of the divine.92 The anthropological way, so far as it has been presented, is also unsatisfactory for Zubiri. He summarizes anthropological arguments in three types: an argument from intelligence and truth (Augustine), from the will and moral duty (Kant), or a feeling of dependence (Schleiermacher). In

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the eyes of Zubiri, all of them fail. First, because they are reductionistic: these arguments do not consider man as a whole, but just a portion of him (intelligence, will, feelings). Second, these arguments presuppose a certain kind of dualism: “the truth” against “other truths” in Augustine; the categorical will against all other volitions in Kant; the feeling of dependence against all other feelings in Scheliermacher. Third, the arguments require opposing and distinguishing man from cosmos; man is considered as very different, to the point of opposition, to the world. But this is false because man is in the world. It is an “impossible antithesis”.93 How, then, can we arrive to God? In order to arrive to God, Zubiri turns to the now familiar phenomenological device of religation. Religation is the ontological link of the whole human existence to the power of the real. “Religation is not mere linking or sentiment of dependence, but the constitutive and formal turning towards the power of the real as fundament of my personal life.”94 Religation is thus the very root of the human being.95 This might appear to be just another anthropological way, but Zubiri claims this is not the case. Religation is not a merely anthropological phenomenon. It is the very structure where the power of the real happens.96 Religation is anthropological, cosmological and ontological in character. “From this follows that religation is not something human in contradistinction to the cosmic, but the very occurrence of all reality in man and of man in reality.”97 In religation, the power of the real shows itself as something ultimate, possibilitating, and impelling. This is a key feature of Zubirian cosmology and his phenomenological constitution of reality towards God.98 The significance of this concept is such that Cescon would write in 2007, “the Zubirian concept of ‘religation’ represents the superseding of Thomism and the introduction of existentialism in Spain.” 99 Religation provides an idea of God based on three points. First, God is the foundation of the power of the real. Sec-

ond, it is a supreme reality. But here Zubiri makes an interesting point, which would echo the Neoplatonists and Jakob Böhme: God is a supreme reality but not a supreme being. God is beyond being.100 Third, God is an “absolutely absolute reality”. The experience of religation is enigmatic because it offers an idea of God but immediately poses the question: Does such reality exists? Zubiri now goes to justify the reality of God’s existence. Zubiri’s Justification of God’s Reality How can we say that God exists, then? Zubiri does so by resorting to a phenomenological epokhé, that is, the suspension of judgment about the existence or nonexistence of the phenomena and the exclusion of any factual data or anything that would prevent the apprehension of the phenomena while fully describing them,101 starting from his view of religation. He builds a “justification” of God’s existence, which in fact is an explanation of God’s existence analogous to an argument or demonstration.102 Thus, one can think of Zubiri’s justification of God as a via phenomenologica, or phenomenological argument for God even though it may not be strictly a syllogistic argument. It is a long series of concatenated conclusions where another key feature of Zubirian thought makes its appearance: sentient intelligence.103 Reality is apprehended in two different, yet simultaneous, moments. First, the mind apprehends the quality of the thing (a thing is red, heavy, etc.) and second, the mind has a distinct impression of the reality of the thing. Now, “[s]ince to apprehend reality is intelligence, and to have impressions is sensing, it follows that the intellective apprehension of man is sentient: his intelligence is a sentient intelligence.”104 Man has a sentient living in reality. His life consists in acts made within reality and this constitutes him as a person. When man acts, he does more than merely perform an action; he is slowly actualizing

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and building his Self, his person.105 “Man is a substantive reality and the Self consists formally in the actualization of this reality in the world”.106 Due to this actualization, the Self can stand in front of any reality and is thus an “ab-solute” being. However, the Self, which is absolute, is also acquired; and due to this tension, man only a “relatively absolute” being, and is radically restless in life. Man’s personal life then, is a process of actualization of the Self, which is a relatively absolute being. Man’s person is constituted in respect to reality; reality is a constituting respectivity of the human person as long as the person is with the things. Since this is what constitutes the human person, the reality is ultimate. Moreover, since reality is what enables the human to be his Self, reality is also possibilitating. Man’s reality is then constantly in the making; and since reality impels (moves, drives to) man to actualize his Self, reality is also impelling. This reality dominates with its power, but this dominance is not the result of physical force, but it makes us physically aware of this reality. Thus, religation physically determines man’s absolute being. Reality is “what makes me be I”.107 What is reality, then? It’s not something like a sea that bathes or submerges things. Reality is a character of things; but the reality of things exceeds their being. “The impression of reality is physically transcendental to each thing. Because of this, real things have the power of determining my relatively absolute being.”108 In each thing we infer that being real is more than being this or that. Each thing, in reality, determines the power of the real and the ontological link to reality manifested as religation, and determines the absolute being of man. The “more” present in each thing constitutes the power of the real and determines human personality.109 The power of the real is based on the “strange unity” between what a thing is concretely and the moment where being real is being “more”. What is this character

of reality itself where things understood as real “more” than the things themselves? Zubiri explains this maintaining that each thing is a vehicle of a character and power that is not exhausted in the concrete things, but surpasses them. But this is not clear by any means, and this unclearness comes from things themselves. This is the “enigma” of reality; reality is constitutively enigmatic. Because of this, we are religated to the power of the real in an enigmatic way. The enigma of reality makes us restless because in every action, man feels a double question: “What is going to become of me, of my absolute being? And, What am I going to make of myself since I am making that being?”110 The power of the real throws intelligence towards this enigma, and makes intelligence aware of the radical foundation of each real thing in religation. “Religation is religation to reality in its enigma.”111 The root of this enigma is that the power of the real is grounded in reality itself; but this reality is beyond each concrete thing in itself. There is another reality which grounds “the” reality; and since this reality determines my relatively absolute being, it must be an absolutely absolutely reality. Zubiri identifies this absolutely absolute reality with God.112 The power of the real can be found in the concrete reality of each thing. Since the power of the real is God as an absolutely absolute reality, He “is present formally in things constituting them as real”113 Thus, the relationship God-world is panentheistic: The presence of God in real things is primarily that of a formal character. God is not primarily present in real things as the cause is in its effect, but is present constituting them formally as real. The possible effective causation of God with respect to things is an ulterior interpretation required by something prior: by the formal presence of God in things. And this presence consists in the fact that the reali-

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ty of each thing is constituted “in” God.114 God is in things themselves and things are in God. That’s why each thing is ambivalent: on one hand each thing is its own reality but on the other is constituted in the absolutely absolute reality that is God. “Each thing, on one hand, concretely is its own irreducible reality; but, on the other, is formally constituted in the absolutely absolute reality, in God. The ambivalence of reality simply consists in this double moment of not being God, yet being now, formally, constituted in God.”115 Consequently, God exists, and is formally and wonderfully constituting the reality of each thing. Because of this He is the fundament of the reality of each thing and of the power of the real in it.116 Zubiri summarizes his via phenomenologica to God on these steps: 1. Man’s personal life consists in actualizing his Self, a relatively absolute Self, by religation. 2. This Self is acquired and actualized by the physical operation of the power of the real as ultimate, possibilitating and impelling. 3. This power of the real is more than reality itself. 4. But the power of the real is grounded in the very structure of reality, distinct from real things, but constituting things as such. This reality is God.117 We see, then, that in order to prove God’s existence, Zubiri resorts to a panentheistic view of God where He grounds all reality by the ontological link of religation.118 After establishing his via phenomenologica, Zubiri discusses some specific aspects of his transcendental view of God.

a) God as an Ultimate, Possibilitating and Impelling Reality Zubiri describes the transcendental reality (God) as reality with three modes: ultimate, possibilitating, and impelling. God is an ultimate reality not because He is the Creator (though he is Creator). God is the ultimate reality because for things, the reality is a physical moment of them grounded in God’s presence in them. “Without God, things would not be real. God is, then, the ground of the ultimateness of reality and of its power.”119 God is also the ground for reality being possibilitating, because God is the possibility of possibilities; He is the absolute possibility and Giver of possibilities. This enables man the possibility of actualize his Self from God. Finally, God is impelling in the building of the Self. Since God is the absolute reality, He impels man to build his (relatively) absolute being.120 By these modes God is the ground of reality; He constitutes it beyond the four classical causes. This grounding is called by Zubiri the power of the real. b) The Power of the Real and Deity in Zubiri’s Panentheism The ground of all reality is for Zubiri the power of the real.121 This power comes from God’s formal and constituting presence in all real things.122 It is not God’s power, but it is a vehicle of it. This ontological structure of the power of the real is another vehicle of God in Zubiri’s panentheism: Certainly, the power of the real is not formally the power of God, just as a real thing is not formally God. But the power of the real “transports” the power of God, transports God as power: real things are, on that account, the “seat” of God as power. Insofar as it is founded in God, the power of the real is “vehicle” and “seat”.123 God is in all things constituting them in their reality. The power of the real is manifestation of the absolutely absolute reality which is God. Things are “seat” of

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God. It is an ontological condition which is far beyond being mere effects. Insofar as things are seat of God, they are deity.124 Deity is reality itself when they show that they are constituted in God. “Real things qua real are the deity which manifests God, who is in them formally, constituting them. And because of this character of deity they are the manifestation, the vehicle of God.”125 Here we have the three cornerstones of the ontological structure of Zubirian panentheism: 1. God is present in all things and all things are in God; and God grounds their reality by the power of the real. 2. Things are a seat of God’s immanent presence and this gives them “deity”. 3. Finally, man accesses this reality by the phenomenological device of religation. In Zubiri’s own words: God regarded as God is the absolutely absolute reality as ultimateness, possibilitation and impellence, formally present in real things and constituting their reality. That reality is eo ipso deity and manifestation of God, not in a general and abstract way, but in all the concretion history reveals to us. Such is the reality of God, justified by the way of religation.126 c) God as Ground of the Human Self and The Reality By the link of religation, God is the ground of any reality and specifically of human life; He is the reality-ground. As such, God grounds human freedom, the course of human life and the execution of human actions.127 However, Zubiri is adamant in maintaining the distinction between God and man but the core of this distinction stems from his panentheistic view of God: “precisely because man is not God, it is God who is making that man not

be God, and that this “not-being-God” be a way of being “in” God.”128 The relationship between God and human Self is not a boundary; it is a theological tension.129 The theological tension constitutes the human Self. Each human build his own Self; but it is God the One who makes each human build his own Self. “God is not mere natura me naturans, but realitas me reificans.”130 Since this is essential to God’s function, it also follows that man is implanted into God, “metaphysically immersed” into him. Zubiri is now ready to offer a more specific description of his theology. Characteristics of God’s Reality Once he worked out the details of his phenomenological-transcendental variety of panentheism, Zubiri offers a view of God’s reality in two stages: first, he deals with characters dealing with God considered in Himself and then he considers some aspects of the God-world relationship. a) God considered in Himself Zubiri starts by stating that God is the “absolutely absolute” reality: “an absolutely absolute reality is the reality, which is “in and by itself” full and absolute reality considered as reality.”131 This does not mean, however, that God is the highest Being, or the classical theistic notion that identifies God’s essence with His existence. The reason is that God’s existence is fundamentally different to any other existence of real things. God is “a reality, which through elevation is not only above and beyond the difference of essence and existence, but also above and beyond its alleged identity.”132 God’s metaphysical essence of God is to be an absolutely absolute reality, and the identity of essence and existence in God are consequential to this, and not the reverse. Since this absolutely absolute reality is one and unique, the world is one and unique and its foundation, i.e., God, is

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also one and unique. Because of this, Zubiri regards any polytheism as metaphysically impossible. The unicity belongs to God as a transnumerical character. The absolutely absolute reality (God) cannot be one because there are no other similar realities; God is one because the absolutely absolute reality is absolutely one in and of itself. Besides being one, God is also a concrete reality, an absolutely concrete reality. This concretion manifests in a personal reality: “In His absolute concretion, God is essentially personal.”133 Moreover, it is a dynamic reality. “Dynamic” does not means here that God is subject to a development process as in Hegelian thought or process philosophy; “Dynamism is neither action nor operation; to my way of thinking, it is what I have called ‘giving of oneself’“ 134 and “the divine life is not a becoming”.135 Dynamism means here the self-possession of the reality in itself; and for Zubiri this is the essence of life itself. Thus, God as an absolutely absolute reality implies His aseity, His self-actuality, and therefore He is Absolute Life in Himself. To put it in other words, God is an absolutely absolute reality, and thus He is a personal reality, and therefore He is a living reality. God’s self-actuality is above all an actuality in the sense of presentation of reality to Himself and thus, God’s selfactualization is also His intelligence. Since this intelligent self-actuality is selfpossession, it is also fruition in the fullness of His own reality. Because of this, God’s self-actuality considered as selfpossession is also God’s will. Therefore, God’s self actualization is in fact the key to God’s intelligent and rational life. Note that when speaking about God, Zubiri inverts the chain of faculties in human psychology: Intelligence and will are moments of God’s life, which in turn is a consequence of His personhood, which in turn is a grounding principle of God’s metaphysical reality:

In God, to my way of thinking, personhood is not consequent upon substantive reality nor upon His life, but is the very principle of it. Intelligence and volition are the way of being absolutely His-own, the way of realizing Himself with respect to what He already is as person. This clearly shows that, in God, intelligence and volition are necessary intrinsic moments of His substantive reality. The Hisownness (suidad) is the fundament of life, and life is the fundament of intelligence and volition.136 In summary, Zubiri ascribes the following characters to God when considered in Himself: absolutely absolute reality, unicity, uniqueness, concreteness, dynamism (in the sense of actuality, not development), personhood, life, intelligence and will. It is fair, thus, to conclude that Zubiri’s inner picture of God is fairly classical and roughly consistent with classical theism. b) God Considered in Respect to Real Things and the World Zubiri understands God’s relation to real things as a panentheistic relationship. God is the grounding reality or realitas fundamentalis.137 However, God as an absolutely absolute reality is independent of things. We cannot know God effectively in Himself, but only as a ground and foundation of real things.138 However, Zubiri seems to imply that the God-things relationship is different from a typical WorldSoul relationship: God is not grounding things as a kind of spirit underlying them; this would be an absurd animism. God is grounding things as an absolute selfgiving. To ground is to self-give.139 Zubiri then specifies the relationship God-things among panentheistic lines. The formal presence of God in things is intrinsic to real things, to the point that there is no physical or metaphysical separation among God and things; but there is a real distinction between God and things. For

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Zubiri, this is God’s “transcendence”: “This characteristic, according to which God is present in things with a formal and intrinsic presence, yet things are not God, is precisely what I call the transcendence of God “in” reality.” God is not transcendent to things; God is transcendent in things: The transcendence of God does not consist in being beyond things, but the other way around. Transcendence is precisely a mode of being in them, that mode in accordance with which they could not be real in any sense, unless they formally included in their reality the reality of God, without this in any sense making God identical to the reality of things.140 Zubiri thinks that by applying his concept of “transcendence” he can avoid both extremes of pantheism and deism or agnosticism. He denies pantheism because God’s being “in” things is also is an alterifying (or other-ifying) “in” and thus an identity between God and things would be impossible. He also denies deism and agnosticism, i.e., stating that God is absent from things, because things without God would not be real. “The transcendence of God is neither identity nor remoteness, but transcendence in things.”141 The panentheism of Zubiri is reinforced by universalizing the statements with respect to things to the world. Things in reality have the attribute of respectivity, and the unit of respectivity is the world. Therefore, anything that can be predicated of the God-things relationship can be said also of the God-world relationship: Hence, the formal and transcendent presence of God in things is a presence in the whole world as such. God is transcendent in things, and because of this He is transcendent in the world. Indeed, for the same reason that the transcendence of God is not identity or remoteness, the presence

of God in the world is neither remoteness nor identity.142 Consequently, Zubiri also denies God’s identity with the world and God’s absence from it as it would be in deism or agnosticism; and the relationship between God and the world is also a classic statement of panentheism: God is simply transcendent “in” the world. The fundamentality of God is the worldly transcendence of God. The world formally carries God in itself.143 God’s presence in things is not only formal and intrinsic, but also a constituting presence. God makes things real and thus God, as an absolutely absolute reality is a fountain-ality of reality; God is realitas fontanalis. For Zubiri, then, God is an absolutely absolute reality, concrete, personal, living, intelligent and willing, the power of the real, the ultimate, possibilitating and impelling reality, and the ground of religation. Summary In Man and God, Zubiri develops an impressive feat: expound a coherent natural theology where he develops a transcendental view of God that is yet compatible to standard Roman Catholic doctrine. Using religation as a key phenomenological device, he embarks in an explanation or justification of the reality of God via a phenomenological epokhé or analysis. He finds God as the ground of all reality, the foundation of the power of the real, an absolutely absolute reality that is ultimate, possibilitating and impelling. In Himself He is one, personal, living, intelligent and willing; and with respect of the world He is the ground of all reality. God is ontologically linked to the world as a transcendental personal power, grounding and giving Being to all reality. A comparison of Zubiri’s theology in Man and God with the theology developed in Nature, History, God shows that Zubiri’s theology is now more complete, with

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themes that were previously hinted now fully developed (i.e., religation). Despite the span of almost forty years between these two books, the coherence of thought between the ideas in both books is remarkable. 2.

Conclusions

After considering the distinctive features of Zubiri’s theology in both Nature, History, God and Man and God, the remarkable uniformity and conceptual coherence between two works that are separated by a time span of roughly four decades is nothing short of remarkable. There are developments, of course, such as the concept of the power of the real; but the key concepts such as religation, deity, and the phenomenological epokhé as a method to access God’s reality show an amazing continuity. Nevertheless, there is a refinement of concepts and themes in the latter work. By Man and God, Zubiri shows his theology as one of the pillars of his thought, and a powerful contribution to philosophy in itself. This study shall conclude by first examining the issue of whether there is a panentheism in Zubiri’s theology; second, by considering whether this panentheism could be described as a transcendental panentheism; third, by contrasting the peculiar aspects of Zubiri’s panentheism against Cooper’s 5-point matrix; and then a final evaluation will be attempted. There Is a Panentheism in Zubiri’s theology There is no doubt that Zubiri’s view of God is strongly immanentistic, a characterization that is common to both panentheism and modern classical theism. Many statements given by Zubiri are consistent with panentheism, but they cannot exclude a strongly immanentistic version of classical theism. God is the power of the real and the ground of all reality. For Zubiri, God is in the world and constitutes any and all reality. However, there are other statements that are consistent with panentheism.

There are places in both Nature, History, God and Man and God where Zubiri speaks not only of God’s presence in the world, but also of the world in God.144 In view of this evidence, this study concludes that there is a panentheism in the theology of Xavier Zubiri. Zubiri strongly affirms the immanence of God in the world at an extent that borders on pantheism. In “God and Deification” he maintains that a necessary consequence of the chain of being is the cosmic unity of creation and the unity of being and God (who Himself is beyond being). Religation guarantees this ontological link of immanence. At the same time, Zubiri denies emphatically that his view of the God-world relationship should be considered as pantheism;145 that is, he denies that the Godworld relationship should be understood as an identity. Zubiri denies such identity and instead maintains a distinction between God and the world. Furthermore, the necessary character of the unity of God and the world should not be extended to the act of creation itself. Once created, the cosmic unity of being and God is necessary; but creation itself is contingent because it is the product of God’s freedom. A good summary of the God-world relationship in Zubiri is provided by Antonio González, who does so while managing to avoid the use of the term “panentheism”. This means then that God is not segregated from the world, and the access to Him is not, then, a fleeing from the world, but a deepening in the reality of things. This is not pantheism because God is an absolutely absolute reality with respect to the world. But also it is not possible to maintain that God and the world are “two” realities. God and the world are not two, but they are not one, neither. It is not about identity or duality, but precisely about transcendence. God is transcendent “in” things, without being separated from them. This is what Zubiri means when he writes “God

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transcends the world, but the world is immanent to God.”146 Since Zubiri states both the ontological immanence of God in the world and the world in God, and the distinction between God and His creatures, his view of God is a form of panentheism. Zubiri’s Panentheism Is a Transcendental Panentheism For Zubiri, God is the power of the real. Religation exposes man to an ultimate reality which Zubiri calls “deity”. What deity does, among other things, is to present all that is real to man by religation and manifest what is real as being grounded with God. This characterization of God could be described as transcendental. In fact, Zubiri describes the absolutely absolute reality as transcendental to things.147 In fact, since God constitutes all reality and is behind of all things as the power of the real accessed by religation, it is inescapably a transcendental reality. God is a reality which determines our existence, using the power of the real as a condition for the apprehension of things, and is timeless and universal, the ground of both objects and subject. Moreover, this is not an accidental or side feature of Zubiri’s panentheism; it is mediated by the key themes of religation, deity, the power of the real, the absolutely absolute reality, and transcendence. Thus, it is an essential, distinguishing, pervasive characterization of Zubiri’s view of God. Therefore, this study concludes that Zubiri’s panentheism can be thought of as a transcendental panentheism. Zubiri’s Panentheism and Cooper’s Matrix As previously stated in this paper, Cooper offers a matrix of distinctions to study panentheism. These are: 1. Explicit or implicit panentheism. 2. Personal or nonpersonal panentheism.

3. Part-whole or relational panentheism. 4. Voluntary or natural panentheism. 5. Classical or modern panentheism.148 This matrix will now be applied to Zubiri’s panentheism. Explicit or implicit panentheism There are some contemporary panentheists who never identified themselves as such despite meeting with the standard definition, such as Teilhard de Chardin or Pannenberg. On the other hand, there are other thinkers who explicitly identified themselves as panentheists, such as Moltmann or Philip Clayton. Where does Zubiri falls in this distinction? The answer should be evident. Even though Zubiri’s view of God is clearly panentheistic, Zubiri never identified his view as such. Therefore, Zubiri’s panentheism should be regarded as an implicit panentheism. A question could be raised on why Zubiri did not identify himself as a panentheist. Of course, perhaps he was not aware of the concept; but there are two difficulties to this notion: first, because Zubiri was one of the leading philosophical minds of his time, regarded as a peer by Husserl and Heidegger, and possessed an astonishing breadth of knowledge. Thus, it is somewhat unlikely that he was not exposed to this concept. Secondly, it should be kept in mind that Zubiri is a Spaniard, raised at the beginnings of the 20th century. Krause, the inventor of the term “panentheism”149 was highly influential in Spain, to the point that Julián Marías states that his thought “enjoyed an unusual vitality” in that country. Krausism was mediated in Spain by his chief Spanish apologist, Julián Sanz del Río (1814-1869) and later by Francisco Giner de los Ríos (1839–1915).150 The term “panentheism” was well known in Spain by the time of Zubiri’s formative years. And yet, Zubiri does not use the word

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“panentheism” even once despite being a term well known because of the Krausist influence in Spain. There may be a reason for that. Corominas points out a little known fact of Zubiri’s life, his excommunication in 1922 for his adherence to Modernism, the Roman Catholic counterpart to Liberal Protestantism who was thoroughly condemned by Pope Pius X in his encyclical letter Pascendi dominici gregis (1907).151 Zubiri later recanted from his Modernist views, but he was always suspicious in the eyes of the Nationalist-Catholic establishment that ruled Spain after the Spanish Civil War. As Corominas aptly puts it: For Zubiri, Modernism was no mere anecdote. It marked indelibly his life and work, somewhat conditioned the free expression of his faith, and made him adopt a certain restraint up to the end of his days in expressing certain theses. [Zubiri] wanted to be sure that everything that he said was orthodox and he was willing to remain silent before entering again in a conflict with the Church.152 This circumstance may explain why Zubiri never wanted to identify his theology as panentheism: he wanted to avoid even the slightest suspicion of heresy. But this is an argument from silence. The real answer, of course, is unknown. Personal or ground-of-being panentheism For some thinkers, mostly those of the Neoplatonic tradition, God is the nonpersonal Ground of Being. For others, mostly modern and contemporary panentheists, God is personal and their panentheism is relational or interpersonal. On one hand, Zubiri clearly follows the Neoplatonic tradition, and this is clearly shown in the theology of his essay “Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology”153 God is the ground of any and all beings and any and all reality; He is the absolutely absolute reality, the ultimate, possibilitating, impelling reality. This would place Zubiri in the ground-ofbeing field.154

On the other hand, however, Zubiri affirms the personal reality of God and describes Him as a personal, living, free, intelligent, and willing reality. Thus, Zubiri’s God would hardly be the nonpersonal being of non-personal panentheists such as Ruether or Tillich. Therefore, even though he is influenced by Neoplatonism, it can be maintained that Zubiri is a personal panentheist, because for him God is both the ground-of-being and an eminently personal reality. Part-whole or relational panentheism Certain types of panentheism maintains that the world is part of divine nature while others view the world as a relational correlate of God. For Zubiri, the world is “in God”. Moreover, creation is an emanation from God and things are kept in ontological unity with Him.155 However, Zubiri still maintains a firm distinction between God and the world. Thus, Zubiri should be regarded as a part-whole panentheist, with some qualification. Voluntary or natural panentheism. This distinction stems from how different panentheisms have answered the question: “Could God exist without a world?” If the answer is that the world is a necessity for God, then this panentheism is natural; while if the answer is that God is free and creation is an act of divine freedom, then we have a voluntary panentheism. Zubiri’s position on this distinction is clear. He maintains inequivocally the attribute of divine freedom and affirms creation as a product of God’s free agency. Moreover, Zubiri affirms divine freedoms explicitly against gnosticism and Plotinus.156 He does not even hint to the “compatibilist” compromise on divine freedom.157 Therefore, in Zubiri we have a distinctly voluntary panentheism.158 Classical or modern panentheism The final distinction is between a panentheism that affirms divine omnipotence and does not allow for creatures to

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affect God, which was the case of classical panentheists, or stating that God is affected by human action. In the case of Zubiri, his panentheism is a way to explain how God is the ground of all reality; God affects creatures by the power of the real, but creatures do not affect God. Therefore, Zubiri’s panentheism is a classical panentheism. Final Evaluation The contribution of Xavier Zubiri to philosophy is of such a significance that he could be counted, in all justice and without any exaggeration, among the greatest philosophical minds of all time. His approach to the problem of God shows the breadth and depth of thought in Zubiri, as well as the formulation of a the-

ology highly original and yet deeply respectful of Roman Catholic doctrine. Upon careful examination of the relevant texts in both Nature, History, God and Man and God, this study finds that the theology of Xavier Zubiri is a transcendental panentheism, mediated by a phenomenological device (religation), and characterized as implicit, personal ground-of-being, part-whole, voluntary, and classical. Zubiri maintains a personal God, but modified by a modified Neoplatonic ontology of “chain of being.” In all, this is the work of a genius, a towering mind who despite his physical self-exile influenced and still remains influential for much of the current Roman Catholic philosophy and theology, and a significant contribution to the history of philosophy.

Notes 1 The other ones were the problems of intelligence and the problem of reality. See Francisco Correa Schake, “Zubiri: la experiencia como vía de acceso del hombre a Dios. Una aproximación inicial a su trilogía religiosa” Teología y Vida 45 (2004): p. 479; Everaldo Cescon, “Uma introdução ao pensamento filosófico-teológico de Xavier Zubiri (18981983),” Síntese - Revista de Filosofia 31, no. 100 (2004): p. 258; Juan José García, “Inteligencia sentiente, reidad, Dios: Nociones fundamentales en la filosofía de Zubiri,” Cuadernos de pensamiento español 30 (2006): 1-73. 2 Paulino Garagorri, La filosofía española en el siglo XX: Unamuno, Ortega, Zubiri (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985), p. 118-157. 3 Everaldo Cescon, “O problema de Deus e do seu acesso e a experiência de Deus,” Teología y Vida 44 (2003): 373-394; Cescon, “Uma introdução ao pensamento filosófico-teológico de Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983)” 4 García, “Inteligencia sentiente, reidad, Dios.” 5 Carlos Zárraga Olavarría, “Xavier Zubiri: Filósofo vasco,” 2007, accessed March 3, 2014,

http://culturavasca.asmoz.org/trabajos/200 6-2007/Carlos_Zarraga.pdf. 6 José María Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri” (PhD diss., Universidad de Murcia, 2008), pp. 220242. 7 Jorge Eduardo Rivera Cruchaga, “Recordando a Xavier Zubiri,” Anuario Filosófico de la Universidad de Navarra 17 (1984): p. 175. Accessed March 3, 2014. 8 Xavier Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, 3rd ed. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial / Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1985), p. 149. 9 Cescon, “O problema de Deus e do seu acesso e a experiência de Deus,” p. 380-383. 10 Correa Schake, “Zubiri: la experiencia como vía de acceso del hombre a Dios. Una aproximación inicial a su trilogía religiosa.” 11 Ibid., p. 492. 12 See Germán Marquínez Argote, “Paul Tillich y Xavier Zubiri: Planteamiento del problema de Dios,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 8 (2006): 103-110; for Tillich’s panentheism, see John W. Cooper, PanentheismThe Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), chap. 8; David H. Nikkel,

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Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich: A Creative Synthesis (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1995), accessed March 3, 2014. 13 Jordí Corominas, “Xavier Zubiri y la crisis modernista,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 8 (2006): 17-57. 14 Zárraga Olavarría, “Xavier Zubiri: Filósofo vasco,” p. 60. 15 Zárraga Olavarría, “Xavier Zubiri: Filósofo vasco,” p. 59. 16 Félix Alluntis, quoted by Francisco-Xavier Sotil Baylos, “La conceptuación zubiriana de la presencia eucarística de Cristo: críticas y valoración de las mismas,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 9 (2007): p. 43, note 186. Here is the relevant part: “Alluntis remembers that Zubiri identifies that presence of God with His transcendence, understood by him —in a way that is different of the traditional sense of the term— not as “being beyond” things (transcend “to”) but precisely as their mode of being “in” them (transcend “in”), by virtue of which things are different of God but not separate from Him. And Alluntis comments that in this point Zubiri “uses expressions that [...] gave motives to people to talk about a Zubirian ‘kind of pantheism’ (pantheismpanentheism). We believe there is no basis for that.” 17 Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, p. 27. 18 Stephen Palmquist, “Kant’s Moral Panentheism,” Philosophia 36, no. 1 (2008): 1728, doi:10 . 1007 / s11406 - 007 - 9098 0, p. 20. See also the interesting note 13 in Fernando Inciarte Armiñán, “Observaciones histórico críticas en torno a Xavier Zubiri,” Anuario Filosófico de la Universidad de Navarra 1 (1971): p. 241-242. Accessed March 3, 2014 19 See Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, p. 329-330. 20 Nikkel, Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich: A Creative Synthesis, p. 2-3. 21 Jürgen Moltmann, Trinidad y Reino de Dios: La doctrina sobre Dios (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1983), p. 122. 22 For example see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: Suma de Teología, Edición dirigida por los Regentes de Estudios de las

Provincias Dominicanas en España, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1994), I, q. 19 a. 3 ad 5; I, q. 46, a. 1. 23 John Culp, “Panentheism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2013, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013). 24 See Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, “Basic Terms and Distinctions in Panentheism”, in Chapter I, pp. 26-30. 25 Xavier Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, 9th ed. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial / Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1987); Zubiri, El hombre y Dios. 26 Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 74. 27 Xavier Zubiri, Nature, History, God, trans. Thomas B. Fowler, Jr. [book on-line] (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981); available from http://zubiri.org/works/englishworks/nhg /nhgtoc.htm ; Internet ; accessed 14 March 2014. 28 Xavier Zubiri, Man and God, trans. Joaquín A. Redondo, M.E., M.A. (Phil) [book online]; available from http://www.catholicphilosophy.com/systmpl/door/index.html ; Internet ; accessed 14 March 2014. Note that the website structure makes for an awkward and cumbersome navigation and makes posting a more specific URL impossible. 29 Author’s Introduction to the English Edition, in Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios. 30 Preface to the Sixth Edition, on Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios. See also Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 134-138. 31 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 396397. 32 An existential analysis is an ontological analysis of the existent (Dasein), prior to any psychological, biological or theological descriptions of consciousness, which reveals the consciousness as a phenomenon of the existent (Dasein) presented to it as calling. For a cursory description see Jesús Conill, “La fenomenología en Zubiri,” Pensamiento 53 (1997): p. 121.

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33 See for example Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self, vol. 7, A History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chapter 9, p. 129-138. 34 For example Conill, “La fenomenología en Zubiri,” who states: “Zubiri is, together with Ortega, the privileged locus for the reception and assimilation of phenomenology in Spain. There is no possible contextualization of the thought of Ortega and Zubiri if this is not done in connection with phenomenology”. See also Correa Schake, “Zubiri: la experiencia como vía de acceso del hombre a Dios. Una aproximación inicial a su trilogía religiosa”; Corominas, “Xavier Zubiri y la crisis modernista,” p. 26-27; Thomas B. Fowler, “Introduction to the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 1 (1998): 5-16; Alberto Basabe Martín, “La metafísica realista de Xavier Zubiri: Interpretación metafísico-apriorística de la metafísica realista de Zubiri” (PhD diss., Universidad de Deusto, 1990), p. 59-62; Antonio Pintor Ramos, “Los inicios de la fenomenología en España,” Diálogo Filosófico 46 (2000): p. 47-49.

1983),” p. 276. 46 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 428. 47 Ibid., p. 429. 48 Ibid., p. 431. 49 Garagorri, La filosofía española en el siglo XX: Unamuno, Ortega, Zubiri, p. 131-134. 50 Samuel Yáñez, “Vida y religación,” Teología y Vida 46 (2005): 570-581. 51 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 435. 52 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 441. This quote not only echoes Eckart, but Scotus Eriugena as well, as Zubiri acknowledges in footnote 50 of the essay. See also Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, p. 47-52. 53 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 443. 54 Ibid., p. 444. 55 Ibid., p. 450. On the topic of Zubiri and atheism, see also Juan José García, “Legitimidad de las opciones no teístas en la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 11 (2009): 47-54. 56 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 449. 57 Ibid., p. 449; see 1 John 2:16.

35 Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 20.

58 Ibid., p. 452.

36 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 398.

60 Ibid., p. 453.

37 Ibid., p. 398.

61 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 456. The New Testament texts are supposedly “certain texts from the Epistle to the Romans” (p. 457).

38 Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 135. 39 Marquínez Argote, “Paul Tillich y Xavier Zubiri: Planteamiento del problema de Dios,” p. 107. 40 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 408. 41 For a good summary, see José Luis Martín García-Alós, “Dios como realidad religante del hombre. En homenaje a Xavier Zubiri,” Arbor 116 (1983): 265-289. 42 According to the official Zubiri bibliography: Revista de Occidente 149 (1935) 129-159. 43 Corominas, “Xavier Zubiri y la crisis modernista.” 44 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 427428. 45 Cescon, “Uma introdução ao pensamento filosófico-teológico de Xavier Zubiri (1898-

59 Ibid., p. 453.

62 Ibid., p. 457. Zárraga Olavarría, “Xavier Zubiri: Filósofo vasco,” p. 48, note 32 points out that this chapter came out from Zubiri’s exposure to the Russian Orthodox theologian Myrra Lot-Borodine, who was a vehicle for Russian mystics such as Berdiaev, Chestov, Soloviev, Boulgakov and Lossky, among others. Zárraga quotes O. González de Cardedal about the impact of this exposure to Zubiri: “This is the world that Zubiri discovers (in Paris) that it means a revolution for his theological horizon”. On the impact of this course on the whole of Zubiri’s theology, see also Corominas, “Xavier Zubiri y la crisis modernista”; Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 57.

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63 Marta Jiménez Valverde, “La religación en el pensamiento de Xavier Zubiri,” Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 2, no. 6 (1959): 59-64. 64 Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 57. 65 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 473ff; Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, pp. 45-47. 66 “There is a profound difference, indeed almost an opposition, between agape and eros. But this opposition always occurs within a common root; it is an opposition of direction within the same general line: the ontological structure of reality.” Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 464. 67 Ibid., p. 467-468. 68 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 473. 69 Ibid., p. 480-481. 70 Juan José García, “El poder de lo real en Xavier Zubiri y su lectura de los padres griegos,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 4 (2002): 19-66. 71 Interestingly, when Moltmann explicitly assumes his panentheism in Trinity and the Kingdom he also gives credit to Richard of St. Victor. “The basis [of Moltmann’s panentheism] is Richard of St. Victor’s doctrine of the Trinity” See Moltmann, Trinidad y Reino de Dios: La doctrina sobre Dios, chapter 4, note 17 (p. 122). 72 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 486.

84 Zubiri, X., El problema filosófico de la historia de las religiones (Madrid: Alianza Editorial / Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1993). English translation: The Philosophical Problem of the History of Religions, trans. Joaquín A. Redondo, 1999 [book online]; accessed 15 April 2014; available from http://www.catholicphilosophy.com/systmpl/translatorsintro/index.html; Internet. 85 Zubiri, X., El problema teologal del hombre: Cristianismo (Madrid: Alianza Editorial / Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1997). English translation: Christianity, trans. Joaquín A. Redondo, 2001 [book online]; accessed 15 April 2014; available from http://www.catholicphilosophy.com/systmpl/translator/index.html; Internet. 86 See Marquínez Argote, “Paul Tillich y Xavier Zubiri: Planteamiento del problema de Dios,” p. 104; Zárraga Olavarría, “Xavier Zubiri: Filósofo vasco,” p. 10, 47. 87 See Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 157-171; Everaldo Cescon, “A “trilogia teologal” de Xavier Zubiri: Contribuições e problemas abertos,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 9 (2007): p. 114-115. 88 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 118-121. compare with Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 2 a. 3 resp. 89 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 121.

73 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 490.

90 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 121-122.

74

91 For Duns Scotus’ argument, see Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 9 vols. (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 19461975; New York: Doubleday, 1994), vol. 2 chap. 48 No. 3, pp. 520-523; Julián Marías, Historia de la Filosofía, 21st ed. (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1969), III, 10, A), p. 173; Carlo Balic, “Scotism,” in Sacramentum Mundi, vol. 6 (London: Burn & Oates, 1968), 52-54; Johannes Hirschberger, Historia de la Filosofía, 3rd ed., trans. Luis Martínez Gómez, 2 vols. (Barcelona: Herder, 1968), vol. I, p. 431; “Duns Escoto (Juan)” in José Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de filosofía, 5th ed., 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1965), vol.1 , pp. 488-490; Michele Federico Sciacca, Historia de la Filosofía, 3rd ed., trans. Adolfo Muñoz

Ibid., p. 491.

75 Ibid., p. 493. 76 See ibid., p. 493, 496. 77 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 495. 78 Ibid., p. 496. 79 Ibid., p. 497. Emphasis of this author. 80 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 497. 81 Ibid., p. 499. 82 Ibid., p. 501. 83 See Ignacio Ellacuría, “Presentation”, in Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. i-x; Marquínez Argote, “Paul Tillich y Xavier Zubiri: Planteamiento del problema de Dios”; García, “Inteligencia sentiente, reidad, Dios,” p. 17.

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Alonso and Juan José Ruiz Cuevas (Barcelona: Luis Miracle, Editor, 1958), pp. 254255. 92 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 123. 93 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 126. 94 Ibid., p.128. See also Melero Martínez, “El problema teologal del hombre en Xavier Zubiri,” p. 171-202. 95 Even though Zubiri appears to reject cosmological arguments —based on an outdated notion of causality— in favor of a phenomenological approach based on religation to the power of the real, some have argued that the power of the real in Zubiri is just another notion of causality; see Thomas B. Fowler, “Causality and Personal Causality in the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 10 (2008): 91-112. On the other hand, Antonio González points out that in one of his minor writings, Zubiri appears to have endorsed a cosmological argument for God; see Antonio González, “La vía cósmica hacia Dios según Xavier Zubiri,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 7 (2005): 91-107. 96 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 129. 97 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 129. 98 See also the characterization of religation offered by Jesús Conill-Sancho, “«La voz de la conciencia». La conexión noológica de moralidad y religiosidad en Zubiri,” Isegoría, no. 40 (2009): p. 124. For the power of the real, see García, “El poder de lo real en Xavier Zubiri y su lectura de los padres griegos,” p. 25-38. 99 See Everaldo Cescon, “A “trilogia teologal” de Xavier Zubiri: Contribuições e problemas abertos” The Xavier Zubiri Review 9 (2007), 113. 100 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 131. 101 On the epokhé see Diogenes Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), p. 261; Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750, p. 135136; Wolfgang Stegmüller, Corrientes fundamentales de la filosofía actual, with a foreword by Eugenio Pucciarelli (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nova, 1967), chap. II, 4 (p. 117-122); Michele Federico Sciacca, La filosofía, hoy: De los orígenes románticos de

la filosofía contemporánea hasta los problemas actuales, 2nd ed., trans. Claudio Matons Rossi and Juan José Ruiz Cuevas (Barcelona: Luis Miracle, Editor, 1956), IV, 2 (p. 143); Marías, Historia de la Filosofía, p. 398-399. 102 See García, “Legitimidad de las opciones no teístas en la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri.” 103 For a concise explanation of the concept, see Fowler, “Introduction to the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri,” p. 10-13. 104 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 135. 105 Ibid., p. 136. 106 Ibid., p. 136. 107 Ibid., p. 140. 108 Ibid., p. 141. 109 José Antonio Hernanz Moral, “La constitución del orden transcendental en la metafísica de Xavier Zubiri,” Estudios Latinoamericanos, nos. 14-15 (2004): 5-23. For the place of the transcendental in the metaphysics of Zubiri see Basabe Martín, “La metafísica realista de Xavier Zubiri”; Roberto Hernáez Rubio, “El realismo sistémico de Xavier Zubiri” (PhD diss., Universidad del País Vasco, 1995), p. 69-83. 110 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 146. 111 Ibid., p. 80. 112 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 147. 113 Ibid., p. 148. 114 Ibid., p. 148. Emphasis in the original. 115 Ibid., p. 149. Emphasis of this writer. 116 Ibid., p. 149. 117 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 149. 118 See Basabe Martín, “La metafísica realista de Xavier Zubiri,” p. 182-183. 119 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 153. 120 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 154-155. 121 See ibid., Appendix 1, p. 89-91; p. 155156. 122 Ibid., p. 154-155. 123 Ibid., p. 155. 124 Ibid., p. 155-156. 125 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 156. 126 Ibid., p. 157.

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127 Ibid., p. 161. Zubiri claims that these predicates could be valid for any God, and not only for the Christian God. 128 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 161.

148 See Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, “Basic Terms and Distinctions in Panentheism”, in Chapter I, pp. 26-30. 149 Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, chapter 5, p. 121-122.

129 Ibid., p. 161. 130 Ibid., p. 162.

136 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 170.

150 Marías, Historia de la Filosofía, p. 325; other similar statements at “Krause (Karl Christian Friedrich)” in Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de filosofía, vol I, p. 10651066; Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 7, p. 146-147; and especially the Spanish philosophy appendix to Hirschberger, Historia de la Filosofía, vol. II, p. 489-492.

137 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 172.

151 See Aubert, “Modernism.”

138 Ibid., p. 173. 139 Ibid., p. 173.

152 Corominas, “Xavier Zubiri y la crisis modernista,” p. 18.

140 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 175.

153 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 455.

141 Ibid., p. 176.

154 For example see Fowler, “Introduction to the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri,” p. 6: “[Zubiri] rejects the traditional notion of God as a reality object, instead conceiving of Him as a reality fundament or ground” (Emphasis of the author of this paper).

131 Ibid., p. 165. 132 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 166; emphasis of the author of this paper. 133 Ibid., p. 168. 134 Ibid., p. 168. 135 Ibid., p. 169.

142 Ibid., p. 176. 143 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 177; emphasis from the author of this paper. 144 See for example Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 443. Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 149. 145 See, for example Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 443, 493, 496; Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 175-176. 146 Antonio González, “La novedad teológica de la filosofía de Zubiri,” Revista Latinoamericana de Teología 10, no. 30 (1993): p. 255; for a similar statement see Jesús Sáez Cruz, “La causalidad personal: una propuesta zubiriana en diálogo con Mario Bunge, parte II,” The Xavier Zubiri Review 11 (2009): p 78. 147 Zubiri, El hombre y Dios, p. 141; see also Hernanz Moral, “La constitución del orden transcendental en la metafísica de Xavier Zubiri.”

155 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 492493, 497. 156 Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, p. 493. 157 See Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the Philosophers, p. 29. 158 However, see Juan Alejandro Navarrete Cano, “Materiales para la elaboración de una teología de la creación desde Zubiri: Análisis de un párrafo del libro “El problema teologal del hombre: Cristianismo”,” Revista realidad, no. 112 (2007): 247-257, who tends towards the necessity of the world from what Zubiri wrote in The Theological Problem of Man: Christianity.

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J. J. Gibson’s Psychology of Perception from Zubiri’s Standpoint

Alfonso de la Puerta González-Quevedo Instituto de Enseñanza Secundaria Antonio Machado Alcalá de Henares, España

Abstract Although James J. Gibson (1904-1979) and Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) were never acquainted, the harmony between the two is remarkable: the power of truth, the power of reality holds them. The author is highly critical of authors such as Fodor and Pylyshyn, and he is in the passionate defense of the positions of Gibson and the ecological psychology, albeit with important nuances from Zubiri, the Spanish philosopher, disciple of Husserl, Heidegger and Ortega y Gasset, among others. Perception is direct and not mediated by inferences of any kind, because it is direct at its root: the primordial apprehension of reality. We perceive in the field of reality, in which we “are” fluently, and where things are among others: it is the duality of the logos that involves primordial apprehension. The inferences of Gibson’s critics would approach to this duality, but leaves untouched the primordial apprehension. Our senses considered as perceptual systems “come out” (Gibson) and feel reality directly. That is, human sensing is intellective (Zubiri). Indeed, sentient intelligence is the other side of intellective sensing. Perceiving is the simplest and best way of knowing (Gibson). Although he did not elaborate anything like Zubiri’s logos and reason, our hypothesis is that his theory of direct perception would approach the primordial apprehension of Zubiri. The ecological approach to perception is in line with the physical-sentient in Zubiri, as a “phenomenology” prior to the level of scientific explanation at the level of reason. This phenomenology can be understood as a philosophical dimension in the context of scientific psychology. There is nothing like Zubiri’s noology for this joining of philosophy and science.Gibson and Zubiri could well be a prelude to a revolution in cognitive sciences. It always takes time. They are destined to become classics. Resumen Aunque James J. Gibson (1904-1979) y Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) no llegaron a conocerse, es asombrosa la sintonía entre ambos: la fuerza de la verdad, la fuerza de la realidad los sostiene. Contra autores como Fodor y Pylyshyn, el autor es fuertemente crítico y se sitúa en la defensa apasionada de las posiciones de Gibson y la psicología ecológica, si bien con importantes matices provenientes del filósofo español, Zubiri, discípulo de Husserl, Heidegger y Ortega y Gasset, entre otros. La percepción es directa, y no mediada por inferencias de ningún tipo, porque lo es en su raíz: la aprehensión primordial de realidad. Percibimos en el campo de realidad, en el que estamos fluentemente, y donde las cosas están entre otras: es la dualidad del logos que envuelve la aprehensión primordial. Las inferencias de los críticos con Gibson apuntan a esta dualidad, pero resbalan sobre la aprehensión primordial. Nuestros sentidos considerados como sistemas perceptivos “salen afuera” (Gibson) y sienten la realidad directamente. Esto es, el sentir humano es intelectivo (Zubiri). Se supera el origen de todos los dualismos, provenientes de las operaciones de la mente sobre 133

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las entregas de los sentidos. En su lugar, la inteligencia sentiente es la otra cara del sentir intelectivo. Percibir es la forma más simple y mejor de conocer (Gibson). Si bien éste no elaboró nada parecido al logos y la razón zubirianas, nuestra hipótesis es que su teoría de la percepción directa “apunta” a la aprehensión primordial de Zubiri. La aproximación ecológica a la percepción estaría en línea con lo físico-sentiente en Zubiri, como una “fenomenología” previa al nivel de explicación científica al nivel de la razón. Dicha fenomenología puede entenderse como una dimensión filosófica en el contexto de la psicología científica. Nada como la noología zubiriana para esta articulación filosofía-ciencia. Gibson y Zubiri, bien podrían ser el preludio de una revolución en ciencias cognitivas. Esto siempre requiere tiempo. Estarían destinados a convertirse en clásicos. Introduction: Philosophy and Science What makes Gibson’s works so attractive, so resistant to critics, to neglect, and to the passage of time? As much as it provokes many “cognitive scientists,” ignorant of Zubiri’s philosophy, to smile in a condescending way, let us respond: “The strength of truth, the strength of reality, which imposes itself upon us!” 1 Although Gibson usually inspires respect, the most frequent accusation made against him is that of lacking solid experimental underpinnings.Yet it would seem not to matter to Gibson whether authors he read were scientists or not, judging from the frequency of his quotes from Berkeley, Locke, Kant and other philosophers. It would seem that only the reality he confronted mattered to him. It would also seem that Gibson ignored the considerable baggage of philosophy that went with the most essential part of his work. He performed many experiments, but it seems that his critics have not accorded them much value.2 Nonetheless, as we shall see, Gibson’s alleged unawareness was only relative. In our opinion, the origins of the misunderstandings of Gibson’s work stem from the context of scientific psychology in which he moved. His explicit critiques of the categories of science in his ecological approach to perception bear witness to this. Let us examine this point. J. J. Gibson’s Ecological Approach to Perception To date physical science has mainly concerned itself with what is very, very large, astronomical, or what is very, very

small, atomic. But for perception, Gibson holds, what is relevant is “the animal level”: this is the ecological level. What is ecological is necessarily linked to direct perception and vice versa. It is a question of the unity of the act of perception. We will also see this when we establish the comparison with Zubiri. Every perception that is not direct loses the unity of that act and necessarily implies a projective (transmitting) logic3 instead of a logic of “field simultaneity”; it is what I call “the constructivist journey.”4 This journey, moreover, implies the utilization of categories of modern science that are in the forefront, as we shall see; that is to say, the contrary of the ecological level, “the animal level.” In fact, that projective logic is marked beforehand by the basic problem of space, which characterized Gibson’s initial break with traditional theories, and with contemporary theories as well, as seen from his first book onward.5 It was as a psychologist of the United States Air Force that Gibson began revolutionizing one of the pillars of both traditional and contemporary: spatial perception. As paradoxical as it seems to us, he tells us, the space of the airplane pilot is determined by the earth and the horizon, not by the “air” through which he flies. It was then that ground theory took the place of air theory for spatial perception. This decisive fact—the lack of sensible impressions for the perception of the dimension of depth—is what traditionally has been taken as evidence for the largely unquestioned presumption in philosophy and

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psychology that all perception, as Kant said, is given in space, and needs something from the mind to be complete. From here also derives the traditional distinction between sensation and perception. But Gibson’s conclusion is that empty space, besides being a geometric abstraction, is unperceivable. We can only perceive the spatial dimension from longitudinal surfaces. It is important to point out here, as we shall see in the comparison with Zubiri, that what is sensibly concrete, such as the terrain or the horizon, is what we can perceive. Now, starting from objects situated in “empty space,” the logic of the “constructivist journey” is produced: light rays falling on objects that reflect them, transductions of energy in our interior, nerve impulses, sensory organization… We therefore see that the problem starts from the abstraction of geometric space and begins with scientific categories and units. Perception is seen as a product and result of the facts being categorized scientifically (photons, waves, receptors, nerve impulse…). The unavoidable result is the construction of the “terminal image” in the “theatre of consciousness.” Even at the outset Gibson analyzed and mercilessly criticized the popular belief—common to not a few scientists—that the retinal image is transmitted to the brain. For him already in his time there were more sophisticated versions of the same fallacy, which necessarily presupposed the theory of the homunculus, i.e., “someone” or “something” becomes necessary in the inside of our mind-brain, that sees (directly, of course) that “terminal image.” To speak, as is done today, of neuronal engrams representing the “psychological subject,” would be seen by Gibson, once again, as a more sophisticated version of the same fallacy. Assumed scientific categories, constructivism, and indirect perception mediated by mental representations necessarily go together. So also do the ecological level and direct perception.6

In SCPS Gibson broaches physiology in harmony with the foregoing. The earlier vision implies that the senses stop being mere organs of a brain and that the nerves stop being mere channels for sensation. Also, Johannes Müller’s nineteenthcentury doctrine of specific nervous energies is left behind. Then the senses come to be considered as perceptive systems. They cease to be conceived in isolation and become integrated with the whole organism, with the whole human being, who it is that perceives, actively exploring and in movement. But what is most important and a consequence of all the foregoing is that the perceptive systems begin the process of perceiving directly; they are integrated with the totality of the human being, which is, in the last analysis, what directly perceives. Mechanicism has been surmounted by means of fully embodied and integrated senses. The dichotomy sensation-perception has been surmounted. With this, projective logic is also surmounted, and we accede to “field simultaneity.” Then, when we communicate directly with things in field simultaneity, our nerve structures resound with the information. Gibson is aware that this resounding is a metaphor,7 but he counters that it is a better and more coherent metaphor than those of transmitting logic. Ecological optics and the pickup information theory complete Gibson’s vision.8 Given the ecological-psychophysical approach, light cannot be considered as a function of classical optics or as a function of the physiological optics inaugurated by Helmholtz for the interior of the eye. In its place, Gibson proposes a new optics, something previously nonexistent, but whose basic lines he began to establish in SCPS and continued to mature in EAVP. To clarify with an example, he establishes a difference between radiant light, which is transmitted and measured by scientific units, and ambient light, that type of static “sea,” the product of infinite reflections of light and forming part of the ecological medium of light as that by means of which we see.9 It is not something transmitted

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but something that is situated (this sounds so much like Zubiri). The ambient light contains the invariants10 of optical structure that would be directly captured11 by our perceptual systems. Gibson’s metaphor states that our senses “go outside” and directly capture ambient optical distribution. Finally, he assigns special importance to what he calls the principles of reversible occlusion, and the occluding edge. These principles require very little description, since almost everything appears in their names. Nevertheless, they express in condensed form an essential nucleus of the ecological optics12 of direct perception. In addition, they hold very important consequences for psychology and epistemology. What underlies this is that what is seen now and what is seen from here is specified by the ego, not the environment. While admitting the perception of the ego on the same footing as the perception of the environment, Gibson suggests that the latter perception is timeless, and that the past-present-future distinctions are relevant only for the consciousness of the ego. He proposes surmounting the doctrine whereby perception is to be restricted to the present moment, and everything else is memory. Perception can extend to past and future because it is given in time and in movement. Kaplan’s experiment of 1969 decisively demonstrated, according to Gibson, that we also perceive things of which we have no sensation at the present moment (hidden), and that these things cannot any under circumstances be described as remembered.13 In accordance with this posing of the issue, according to Gibson, the old problems of the permanence of the object, perceptual constancy, and so many other perplexing points that for centuries have resisted analysis of philosophers and psychologists vanish forever like mist. Finally, we can ask how Gibson describes what is postulated as mental representations. For Gibson his theory does not rest on itself. It implies a new theory of knowledge in general. “To know” is an extension of “to perceive.” To perceive is

the simplest and best form of knowledge.14 All this also implies a new theory about the non-perceptual forms of consciousness, such as dreams, hallucinations, memories, etc. He responds that the visual system that extracts certain invariants15 from the flow of stimulation can function without the constrictions of that flow while separating later from the stimulation. He returns to the idea of affordances that he earlier introduced in SCPS. We might define them as impelling possibilities of stimulation as a function of the structures and needs of the animal. In the human being they include meanings and values. And they are directly perceived. This supposes for him the apex of his ecological optics and a new approach to psychology. Gibson Seen from Zubiri’s Perspective16 Our second17 major hypothesis is that “ecological” in Gibson is equivalent to the physical-sentient in Zubiri. Gibson makes it clear he is dealing with an approach both to perception and to psychology. Today in cognitive sciences it is said that the model of mind is determined by the model of perception. I would say that they codetermine each other, since perception, according to Zubiri, is a psycho-organic act. These are the philosophical suppositions of modern science. If the first philosophy fails, the search loses orientation, and the reception of empirical data is misplaced.18 The theories criticized by Gibson use the categories of science at the outset. They begin by conceiving space as physics does, as a geometric abstraction that shelters bodies, for which we have no sensible impressions, and continue with light conceived in terms of photons or electromagnetic waves, passing through receptors and nerve cells until reaching the postulation of inner images. But in the ecological approach, there is no space19 but the medium, no radiant but ambient light, no physical but ecological optics. Sensations are merely incidental and the senses are

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perceptual systems that extract the information in “field simultaneity” of environmental optical distribution. There is no transmission, but we enter into direct communication with the things we see. Our nerve structures “resound” with them. Of course there are no mental representations in the “inner theatre of consciousness.” Speaking of the ecological approach, Gibson intends for this to encompass all necessary levels through which the study of perception can be broached, by which one must begin. It is a question, hence, of a phenomenology which we see greatly in tune with Zubiri’s realism. The level of scientific reason, let us recall, is always something lying beyond.20 Our third major hypothesis constitutes a development of the first: it is the radical philosophical supposition, conscious or not, which errs in theories that Gibson criticizes, and also in those that criticize him.21 If perception is conceived as a synthesis of subject and object, we have dualism right from the outset, and our attempts to free ourselves from it will be in vain, because the unity of the perceptual act has been lost at the point of departure. We say this because it is impossible to escape a “transmitting” or “projective” logic. It is what I call “the constructivist journey”, with the light rays hitting the objects that reflect them, the transductions of energy in our interior, the nerve impulses, sensory organization, and the construction of the terminal image in the “theatre of consciousness,” where, to be sure, the homunculus will be necessary or—but which, in the final analysis, would be a more sophisticated version of the same fallacy, according to Gibson—the neuronal engrams that represent the “psychological subject.” As can be seen, this entire heap of nonsense originates with the duality of the point of departure. Perception would then be irremediably indirect, that is, mediated by mental representations, inferences, etc., in sum, by the addition of the mind. All this also implies inexorably mechanicism and mind-body dualism.

Instead, contrariwise, Zubiri tells us that it is perception that breaks into the unfortunately denoted “subject” and “object.” Zubiri’s sentient intelligence (or intellective sensing), as well as the ecological approach, preserve the unity of the act of perception, becaue perception is direct. The underlying logic is that of field simultaneity. This is only possible with what Zubiri calls actuality. Actuality does not mean the condition of being an act (actuity). The condition of being an act (actuity) would come from the act of Aristotelian potential. It would be real and effective fullness of being, which in our context we can correlate, among other things, with the level of actuations of things in receptors, with their interactions. But actuality on the level at which perception takes place is not the condition of being an act. Actuality means “being hereand-now present” from the standpoint of oneself because of being real, while emphasizing the “being” of “being here-andnow present.”22 It is something noergic.23 It apprehends the real, it is intellective,24 and at the same time something physical,25 something sentient. It does not need to come to reality, because it is already situated within it and is “at one,” a situation of the thing in us, and our being situated in the thing. This is unity. In reality it is a question of a co-actuality. The thing qua perceived and I qua perceiver are in the same act of perception. This is unity. It is also unity of what is intentional (intelligence or nous) and what is physical (ergon) in the noergic part of actuality. Sentient intelligence is no longer merely intentional. The dualism sensing/making intelligible, expressed in psychology as sensation and perception, and in many other forms, has been surmounted. This means that the actualizations of the condition of being an act26 will always go too far afield27 with respect to the actualizations of actuality.28 Hence, we could correlate Gibson’s relationship stimulus information with Zubiri’s notion of actuality, and the relationship stimulus energy29 with the state of being an act (actuity), just

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as radiant light, measured by the categories of physical science, go hand in hand with the condition of being an act (actuity), while ambient light and ecological optics go hand in hand with actuality. For the human being, affordances would be the equivalent of Zubiri’s idea of the meaning-thing, which would go “mounted” atop the reality-thing. We are on the level of socio-cultural symbolic meanings, which in Zubiri is given in the logos. Let us recall that they are neither physical nor phenomenal, but ecological. Perception is a psycho-organic act. This leads us to the construct system of human substantivity in Zubiri, with its organic and physic subsystems. Only from this standpoint can the dualisms be coherently surmounted. In Zubiri co-herence is what is proper to the construct system of human substantivity, wherein every note is a note-of-all-the-others, co-herent with all of them; substantivity in Zubiri’s philosophy takes the place of substance/subject of inherent properties. Thus what is psychic or mental and what is organic are only subsystems without substantivity. Only the human being as a system has constitutional sufficiency, which defines substantivity. Thus everything organic is psychic and everything psychic is organic. What is psychic would be our turn toward reality. Co-herence surmounts the dualisms because only in it is there system, that is, unity. In intimate connection with what has already been said, in Zubiri would there be no mental representations and this would harmonize with the alternative that Gibson offers to non-perceptual psychic phenomena: dreams, hallucinations, memories… There exist, though, some critical observations to make of Gibson from Zubiri’s standpoint. Let us focus on perceptual learning. We call to mind the stages of the development of intelligence according to Piaget, which involve an entire perceptual learning, as a function of different mentalities or mental structures that the child has been building in his interaction with the world. It is obvious that a newborn

does not perceive the same as a six-yearold child, as an adolescent of sixteen, as an adult of sixty. Where does the difference lie? Apparently, the mental structures so acquired make the difference. The issue here would be the role that simple apprehensions play, the roll through unreality, in Zubiri, in perceptual learning, in the sense that we have remarked about Piaget. Though Gibson concerned himself to a degree about the theme of learning in his first book PVW, usually insists stubbornly that there is no enrichment of the input, but that what basically progresses is the education of attention and the abililty to extract the inexhaustible wealth of information contained in the environmental light of the ambiance. Here Gibson seems to need some important corrections and qualifications. These would be along the lines that, although the origin of all learning is in reality itself—we believe that direct perception, the impassioned intuition of Gibson, would point toward primordial apprehension30 as understood by Zubiri— nonetheless not everything is simply a question of progress of attention. Or at least the latter would have to be grounded on the duality of the logos: simple apprehensions play a role, although ultimately they must be realized in what is primordially apprehended. And in perceptual learning, acquired mentality, constituted by the building of cerebro-mental structures as Piaget shows, would have to play a role and would correspond to the gradual improvement of those simple apprehensions. We will consider this at greater length below. But before that we will characterize the two important positions. Let us follow a symbolism, inspired in Gestalt psychology,31 and consider the figure-ground dichotomy. The concrete discussion is going to play the role of the figure; and Gibson and Zubiri’s opposition to—let us say—the dominant ideology in the fields of psychology and philosophy in respect to the problem of our concerns, is going to play the role of the background. We pretend, then, that the contrast between figure and ground offers us a depth

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dimension perspective of our question by the lines connecting them. Let us start with the ground of our two opposing mentalities: The two positions Let us start with Fodor and Pylyshyn’s famous article (1981, see bibliography) in which they think they have argued strongly that there will not be a Gibsonian revolution in cognitive psychology. In contrast to this view our modest study is pointing in the same direction as the words of the great neurologist Edelman: But I must also add that the cognitive enterprise rests on a set of unexamined assumptions. One of its most curious deficiencies is that it makes only marginal reference to the biological foundations that underlie the mechanisms it purports to explain. The result is a scientific deviation as great as that of the behaviorism it has attempted to supplant. The critical errors underlying this deviation are as unperceived by most cognitive scientist as relativity was before Einstein and heliocentrism was before Copernicus.”32 Gibson himself repeatedly expressed similar opinions, saying that the many experiments done by constructivist cognitive psychology were focused wrongly. He did not say they lack any value, but argued that they must be reinterpreted. We believe, with the disciples of Gibson, authors of the 1981 work Ecological Laws of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn, that his ecological approach to perception is revolutionary, and basically correct.33 Why then, this state of erroneous theories, put forth by a significant minority? This is not the place to try to formulate a response to this great and complex question. Gibson’s disciples correctly point out that the debate between the position of the Establishment, represented by Fodor and Pylyshyn at that time, and the ecological stance they advocate, should be considered part of a larger

controversy that has been endlessly debated by philosophers and scientists.34 We note that, in his way, Zubiri tries to answer it throughout his last work, the trilogy on sentient intelligence, which retrospectively illuminates all his former work, and thereby also illuminates our question. According to Zubiri, the origin of much of Western philosophy’s dualisms comes in no small measure from the dualism between sensing and intellection. However, this trilogy forcefully establishes that, though sensing and intellection are formally distinct, human sensing, unlike animal sensing, is intellective35. Or, what is the same, intellective knowing is sentient. The problems that have crystallized as a result of this confusion are called by Zubiri logification of intellection and the congeneric entification of reality,36 to which we alluded earlier. When Gibson characterizes the theories that he criticizes as theories of perception based on sensation, he says that it is a question of “the deliveries of the senses to the mind.” Coincidences between Gibson and Zubiri are striking. The latter characterizes this mentality as conceiving intelligence, unlike his sentient intelligence. In Gibson, all his work, but very expressively the title of his second book, is fully in line with this: The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (SCPS), not as mere channels of sensation. Gibson also dedicated considerable efforts to trying to imagine how and why this wrong state of affairs has historically been produced, given its volume. And so back in pre-historic times, there was the projective nature of shadows, whether from sunlight or fire, and later, the myth of Plato’s cave, at the origin of Western philosophy, in which the shadows of objects also project on the wall of the cave. This is what he calls the “fundamental graphic act,” at first scribbles, and then drawing and paintings on the cave walls, until the invention of writing, up through the discovery of perspective by Renaissance painters, and the invasion of all kind of representations (paintings, photographs, film, television, symbols of all kinds in two dimen-

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sions, etc.) in modern culture. This secular tradition would be at the origin of the picture theory of perception. In modern philosophy and psychology that yielded the representational theory of perception, the idea that we perceive through mental images in two dimensions (representations), to which the action of the mind must be added in order to perceive three dimensions. It is not that traces of distance and depth dimension are not found in stimuli, but rather that mechanicism in modern culture has produced the pernicious effect of the distorting influence of technology in the popular mind and in a great number of scientists. So Gibson is engaged in dismantling one of the biggest fallacies in this field: that the image of the retina is transmitted to the brain. This fallacy may adopt sophisticated ways, but it is the basis of all conceptions of projective logic we have grouped under the term “constructivist journey.” Even the more sophisticated theory that the retinal image is transmitted as signals in the fiber of the optic nerve has the lurking implication of a little man in the brain. For these signals must be in code and therefore have to be decoded; signals are messages and messages have to be interpreted. In both theories, the eye sends, the nerve transmits, and a mind or spirit receives. Both theories carry the implication of a mind that is separate from a body.37 Let us also quote the eloquent words of the book Ecological Psychology in Context (Harry Heft, 2001) to illustrate the influence of technology on current theories of perception and cognition, especially in psychology: The practice by philosophers and psychologists of using the idea of representation to describe an essential feature of mind reflects a long-standing tendency to import as concepts artifacts found in the world “into” the black box of the mind, and to use

these concepts as inferred mental structures or processes. Conceptualizing vision along the lines of a camera obscura is an early instance of this tendency. More modern examples include viewing the mind/brain as a telephone switchboard, a sequential processing computer, or most recently, as a parallel processing system. Like these developments –although perhaps less obviously –mental representations, now so central to cognitive theories, are in the first instance, features of the world… …What the emphasis on mental representations has succeeded in doing is to deflect attention away from the role that representations as features of our environment play in our daily transactions. In turn, this emphasis on mental representation has misled us about the nature of cognition itself.”38 But let us focus on what the title of our epigraph says to try to make a concrete contribution to the debate. Let us go beyond the background problem, and illustrate with the figure of a specific problem, which, by the way, we believe represents something nuclear. The pickup of information and the invariants of optical structure (Gibson)/ recurrences and simple apprehensions (Zubiri) This section title expresses something related to—but is not identical with—the fundamental point of disagreement between the two mentalities,39 focusing especially on how the article by Fodor and Pylyshyn represents the Establishment.40 Criticism of this article and the prompt response of Gibson’s disciples M.T. Turvey, R.E. Shaw, E.S. Reed and W.M. Mace, 1981 (see bibliography), are full of important nuances, some of which we will discuss. This is where Zubiri comes in. While we are unequivocally with Gibson’s followers in this controversy, we have yet to pinpoint why we think that the criticism of Fodor and Pylyshyn is understandable

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(though we do not agree with it in the end). The Gibsonian position is passionate because it has captured the root of the error of the widespread opposite mentality. And it has to do with realism. It is not surprising that one of the major intellectual roots of Gibson was the radical empiricism of William James, albeit mostly through his disciple Edwin B. Holt and his philosophical behaviorism.41 Fodor and Pylyshyn insist that, however interpreted, in the end we will run into the problem of the inevitability of inferences, or mental representations, or intentionality.42 Let us quote them towards the end of their article: Missing the point about inference, missing the point about mental representations, and missing the point about intentionality are thus all aspects of missing the same point.43 What do we think is right in Gibson? He is right: perception, ultimately,44 is direct. But it is not only because of that, but because of the overall coherence of all his analysis and proposals, and because of hs focus on the ecological approach, which is the right point of departure. Otherwise, as he used to say, we would be “putting the cart before the horse”. What fails in Gibson, and why do we think he needs Zubiri’s critical foundation? 45 We describe it as follows: the profound truth of his radical intuition, his defense of a new original model of perception, and the light that this sheds on a new approach to psychology, have led him to underestimate the relevance of some arguments of his opponents. These arguments contain portions of truth, and so are worth more patient consideration by him. Of course, the purpose is not to take them literally, but to reinterpret their criticism in a way that, we think, lends them the attention they deserved. In this way they would have been able to provide a non-negligible role in the consolidation of his basically correct intuitions. We believe that his theory of information pickup in conjunction with his theory of perceptual invariants needs im-

portant subtle modifications. And these would come, in our view, following Zubiri, by the hand of recurrences which inevitably put our being fluently in reality, and which, in turn, inexorably require the detour by irreality. It is the irreality of simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta46 and concepts), which play a role in all perception. Let’s look a little more in detail the issue. It is not that perception is indirect, it is not. To begin we must clarify what we mean by perception. While Zubiri sometimes uses this term, the term used preferably in his most definitive and mature work, the trilogy on the sentient intelligence, is apprehension. This is also a philosophical context of noology,47 or philosophy of intellective knowing. Zubiri states that noology (philosophy of intellective knowing), and metaphysics (philosophy of reality) are strictly congeneric. We cannot speak of our apprehension of reality without necessarily referring to the reality we apprehend. Both the charters of intelligence and the charters of reality are involved in the act of apprehension, as Zubiri likes to say. This means that man communicates directly with reality. Moreover, he says: And indeed, by the mere fact of hereand-now apprehending things as reality ... man finds himself inexorably bound to reality. Bound to reality, but also, secondly, swollen with reality. So swollen, that nothing, not even the irreal, falls outside reality. He is bound to and swollen with reality, but also driven by the real, and physically dragged along. Now, none of these three characteristics is formally the distinction between the character of reality and its contents....The distinction between the character of reality and its content becomes, in the intellective act, something different; it turs into the creation of the scope, the scope of reality, where man will include not only the things he actually perceives, but also the things that he

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creates. It is the real scope of irrealization.48 We need never “come to reality”, but we are already and always installed, irrefutably, in reality. We are reality, everything is reality, and there is nothing that is not reality. Even the irreal, simple apprehensions, are “really irreal”, they are reality, although in the form of irreality.49 The human being inexorably forges the irreal (percepts, ficta and concepts) in order to be in reality fluently, because of a functional necessity. The human being has to make its life; it has to choose between possibilities, freely. This way it also builds the figure of its substantive being. And for that it must to rely on things. But for that it needs to recognize them: this is where, inevitably, our being fluent in reality cannot consist in mere sensing, in the flow of always-new content in the stream of consciousness, to use William James’ famous expression. If so, Zubiri says, instead of living and making our lives, choosing between options, and relying on things, “we would just let ourselves live.” With reference to psychologists, let us mention the classically so-called perceptual constancy, which has to do with what Gibson called the direct pickup of invariants, and what Zubiri called recurrences.50 This is where one can introduce an important nuance. While in some contexts Zubiri used the terms apprehension and perception interchangeably, there is a difference between the two in his work. In his course, published as a book, Man, the Real and the Unreal (HRI), Zubiri does study perception, and characterizes it as perceptual experience. Before doing so, he explores the meaning of experience, distinguishing up to five meanings. Finally he defines the one we are interested in here thus: Experience is constitutive and formal testing, testing if things indeed are or are not as we have esteemed them— and not by reasoning, but precisely by immediate contact with them….For this reason experience is not mere

sensing. Neither that purely sensible sensing that empiricists talk about, nor even the intellective sensing of the impression of reality. Because that would be to sense; but it would not be to have experience….The integration of the irreal, a figuration, into the real, is just this: experience. “51 And he defines perceiving thus: Now, testing in this case is not simply to capture what I have ahead. This would be purely and simply to feel. But it consists in noticing52 that is exactly the same. However, to notice is the vulgar manner of expressing what the Latin verb per-captare means, from per-caeptio, which is just perception….That is the first mode of experience: the experience of the sameness of a recurring object is precisely what we call the per-caeptio, perception; this is the direct perception of the sensed, with respect to what is figured in recurrence. .... In this sense, experience is the experience of sameness53, not in an incidental way, but formally. Perhaps psychologists would disagree with that, but I would argue with them about it.54 That is to say, to perceive is an experience of us, which would put us in the charters of intelligence, which, as we have explained, are the charters of our sensing, which is an intellective sensing. What does it mean to say that it is our experience, although an immediate experience? It means that to make our life, to choose among possibilities, we approach things, in the recurrences, figuring out what they would be, and integrating our figuration (the irreal) into the moment of primordial apprehension of the directly sensed. Our simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta55and concepts) ultimately come from our experience with reality. They constitute that which earlier in this paper—recalling Piaget’s, theories—I have called the “mentality gained mentality by an ‘experienced’ perceiver,” that mentality with which things are perceived; it may not be the same as

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that of an inexperienced perceiver, say a newborn. Gibson, and especially his first wife, Eleanor J. Gibson, addressed the issue of perceptual learning, and thought specifically on the topic: “What do we learn when we learn to perceive? In articles prior to his last book, the most definitive, Gibson focuses, in collaboration with his wife, on the central issue of whether there is an enrichment of a poor inputor a progressive differentiation.56 The conclusion falls on the side of progressive differentiation. And in his last book, published shortly before his death, he summarizes the issue of perceptual learning in terms of exploration and especially education of attention, as a result of which pickups of information become finer and more elaborate; that is, one achieves finer and more elaborate distinctions, which are always made directly to the inexhaustible information contained in our environment. We think that Gibson could not recognize any kind of duality in perception. The consistency of all his proposals and theories was at stake. However Zubiri said that inherently there are dualities in perceptual experience. Above all there is the duality between the real thing and its field of reality.57 Each real thing grounds its field of reality, every thing is in reality itself. There is a cyclical respectivity between each thing and its field.58 Things are inter alia. As we are midfield, then it would be the duality between the perceived and the perceiver. Today it is well known that in 20th century philosophy all phenomenological theories as well as others have gone beyond the subject-object dichotomy in the theory of knowledge, and, therefore, in the conception of perception. It has to do with what we said earlier on that there is in Zubiri a congeneric relationship between the jurisdictions of intellective knowing (or intellective sensing, say perception), and the charters of reality (the perceived). Sentient intelligence (or intellective sensing) is here-and-now in the real perceived, and the perceived is here-and-now in our intellective sensing.59 But it is the same “being

here-and-now”, in which the two jurisdictions are compactly, because this is what constitutes sensing. Gibson for his part quotes the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid who drew attention to the two regions opened by our senses. Thus we see that not always, although almost always, philosophy went astray on the otherness of human sensing, qua sensing, as Zubiri used to say. A philosopher who inspired Gibson affirmed it and is worth quoting literally60: The external senses have a double province; to make us feel, and to make us perceive. They furnish us with a variety of sensations, some pleasant, others painful, and others indifferent; at the same time they give us a conception, and an invincible belief of the existence of external objects. This conception of external objects is the work of nature. The belief of their existence, which our senses give, is the work of nature; so likewise is the sensation that accompanies it. This conception and belief which nature produces by means of the senses, we call perception. The feeling that goes along with the perception, we call sensation. The perception and its corresponding sensation are produced at the same time. In our experience we never find them disjoined. Hence we are led to consider them as one thing, to give them one name, and to confound their different attributes. It becomes very difficult to separate them in thought, to attend to each by itself, and to attribute nothing to it which belongs to the other (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, II, p. 17).61 When I touch a piece of cold metal, in the same sensing is how it affects me, my skin, my flesh, and me as a whole, whether the cold metal touches me or I touch it. On the other hand—but in the same sensing—there is the region of the other-thanme that I sense in my sensing, in this case, the metal that I am sensing in its hardness, in its texture and in its cold-

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ness. Admirable, but no doubt there are “two things in one” in the “starting point,” two realities, analytically distinguishable, but not separate, because they are in the same sentient act. Here we have the duality in a unitary act of direct perception. We give the name “apprehension” to this direct communication with reality, unmediated (by mental representations or the like), and direct in this sense, not indirect, unmediated. But duality is also at the root. It is not, as in Kant, some kind of experience by synthesis of the perceiver and the perceived. Rather on the contrary, and in line with phenomenology,62 Zubiri will say, it is rather a dis-integration of the poorlynamed “subject” and the poorly-named “object”, as already explained. And that is because we start from the radical unity of the perceptive act. From the epistemic point of view this unity is prior and more fundamental than the aforementioned duality, as we have just expressed. It is from this phenomenological unity that we have called “apprehension,” which puts us into direct communication with the real, that we can subsequently access either the charters of reality or the charters of sentient intelligence (that is to say intellective sensing; it could also be read as “perception”). In our being fluent in reality, with different contents streaming, we live moving, even when we seem to be still. In this flow recurrences are inevitable, and according to Zubiri this occurs continuously, viz. the merger or integration of the real and the irreal of our simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta and concepts). We perceive, we have the perceptual experience of the new merged with what we recognize. Gibson and the ecological psychology speak about “persistence and change,” for example, in our locomotion. We perceive when we recognize, or when we capture what remains and does not change in the middle of changes (as Gibson would say), or (as Zubiri says) one thing from the standpoint of another thing. Zubiri says that in the field of reality we perceive a thing among others.63 But we can also say that we perceive one thing from the standpoint

of other things. We do not have the same appearance when dressed in a particular way, or hair arranged in a certain way, than we do in other ways. And, as an essential part of the field of reality, we are as midfield; as we said the perceived in and the perceiver are inseparable in apprehension. Things have relations (in the language of ecological psychology) or have respectivities (in the language of Zubiri), between them, and between them and us.64 Finally, Zubiri says, man is the geometrical locus of reality. The first respectivities would be integrated into our perception. That is, we perceive a thing from the standpoint of other, previously perceived things, even to form the elemental and constitutive experience of all perception that psychologists call object permanence, perceptual constancy. Not only constancy of the who (the individual), but constancy of the what (the species). The perceptual experience always carries constitutively inherent the experience of these samenesses. And William James said, according to Harry Heft, that percepts and concepts are continuously melded. And perceiving a thing in terms of other previously perceived things, we have, according to Zubiri, at once a primordial apprehension of reality, involved, or encapsulated, as it were, in the duality alluded to earlier. That is to say, there is the duality of, first, the simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta and concepts, or the irreality of the charters of intelligence), with, on the other side (but cast or integrated with the above), what was previously apprehended in primordial apprehension (that is to say, the charters of the reality in which we are installed). Another metaphor to express it would be to say that in perception, which is always direct and unitary, a root, a primordial apprehension of reality, is always given; although this root is displayed unfolding in certain branches (which Zubiri called the “duality of logos,” because one thing is perceived in terms of others) that are the charters of intelligence: percepts, ficta and concepts.

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However, this integration or realization of the irreal (percepts, ficta, concepts) in the real previously perceived in primordial apprehension, which has to do with perceptual constancy (and, therefore, with what Gibson called the direct pickup of invariants), is directly involved in the constitution of reality. This is the important concept of formalization in the philosophy of Zubiri, which has to do with the concept explained above, formality. Formality is the way that content stays in the sentient apprehension. And we saw two basic ways of formality: formality of stimulus, in the mere animal, and the formality of reality, in the human animal. Formalization is the modulation of formality, modulation of the independence or autonomy of the sensed content, in respect to other contents, and in respect to the apprehendor. Formalization is precisely the “unity” of the sensed content.65 And therefore it will have everything to do with elaboration of the real, which is no stranger to the so called “perceptual constancy,” (which the direct pickup of invariants in Gibson accounts for). There are variations and invariances in recurrences, uniting in this phrase Zubiri’s recurrences with variations and invariance in Gibson. According to Zubiri (Gibson also used this term) to come to perceive “the same” table, there is a process, not of abstraction but selection: Indeed, certain recurring moments are selected in order to say, “these are this table, the same table, and the other are events that happen to the same table: different lighting, different distances, different perspective, etc.”66 Zubiri tells us that we proceed by leaving these vicissitudes aside, and that formalization is precisely the factor playing a crucial role on it. And in the human animal, psycho-physiological structures are hyper-formalized, i.e., formalizing the stimuli apprehended as real. The formalization depends on the psychophysiological structures of the animal. “Real” means that the unity of the sensed possesses the cutting or unitary profile of

the notes perceived as something that is “in its own right”. In its own right here means autonomy or independence in respect to anything, and in respect to the apprehendor itself, as a prius. But for this to happen, to constitute the real in perception, human beings inexorably need, according to Zubiri, being surrounded by the irreal: In this perception, so quickly described, we are dealing with a testing or experience. We are not talking about opening one’s eyes and seeing the world in just any way, but in a perfect and direct testing. Man goes about assembling the chain recurring and substantive things based on testings; so a moment of irreality intervenes: just what I esteem is the thing, the same thing. And secondly, there is a moment of presentation of the real thing in perception.67 But let us go back to the root, the primordial apprehension, and its branches. These branches are not only enrichment of the content because of the logos, but also by reason. But let us give some minimum references to the reader not familiar with Zubiri, on the latter point. For Zubiri, perception is given in the logos, involving primordial apprehension. This primordial apprehension of reality is the basic form of sentient intellection (or intellective sensing); and it is the root of all intellection, although it is never given alone, but, as it were, with its branches. The logos, where the phenomenon of perception is given, is a modalization or deployment of primordial apprehension; it is a mode of ulterior actualization of what is already intelligized (sensed) in primordial apprehension, but without leaving the apprehension. If intellection is for Zubiri the mere actuality of the real in the sentient intelligence, the logos is nothing but a reactualization of what was previously intelligized (sensed). And what is actuality for Zubiri? We saw briefly in the first part of the article: actuality means “being hereand-now present” from the standpoint of

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oneself because of being real (while accenting the “being here-and-now” of “being here-and-now present”). Present to what? It depends on the context, on what you consider.68 But in our case, let us think of our sentient intelligence. And so actuality, translated as “being here-and-now present”, communicates directly, in apprehension, the real as perceived (the being), with the sensor, to which it makes present. We put the accent on the being hereand-now to emphasize the apprehensive character of our direct communication with the real of the environment. As we said earlier, in this apprehension there are “two things in one”, although the apprehension is the unitary root of our direct and immediate contact with reality. But this root is split into a duality. Or we could say that the root continues to a stalk from which a branch sprouts. That branch would be the logos we have mentioned above. And it is in the logos where our everyday perception occurs. So we said that perception is given in the logos “that involves the primordial apprehension”. We also said that the deployment, or modalization or reactualization of what was previously intelligized (sensed) in primordial apprehension, was given “without leaving the apprehension”. And reason? This is another question. Reason will be of paramount importance in the study of perception, in the critical foundation of Gibson’s ecological approach to perception. To rescue ecological psychology from the margins69 the level of reason is also primary. For in reason, yes we escape from apprehension, in the conceptualization of Zubiri, and we access reality in depth, categorized by science. Though the logos enriches the content70 of primordial apprehension, maintaining the same formality of reality, and without leaving apprehension, in reason, we progress from the field to the world. Or, if preferred, we progress from “reality at the surface level” to” reality in depth”. We think this latter formulation is clearer to psychologists, scientists and philosophers in general, and for all readers. It has the virtue

of overcoming the insurmountable dichotomy, harshly criticized by our two authors, and to which both proposed solid solutions. It is—recalling the famous example cited by Gibson in SCPS71—to overcome the paradox of the two tables of Eddington.72 One would be the familiar table, on which I study, or I write, or I eat. The other is the scientific table, composed of atoms, molecules, energy. Eddington said, according to Gibson, that the table is only “a swarm of atoms,” and that, according to physics, the objects that are on it do not really touch it; there would be a bombardment of molecules, and that, in fact, the familiar table, like “the earthly world of surfaces, objects, places and events”, is a fiction, because to the world of physics only those particles exist. Zubiri has echoed this major problem and has spoken of the scandal of modern science.73 For many scientists and philosophers sensible qualities are subjective: If it is an ingenuous realism—and it is—to make sensible qualities into properties of things outside of perception, it is an ingenuous subjectivism to declare them simply subjective. Real things are set off in some zone beyond perception, and everything else is put into the zone of the subjective.74 So in our issue of perception, neither psychologists or physicists, biologists or physiologists, or philosophers (though it depends on whom you ask) know where to house the color.75 The scandal is—to mention another aspect of the same thing— that science has ignored explanation of sensible qualities, and does not tell us a word about how the physicochemical and psycho-physiological processes inside our bodies produce sensible qualities such as color or sound, or what these qualities in their formal reality are. Phenomenology merely describes them. Zubiri qualifies as scandalous that what is ignored is what, in the last analysis, is the foundation of all real knowledge. This situation is science’s responsibility, according to Zubiri.76 In the

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same vein two young followers of Gibson said as early as 1981: A good measure of philosophical thinking will be needed just to generate the questions about the essential nature of a knowing agent that theory and experiment will address. It is not that the problem is a new one; it is not. Nevertheless, the problem has often been avoided, perhaps because of the apparent recalcitrance of the problems of purpose and intentionality for a science trying to deal with observables. However, in the face of the seemingly obvious truths that knowing implies someone who knows, and that what is known and how it is known cannot be indifferent to who knows, the time has come to squarely face these issues. Psychologists who are hesitant to tread on this terra incognita or who feel that the ecological psychologists’ “obvious truths” above are misty or spiritual exhortations should recognize that similar exhortations have been coming from the other side of science. Quantum mechanics has its own “algorist problems” in trying to understand what it means to observe. Shaw and McIntyre (1974) quote Winger (1970): …the basic concept in the epistemological structure of physics is the concept of observation and … psychology is not yet ready for providing concepts and idealizations of such precision as are expected in mathematics or even physics. (p.37)77 It can be seen that some people are aware of the philosophical problems that underlie modern science, including psychology; problems, moreover, that are old and recalcitrant in themselves, which Gibson himself said have occupied the most prominent thinkers of history. We simply say— though humbly and modestly—that the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri, is, in our view, one of those heads in Gibson’s

mind; and we consider that the solution he brings to us is is not only highly solvent and solid, but fascinating. Stemming from remote origins in ancient Greece, the problem goes back centuries in modernity. Let us recall again the problem of the division of sensible qualities into primary and secondary by Descartes and Galileo. From there it went to other philosophers and scientists like Locke. It is interesting to quote the above authors, Michaels and Carello, regarding the dualism of “the perceiver and the perceived” that represents the division of the qualities as primary and secondary mentioned before, dualism that has covered much of the history of philosophical and scientific thought: Perhaps the most fundamental premise to which we would object is that objects have certain properties while ideas about objects have certain other properties. At issue for us is not so much whether the object in the head (idea) and the object in the world have different properties, but whether it makes sense to consider them as two objects.78 The interesting thing that these authors are telling us here for us is their brilliant intuition along the lines not just of Gibson, but of Zubiri and his primordial apprehension. Not that they or Gibson noticed the difference between the primordial apprehension and the logos (this is one of the main shortcomings of Gibson and ecological psychology, but fortunately we have Zubiri), but they do make a conceptualization that confronts the dominant positions (wrong in their judgment and in ours) based on a direct perception which they do not withdraw, and that in our view points towards Zubiri’s primordial apprehension. And then they make a conceptualization that we see consistent with the primordial apprehension, where there would be compactly the charters of intelligence (or intellective sense) and the charters of reality, in the same being, in the same sensing, as explained. This is what makes the question consistent whether it

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would make sense to consider two different objects. According to Zubiri, from this compaction we can try to access either the charters of intelligence or the charters of reality. It is the same spirit in which the above mentioned Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid expresses himself. But let us return to the topic of reason and to our progression, according to Zubiri, from apprehension of the logos to the world, moving out of apprehension. I said that the formulation of the progression from reality at the surface level to reality in depth, in the context of our article, seems to us preferable here, because, among other things, it has the potential to connect together the two tables of Eddington. Because, of course, there is only one table: Gibson would agree. What we perceive first is the familiar table, which, according to Zubiri, is not only real, but it is the real table par excellence. The scientific table only represents an enrichment of content, progressing from reality at the surface level of the table (the familiar table), to reality in depth of the table (the scientific table). We say “real table par excellence,” because, for Zubiri, as we said, in all perception of reality we can distinguish content and formality of reality. All they do, logos and reason, is to enrich the content, maintaining the same formality of reality. They are modalizations or re-actualizations of the primordial apprehension of reality (which would occur in the perception of the familiar table; this perception occurs in the logos, but involving the primordial apprehension). But of the two aspects, content and formality of reality, the moment that has primacy is the moment of reality. So Zubiri says that the logos and reason, ulterior modes of intellection, are successive: It is therein that all of the enrichments of the intellection of what something is in reality have to be inscribed. Hence, despite its enormous volume and richness, the intellection of the ulterior modes is unutterably poor with respect to the way in which

the primordial apprehension apprehends reality. The intellection of the most poor reality intellectively known in the primordial apprehension is immensely richer as intellection than the intellection of reality in its ulterior modes. It is only as referred to the primordial apprehension of reality that the ulterior modes are what they are, viz. intellections of the real. It is because of this that these ulterior modes are just succedaneous.”79 That is why we say that Gibson is ultimately right about his critics. We think his stubborn defense of perception as direct and not mediated by mental representations or any such thing (which Zubiri says almost in the same terms) points precisely to this fact, that the root of all perception, primordial apprehension (but ulteriorly deployed into a duality) makes of perception always something direct and immediate, makes what is perceived a presentation and not a representation,80 and makes the basis of all perception a direct communication with reality, in which we are always irrefutably installed: In this apprehension, then, we apprehend the reality of the real impressively.81 For this reason I call it the primordial apprehension of reality. In it the formality of reality is apprehended directly, and not by way of representations or the like. It is apprehended immediately, not in virtue of other apprehensive acts or reasoning processes of whatever sort. It is apprehended unitarily; that is, the real, which can and does have a great richness and variability of content (in general), is in its content apprehended unitarily as formality of reality pro indiviso, so to speak. Later I shall speak of this content; for now I refer only to the formality itself of reality. It is in the unity of these three aspects (directly, immediately, and unitarily) that the fact that the formality of the real is apprehended in and through itself consists.

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In the primordial apprehension of reality, the real is apprehended in and through itself. By virtue of being an apprehension, in it we “are actually” in reality itself. And this apprehension is primordial because every other apprehension of reality is constitutively grounded on this primordial apprehension and involves it formally. It is the impression which primarily and constitutively installs us in the real. And this is essential. One does not have a primordial impression and besides it another apprehension; rather, what we have is a primordial modalized apprehension which is, at the same time, in distinct forms. The real, apprehended in and through itself, is always the primordial thing and the essential nucleus of every apprehension of reality. This is what the expression “primordial apprehension of reality” signifies.82 Zubiri says that in the issue before us, perception, the electromagnetic waves, or photons, do not produce color (because here we would still have two things or a duality) but that the electromagnetic wave of light is the color in perception. Therefore, in perception, when we progress from apprehension of the logos to the world (or the in-depth dimension of reality itself, for example the table), we go from the perceived color to the study of the foundation of this reality in the world, that is to say, in depth, where we categorize the aforementioned foundation in several possible ways. One of them—and very important for Zubiri—is the categorization that science does; therefore we would be proceeding from the perceived color to the wavelengths or photons. All this puts before us Zubiri’s concept of reality. We have seen that for Zubiri, we do not need to reach reality. For Zubiri sensible qualities are real, and, as stated above, are part of reality par excellence. Zubiri does not say that they are real beyond apprehension. They are real in apprehension, they are real in perception. Reality is not a zone of things. Reality is what is de

suyo83 or “in its own right”. And this begins in the apprehension, since in apprehension are compactly the charters of intellective knowing and the charters of reality, at one and the same time and undivided, in the co-actuality of a same being here-and-now. In the example of the table the real starts in the apprehension of the familiar table. From there we can progress, through reason, towards its foundation in the world: photons, electromagnetic waves, wavelengths, rods and cones in the retina, occipital region of the brain,84 etc. The character of being de suyo or “in its own right”, would be common to all forms of intellective sensing (or sentient intellection): be it primordial apprehension, logos, or reason (where scientific categories would reside). Thus, the colors, or the causal level of functionality in the logos, or the differential equations of quantum physics, are all be real, not for being here or there, but for being what they are, de suyo or “in their own right”, absolutely independent of everything else and of all possible apprehender, as a prius, which, where appropriate, grounds its own apprehension and imposes itself with a certain force in the impression of reality. However in the case of differential equations at the level of reason, they must be tested; though what is tested is not the truth of they affirm (it would not be verification, which is not needed in mathematics) but it would be the very presence of the reality apprehended in line with the deduced truth.85 All this, as shown, is in perfect harmony with Gibson’s ecological approach to the psychology of perception. Therefore, since his second book, SCPS, he said and emphasized to the various students studying perception that scientific categories were not relevant at this level of study. Therefore he also insisted that we should “not put the cart before the horse”. By this he meant not to start with abstract geometric space, with electromagnetic waves (with the categories of science); as Zubiri says, “at the starting line.” That reality in depth you reach by marching from the apprehension of logos

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to the world. It is the work of reason, where Zubiri locates the scientific categories. But let us finish outlining the nuances that we think the theory of pickup information and the invariants of Gibson needs. We have previously analyzed the nuances that, we think, the theory of information pickup needs. Having presented his second book in his new conception of the senses considered as perceptual systems, we do not now need the plus of the mind, namely, the operations of the mind on the delivery of the senses. Zubiri would have said that with this it is presented a conceptualization of the senses in line, not with a conceiving intelligence, but with a sentient intelligence. The environment is perceived directly by direct uptake of information by our senses, which “get out there” and, for example for visual perception, pick up the information contained in the sea of ambient light. Instead of saying that coded information on our retina is projected, producing an image that, in one way or another is transmitted to the brain, where finally a picture or terminal representation would occur, we say that we see not pictures but the real thing viewed directly through the optical environmental structure, and our nerve centers, just resonate in field simultaneity to capture information. We have resolved the problem when, as Gibson says, we have superceded classical theories of perceptual constancy, recognizing that our visual system captures and extracts the invariant optical structure directly. We think this “capturing or extracting” invariant optical structure directly needs elaboration. It is something that Harry Heft recognizes in the book mentioned, quoting an important author, Ulric Neisser: In the case of the present problem, it is hypothesized that what specifies object shape that structure in the reflected light that remains constant across transformations generated from a moving point of observation. Because this structure remains invar-

iant, and because it is specific to a particular object shape (i.e., there is a one-to-one mapping relation between the two), it could be said with justification that this invariant structure in reflected light can serve as information for the presence of this object (rather than some other object) in the immediate environment. But this statement does not go far enough. The next step must be taken and this invariant must be identified, which is a difficult task. It is toward this effort that much basic work in an ecological approach to vision has been directed, and a great deal of this work remains to be done.86 So as we said before, this is where we come to Zubiri. But for the “discussion” between our two authors, it is necessary to sharpen the analysis. This is where Zubiri speaks of recurrences and the integration of simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta and concepts), which belong to “the charters of intelligence”, in the real thing, previously apprehended in primordial apprehension (the charters of reality). This is where we are recognizing. But the integration of percepts, ficta and concepts in the real thing apprehended in primordial apprehension is realized in the context of a direct, immediate and unitary perception.87 In this sense, it is something quite different from the inferences of Helmholtz, and with him of many scientists of visual perception who followed him in this, such as Fodor and Pylyshyn’s cognitive science. The conception of these authors is prey to the projective logic of what I have called the “constructivist journey.” Instead, Gibson and Zubiri are in the orbit of logic of “field simultaneity” of direct perception. However, as mentioned, there is still an important point for discussion, and it has to do with the integration or realization of simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta and concepts) in the real previously intelligized (sensed) in primordial apprehension. Let us see:

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How would this integration or realization be? How would these simple apprehensions or gained mentality of an experienced perceiver be in us? Let us recall that Gibson said that in perceptual learning there is no enrichment of the input, but a progressive differentiation which is a result of exploring, and an education of attention. In that way Gibson was fighting against classical theories of perception based on sensation; Zubiri called these conceptions “conceiving intelligence”. Expressing this in a way similar to that of both authors, we would say that it is to overcome conceptions that are based on “the operations of the mind on the delivery of the senses”. It is something that comes from the dualism at the starting point, which is superceded by our two authors, who are based on the unity of the perceptive act. Gibson also disputes that memory plays some role in perception. With this he was opposed to the theories that conceive perception as a series of snapshots which must then be integrated into a sequence— theories which are unable to account for motion, either coming from the world, or from movement of the observer. It would require a continual recalling of appropriate representations from memory store. Gibson is opposed, and Zubiri also, to conceive memories or memory contents of thought in the form of representations or mental images. The issue also has to do with the stream of thought of William James and the fact that our perception, is not only in motion, but in time. Let us quote them: Because we are led to separate the present from the past, we found ourselves in what I have called “the muddle of memory” (Gibson 1966a)88. We think that the past ceases to exist unless it is “preserved” in memory. We assume that memory is the bridge between the past and the present. We assume that memories accumulate and are stored somewhere; that they are images or pictures, or representa-

tions of the past; or that memory is actually physiological, not mental, consisting of engrams or traces; or that it actually consists of neural connections, not engrams; that memory is the basis of all learning; that memory is the basis of habit; that memories live on in the unconscious; that heredity is a form of memory; that cultural heredity is another form of memory; that any effect of the past on the present is memory, including hysteresis. If we cannot do any better than this, we should stop using the word.89 Zubiri, in general, did not deal with memory in his writings. Why? We tend to think that just as—to take one significant example—the word culture hardly appears in his writings, the word memory, like the word culture, would be heavily loaded with connotations that he wished to avoid. Zubiri, however, spoke of the meaningthing, which could be considered as a basic ingredient of culture.90 Therefore, we believe that most likely he would be on guard regarding the tremendous complication around memory—possibly, we are speculating, in a way similar to that expressed by Gibson here. Let us quote a text that we consider very important in this regard: ... The brain configures the mind, but the mind also configures the brain. And just as the psyche does not receive “traces” from the brain, so neither does the brain have traces of the psyche. For configuring does not mean “impressing traces”, but configuring a mode of being and acting in the field of reality. And this “availability” for action is psycho-organic, brain-mental. In the brain neither situation nor memories are deposited, but the brain acquires more or less new “ways of functioning,” which furthermore are not privative of the option that has determined them.”91 The issue of integration or realization of simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta

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and concepts) as previously intellectively known in primordial apprehension is something that Zubiri deals with in HRI; but its final version is in IL. However, the above quotation is from SH, where Zubiri extensively treats the mind-brain relationship. As perception is a psycho-organic act, like all human activity, it involves brain-mental act, and therefore we can find in SH very valuable suggestions for our subject of perception. In particular we have seen the issue of integration or realization of the irreal in the real, clarifying step-by-step all its aspects. In parallel to our problem at hand, Gibson shows consequences of his theory of information pickup, which is to say his theory of direct perception, very much in tune with those of Zubiri and other, and upon which we wish to comment. We present, first, a text that shows Gibson’s awareness of the contradictions of conceptions that fall within what we call “projective logic”, prey to mechanism and dualism. From here the texts that take more direct consequences of his conception of direct perception “in field simultaneity” will become more apparent to us: But the ancient Cartesian doctrine still hangs on, that animals are reflex machines and that humans are the same except for a soul that rules the body by switching impulses at the center of the brain. The doctrine will not do. Locomotion and manipulation are not triggered by stimuli from outside the body, nor are they initiated by commands from inside the brain. Even the classification of incoming impulses in nerves as sensory and outgoing impulses as motor is based on the old doctrine of mental sensations and physical movements. Neurophysiologists, most of them, are still under the influence of dualism, however much they deny philosophizing. They still assume that the brain is the seat of the mind. To say in modern parlance, that it is a computer, with a program either inherited or acquired, that plans a voluntary action and

then commands the muscles to move is only a little better than Descartes’s theory, for to say this is still to remain confined within the doctrine of responses.”92 The philosophical criticism of Cartesian dualism and mechanism can be seen in this text, as a background—theories that implicitly or explicitly underlie projective logic as embodied in what he calls the doctrine of responses. From there it continues by considering the brain as the place of mind. Gibson sees the senses as systems, or, if you like, subsystems embedded in another, and so on until the last system is reached, which is not the isolated human being but the organismecological niche system, according to the principle of mutuality between the animal and its environment. This Zubiri calls congenereity between intelligence and reality, or coactuality between sentient intelligence and perceived reality. For Zubiri the sentient intelligence is a systemic property of the whole human substantivity, which in its dynamism turns towards reality, and this is its psychic character.93 Otherwise, the text has the virtue of making clear that the current trend of “computer as a model of mind-brain” is a contemporary version of mechanism, which historically stems from Descartes. Here are two texts containing the basic problem to be treated, to be conceptualized classically by theories of perceptual constancy, and that is replaced by Gibson’s pickup information theory, according to his general approach wherein invariants of optical structure are extracted directly from the flow of environmental stimulation. This was to deal with the enormous difficulty of accounting for both persistence and change at the same time: Finally, fifth, optical information theory entails an activity of the system not heretofore imagined by any visual scientist, the concurrent registering of both persistence and change in the flow of structured stimulation.”94

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“The perceiver extracts the invariants of structure from the flux of stimulation while still noticing the flux. For the visual system in particular he tunes in on the invariant structure of the optic array that underlies the changing perspective structure caused by his movements.”95 Now we present Gibson’s answer to the question we asked at the beginning: if not in the store of memory, if not in the form of images or mental representations, etc., how are our memories, fantasies, dreams, fictions, hallucinations in us? How are percepts, ficta and concepts in us? These are what Zubiri called the “simply apprehended”. Gibson’s response will involve a theory of cognition in general. Referring to: “(a) remembering..such as items in the story of one’s own life; (b) to expect, anticipate, plan, or imagine creatively... within what we call the limits of possibility; (c) to daydream, dream, or imagine wishfully (or fearfully) ... that are outside the limits of possibility”, he says: These three kinds of nonperceptual awareness are not explained, I think, by the traditional hypothesis of mental imagery. They are better explained by some such hypothesis as this: a perceptual system that has become sensitized to certain invariants and can extract them from the stimulus flux can also operate without the constraints of the stimulus flux. Information becomes further detached from stimulation. The adjustment loops for looking around, looking at, scanning, and focusing, are then inoperative. The visual system visualizes. But this is still an activity of the system, not an appearance in the theater of consciousness.96 Knowing is an extension of perceiving.97 … The process of pickup involves not only overt moments that can be measured, such as orienting, exploring, and adjusting, but also more general

activities, such as optimizing, resonating, and extracting invariants, that cannot so easily be measured. The ecological theory of direct perception cannot stand by itself. It implies a new theory of cognition in general. In turn, that implies a new theory of noncognitive kinds of awareness – fictions, fantasies, dreams, and hallucinations. Perceiving is the simplest and best kind of knowing. …”98 Moreover, as can be seen, Gibson postulates a hypothesis to explain, according to his theories, how would it be consistent to think conscious non-perceptual contents, going beyond the representationist conception of mental content (such as dreams, dreams, imaginations, etc.) as images or the like appearing “within the theater of consciousness.” On the other hand he leaves clear continuity between perceiving and knowing. But the final statement, that “perceiving is the simplest and best way of knowing”, very much in line with the primordial apprehension of Zubiri we’ve seen before, is even more interesting.99 Again the similarities between our two authors, who did not know each other, and whose theories are so counter to many psychological, cognitive and philosophical theories still in force, gives one pause.100 Gibson explicitly states that his ecological theory of direct perception does not rely on itself but requires a new theory of cognition in general.101 Not only that, but this requires a new theory of non-cognitive forms of consciousness—fictions, fantasies, dreams and hallucinations. So we again arrive—it must be for some reason— at the issue with which we began the last analysis, viz. about memory, the relevant mind-brain relations in perception, and in general, and how the so-called mental representations (images, etc.) are possible. Be that as it may, this is not the place to address this issue in all its depth. We believe that with what the texts cited make

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clear, is enough that the reader will not confuse Zubiri’s position with those of Gibson. In EAVP, when summarizing his Pickup Information Theory, he reviewed The Traditional Theories of Perception: Input Processing, and referred, among others102 to those in which there is the Application of Memories to the Sensory Inputs, with which he differed. All of them have to do with “mental processing of information”, as it may be read in the title of the section. And if there is something characterizing Gibson’s position, it is opposition to all theories consisting in information processing. All of them suffer a projective logic, which our two authors have called “the operations of the mind on the delivery of the senses.” All of them are forced to a model of indirect perception, to the enrichment of the sensory input by the mind. Let us quote Gibson: The fallacy is to assume that because inputs convey no knowledge, they can somehow be made to yield knowledge by “processing” them. Knowledge of the world must come from somewhere; the debate is over whether it comes from stored knowledge, from innate knowledge, or from reason. But all three doctrines beg the question. Knowledge of the world cannot be explained by supposing that knowledge of the world already exists. All forms of cognitive processing imply cognition so as to account for cognition.103 While in Zubiri the issue of integration or realization of percepts, ficta and concepts in what was previously intellectively known in primordial apprehension could be confused with the stance criticized by Gibson as The Application of Memories to the Sensory Inputs, we believe that what has already been explained leaves it sufficiently clear that this is something quite different. In Zubiri knowledge of the world comes from the primordial apprehension, present in every perception. The simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta and concepts) come from the irrealization of a content apprehended in primordial apprehen-

sion; and integration or realization is done on the root of the same apprehension, which is primordial apprehension. Said primordial apprehension is the exigent basis of simple apprehensions (percepts, ficta and concepts) and where they are integrated or realized. We think these essential nuances (a paradox!) that Zubiri provides in his trilogy about sentient intelligence are what the too obvious direct pickup of information invariants of Gibson needs. In any case, I must say that the subject is difficult and requires a thorough analysis. Zubiri dedicated two books to it, HRI, and the second volume of the trilogy on the Sentient Intelligence, IL. Conclusion In Zubiri perception is a very complex phenomenon situated in the logos. Primordial apprehension in a pure state would never be given.104 Nonetheless, it is constitutively implicated in the logos and, therefore, in every perception. The hypothesis I suggest is that direct perception in Gibson would approach primordial apprehension in Zubiri, although Gibson never elaborated anything like Zubiri’s notion of logos. The thesis of his critics, that all perception implies some kind of inference, would approach, on the one hand, the duality of the logos, but, on the other hand, leaves untouched the primordial apprehension that all logos involves. We perceive in the field of reality in which we are situated in a state of flux. This is congruent with Gibson’s theory that we perceive in motion, in time.105 Gibson’s affordances of things “would contain” their sociocultural meanings and would be in tune with Zubiri’s notion of habitude, and with the thing-meaning. Vis-à-vis theories that he criticizes and vis-à-vis his critics, Gibson basically is right. The powerful, well-elaborated philosophy of Xavier Zubiri, with which he is very much in tune, backs him up. This basically refers to his ecological approach, which we describe as phenomenological and prior to the level of scientific explanation. In this work we understand phenom-

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enology as a philosophical dimension in the dimension of scientific psychology. There is nothing like Zubiri’s noology for this joining of philosophy and science. Bibliography PVW-GIBSON, J.J. 1950. The Perception of the Visual World, The Riverside Press, Houghton Mifflin Company, Cambridge, Boston. SCPS-GIBSON, J.J. 1966. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. EAVP-GIBSON, J.J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey & London, 1986. (Originalmente publicado en 1979). IRE-ZUBIRI, Xavier. 1980. Inteligencia Sentiente, Alianza Editorial, Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, Madrid, (vol. 1: Inteligencia y Realidad). IL-ZUBIRI, Xavier 1982. Inteligencia Sentiente, Alianza Editorial, Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, Madrid, (vol. 2: Inteligencia y Logos). IRA-ZUBIRI, Xavier 1983. Inteligencia Sentiente, Alianza Editorial, Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, Madrid, (vol. 3: Inteligencia y Razón). SH-ZUBIRI, Xavier 1986. Sobre el Hombre, Alianza Editorial, Fundación Xavier Zubiri, Madrid. HRI-ZUBIRI, Xavier 2005. El Hombre: lo Real y lo Irreal, Alianza Editorial, Fundación Xavier Zubiri, Madrid. ETM-ZUBIRI, Xavier 2008. Espacio, Tiempo, Materia, Nueva Edición, Alianza Editorial, Fundación Xavier Zubiri, Madrid. Studies ARRIBAS MONTES, Vicente. 2005. “El tema de la ciencia en la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri”; The Xavier Zubiri Review, Vol.7, 2005. CONILL, Jesús. 2005. “Ciencia, técnica y filosofía en nuestra situación intelec-

tual desde la perspectiva de Ortega, Zubiri, y Aranguren”, en The Xavier Zubiri Review, Vol.7, 2005. COPE, Theo. 2007. “Some Thoughts on Metaphor in Cognitive Psychology and Zubiri,s Sentient Intelligence”, The Xavier Zubiri Review ,Vol.9, “The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America”, Washington D.C. ESPINOSA LOLAS, Ricardo. 2004. “Realidad Y Tiempo”, in The Xavier Zubiri Review,vol.6, edited by “The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America”, Washington D.C. FERRAZ FAYOS, A. 1993. “El espacio en la metafísica de Zubiri”, in Cosmología: Física, Filosofía, Religión, Editorial Ayuntamiento de Pozuelo de Alarcón (Madrid) / Patronato Municipal de Cultura / Amigos de la Cultura Científica. FERRAZ FAYOS, A. 2005. “Filosofía, ciencia y realidad: apuntes zubirianos”; The Xavier Zubiri Review, Vol.7, 2005. FODOR J.A., PHYSYLYN, Z.W. 1981. “How Direct is Perception?: Some reflections on Gibson’s “Ecological Approach”, en Cognition 9 (139-196), ed. by Elsevier Sequoia S.A., Lausanne (Netherlands). FOWLER, Thomas. 2005. “Reality in Science and Reality in Philosophy: Importance of the concept of Reality by Postulation; The Xavier Zubiri Review, Vol.7, 2005. GARCÍA, Juan José. 2006. “Realidad y Cosa-Sentido en la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri”, en The Xavier Zubiri Review,vol.6, edited by “The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America”, Washington D.C. GIBSON, Eleanor, J. 1970. “El Desarrollo de la Percepción como un Proceso Adaptativo”, Trans. Mario Carretero, in Lecturas de Psicología del Niño, Compilation of Juan Delval, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1978. GIBSON, J.J. and GIBSON, Eleanor J. 1955-a. “Perceptual Learning: Differentiation or Enrichment?”, Psychological Review, Vol. 62, Nº1, Cornell University. GIBSON, J.J. and GIBSON, Eleanor J. 1955-b. “What is Learned in Perceptual Learning? A Reply to Professor Postman”,

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Psychological Review, Vol. 62, Nº6, Cornell University. GONZALEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Antonio. 1994. “La Tarea de la Filosofía”, cap.3 de “Un solo mundo. La relevancia de Zubiri para la teoría social”. Tesis doctoral. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid. GONZALEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Antonio. 2004. “Ereignis y actualidad”, en Desde Zubiri, Diego Gracia (editor); Editorial Comares, Granada. GONZALEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Antonio. 2008. “Las cosas”, en “Zubiri ante Heidegger”, editado por Juan Antonio Nicolás y Ricardo Espinoza (eds), Herder, Barcelona. -RACIA, Diego. 2005. “Ciencia y Filosofía”, in The Xavier Zubiri Review, vol.7, edited by “The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America”, Washington D.C. GRACIA, Diego. 2014. Zubiri, Treinta Años Después, Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, Año LXVINúmero 91-Curso Académico 2013-2014. GUEDÁN PÉCKER, V.L. 2001. “La noción de paradigma y su aplicación a la psicología”, en Pedro Chacón Fuertes (ed.), Filosofía de la Psicología, Ed. Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid. HEFT, Harry. 2001. Ecological Psychology in Context, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Mahwah, NJ. KUHN, Thomas S. 1957. La Revolución Copernicana, Ariel, Barcelona, 1996. LOSADA LABRAÑA, Mario. 2009. “La concepción del conocimiento científico en Naturaleza, Historia, Dios: la interpretación ontológica del principio de indeterminación de Heisemberg”, en Zubiri desde el siglo XXI, Antonio Pintor-Ramos (Coord.), Publicaciones Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Salamanca. MAZÓN, Manuel. 1999. Enfrentamiento y Actualidad. La Inteligencia en la Filosofía de Xavier Zubiri, Estudios 74, Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid. MICHAELS, Claire F and CARELLO, Claudia. 1981. Direct Perception; PrenticeHall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632.

MONSERRAT, Javier. 1976. «El realismo zubiriano en el conjunto de una teoría crítico-fundamental de la ciencia», en, Realitas. II, 1974-1975. Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones. Ed. Labor. Madrid, pp. 139-202. MONSERRAT, Javier. 1998. La Percepción Visual. La arquitectura del psiquismo desde el enfoque de la percepción visual, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid. MONSERRAT, Javier.2001. “Engramas neuronales y teoría de la mente”, en Pensamiento, Vol. 57, Nº 218, pags. 177211. MONSERRAT, Javier. 2005. “La conexión fundamental de Zubiri con las ciencias humanas” in The Xavier Zubiri Review, vol.7, edited by “The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America”, Washington D.C. MONSERRAT, Javier.2007. “Zubiri desde la Ciencia Cognitiva”, en Nicolás, J.A., Samour, H. (edtrs.), Historia, Ética y Ciencia. El Impulso Crítico de la Filosofía de Zubiri”, Ed. Comares, Granada. NAKAYAMA, Ken. 1994. “James J. Gibson-An Appreciation”, Psychological Review, vol.101, Nº 2, 329-335. PELEGRINA CETRÁN, Héctor, 2006. Fundamentos Antropológicos de la Psicopatología, Edcs. Polifemo, Madrid. PINTOR-RAMOS, Antonio. 1993. “El Sentido en Zubiri”, en Antonio PintorRamos, “Realidad y Sentido. Desde una inspiración zubiriana”, Publicaciones Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Salamanca. PINTOR-RAMOS, Antonio. 1996. “Zubiri (1898-1983)”, Ediciones del Orto, Madrid. PUERTA GONZÁLEZ-QUEVEDO, Alfonso de la. 2005. Lectura de J.J. Gibson desde la Antropología Básica de Zubiri. Primeros Materiales de Investigación, trabajo de investigación para el D.E.A. (Diploma de Estudios Avanzados), presented in la Universidad Pontificia Comillas, in Madrid, June 2005. TURVEY, M.T., SHAW, R.E., REED, E.S. &MACE, W.M. 1981. “Ecological laws

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of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn”, en Cognition, 9, 237-304. ZUBIRI, Xavier. 1979. RR (“Respectividad de lo Real”), en EM (“Escritos Meno-

res (1953-1983)), Alianza EditorialFundación Xavier Zubiri, Madrid, 2006.

Notes 1

This article has deliberately many words in italics. At least once in the text expressions appears in italics that in the work of Gibson or of Zubiri have special significance, either by the strong condensation of meaning, for the importance of it, or to make clear important distinctions.

2

See Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981 or Nakayama, 1994.

3

The terms "projective or transmitting logic", " field simultaneity" or “constructivist journey” have been invented by me, in the sense that I have created them here, from my analysis of Gibson from Zubiri standpoint, ignoring if such expressions have ever come to the mind of anyone in these contexts, or if they have already been used by others (which could have happened, but it is not something that I know of, even if it were something well known in general). I am therefore responsible for its introduction here. term constructivism in psychology of perception denotes those theories in which the final product of our perception is constructed on the basis of stimuli originating from the outside in our mind. This term holds a very different meaning in Zubiri and in other contexts.

repeated endlessly for centuries among philosophers and psychologists 7

See for a grounding of metaphor in cognitive sciences, in cognition in general, and in the thinking of Zubiri, Cope 2007.

8

In note 12 are additional references about ecological optics, and in our last long section, before the conclusion, by the second third of this writing, "The pickup of information ..." on the pickup information theory.

9

The medium (aerial for us…) in Gibson, together with substances, form the environment, and seem to be separated by surfaces. They are ecological.

10

We deal with the concept of invariants in note 14.

11

The pickup information theory, central in Gibson’s theory, will account for this, which we are only mentioning briefly here. In the second half of this article, we discuss in some detail this nuclear and controversial point about Gibson´s theory from Zubiri standpoint—the direct pickup of optical invariant structure.

12

The ecological perspective is central to Gibson’s proposal. Introduced in his second book, SCPS, he made further developments in his last one, EAVP. Gibson acknowledges that it was nonexistent at the time that he created, but he considered it essential for his new theory. He is aware that, for now, he can only guess at its main lines. It is very different from the classical optics of physical science. It is in line with its ecological approach. And he says it will be interdisciplinary, and made of contributions from physical optics, lighting engineering, ecology and descriptive geometry. Instead of dealing with radiant light, it will deal with ambient light, which we discussed. There will be very important concepts in it, like ambient optic array, optical structure, optical invariant structure, and its culminating concept, the affordances (which we see in tune with the concept of habitude and meaning-thing in Zubiri). In our thesis, we study a first consideration of light, from

4The

5

PVW: see bibliography

6

In parallel, we note that criticism of the opposite view, the Establishment, such as Fodor and Pylyshyn, represented in their article in 1981 (see bibliography), said on pg. 194: “Missing the point about inference, missing the point about mental representations, and missing the point about intentionality are thus all aspects of missing the same point.” (see note 44). We think, as do the disciples of Gibson, expressed in their article written in reply to the previous one of Fodor & Pylyshyn (Turvey, M.T., Shaw, R.E., Reed, E.S., Mace, W.M., 1981), in the final Postscript, that the controversy between defenders of ecological psychology and the article by Fodor and Pylyshyn representing the Establishment, is to be positioned in an argument

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Gibson’s ecological optics. This is in keeping with the theme of ecological approach, and with the ulterior access to the categories of science at the level of reason. In the case of light, access to radiant light as energy, and its electromagnetic waves, photons, etc. As ambient light is taken with reference to an organism; however the radiant light is taken with reference to the universe. (SCPS, p. 13). 13

We will discuss later, toward the end, how these statements have much in tune with the whole trilogy of Zubiri on the sentient intelligence (see bibliography: IRE, IL, IRA)

14

Gibson tells us that: “The theory of the concurrent awareness of persistence and change requires the assumption of invariants that underlie change of the optic array.” (EAVP, pg. 310). He postulates various kinds of invariants: “those that underlie change of illumination, those that underlie change of the point of observation, those that underlie overlapping samples, and those that underlie a local disturbance of structure” (EAVP, pg. 310). The theory of extracting invariants by a visual system plays the role, Gibson recalls, of the theories of “constancy”. To illustrate, we point out some of these invariants within the different types; for example, the edge of the nose, or the horizon, would be invariants in line with the mutuality between the observer and the environment. The horizon, for example, is an invariant of all optical distributions and from all observation points; it is that to which all the optical movements refer. It is neither objective nor subjective.

15

To read this letter, in general, the best and most convenient, it is a certain familiarity with Zubiri, in addition to Gibson. To a first approximation to Gibson, we recommend the website of the Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action (CESPA) belonging to the University of Connecticut, in the US, where there are still some who were direct disciples of Gibson. For Zubiri we recommend the introductions of the website The Zubiri Foundation of North America, either in English or Spanish. Here one can find the online magazine The Zubiri Review. Of course, if the language of our author is mastered, the Spanish website is recommended, www.zubiri.net, for those able to take advantage of the joint use of both sites. In this article we have the current limitations, so

mostly we point to lines of convergence, but also we examine analytically in detail, to some extent, some points of special interest. In general we talk about hypotheses. 16

See also, Harry Heft, 2001, pgs. xxii and xiii of the Introduction, among others. Besides, the author has the power to note that one of the great problems of modern psychology of the scientific field is an inadequate philosophical heritage that permeates many of their historical developments: basically a metaphysics of Cartesian origin, and a physics of Newtonian origin, and, in general, a philosophy designed to natural things, not for humans, their psychology, their behavior. This is in line with the doctoral thesis that we are developing (Critical Foundations from Zubiri standpoint- of JJ Gibson´s ecological approach to psychology of perception) in which one of the hypotheses to study is the decisive non empirical component (philosophical) in theories of perception, both the ones criticized by Gibson, or the contemporary theories, we would say. Of course, decisive in Gibson: hence our research. In this line (what a coincidence!), Harry Heft argues that the intellectual roots of Gibson, being many, are one of the most important in William James, whose radical empiricism has been seen in line with the so-called "new realists". Edwin B. Holt, who decisively influenced Gibson, is one of them and, according to Harry Heft, through which the influence of William James came to Gibson. Zubiri was also interested in William James, whose pages The Stream of Thought, chapter nine of his Principles of Psychology, described as memorable, and the author as genial. We guess there is a great harmony in the characterization done by Zubiri in HRI of our "being fluent in reality", with the stream of thought of William James, as described by Harry Heft. And this coincidence commented by Zubiri in HRI is what has made us better understand the distinction, central to his philosophy, between content and formality of reality. Our apprehension flows from one content to another, "in reality", in the field of reality. Different contents are flowing, but all are part of the same formality of reality. Our hyperformalized neurophysiological structures, formalize all our apprehensions with the formality of reality. Hence, in Zubiri, the field will be considered as a means of intellection

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(or intellective sensing); that is, considered as a means of perception. This will bring important consequences. You can also see the strong epistemological tensions in the study of perception and cognitive sciences in general in Monserrat, Javier, 1998, pgs. 41, 46, 79 and 105, among others (see bibliography). 17

We gave an exposition of the first hypothesis in the initial lines of our introduction.

18

This statement should be qualified. We follow here our convictions, influenced by Harry Heft, 2001, who in his pages. 114-119, and 169-171, adequately clarifies the issue. In the US the influence of the phenomenological tradition in psychology often had mentalist connotations. Gibson was identified, though openly and critically, in the behavioral and positivist tradition, namely William James line, which made him reject anything with those mentalist connotations. It was through the disciple of William James, Edwin B. Holt, that Gibson received this influence, although Gibson then drank directly from James´s Principles of Psychology, and there is no evidence that he was familiar with many of James’s writings other than the aforementioned. More inclined to the source of W. James than to the Gestalt, from which, however, he received a strong influence (Koffka, Heider), we could say that the phenomenological method of Gibson would come closer to the way of Merleau Ponty or Heidegger, than to the Husserlian line, which he did not get to know. Also Langfeld, influenced by Carl Stumpf, student of Brentano, and Robert MacLeod, influenced by David Katz, of experimentalist phenomenologists line, lefttheir mark on Gibson in his formative years. Harry Heft concludes that there is a clear use of phenomenological ideas in Gibson, in his first phase, hence the search for conceptual frameworks derived from that experience, and to contrast hypotheses experimentally. This would make of Gibson someone away from classical behaviorism, rather an experimentalist phenomenologist, hardly with philosophical prejudices. For us this lands on the ecological approach. This, in turn, puts him in Zubirian terms, in line with the ulteriority of scientific categorization at the level of reason, beyond the first phenomenological level of perception at the level of logos that involves primordial apprehension.

19

For Zubiri all space, whether physical or geometrical, is to be ultimately referred to real space and to be inscribed in it and not vice versa. Space is grounded in spaciousness as a real property of things, sensed in primordial apprehension. Physical space and geometrical space are situated on the level of scientific reason and therefore lie in a status lying beyond with respect to real space, which is always something sensed.

20

Ulterior is the expression used by Zubiri.

21

See Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981, Nakayama, 1994.

22In

intimate connection the theme of being, the presence of the real in the world, prior to its presence in intellection, and the complex theme of the entification of reality and its related logification of knowing, are very important, but we cannot enter into these matters here. Suffice it to say here that the expression of the latter in psychology would be the duality sensation-perception.

23

Noergic is a philosophical neologism of Zubiri that comes from melting two Greek terms: nous (intelligence) with ergon (activity, work, energy ... it's something physical, and this is the meaning given by Zubiri).

24

Intellective in Zubiri means that it apprehends reality.

25

Physical in accordance with its meaning in ancient philosophy, not what it means in modern science. See General Note in SE.

26

The Spanish term used by Zubiri is actuidad.

27

We could say that “the actualizations of the condition of being an act are ulterior with respect to the actualizations of actuality”.

28

As the phrase could lead to confusion, we clarify: actualization is a sustantivation of the verb to actualize; actuality is the noun.

29

Gibson distinguishes between stimulus energy and stimulus information. This is about, in the first case, the stimulus categorized as energy according to the magnitudes of physical science, and in the second, of its dimension of ecological information that directly the animal captures , and therefore is defined with reference to the animal , ie, the "ecological" level, according to the ecological principle of mutuality between the animal and its environment. The latter is explicitly defined by Gibson in his third book, EAVP, pg. 8.

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30

We deal specifically with primordial apprehension in the last third of our writing, letting Zubiri to speak by himself in the quoted passages corresponding to footnotes 91 and 94.

31

Gestalt psychology greatly influenced Gibson, though he criticized it decisively and superceded it. Gestalt psychology was also known to Zubiri.

32

Edelman, G. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind. NY: Basic Books, p.14, cited by Cope, Theo, The Xavier Zubiri Review, Vol. 9, 2007, pp.133-154. It would be consistent with the words of Edelman to say that they contradict the view of Fodor and Pylyshyn who strongly conclude that “there will not be Gibsonian revolution in cognitive science”. We can say after reading his lengthy article, that Fodor and Pylyshyn, of the Establishment of cognitive science at that time, 1981, would be among the cognitive scientists disavowed by Edelman, and precisely because of their unchallenged philosophical assumptions. That is, it would not be inconsistent with the words of the great neurologist, considering that there remains the challenge of Gibson and his followers of ecological psychology to the dominant Establishment of cognitive science, and also there remains the challenge of radical empiricism of William James, which is not far removed in time, not to mention other themes from across the Atlantic, such as phenomenologically inspired currents, among which we would include Zubiri. According to Monserrat 1998, or the 17th International Conference on Perception and Action (ICPA) Estoril, Portugal, 2013; or the 13th European Workshop on Ecological Psychology (EWEP), Queen s University, Northern Ireland, 2014), the challenge remains to the latter and present Establishment in cognitive science. For all the cited authors and currents, in our view, directly conflict with the positions of Establishment, narrated by Fodor and Pylyshyn. The consistency of this challenge means that it is not inconsistent—so to speak—to continue considering Gibson, at least, a prelude of that revolution. Diego Gracia, Director of The Zubiri Foundation in Madrid, in “Zubiri, Thirty Years Later”, explores the intellectual fashions and factors that make an author to pass or not into history. And he gets particularly acute at the

phenomenon of revolutionary authors, breaking paradigms, as happens in the history of science, as Thomas F Kuhn analyzed. There he analyzes the complexity of the above factors and concludes that in the case of authors breaking the regular molds of interpretation, time is required. An author may be fashionable in life and not go down in history, and vice versa. Those who eschew fashion go down in history and become classics. Fashions do not pose serious interpretation problems, the classics continuously do it. So we continue to learn from them. Our conviction is that both Gibson, as Zubiri are destined to become classics, each in its field. We do not have the same conviction about Fodor and Pylyshyn. For the application of Kuhn’s concept of paradigm to psychology: Guedán Pécker, V.L. 2001. 33

That was their final statement of their (1981) Ecological Laws of Perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn (see bibliography).

34

Despite the fact that the following point is not important here, because it depends on intellectual references of each cultural context and of each author, let´s say that we do not characterize said major controversy in the same way Gibson’s disciples -authors of the mentioned writing- do, although there are similarities. For example, we would not describe as arrogant Kantian positions, whether explicit or not their roots are, although we also disagree with them.

35

For Zubiri intellective means apprehending reality itself. What is apprehended stays in the sentient with a particular formality, which is, in the human animal, formality of reality; however, in the mere animal, what is apprehended stays with a formality of mere stimulus; that is, as a mere “sign” of tonic modification and response. Being real is to be de suyo or in its own right, absolutely independent of the capturer, and anything else. This is possible because of the hyperformalized structures of the human animal, especially the nervous system. This being in its own right begins in the apprehension itself, but continues beyond apprehension, “in the world”. See later in this paper the example of Eddington’s two tables concerning “reality on the surface” and “reality in depth.”

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Zubiri explains that the logification of intellection makes the logos the fundamental mode of intellection. This entails that being is the fundamental mode of reality, that reality is entity; this is the entification of reality. But what one need to do is to “intelligize” the logos; and to reify being. For the fundamental mode of intellection is not the logos but sentient intellection in primordial apprehension of reality; and reality is not a mode of being, rather the reverse, being is a mode of reality. The logos is an ulterior mode of intellection and being is a ulterior mode of reality. Logification of intellection and entification of reality were from Parmenides onwards the two major assumptions of Greek philosophy, and they have dominated the entire western philosophical traditition up to Husserl and Heidegger. All this has had and has huge consequences, including conceptualism and idealism, secular evils of philosophy. In the present problem this immediately translates as the difference between sensation and perception. Or that time (all perception has its spatial dimensions and occurs over time) is something that, according to Zubiri, directly affects being, not reality; besides having more to do with the perceiver than with the perceived. And yet, it seems that William James, who inspired Gibson, has some concepts of sensation and perception that do not fall into the classic problems that almost all positions fell (Harry Heft, 2001, pgs.156-158). Nor does Gibson fall into the problems we denounce, as he is clear about the problems of postures representing “the operations of the mind on the delivery of the senses”, as explained.

this is where, in our view, the conceptualization of Zubiri, including recurrences and simple apprehensions, would be useful, qualifying coherently, to what Gibson left without sufficient explanation or elaboration.

36

37

EAVP, pg. 61.

38

Harry Heft, 2001, pgs. 351-352.

39

The two mentalities, of course, are not the ones of Gibson and Zubiri, as both are on the same side, but that of the group of which we consider them outstanding exponents, and that represented by Fodor and Pylyshyn, which they call the Establishment, in the specific field of cognitive science. The core of discrepancy, which in turn involves several points, we could say that is if perception is direct or indirect. The pickup information theory is, therefore, something unavoidable in keeping with the directness of perception, and so things, the direct pickup of invariants of optical structure is itself necessary, in Gibson’s view, to give account for the phenomena known as perceptual constancy. But

40

This expression is the one the authors used to position themselves in an exercise not lacking irony, given that the Kühnian background of “scientific revolutions” is guessed. Gibson himself said that his ecological approach to perception also aims to be a new approach to psychology. Coinciding with Zubiri Gibson in many of the general assumptions on which they rest -although both authors apparently didn’t get to know each other- it is not for surprise the astonishing coincidence between them, and that we are determined to rescue Gibson from the margins (Harry Heft, 2001, inspired us this expression) through its critical foundation from the powerful and solvent philosophy of Zubiri.

41

See Harry Heft, 2001, especially chapters 1 and 2. And on pg. 73 says: “The collective effort of the six philosophers who identified themselves as The New Realists can be seen mostly as an attempt to defend and expand James’s radical empiricism and explore some of its implications.” Edwin B. Holt was one of them.

42

Javier San Martín Sala points out in his article “Psychology and Phenomenology” that intentionality of most of cognitive science is anchored on its representationism. This author echoes the debate that occurred in the United States in the 70s and 80s about the two ways of interpreting Husserl: a Husserl who is a representationist theorist (which influence cognitive science), and a Husserl of experience (which influence Merleau Ponty and Heidegger), and where there are no representations.

43

Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981, pg. 194. (See note 4 pg. 2). The sentences of both notes condensed nuclear aspects of both opposing positions.

44

We hope that this word does not confuse those who are not familiar with certain philosophical language. For to say that perception, ultimately, is direct, is said in a language that might suggest that, first, is indirect, which, all in all, sounds like nonsense. Perhaps this is better understood saying that

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it is, at its root, direct. As explained below, what happens is that, ulteriorly, a duality is given in perception, duality that has a direct root. This ulteriority is not temporary, but concerns foundations. The basis or root is direct, although the direct nature involves a duality. We explain in detail below. 45

We know of no better philosophy, having the strength and creditworthiness of the philosophy of Zubiri, not only for the problem at hand, but for the great problems of human beings and contemporary culture.

46

See the home page of The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America (http:www.zubiri.org). The Spanish Word used by Zubiri is ficto, the term for the mental entity of a fiction or creation, as percept is the term for the mental entity of a perception. The closest word in English could be notional.

47

The word used by Zubiri in Spanish is noología, kind of philosophical neologism, coming from the Greek nous, which means intelligence.

48

HRI, pp. 65-66 (Spanish original: to my knowledge there is no translation into English of HRI yet). Moreover, the scope of the irreal, which in its most definitive version by in IL consist of percepts, ficta and concepts (the simple apprehensions) as herein mentioned, and comes from the irrealization of the content of what is apprehended in primordial apprehension in a retracting movement, while retaining the moment of formality of reality.

49

50

Of course, the above is not a truism, nor a simple game of words, but, in our view, an invaluable conceptualization which is a product of a thorough analysis, such as those of Zubiri. This is in contrast to many analyses in which reality is “a zone of things” (González, Antonio, 1994) not included in perception. In them the perceptive act lacks unity, e.g. those of the Establishment of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s article, or theories criticized by Gibson, based on sensation, or those of constructivists from the field of scientific psychology, or scientific or philosophical theories with a Kantian matrix, either expressed or implied. We refer to HRI.

51

HRI pp. 155-156. We have to clarify, to avoid susceptibilities of Zubiri´s connoisseurs, we are following in this article more the book HRI than IL, as it seems to us, for the problem at hand, the most enlightening book. Although, actually, as Jesus Conill warns us in the Introduction, the meaning of experience Zubiri offered in this book is not exactly the same as the one in IRA, or SH. But also he remembers Mary Riaza, who, in the following publications considered this book “a treaty of experience”, and this course as the most appropriate place to reconstruct a theory of experience in Zubiri: Riaza, María, “Una línea de experiencia que pasa por Kant”, in Realitas I, 1974, pp. 399-436, and “Sobre la experiencia en Zubiri”, Realitas II (1974-75) 1976, pp.245-312 . Cited by Jesus Conill, pg. x of the Presentation of HRI.

52

The Spanish word used by Zubiri is percatarse, which, etymologically, has exactly the same Latin root than per-captare (actually, the Spanish expressions percatarse and percepción come from the Latin per-captare).

53

This note is ours. Later on we explain that sameness can be considered from the individual point of view that is the sameness of who, relative to the percept, or the sameness of what, from the point of view of the notes, relative to the concept (HRI, pgs. 178 and 179). We will see that this has everything to do with Gibson´s theory of invariants.

54

HRI pg. 167.

55

Remember this is our particular translation of a neologism created by Z to design that which corresponds to a fiction: ficto (the term used by Z); we have percept translating percepto, concept translating concepto; so we decided to translate ficto by fict.

56

Gibson J.J. and Gibson Eleanor J., 1955a , and Gibson J.J. and Gibson Eleanor J., 1955b.

57

Despite important differences—and there are many—any reader of issues of perception knows the figure-ground duality of Gestalt psychology. This is given as a reference to know what Zubiri is talking about here.

58

Zubiri says that the respectivity (in respect to which we consider one thing, depending on what, etc.) is a deeper stratum than the simple relationship, to the point that it predates the related things, and grounds them. The

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issue is complex and we can find it in Respectividad de lo Real in EM. 59

60

The translation into Spanish of is here would be está, not es. Perhaps the sentence could have been expressed using the verb to stay, instead of to be. In Spanish, we distinguish between ser and estar, a difficult task for a beginner studying Spanish: both are translated by the verb to be. In Zubiri the difference between ser and estar yields a very important philosophical meaning which has much to do with our investigation, because in Western philosophy there was no important difference between being (ser) and reality (which in Zubiri’s philosophy is often “represented” by the word estar). Actually, most times, instead of “reality” the term used was being. For Zubiri there is something beyond being which is more radical. The ultimate is reality, not being. Being is only a mode of reality, not viceversa, as in the Western tradition. That was called by Zubiri the entification of reality, which entailed its congeneric logification of intellection: because logos is not, for Z, the radical mode of intellection: the primordial apprehension of reality is instead. In psychology, as we have stated repeatedly in this work, this historical problem of the Western tradition has appeared in the form of the distinction between sensation and perception. As we have mentioned before, and will explain later on, the huge historical problem of entification of reality and logification of intellection is one of the main problems visited on the Western tradition by the separation of sensing and intellection in the human contact with reality. Gibson’s theories, as we have shown in previous chapters, are in tune with all this, in his way. Among other things, worth, because Gibson is directly inspired by him in his revolutionary conception of the senses considered as perceptual systems (a revolution in tune with Zubiri; the authors did not know each other, but they had something important in common: the underlying truth, a genius to reveal it, and courage to proclaim it against the prevailing theories). Gibson’s theory is the necessary conception consistent with his ecological approach to direct perception. In turn, attunement to the sentient intelligence (or intellective sensing) of Zubiri is important, as shown here, and generally, in this article.

Of course, not everything matches, because the wordy analysis of Zubiri we believe is unprecedented, and therefore, we could find important and not negligible differences, as in fact we do, which in certain contexts are important. But here we look at the lines of convergence. 61

Gibson quotes the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, who wrote this in 1785, in SCPS p.1.

62

We could characterize the philosophy of Zubiri, roughly, as a phenomenological realism.

63

In order to give orienting references let us put this in connection with, for example, the Gestalt figure-ground phenomenon.

64

Here respectivities is the noun in plural derived from respect, as in respect to, for example. One thing is considered X in respect to other thing.

65

IRE, pp. 36-37.

66

HRI, p. 168.

67

HRI, p. 169.

68

We are thinking here about the subject of being, that for Zubiri, is the actuality of the real in the world. That is, reality may and does have many respectivities or actualities; the actuality in the sentient intelligence is just one of them.

69

It is an expression of Harry Heft, 2001, p. xxiv of the Introduction.

70

Clarification for Gibsonians: The enrichment of the content, while maintaining the same formality of reality (thus, as it were, without losing the primordial apprehension of reality, which is at all times the demanding referent of the simple apprehensions realizing it) has nothing to do with the enrichment of a poor input to which Gibson and his tradition criticize and oppose. They do so because the latter would be qualified by Zubiri as conceiving intelligence: it starts from a duality and from an indirect perception mediated by mental representations. However, in Zubiri, this enrichment is only of the content, it belongs to a sentient intelligence frame, and starts from a unitary and direct perceptive act; and is a presentation and not a representation. Nevertheless, primordial apprehension, direct and unitary at its root, is ulteriorly split into a de-

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ployment where we can see the duality of the logos. 71

SCPS, pp. 21 and 22, paragraph The World of Physics and the Sources of Stimulation. Furthermore, this issue is directly related to the ecological approach. Gibson always said that it is the level where you have to start ... because it is the level of the animal ... the reality being structured at all levels ... these are embedded (nested like Russian dolls) one into each other. Please continue now seeing how these levels—in which the environment and reality are structured—are the appropriate framework to use with Zubiri, as one of these levels, the one of the world, to which we access going from apprehension of logos, the level where perception occurs. It is worth noting that Gibson joined the General Systems Theory explicitly. We think that the philosophy of Zubiri, in general, is in tune with it; especially through his concepts of system and structure.

72

Eddington was a physicist, famous for spreading the theories of Einstein in England, who in 1929 published a book that had great impact, The Nature of the Physical World. Insurmountable differences were evident between the world described by physical science, and the one we see in our daily lives. Gibson echoes this controversy, since it has everything to do with his positions, and very specifically with the issue of the ecological approach.

73

IRE, pg.177 (Spanish Version; English Version pp. 64-65).

74

IRE, pp.177-178. What we have described formerly as constructivist travel, regarding theories that Gibson criticizes, seems something very similar to what Zubiri describes here by saying that it starts from the real things in the area beyond perception, and the rest is quartered in the area of the subjective.

75

HRI, pp. 171-176.

76

IRE, pp. 176-177.

77

Michaels, Claire F. and Carello, Claudia, 1981, pgs. 168 and 169 (see bibliography). They are quoting Wigner, E.P. In W. Moore & M Scriven (Eds.) Symmetries and Reflections: Scientific Essays in Honor of Eugene P. Wigner. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970. The book Direct Perception, from the mentioned

authors, looks to be a compendium of reference today in Ecological Psychology. It can be found in the world wide web, on the website of the Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action (CESPA) of the University of Connecticut. 78

Michaels, Claire F. and Carello, Claudia, 1981, pg.177.

79

IRE, pg.267 (English version, pg. 97).

80

For example, in IRA, pg.159 (Spanish version); English version, p. 299.

81

Impressively means, according to Zubiri, sentiently, through our senses, but not conceptualized in the classical manner, but as intellective sensing. By being senses they capture through sensitive impression, by being intellective they capture the stimuli as real, ie as de suyo or “in their own right”; which means, absolutely independently of the capturer, and of everything else. It is a sentient intelligence, not just sensible. This means, in line with Gibson (senses considered as perceptual systems, and knowledge as an extension of perception) having structurally three stages: in addition to the moment of affection—state of being affected, not as a feeling or emotion—a moment of otherness, and a moment of force of imposition. Zubiri insists that philosophy has overlooked impression, and was fixed almost exclusively on affection (in line with projective logic), neglecting the moments of otherness and force of imposition almost completely. The otherness was for the mind (“the operations of the mind on the delivery of the senses”), with the consequent problems regarding intentionality, or the correspondence between the mind and that otherness.

82

IRE pp. 64 and 65 (Spanish Version), English version, p. 26.

83

We do not translate de Spanish expression de suyo, but it is equivalent to en propio, which we do translate (following the main translators of Zubiri into English—Nelson Orringer, Thomas B. Fowler, etc.—by in its own right.

84

Is it right to have included in the world, both the wavelengths, etc., as well as the rods and cones of the retina and the occipital region of the brain In fact, all things considered, if reality is not a zone of things, and if “it begins in the apprehension”, which is also reality

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par excellence, and the world is reality in depth, which is beyond apprehension. But also, in respect to the apprehension, in this case corresponding to the color of the table, it turns out that this “beyond” in respect to color is both electromagnetic waves and photons, as well as rods and cones of the retina and the occipital region of the brain. 85

IRA, pp. 253-254 (Spanish version), English version, p. 332.

86

Indeed, as Neisser (1978) pointed out some time ago, the identification of stimulus invariants is “the largest outstanding promissory note in ecological optics” (p.24). This statement remains only slightly less true today.

87

In HRI, Zubiri speaks of integration. In IL, the second volume of the trilogy, he speaks of realization. Percepts, ficta and concepts come from the irrealization of the content of primordial apprehension. It is what Zubiri called, in HRI, the forging of the irreal.

88

Gibson quotes himself: Gibson J.J. “The problem of temporal order is stimulation and perception”, Journal of Psychology 62, 141149.

89

EAVP, pg. 254.

90

Something very important in the philosophy of Zubiri is the distinction in each real thing (most of which are surrounding us humans) of its dimension of reality-thing and its dimension of meaning-thing. Zubiri gives the example of a table. We never perceive a table as such, but the physical materiality of its notes, either wood or whatever material. To be a table is the dimension of meaning-thing, which would go mounted, so to speak, on its most radical dimension of reality-thing. For Zubiri, the meaning-thing is a constructed function of our lives, particularly our being (our personality), with the reality of the table, namely the reality-thing. We have, in that way, the reality of the table. Antonio Gonzalez points out in “Las cosas” (González Fernández, Antonio, 2008) that a significant virtuality of the philosophy of Zubiri, which distinguishes him from all phenomenological currents, is that it does not stay in the mere sense, but comes even to what is most radical, that is reality. And this has big consequences. This is also, in its conceptualization, an old problem that Gibson dealt with and was already treated by the Gestalt. We

remember in EAVP, pp. 138-140, a reflection on this problem around a mailbox. It is the problem of meaning and values of things, that Gibson argues that we perceive directly, as they would be placed on the affordances of things, which are specified in ambient light. Given the dualism of the phenomenal mail and the physical mail of Koffka, Gibson concluded: “I prefer to say that the real postbox (the only one) affords letter-mailing to a letter-writing human in a community with a postal system”. Just note here that our hypothesis is that the concepts of Zubiri that are closer to, or have to do closely with, the affordances of Gibson are be meaning-thing and habitude. But we cannot here go in depth in the confrontation of the positions of our authors on this point. Our first impression is that, although there would be differences, their conceptualizations on this point, in line with their general positions, which together are of great harmony and affinity, would not be a striking exception to that affinity. 91

SH, pg. 542.

92

EAVP, pg. 225.

93

In his philosophy, Zubiri replaces, consistent with all his positions, the old concept of substance by the concept of substantivity. The substance is a sub-jectum, subject of ininherent properties. Substantivity is a structural system of co-herent notes or properties, where each property or note is note-of-all others. There is an “in” and an “ex” which could be translated as inner and outer. The “in” is structurally reflected (structure) on the “ex”. But according to this, sentient intelligence is a systemic property of the whole substantivity, not subjacent, but in any case super-shelf. This is in line with, not a “projective logic” (as it would be the case of substance), but with a logic of “field simultaneity”.

94

EAVP pg. 239.

95

EAVP pg. 247.

96

EAVP pg. 256.

97

EAVP pg. 258.

98

EAVP pg. 263.

99

Obviously, this statement is our interpretation, standing on what was said here by Gibson, but from a view of the whole of his work. Gibson did not speak clearly of some-

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thing like a primordial apprehension as Zubiri did, nor develop anything like logos and reason as Zubiri did, as we have repeatedly pointed out. Having his stubborn defense of direct perception in the background of our mind, against theories of perception defending that we perceive through mental images, we think that statements like the one upon which we are commenting, “are consistent with” or “suggest” something similar to the primordial apprehension of Zubiri. Moreover, the meaning of knowing in Zubiri is very accurate, as an ulterior mode of intellection ultimately anchored in the primordial apprehension. In Gibson, the meaning of knowing does not seem as precise as in Zubiri. Anyway, Gibson explicitly admits that “The ecological theory of direct perception cannot stand by itself. It implies a new theory of cognition in general”. We do think Zubiri has developed a philosophy which, among many other things, self-gives something that could be considered the grounds of a new theory of cognition in general. That is why we try to give critical foundation and support to Gibson through Zubiri. We believe that Gibson’s theory has enough strength to

stand by itself, but Zubiri’s support makes it patent. Hypothesis: is it the truth that underlies both by low? 101 Obviously, we think that this theory already exists. It is over a thousand pages of the trilogy of Zubiri on the sentient intelligence, with its three volumes: Intelligence and Reality, Intelligence and Logos, Intelligence and Reason (see bibliography). This is the subject of our interest and the subject of our doctoral thesis: Critical Foundation—from Zubiri’s standpoint—of J. J Gibson´s Ecological Approach to Psychology of Perception. 102 In addition to the above-specified, he mentions and analyzes the following ones in EAVP, pp. 251-253: Mental Operations on the Sensory Inputs, Semilogical Operations on the Sensory Inputs, Decoding Operations on the Sensory Inputs. 103 EAVP p. 253. 104 Or hardly ever? 100

Time in Zubiri is in intímate connection with being, but, as we said, we cannot enter here into this very important but complex and deep theme.

105

XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015

Book Reviews

Cristianismo y realidad. La credibilidad de Cristo en J. Montserrat y la novedad teológica en X. Zubiri. José M. Millás. Editado por el Pontificio Instituto Bíblico. Gregorian & Biblical Press 2014, Rome. Este texto de José M. Millás surge de la preparación de unas clases para la Facultad de Teología de la Universidad Gregoriana de Roma. Dirige su atención a la filosofía de la realidad de Zubiri y atiende a las premisas de que es insuficiente la justificación de la existencia de Dios y la fe cristiana en los modelos clásicos que conocemos. Por un lado, aparece la realidad y la credibilidad de Cristo en la filosofía de X. Zubiri y por otro lado, la idea en J. Montserrat de renovar el paradigma del pensamiento cristiano. Millás decide atender a una intuición según la cual en el pensamiento de J. Montserrat sí se hallarían los elementos fundamentales para esa justificación y credibilidad a las que antes aludía. El objeto principal de este libro es la fundamentación de la fe así como la contribución a la estructuración del pensamiento cristiano a fin de que pueda facilitar el desarrollo de una teología dogmática coherente y actual. La obra tiene dos partes. La primera titulada “Realidad y credibilidad” en la que el autor se centra en el concepto de realidad en el pensamiento de Zubiri y el pensamiento de Montserrat en cuanto a la renovación del paradigma cristiano que corresponda a la comprensión actual del mundo y del hombre. Aunque el mismo autor advierte que habrá que verse si todo ello posee una fuerza de convicción suficiente. Con lo cual queda bien planteada la cuestión desde el punto de vista del autor que responde de este modo al tema siempre espinoso del cambio de paradigma en el cristianismo. Un tema que han abordado muchos teólogos y filósofos. Después de muchos años intentando explicar ese cambio de paradigma todavía no me parece claro. En este punto de la reflexión el Dr. Millás no deja a Dios ni a Cristo fuera de ese hipotéticamente necesario cambio de paradigma y es muy de agradecer ya que en esos intentos de explicación hemos oído hablar muy serenamente a teólogos y otros pensadores en términos de una religión sin Dios, una espiritualidad sin fe y hasta de un cristianismo sin Cristo, que no digo Jesús histórico, sino Cristo, un Cristo tan poco cristiano que yo no puedo entender. La aceptación, la asunción, del carácter profundamente enigmático que tiene la religación como experiencia y como manifestación está presente en todo el libro. Se trata de una idea fundante en el pensamiento del autor y transita honestamente, sin que se fuerce su comprensión, todos y cada uno de los capítulos. La segunda parte titulada “Realidad y teología” sigue los pasos de PTHC, El problema teologal del hombre: Cristianismo de Zubiri, publicado en 1997. El autor cree que un planteamiento contemporáneo de la Trinidad tendría que ver con comprenderla en la realidad, en la vida, La centralidad de Cristo Jesús en la comprensión del Cristianismo así como la actualidad de este Cristo en la Iglesia son de una fuerza significativa al elaborar la idea de realidad en el seno de la reflexión teológica. En el último capítulo el profesor Millás entiende la realidad de la Iglesia anclada en la historia tanto de la Revelación como de la Tradición. Es fundamental para el autor mantener la historicidad inevitable, y en su comprensión inquebrantable, de la Iglesia hoy. Sin embargo, la historia no es lo más radical del Cristianismo sino el dar de si de Dios en la Historia de la Revelación; del mismo modo que Cristo es no sólo central sino la justa respuesta al enigma de la realidad.

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Cristianismo y realidad representa una significativa aportación a las revisiones y estudios de teología dogmática que se están realizando hoy. El rigor y la seriedad del profesor Millás en todos sus planteamientos son de indiscutible valor en las reflexiones teológicas y filosóficas contemporáneas. Dra. Nativitat Senserrich y Morata

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La actualidad de lo real en Zubiri: crítica a Husserl y Heidegger, José Alfonso Villa Sanchez, Plaza y Valdes, 2014, México D.F., 328 pp., 300 pesos. (Available from www.plazayvaldes.com). This fine book, by Professor José Alfonso Villa, is a great addition to the literature on Zubiri. As its title suggests, it is about the subject of actuality of the real in Zubiri’s philosophy. The author develops this subject in a very insightful manner, which enlightens many aspects of the subject. But the book also works to clarify the topic of actuality by comparing and contrasting Zubiri’s view of the subject with those of Husserl and Heiddeger, and other philosophers, principally Aristotle. As the author points out in the Introduction, Zubiri himself did not systematically develop the notion of actuality, though it appears throughout his mature philosophy. This book takes up that challenge, and does so in a very thorough and easy to read manner. It begins by showing how Zubiri transforms phenomenology into filosofía primera. It then discusses actuality and the philosophy of actuality in two chapters, and continues with a treatment of sentient intelligence in the context of actuality and Husserl’s philosophy. The remaining chapters cover actualization of the real, a dialog with Aristotle, actuality and being, and the transcendental order and being. The explanations and discussions in the book are quite clear and can be understood even by someone with minimal exposure to Zubiri. But they are sophisticated enough to appeal even to those who are experts. I highly recommend this book for all Zubiri libraries. Thomas B. Fowler

El estatuto biológico y ontológico del embrión humano, Francisco Güell, Bern: Peter Lang, 2013, 610pp, $137.95. This book is an investigation of the biological and ontological status of the human embryo, based on Zubiri’s philosophy. In particular, it utilizes his notions of essence and substantivity. It is an attempt to bridge the longstanding gap between the way that the sciences perceive the world, and the way that the humanities—and in particular philosophy—perceive the world. Zubiri himself of course always sought to do this; but the present book does so by focusing on a topic of particular interest today in bioethics. The book is divided into three principal parts: Part I is a detailed exposition of the principal notions of Zubiri’s philosophy, especially those in Sobre la esencia [On Essence]. The second part shifts to biology and gives a detailed explanation of the development of the human embryo from the standpoint of the biologist and physiologist. In the third part there is a precise description of biological reality intended for the purposes of ontological and ethical examination and reflection. The author believes—and no doubt Zubiri would concur—that there is a continuity between biological and philosophical investigation. In his conclusion, Prof. Güell notes that “the conclusions about the analysis of the substantive character of the embryo, about the constitutive sufficiency of the embrio and about the essentiality or constitutionality of the genetic and epigenetic material correspond to the precision which Zubiri bestows upon the meaning of “substantivity,”

The Xavier Zubiri Review 2013-2015

Book Reviews

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“constitutional sufficiency,” and “essence.” (p. 562) The point of the book is to demonstrate that a complete understanding of the genetic process of the human requires more than biology; it requires a grasp of philosophical concepts such as those provided by Zubiri. I recommend this book highly for all who are interested in biology, in Zubiri’s views of science, and in questions about the uniqueness of humans. Though long, it is a very worthwhile study.

The Xavier Zubiri Review 2013-2015

Call for papers… The Xavier Zubiri Review is soliciting papers for its 14th edition, which will be published in 2016. Papers dealing with any aspect of Zubiri’s philosophy or biography will be considered. Of special interest are papers that extend Zubiri’s thought to new areas, expound and solve problems in his philosophy, and deepen our understanding of key aspects of his philosophical system. All papers are reviewed by the Editorial Review Board, and authors may be asked to make changes or corrections. Papers may be in any language, though English and Spanish are preferred. Papers should be 10-20 pages in length, and should be submitted electronically if possible. This may be done by including a diskette along with the printed version of the paper, or by sending the paper electronically, as an e-mail attachment. Charts, diagrams, and photographs are acceptable, though photographs will only be printed in black-and-white. All papers accepted will be published on the Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America’s web site, www.zubiri.org, as well as in printed form. Papers must be received no later than 1 April 2016 to be considered for this issue. Authors should also include a brief biography and a photograph, or be prepared to supply them after acceptance of their paper for publication. We are also seeking Zubiri-related books to review. If you wish to have your book reviewed in these pages, or if you would like to serve as a book reviewer, please contact the editor at the address below, or send an e-mail message. Please send papers and books to review to: Editorial Board, Xavier Zubiri Review Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America 1571 44th Street, NW Washington, DC 20007 Address for electronic submission: [email protected]

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THE XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW a publication of The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America Volume 13 ISSN 1538-5795 2013-2015 ———————————————————————...

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